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AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD MARKETS IN CENTRAL AND  
EASTERN EUROPE: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
STEPHAN BROSIG, HEINRICH HOCKMANN
* 
 
Since the seminal work of Adam Smith, markets have been considered an effi-
cient tool for co-ordinating the behaviour of economic agents. The basic charac-
teristic of a market economy is that the complex system of interaction among 
individuals is not centrally coordinated. Under the assumption of profit and utility 
maximisation (and a whole set of assumptions about the institutional frame-
work), relative prices and their change over time provide the signals that guide, 
like an invisible hand, the allocation of resources, i.e., the structure of produc-
tion and the intensity of input use in the various production processes. They do 
this by co-ordinating the activities of economic agents, i.e., of resource owners, 
producers, intermediaries, traders, and consumers. 
After system change in the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) central economic planning had to be replaced by other forms of 
co-ordination. The general direction in all transition countries was towards a 
market economy, but the speed and depth of reforms towards an environment in 
which markets can evolve differed largely between countries, sectors and be-
tween different phases during the past 15 years. IAMO Forum 2005 focuses on 
this development and discusses the functioning of markets, the requirements for 
this, and the advantages and disadvantages of other co-ordination mechanisms 
under different environments in the agricultural and food sectors in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
CEE agri-food markets deserve researchers' and policy makers' attention for 
several reasons. Two of them regard the high demand for support to policy de-
cisions that aim to stimulate economic and social development in the region.  
In most CEE countries, the significance of the agricultural and food sector is 
relatively high with respect to income and employment. In particular, rural areas 
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can benefit from the development of this branch of the economy. Also, there is 
marked indication that agri-food markets in CEE are not ensuring exchange as 
frictionless as possible. This means that large benefits can be expected if poten-
tial improvements of the economic environment are implemented and if indi-
vidual agents adapt optimally to that environment. 
Another motivation for economic research on transition countries is that we are 
looking at a huge region that started almost as a vacuum with regard to institu-
tional settings. This means that a wide range of substantially different settings 
were introduced in the respective countries, and were only weakly confined by 
political rigidities or path dependencies. From a distant perspective, the repeated 
fundamental shifts in recent economic policies almost evoke the impression of a 
trial and error approach. The consequences of distinctively different options 
(across countries and periods) can be observed in a way almost similar to a labo-
ratory situation. Such unique opportunity has attracted economists, particularly 
those interested in institutional economics, to conduct research on CEE. How-
ever, this also means that the experiences made in CEEC can enhance the general 
understanding of what markets can do and what the limitations of market co-
ordination are. 
This volume contains selected contributions presented at IAMO Forum 2005 
and gives an overview of the major topics discussed there. 
Partial analyses of specific economic problems usually abstract from the general 
economic framework which is assumed to be more or less constant as expressed 
in ceteris paribus clauses. Oftentimes, the set of institutional conditions is even 
assumed to be sufficiently well-described by the framework used in neoclassical 
models. Particularly for transition countries, this has frequently led to spurious 
results because crucial aspects of the framework actually in place were not con-
sidered, and sometimes were not even thought of. An extreme and very obvious 
example is the neglect of the effects of the replacement of monetary by non-
monetary exchange in phases of a barter economy. There is no generic approach 
to avoid unintended omission of crucial framework conditions, but it must gene-
rally be emphasised that a broad look at the various interdependent markets and 
at the entire socioeconomic context of a country is needed before going into de-
tail. Descriptive analyses of the situation in various markets form part of such a 
broad look. The contributions of POPP, FERTÖ et al., WILKIN et al., and HEIN in 
the chapter Selected analyses from CEEC provide excellent examples, and fo-
cus on market developments in new EU member countries. On the one hand, the 
papers show the heterogeneity of problems e.g. due to largely differing farm 
structures. On the other hand, several common patterns can be observed: The 
market shares and power of large processors and retailers (hypermarkets, etc.) 
are increasing. Also, international (especially intra-EU) trade in commodities 
has increased in response to CAP-induced price harmonisation. Both tendencies 
weaken the market position of farmers, particularly small entities which cannot 
supply in volumes sufficient for large processing and trade firms. Within the Agricultural and food markets in Central and Eastern Europe: An introduction  IX
food industry concentration increased as many smaller firms could not comply 
with EU processing standards and had to quit the market. The increased size and 
specialisation of large producers, as well as of large processors, made many of 
those firms co-ordinate business with each other through long-term contractual 
agreements rather than by relying on spot markets. This tendency is very distinct 
in the fruit and vegetable sector, as WILKIN’s contribution describes. 
Two contributions draw attention to the institutional framework itself, mainly 
by looking at circumstances which prevent market allocation from leading to an 
optimal outcome. HOBBS describes factors that impede investment and growth 
by drawing on transaction cost economics. Situations typical for transition coun-
tries are highlighted where e.g. transparency is not sufficient or the existence and 
reliable enforcement of contract or corporate law are not guaranteed. NUPPENAU 
stresses the need for the appropriate and precise formulation of land property 
rights, which should evoke a balance between governance and exclusion. The 
importance of appropriate and reliable institutions to avoid flaws is emphasised. 
But even with suitable institutions, transaction costs cannot be reduced to zero. 
The main reason for this is that since agents may gain form a head start of in-
formation, incentives to reveal their knowledge are quite restricted. Furthermore, 
some of the information required to make correct decisions is not available. This 
especially concerns information regarding all future contingencies. An uncertain 
future and the asymmetric distribution of information impose special problems 
when decisions have long-term effects and agents are linked together through 
investment decisions. This offers possibilities for opportunistic behaviour, i.e., 
when an agent behaves in a way that allows him to extract rents from the part-
ners' activities. The friction induced in such situations may result in a market 
outcome that is biased by transaction costs. Mitigating this bias should be a goal 
of public policy but it is also in the interest of (at least some of the) private 
agents involved. This issue is discussed in more detail in the papers dealing with 
alternative governance structures. 
A number of contributions to IAMO Forum highlight approaches for measuring 
the well-functioning of markets. While studies that aim to directly measure 
transaction costs are very rare and are necessarily limited to comparing only 
very specific portions of transaction costs, most studies focus on indirect indica-
tors. These usually start from the idea that in a well-functioning, competitive 
market any supply or demand shocks are reflected in price changes, not only in 
the particular market where the shock occurs but also in other, related markets, 
i.e., in different locations or at different stages of the production and marketing 
chain. Consequently, an approach for assessing the functioning of markets is to 
compare price differentials with processing-, marketing- or transfer-costs, or – 
since these costs are usually difficult to quantify – to observe price differentials 
over time. Accepting the assumption that the costs reflected by price differentials 
are more or less constant (or stationary) over the observed time span, any addi-
tional price changes or a lack of price co-movement is interpreted as an indication Stephan Brosig, Heinrich Hockmann  X 
for insufficiently connected or insufficiently functioning markets. Three contribu-
tions in the chapter Analytical approaches for measuring market efficiency 
describe analyses which mainly focus on the vertical dimension, i.e., between-
market stages. BOJNEC, in his descriptive price analysis for several agricultural 
products in Slovenia since 1991, finds a heterogeneous development of the farm 
gate/consumer price spread: The processing and marketing margins increased 
for wheat and beef while they declined for grapes (processed to wine), sugar and 
poultry. BRÜMMER and ZORYA, as well as BAKUCS and FERTÖ, use cointegration 
analysis to describe the degree and nature of vertical price integration in the 
Ukrainian wheat market and the Hungarian pork market, respectively. Both 
studies find that price changes are transmitted vertically, that there is a tendency 
to "correct" any deviations from some underlying equilibrium price-relationship. 
However, such error correction mechanisms are found not to be a constant, uni-
versal force. In the Hungarian paper, it could only be found for a sub-period of 
the observed time span, excluding the highly volatile early 1990s. Also, equilib-
rium was found to be achieved by adjustment of farm gate prices only while the 
retail prices were found to be exogenous, i.e., not responding to any disequilib-
rium. The paper on Ukraine shows that adjustment processes between wheat and 
wheat flour prices cannot be sufficiently described by a constant error correction 
mechanism for the period 2000 to 2004. In fact, four different regimes of ad-
justment processes were found to have been in force, reflecting particular phases 
of largely differing market situations and political interventions.  
The functioning of markets depends on several crucial conditions. One of these 
conditions concerns the availability of information. Only if agents have perfect 
and complete information will the exchange lead to an outcome in which no in-
dividual can be better off without reducing the welfare of others. However, in 
the real world this condition regarding information is not fulfilled. Information 
is not perfect, since the future cannot be predicted with certainty. Incomplete 
information results from, first, not all information being revealed, and second, 
individuals not possessing the mental capacity to collect and process all infor-
mation. Moreover, because of its asymmetric distribution, information can be 
regarded as a resource that can be exploited by agents. This means that there are 
incentives to hamper the diffusion of information to the public domain. In gene-
ral, the more uncertain the future is and the more information is tacit, the worse 
markets will function, and the more beneficial become alternative mechanisms of 
coordination. Three papers dealing with this issue of organisational choice. 
HANF focuses on governance structures within supply chain networks that are 
appropriate for allowing an optimal flow of information between the involved 
individuals while retaining the necessary hierarchy for efficient implementation 
of strategic decisions. MAACK’s analysis shows that there is strong mutual inter-
est between producers and processors of berry fruits to reduce marketing and 
procurement risk, respectively. This can be achieved by switching from spot 
market exchange to contractual supply agreements. A prerequisite for such Agricultural and food markets in Central and Eastern Europe: An introduction  XI
agreements is that a well-balanced distribution of risks and risk premiums between 
the farmer and processor is implemented. This means that processors, who – facing 
a multitude of small producers – are used to opportunities for exerting market 
power, have to agree to cover part of the production risk through appropriate 
contractual clauses. Finally, BALINT looks at the various marketing channels 
used by Romanian farmers and finds that a self-enforcing dualism exists. For 
commercially-oriented farmers who can supply large quantities, marketing di-
rectly to traders, wholesalers and processors is most favourable and involves 
relatively low transaction costs. Although this form of supply-relationship is 
usually not based on contractual agreements, it can still be characterised by a 
certain stability over time. In contrast, small farmers whose production does not 
considerably exceed the subsistence level incur relatively high (per unit) transac-
tion costs in selling their produce on local markets and to other farmers.  
Another aspect of organisational choice is the question of whether ownership of 
production factors is transferred or only the right to use them temporarily. The 
uncertainty of future developments implies that the possession of resources can-
not be only regarded from the point of view of income generation at a certain 
point in time. With perfect foresight, there is no difference whether a factor is 
rented or purchased, because the remuneration would be the same. This perfect 
substitutability is no longer given when the future is uncertain. Income genera-
tion, then, is only one feature of ownership. Additional aspects such as insurance, 
wealth, and speculation as motivations for possession affect the value of owner-
ship and thus shift the demand and supply curves of the factor. HURRELMAN picks 
up this issue in her analysis of the Polish land market and shows the impact of 
additional grounds for valuing property on the decision to rent or to buy land.  
Uncertainty may also affect the specialization of factor use. Allocating a factor 
of production to different production activities reduces the risk of income insta-
bilities, but at the cost of specialization gains through economics of scale. 
Moreover, the decision on income combination is – besides risk – affected by a 
complex interaction of other determinants. GLAUBEN et al., analyse these inter-
actions for the case of part-time farming in China and show how the decision of 
income combination is affected by household characteristics, human capital and 
other variables.  
Incomplete and imperfect information not only causes individuals to choose 
optimal governance modes, often it is also understood as a call for government 
intervention. The selected papers in the chapter on policy intervention plead 
for careful selection and coherent implementation of policy instruments. BENNER, 
as well as KUHN, highlight the significance of information diffusion and argue 
in favour of government intervention in this area. However, both emphasise 
that these interferences should be used carefully and be adjusted to specific mar-
ket failures. Both argue that setting up information systems would improve the Stephan Brosig, Heinrich Hockmann  XII 
functioning of markets. BENNER also discusses possible negative impacts if 
governments that engage in setting up and enforcing product and process stan-
dards try, at the same time, to foster a sector like agriculture through support in 
marketing. The latter activity affects the government’s (crucial) credibility in the 
first activity. KUHN points to negative welfare effects and budgetary require-
ments of an intervention system which is implemented to increase price stability.  
Moreover, when a government intervenes in market allocation or intends to pro-
vide rules that should facilitate the exchange on markets, it has to take into ac-
count that the new regulation has to be implemented in a coherent manner. This 
requires the various policy regulations and institutional settings to be comple-
mentary and not cause frictions which hamper the functioning of the system. 
LERMAN and SHAGAIDA highlight this aspect in their discussion of the Russian 
land market, where bureaucracy and high costs for the registration of property 
rights can be regarded as a major cause of the low number of land transactions. 
However, since economic activities take place in a dynamic environment, the 
comparative static point of view may lead to inappropriate policy formulation. 
WANDEL discusses this aspect in the context of competition policy. From a com-
parative static point of view, market power has to be assessed negatively be-
cause of the distortions of resource allocation. However, monopoly profits are 
an indicator of extra rents and thus provide incentives for market entry. On the 
one hand, this thread may lead to special pricing schemes and/or to the accelera-
ted development of technological change so that a monopolist can consolidate 
its market position. But it is possible, on the other hand, that market entry may 
in fact happen. In this case, one would observe structural change, which would 
be accompanied by an improved use of resources. This in turn means that com-
petition policy should not be oriented towards an optimal market structure but 
towards the facilitation of market entry so that competition can discover market 
opportunities and determine the optimal structure of the market. 
The present volume shows the wide range of interesting and controversial topics 
that are concerned when looking at co-ordination, particularly on markets in 
CEE agri-food sectors. It remains a hope that the heterogeneity and dynamics of 
the developments will decrease as successful constellations of framework condi-
tions, organisational choices and individual behaviour become more and more 
obvious and widespread in the region. Conversion to sustainable, balanced pat-
terns might take place, but this cannot be taken for granted. However, chances 
for such development are better the more stable and balanced political develop-
ments, as well as international co-operation, become. We hope that the academic 
community will contribute towards such goal.  
SELECTED AGRIFOOD MARKETS IN CEEC 





The paper analyses the impact of EU enlargement on the agricultural markets in 
the New Member States (NMS). A high level of market integration in the EU-25 
was achieved prior to enlargement. Sixty-five percent of all agricultural exports 
of the NMS and 69 % of all imports went to EU-25 destinations in the years 
immediately prior to accession. The intensity of production and productivity are 
relatively low in the NMS as compared to the EU-15. This means that agricul-
tural potential can be only gradually used and that structural adjustment will 
continue. The market impact of enlargement seems to be positive for the NMS 
and will lead to the stabilisation of agricultural production, particularly in the 
area of cereal and meat production. Agricultural markets will benefit from the 
trade creation effects of integration into the single market and from the support 
of the CAP.  
Keywords: Enlargement, production, agricultural market, trade, integration of 
markets. 
1 MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AFTER ENLARGEMENT 
Following a historical agreement on enlargement, 10 New Member States 
(NMS) acceded to the European Union on May 1, 2004. Although the European 
Union (EU) has expanded its membership in the past, this enlargement is unique 
in terms of its scope, diversity, and number of countries, area, population and 
large rural sector. The NMS add about 38 million ha of utilised agricultural area 
to the 130 million ha of the old Member States, which represents an increase of 
30 %, while production in the EU-25 increases by about 10 % to 20 % for most 
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products. The NMS add 52 % to the agricultural work force of the EU, illus-
trating the low productivity as compared to the old Member states. 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as applied in 2003 or planned under 
Agenda 2000 will never be implemented in the new Member States (NMS). 
Farmers from NMS have access to CAP market measures, but direct payments 
(Single Area Payment Scheme: SAPS) will be phased in over 10 years. The Act 
of Accession provides for a transitional period for the progressive introduction 
of the CAP direct payments in the NMS. In 2004, NMS received 25 % of the 
full EU-15 payment rate from EU budget, a number that will gradually rise to 
100 % by 2013. Direct payments are divided equally over all eligible hectares, 
with no distinction between sectors. Two-thirds of the direct payments are allo-
cated for Poland and Hungary, followed by the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
(Table 1). 
Table 1:  Allocation of direct payments in the EU-10 
    (Million EUR) 
  2005  2006  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Czech 
Republic  227.9  265.7 342.4 427.8 513.2 598.5 683.9 769.3 854.6
Estonia  23.4  27.3 40.4 50.5 60.5 70.6 80.7 90.8  100.9
Cyprus  8.9  10.4 13.9 17.4 20.9 24.4 27.8 31.3 34.8
Latvia  33.9 39.6  55.6 69.5 83.4 97.3 111.2 125.1 139.0
Lithuania  92.0  107.3 146.9 183.6 220.3 257.0 293.7 330.4 367.1
Hungary  375.4 408.7  495.1 618.5 741.9 865.2 988.6 1  111.9 1  253.3
Malta  0.67  0.78 1.59 1.99 2.38 2.78 3.18 3.57 3.97
Poland  724.3 845.0 1  098.8 1 373.4 1 648.0 1 922.5 2 197.1  2 471.7  2 746.3
Slovenia  35.3 41.4  55.5 69.4 83.3 97.2 111.0 124.9 138.8
Slovakia  97.6  113.6 144.5 180.5 216.6 252.6 288.6 324.6 360.6
Source: OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 30.03.2004. 
A large portion of the funds supporting agricultural policy will have to come 
from non-CAP funds. Implementation of the CAP in the NMS will be concluded 
after a transition period. During this phase-in period, the NMS may complement 
EU funds for direct payments by national contribution (Complementary Na-
tional Direct Payment: CNDP) up to 30 % above the applicable phasing-in level 
for direct payments for the relevant year. CNDP shall be granted for the produc-
tion of products covered by the CAP support schemes. Bovine animals (beef 
production) and ewes can be supported exclusively by CNDP. Most support will 
continue to benefit larger and often richer farms. Area payments granted for the 
NMS will, by 2013, reach an average 83 % of the level of the EU-15 (Table 2). Agricultural markets in CEE – An overview  5







2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011-
2013 
Czech 
Republic  4.20 145.7 159.0 172.2 185.5 212.0 238.5  265  265 
Hungary  4.73 149.5 161.0 174.3 208.6 238.4 268.2  298  298 
Poland  3.00 104.0 113.4 122.9 132.3 151.2 170.1  189  189 
Slovakia  4.06 140.8 153.6 166.4 179.2 204.8 230.4  256  256 
EU-10  4.00**  138.6 151.2 163.8 176.4 201.6 226.8  252  252 
EU-15  4.77 300.5 300.5 300.5 300.5 300.5 300.5 300.5 300.5 
EU-10/ 
EU-15,%  83.8 46.1 50.3 54.5 58.7 67.1 75.5 83.8 83.8 
Source:  DG AGRI, Country Reports. 
Notes:  *   CNDP: From the national budget. 
 **  Author’s  estimate. 
The trade policy regime of the NMS has changed. External duty rates of the 
NMS are now harmonized with the EU-15; internal rates are set at zero. The im-
pacts on intra-EU-25 trade are driven by changes in production and consump-
tion, rather than by the lowering of intra-EU-25 protection, which was already 
low before accession. Nevertheless, trade creation effects have been observed 
since accession in a number of areas where prior to accession barriers to trade 
existed, in particular between old and NMS themselves, but also between old 
and new Member States. There are strong indications that membership has been 
very positive for the trade integration between the NMS.  
The situation of agricultural production in the NMS can be considered rather 
positive than negative. Most NMS have been able to expand trade with the EU 
both on the import and export side. The precise level of direct payments is one 
of the farmers' main concerns because of the unclear information and late deci-
sions of most governments. Nevertheless, requests for national and EU funds far 
outstrip their availability in most countries showing high investment activities.  
Land prices have increased in the NMS, particularly in the Baltic countries, de-
spite the fact that land purchases by foreigners and legal entities are generally 
restricted or forbidden. However, in some countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Slovakia) land owners that are not necessarily part of the rural population or József Popp 
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the farming community are quite aware of the amount of payments. Sharp in-
creases of land prices or rental fees have hampered investments and restructuring 
in some countries.  
While prices for most commodities in the NMS were historically below EU-15 
prices, accession has led to a moderate decreases in the EU-15 prices, whereas 
for the 10 NMS, domestic prices for many commodities have increased substan-
tially. Producer prices have generally increased for livestock, meat and dairy 
products in the NMS.  
High quality beef prices increased significantly due to sustained demand from 
the old Member States. By contrast, low quality beef prices have continued to 
decline. On average, beef prices are significantly higher today than before 
enlargement and domestic demand continues to be very weak. Among the largest 
agricultural producers, prices in Poland have developed particularly well, while 
Hungarian prices have remained rather weak or have been very volatile. Poultry 
prices have increased in a number of NMS due to strong export opportunities to 
the old Member States. Cereal prices in Hungary have been significantly lower 
than in the other main net exporting Member States. Czech and Slovak prices 
have developed more smoothly but have increased less than in other countries. 
That is the result of a record harvest and high transport costs to markets in the 
EU and other countries. Milk markets are characterised by strong competition 
for high quality milk, which is in short supply (Poland, Lithuania and Latvia). 
The spread between low and high quality milk prices is still very high in these 
countries. Milk producers face continued burdens of adjustment in the dairy sec-
tor (for example in Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland). 
The situation of the food industry in the NMS is rather mixed. In most countries, 
consolidation and concentration are ongoing at an increasing pace due to foreign 
direct and domestic investments. The dairy industry faces challenges due to low 
standards and marketing difficulties in a number of countries. Favourable mar-
ket opportunities in the EU, in particular for live animals, have helped to reduce 
the negative impact of diverging competitiveness of meat processors. 
Consumers in the NMS have not been significantly affected by the CAP. In most 
countries only a limited number of products – sugar, beef, pork and poultry – 
have experienced significant price increases. Other prices, such as imported, 
high value-added dairy products, have fallen. 
2 DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE OF THE NMS 
The relative importance of agricultural trade declined in the NMS over the last 
decade, and now stands at approximately 8 % of total trade. The agricultural 
trade balance of the EU-10 remained negative with the world and the EU-15. 
Trade balance of the EU-15 with the EU-10 amounts to about 1 billion EURO. Agricultural markets in CEE – An overview  7
Hungary has maintained its position as a net exporter over a long time. Poland 
has turned from one of the largest net importers to a net exporter since 2003 
thanks to steady growth of its agricultural exports to the world and particularly 
to the EU-15. All other EU-10 countries continued to exhibit a trade deficit. The 
main products contributing to this trend were processed foods, especially proc-
essed fruits and vegetables, poultry and dairy products, which benefited from 
improved competitiveness in the EU-10 food industry. 
Agriculture and food exports in Hungary have displayed a positive trade balance 
for decades, bringing 3.04 billion EURO to the country in 2004. Agriculture and 
food imports have increased, and amounted to 1.87 billion EURO in 2004. The 
trade surplus in this sector consistently fluctuated between 1-1.5 billion EURO 
over the past 10 years (Figure 1). 













































Source: AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH INSTITUTE (AKI), Budapest, 2004. 
In the coming years, the rate of the increase of imports will exceed that of ex-
ports, but the trade balance will remain positive, albeit with a decreasing trend. 
The prospect of agricultural exports can even be improved by the consolidation 
of livestock production and by the development of commercial infrastructure.  
The EU-10 agricultural trade has been dominated by two major players, Poland 
and Hungary, with high shares for some meat products (beef, pork, poultry). 
Furthermore, over 50 % of the EU-10 cereal exports to the world have come 
from Hungary. The export shares of dairy products have been more evenly dis-
tributed among the EU-10 countries, with the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Lithuania as major exporters. The degree of integration between the EU-10 and József Popp 
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EU-15 has increased substantially over the last decade. By 2003, the share of ag-
ricultural exports to the EU-25 rose to 66 %, while the share of imports from 
EU-25 destinations increased to 71 %. The integration of the EU-10 to the agri-
cultural trade of the EU-25 is more advanced on the import side. The most inte-
grated EU-10 countries within the EU-25 market were the Czech Republic, Slo-
vakia, Estonia and Latvia, with import and export shares of about 70-80 %. 
Hungarian agriculture and food products are mostly traded with European coun-
tries. The degree of agricultural trade integration between Hungary and the EU-
15 was 50 % in 2003. The share of exports going to the EU-25 reached 65 %, 
and the share of imports coming from the EU-25 rose to 80 % 2004 (Figure 2). 
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Source: AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH INSTITUTE (AKI), Budapest, 2004.  
The EU-15 countries have increased trade with the EU-10 even though imports 
have been growing faster than exports. The leading net exporters are the Nether-
lands, Spain and France, while Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom have 
shown negative trade balances with the EU-10. The most integrated EU-15 
countries regarding agricultural trade with the EU-10 are Austria and Finland, 
with export shares of 7.3 % and 5.2 %, as well as import shares of 12.9 % and 
7.3 %, respectively. 
For the cereals, meat and dairy sectors, about 80 % of all EU-10 imports have 
come from EU-25. By contrast, the EU-10 share of exports to the EU-25 has 
been more diverse across countries and products (Figure 3). 
Share of exports to EU  Share of imports from EU Agricultural markets in CEE – An overview  9


























Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004): DG for agriculture prospects for agricultural mar-
kets and income 2004-2011 for EU-25, Brussels/Belgium, December 2004. 
Cereal markets 
The NMS contribute to about 20 % (55-60 million t) of the cereal production 
and operate on 30 % (15, 5 million ha ) of the cereal area of the EU-25. Poland 
is the largest producer, with 50 % share of the cereal production of the EU-10, 
followed by Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Of these countries, 
Hungary has been the only significant exporter of cereals, with 3-4 million tons 
per year (Table 3). The other NMS have remained close to self-sufficiency, but 
exports have increased in recent years in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.  
EU-10:  Share of product  
export to EU-25 (2000/2003) 
EU-10:  Share of product 
import to EU-25 (2000/2003) József Popp 
 
10
Table 3:  Supply balance of cereals (Mio t) 
Supply 
balance  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Produc-
tion 
11,306,329 14,119,682 13,004,238 11,374,527 10,037,094 15,046,886 11,705,656  8,769,586 
Feed  7,164,314 6,678,383 6,889,679 7,105,322 6,142,325 6,238,594 6,436,568 6,428,556 
Food  2,163,781 2,382,092 1,961,825 1,855,159 2,326,721 2,258,890 1,922,862 2,105,721 
Imports  106,165 50,142 29,726 47,826 74,897  112,155 58,960  117,309 
Exports  505,406 2,294,149 4,260,197 2,490,254 1,706,728 3,274,761 3,473,064 2,686,507 
Others*  1,578,993  2,815,200  77,737 -28,382 -63,783 3,386,500  -67,878  -2,905,925 
Source: HUNGARIAN CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE (KSH). 
Notes:  Self-sufficiency rate: 150-200 % . 
  * Net stock, seed, industrial use. 
Over the last decade, EU-10 exports stagnated at around 3 to 5 million tons de-
pending on the harvest, with a similar level of imports. In 2004, exports reached 
only several million tons after a record harvest of 60 million tons. Cereal con-
sumption has declined, stagnating at around 50 million tons per year.  
Feed demand is projected to increase despite the gradual improvement in feeding 
efficiency in the NMS. The increased feed demand is expected from higher 
poultry, egg and beef production and the more intensive dairy production after 
enlargement. For each ton of meat produced, about 50 % to 80 % more cereals 
are used in the NMS than in the EU-15 on average. In 2002, 5.4 tons of cereals 
were used for the production of 1 ton of meat and eggs in the EU-15, while the 
ratio was as high as 8 in the NMS. This difference of 50 % will decline, thanks 
to changing prices, the increased use of protein feed and higher feed technology. 
The higher level of cereal use for feeding as compared to the old Member states 
should remain an important base for cereal markets in the NMS.  
The integration of cereal markets in the NMS is quite advanced. Most of the im-
ports of the NMS come from countries in the EU-25. Over the years, more trade 
integration can be expected on the export side, in particular in NMS with a low 
level (45 %) of trade integration on the export side: Slovenia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Cyprus, Hungary and Malta (Figure 4). The net exporting countries with low 
trade integration would benefit from these developments. The net importing 
countries of the EU-10 should gain from lower feed cereal prices.  Agricultural markets in CEE – An overview  11


























Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004): DG for agriculture prospects for agricultural mar-
kets and income 2004-2011 for EU-25, Brussels/Belgium, December 2004. 
However, market prospects appear somewhat clouded for Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia as high transport costs prevent the competitively pro-
duced cereals in these regions from reaching markets in the EU, as well as other 
countries. In Hungary, producer prices are foreseen to remain lower than inter-
vention prices. These cereals could gain regional market share because Hungarian 
cereal feed prices seem to be regionally competitive. The expected low level of 
regional cereal feed prices would then contribute to the stabilisation of cereal 
markets by the expansion of cereal-fed intensive livestock production, in par-
ticular pork production.  
The production of soft wheat in the NMS is expected to expand due to favourable 
price conditions. Production reached 24 million tons in 2004, but under normal 
weather conditions and increasing yield, the production level should reach   
22-23 million tons in the upcoming years. The introduction of mandatory set-
aside after the depletion of the SAPS should reduce production by 
0.6 million tons, owing mainly to the decrease in area in Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia.  
The largest soft wheat producing country in the NMS is Poland, with a production 
of 9  million  tons on average. Poland has only recently become a net exporting 
country and due to favourable market conditions for soft wheat, Poland could de-
velop an export potential of 1.5 million tons, with imports at about 0.5 million tons. 
Poland will be marginally affected by mandatory set-aside in the case of an ex-
pected continuous expansion of production. Hungary will continue to export 
EU-10: Share of cereals export to 
EU-25 (2000/2003) 
EU-10: Share of cereals import from 
EU-25 (2000/2003) József Popp 
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2 million tons, which would decline by 0.2 million tons due to the introduction 
of mandatory set-aside. Hungary will remain the largest exporter of soft wheat 
in the NMS. Production level in Hungary could reach 4 million tons, with a do-
mestic consumption of 2.5 million tons (of which 0.8 million tons is used for 
feed). The expansion of feed wheat will be constrained by the increasing com-
petitiveness of maize. The production of soft wheat will also slightly increase in 
the other NMS. Higher production and use should come from the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia, Latvia and Slovenia. 
Domestic use in the NMS will increase from 18 million tons to 20 million tons 
due to the increase of human consumption and industrial use. Exports of the 
NMS could stabilise at 5 million tons, and about 2 million tons of imports are 
expected. 
12 million tons of maize was produced in 2004 in the NMS. With domestic use 
at 9 million tons, exports should have reached 3-4 million tons. The relatively 
high transport costs in the maize production regions has left producer prices sig-
nificantly below those prices observed in the EU-15, slowing down export op-
portunities. Production, therefore, would stabilise at around 11 million tons. The 
pace of production growth will be reduced when set aside is implemented, leav-
ing production at 10 million tons.  
Competitive maize prices can stimulate domestic use from the current 
9 million tons to 10 million tons per year. Feed maize will benefit from the in-
crease in livestock production and from the increasing substitution of barley in 
total feed demand. Export opportunities should exist for 2 million tons, while 
imports are expected to increase as well. Higher trade will take place with both 
EU and other countries. 
Hungary is the largest producer of maize among the NMS, with a production of 
8 million tons in 2004, which represented 66 % of the production of the NMS. 
The second largest producer was Poland, with 2.2 million tons. Hungary is also 
the largest consumer of maize, with 4.8 million tons in 2004, followed by Po-
land, with 2.1 million tons. Slovakia and the Czech Republic are the third and 
fourth largest producers and user of maize, with around 0.7 and 0.6 million tons 
of production and consumption, respectively. The Czech Republic, a traditional 
net importer of maize (0.1-0.2 million tons per year) will expand maize feed use 
due to the opening of markets and the expansion of poultry and pork production.  
The Hungarian cereal harvest doubled in 2004. As a result of the extraordinarily 
favourable weather conditions that year, it was a record harvest: 16.7 million tons 
of cereals were harvested in 2004. The outstanding harvest caused serious difficul-
ties in storage, because 1.5 million tons of cereals could only be stored in emer-
gency storage facilities. A good harvest has translated into lower producer 
prices. In fact, Hungarian market prices are the lowest among the NMS. Farmers 
expected a more stable cereal market. Certainly cereal farmers need to invest Agricultural markets in CEE – An overview  13
into their own stock capacities in order to better benefit from the CAP. Export 
opportunities for maize and wheat appears less optimistic. Wheat and maize 
prices have remained below the intervention price level. 
Hungarian farmers offered over 4 million tons of cereals for intervention in 2004 
because there were no buyers for the requested price of EUR 94-100/t. Both 
domestic and foreign buyers found that price too high. Hungarian cereal produc-
tion is not competitive on foreign markets, certainly not around the intervention 
price expected by the producers. Moreover, the costs of transport to the sea 
amount to EUR 20 per ton, at least. 
Both the Budapest Commodity Exchange (BCE) and the free market prices have 
remained far below the EU intervention price level (EUR 101, 31/t) since the 
2004 harvest because producers less and less believed in the success of the in-
tervention. The intervention of cereals was begun too late (on March, 2005) and 
is expected to be finished by the end of July 2005 (Table 4). 
Table 4:  Futures quotations, Cereal section of BCE 
Purchase quotations 












HUF/t HUF/t  US$/t 
Milling  wheat  23,000  22,200 23,200 23,000 120.40 
Feed wheat  –  –  –  21,400  112.00 
Feed barley  –  20,400  –  22,700  118.80 
Maize  23,000  23,600* 23,200 22,600 118.30 
Source: BCE. 
Note:  Exchange rate: HUF 191/US$. 
After a bumper harvest of 284 million tons in 2004, 10.5 million tons of cereals 
were offered to public stocks in the EU-25 until April 2005, bringing the total 
level of cereals in the intervention stocks to 13.5 million tons. Of the total offers 
of intervention, 60 % concern the NMS. The export tenders of the Commission 
favour cereals located in areas with relatively easy access to export harbours and 
have not managed to relieve the situation in the NMS and other landlocked 
countries, where the surplus situation is particularly difficult. Making interven-
tion storage space available is a national requirement; the lack of intervention 
storage in the NMS is serious, leading to important market disturbances in the 
whole of the EU. Therefore, the Commission decided in March, 2005 to sell the 
following intervention stocks of wheat: Hungary: 320,000 tons; Czech Republic: 
300,000 tons; Poland: 93,084 tons; and Austria: 80,663 tons.  
Hungary will remain the main exporter of maize. Set-aside will reduce Hungary’s 
production by 0.5 million tons. Domestic use will expand from 4.8 million tons 
to 5.2 million tons. Hungary’s production will benefit from the opening of re-
gional markets and better export conditions due to accession. József Popp 
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The Hungarian domestic market for cereals is characterised by the decreasing 
use of cereals for food and feed, and by the increasing output of feed cereals. 
One of the consequences of the introduction of the SPS (Single Payment 
Scheme) will be the decreasing production of cereals due to the then-compulsory 
set-aside of land, which is not currently in effect under the SAPS. Increasing 
production is expected in regions where production growth is accompanied with 
the improvement of production efficiency as well. Hungarian cereals are com-
petitive only within a limit of certain distances of transportation, primarily by 
shipping cereals on the Danube River. The revenue position of maize production 
is considered to be more favourable than wheat production. The EU is a net ex-
porter of wheat, therefore Hungarian wheat producers will face pressure to de-
crease producer prices or to satisfy special consumer needs (high quality wheat). 
The top priorities of cereal production are the improvement of storage and 
handling facilities, quality insurance, and production efficiency (POPP et al., 2004).  
The forecasted decrease in the number of livestock (pork, poultry and dairy pro-
duction) will decrease the annual feed-use of cereals by 2 million tons, which 
may lead to a significant domestic oversupply of cereals (self-sufficiency rate: 
150-200 %) and to the heavy intervention of maize, which may lead to decreasing 
cereal prices. In the EU-25, the self-sufficiency rate of maize is around 96-100 %. 
Hungarian maize seems to have better chances to be sold in the single market of 
the EU than wheat, which will encourage the improvement of the commercial 
infrastructure needed for intra-EU trade.  
Meat and dairy markets 
Strong growth in per capita consumption of meat and milk products led to sig-
nificant market growth in the last decade. Per capita consumption of meat and 
eggs in the NMS is at 80 % of that in the old Member States. Due to the fa-
vourable development assumed for household incomes, meat and egg consump-
tion will increase in the NMS. Cereal-fed livestock production should benefit 
from favourable regional feed cereal prices, as well as from opportunities to ex-
pand the market share of poultry and egg on the EU markets. Milk production 
and dairy markets should further stabilise. 
Beef market 
The NMS showed a decline in both beef production and beef consumption over 
the last decade. In 2004, production reached 0.65 million tons. Beef meat con-
sumption will stabilise at 0.6 million tons thanks to increasing income levels and 
the better availability of quality beef. Production is expected to slowly decrease 
again and stabilise around 0.6 million tons. 
The NMS already reached a high level of market integration prior to enlarge-
ment. Imports almost exclusively came from EU-25 countries. This integration 
is lower on the export side (Figure 5). Poland, the largest exporter of beef among 
the NMS, should benefit most in quantitative terms from the increasing export Agricultural markets in CEE – An overview  15
opportunities in the old Member States. However, strong relative gains in ex-
ports should also be observed for Lithuania, Hungary and the Czech Republic.  


























Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004): DG for agriculture prospects for agricultural mar-
kets and income 2004-2011 for EU-25, Brussels/Belgium, December 2004. 
The development of beef markets and beef prices in Poland will depend on ex-
port opportunities to EU countries, since domestic consumption will stagnate. A 
similar development will be observed in the Baltic countries, the Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia.  
Pork market 
Pork markets in the NMS were volatile over the last decade, though domestic 
consumption expanded to 3.3  million  tons in 2004. Production, which served 
mainly domestic consumption, followed closely behind. Exports and imports 
amounted to 0.3 million tons in recent years. 
Trade integration of pork markets in the NMS shows wide divergences. Imports 
came predominantly from EU-25 countries since most countries imported more 
than 80 % from these destinations. The export side appears less integrated than 
many other markets. The Czech Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia exported 
more than 80 % of their pork to EU-25 countries. The largest pork producer of 
the EU-10, Poland exported just 20  % to EU-25 destinations and depended 
heavily on the Russian markets. Hungary, another large pork producer exported 
about 55 % of its exports to EU-25 countries (Figure 6). The revenue situation 
of the pig sector will improve slightly in 2005, but investments necessary for the 
fulfilment of EU requirements (meeting standards) will further increase pro-
duction costs. Hungarian pork production has a disadvantage in coordinating 
EU-10: Share of beef export to 
EU-25 (2000/2003) 
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production and markets, and the concentration of production in comparison to 
the most important pork producer member states, which both lead to a decreas-
ing self-sufficiency rate. 























Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004): DG for agriculture prospects for agricultural mar-
kets and income 2004-2011 for EU-25, Brussels/Belgium, December 2004. 
The attractive market conditions in the EU-25 should lead to further trade integra-
tion on the export side over the medium term. This increased market integration 
should reduce the volatility of producer prices recorded prior to accession and 
improve market conditions. Investments in pork production, in particular in Po-
land, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, have started to change the competitive-
ness of the sector. Investments and favourable feed prices suggest that pork pro-
duction could expand and the competitiveness of the production and processing 
sectors could increase.  
Under these conditions, production of pork in the NMS could increase from the 
current level of 3.3 million tons to 4 million tons. New production technologies 
will lead to lower production costs thanks to improved feeding efficiency. Con-
sumption is expected to rise from the current level of 3.3  million  tons to 
3.6 million tons in upcoming years. 
Poultry market 
During the last decade, the demand for poultry nearly doubled, showing an in-
crease from 0.9 million tons to 1.7 million tons. These markets, as well as good 
investment conditions, led on average to significant gains in productivity and 
competitiveness as compared to the old Member States. Production followed the 
increase in consumption and some export markets were found in the old Mem-
ber States.  
EU-10: Share of pork export to 
EU-25 (2000/2003) 
EU-10: Share of pork import 
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Trade integration of markets prior to enlargement was already very high. More 
than 80  % of EU-10 exports went to EU-25 countries. Import markets were 
similarly integrated (Figure 7). After accession, the favourable production and 
investment conditions in many countries, as well as increasing demand should 
further expand production, from 1.7  million tons  to  2.5 million tons  over  the 
next few years. Consumption will increase and exports could expand to 
0.6 million tons. The most important destinations for imports will remain Ger-
many, Austria and Italy. 





















Source: EUROPEAN  COMMISSION  (2004): DG for Agriculture Prospects for Agricultural 
markets and income 2004-2011 for EU-25, Brussels/Belgium, December 2004. 
Dairy market 
Milk production in the NMS has gradually declined, falling to 20 million tons in 
2004. Deliveries and registered direct sales accounted for 17 million tons, which 
is not expected to increase in upcoming years (Figure 8). The marketing quotas 
associated with enlargement restrict the growth in milk production in the NMS, 
resulting in a decline in milk production. Even at these reduced production levels, 
total milk output remains above the total marketing quota for the NMS, reflecting 
a continued, relatively high on-farm use in some countries. The bulk of the 
change in milk production will be accomplished through declines in dairy cow 
inventories. 
EU-10: Share of poultry export to 
EU-25 (2000/2003) 
EU-10: Share of poultry export 
from EU-25 (2000/2003) József Popp 
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Figure 8:   Deliveries in the EU-25 (million tons) 
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Source: RICHARTS, E. (2004): EU-Osterweiterung, Wie reagieren die Märkte für Milch und 
Milchprodukte?, ZMP, Bonn. 
In 2004, the largest producer of milk in the NMS was Poland, with 11.5 million 
tons, followed by the Czech Republic with 2.8  million  tons, Hungary with 
2 million tons and Lithuania and Slovakia with 1.1 million tons each (Table 5). 
Table 5:  Milk quotas in the NMS 
  Basic milk quota  2004/05  New quotas from 
2008/09 
Cyprus  145.2 145.9 150.3 
Czech  Republic  2,682.1 2,695.6 2,831.8 
Estonia  624.5 627.6 668.2 
Hungary  1,947.3 1,957.0 2,058.2 
Latvia  695.4 698.9 753.0 
Lithuania  1646.9 1,655.2 1,762.5 
Malta  48.7 48.9 50.4 
Poland  8,964.0 9,008.8 9,693.9 
Slovakia  1,013.3 1,018.4 1,076.3 
Slovenia  560.4 563.2 596.3 
EU-10  18,327.9 18,419.9 19,640.9 
EU-15  118,892.7 119,374.1 122,741.8 
Source: DG  AGRI,  Brussels/Belgium. 
The structure of production varies significantly between countries. In a number 
of NMS such as Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, the subsistence sector 
represents an important part (10-20  %) of milk production. Market-oriented 
milk producers have to operate and compete for markets and resources along-
side this subsistence sector. Other countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, and Slovakia are characterised by commercial milk production in lar-
ger units. Market-oriented milk production will expand with the ongoing pace Agricultural markets in CEE – An overview  19
of investments. Subsistence production will continue to decline but will leave 
additional markets of liquid milk for domestic production. 
Trade integration is not very high on the export side, but is well-integrated on 
the import side. The large milk producers, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, the 
Czech Republic, and Slovakia, export to destinations other than EU-25 countries 
(Figure 9). Further increases in market integration on the export side will depend 
on the competitiveness of products such as cheese.  
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Source: EUROPEAN  COMMISSION  (2004): DG for Agriculture Prospects for Agricultural 
markets and income 2004-2011 for EU-25, Brussels/Belgium, December 2004. 
3 CONLUSION 
Despite increasing integration, markets in the EU-10 appeared to be limited re-
garding the ability to absorb and stabilise volatile agricultural production. This 
had a particular effect on Hungary – the largest exporter – and on Poland – the 
largest producer of agricultural commodities of the NMS. 
In Poland, producer prices in agriculture have generally developed well. Invest-
ments have increased both in the agricultural and food industries. However, due 
to rapidly changing economic and institutional settings, it is doubtful for farmers 
whether the conditions will continue to be that favourable.  
The value of both agricultural exports and imports has increased in Hungary in 
recent years. The rate of the increase of imports will exceed that of exports, 
though the agricultural trade balance will remain positive, albeit with a decreasing 
trend. The development of the HUF/EUR exchange rate will have a significant 
impact on the development of agricultural production and trade. Hungary, as a 
EU-10: Share of dairy export to 
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net exporter of agricultural commodities, imposes additional challenges to the 
downstream sector. Processors and traders specialised on crops, as well as fruits 
and vegetables, use their organised market power to put pressure on producer 
prices. The lack of competition in the downstream sector may result in restruc-
turing costs being imposed on farmers. Farmers have been disappointed so far 
due to the short-term development of markets and the lack of information on the 
CAP. Uncertainty about the possibilities under the rural development plan, the 
final amount of the top-up of direct payments, as well as the general lack of spe-
cific information on the CAP were among the biggest concerns of farmers. Crop 
production will generate 93-95 % of the total income in agriculture; animal pro-
duction will have a share of 5-7 %. 
Significant impacts will be induced by the enlargement of the European Union, 
particularly for the NMS through policy and price changes in the dairy, sugar, 
and cereal markets. Intra-trade effects from enlargement are significant And are 
caused by changes in consumption and production rather than by changes in the 
intra-protection structure. The new prices faced by consumers and producers in 
the NMS are the major cause of this reallocation. In general, consumers in the 
NMS pay more for their food since accession. There are some changes in trade 
in the NMS because of major domestic changes, such as in beef trade. As a re-
sult of enlargement, the further adjustment of production and consumption will 
take place in the EU-25. Adjustment will include the development of sufficient 
export infrastructure in the cereal sectors of the NMS, development towards 
meeting standards and competitiveness of pork and milk production, as well as 
that of the meat processing industries. 
The market impact of enlargement has been very positive for the NMS. Agricul-
tural production will stabilise in milk and dairy production and increase in the 
cereal and meat sectors. The NMS will be able to gain additional market shares 
in the EU-25 in the area of cereals, poultry and beef. However, some market in-
efficiencies still exist regarding infrastructure and standards of production. Ef-
fective integration into the single market should depend partly on the develop-
ment of production and marketing infrastructure and partly on the compliance of 
production with EU standards in a cost efficient manner.  
Agricultural markets will benefit from the trade creation effects of integration 
into the Single Market and from the decoupled support through the CAP. Re-
garding decoupling, member states are expected to implement CAP reform in 
different ways, which will result in various degrees of decoupling. Changes in 
the set-aside policy in the NMS will also have an impact, inducing reductions in 
supply, yield growth assumptions, relative price movements of commodities and 
their substitution ramifications – both on the demand and supply sides – as well 
as feed use and animal number interactions. As a result of lower prices, the pro-
duction of wheat, corn, and barley commodities in the EU-15 will decrease 
slightly.  Agricultural markets in CEE – An overview  21
The concentration of land use has increased after enlargement, and will continue 
in the upcoming years. Changes in the structure of agricultural production will 
have an impact on agricultural employment as well. The pressure to improve ef-
ficiency will threaten even more jobs in agriculture in the future than in the past.  
Agriculture as both market- and subsistence-oriented is an important phenome-
non in a number of countries, in particular in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. Sub-
sistence farmers obtain little alternative income from social security systems and 
from employment outside agriculture. They basically produce for their own con-
sumption and, to a lesser extent, for direct sales. Restructuring the subsistence 
sector depends on the revival of rural economies and responds only marginally 
to agricultural policy measures directed to markets and income. With EU acces-
sion, funds have become available to contribute to the revival of rural econo-
mies, if these funds are well-managed and targeted. 
Due to the steep competition in the EU, small-scale producers and producers 
unable to meet community requirements (standards) will be forced to give up 
agricultural production. Decreased production in the concerned sectors may lead 
to decreasing output of the processing industry as well. Thus, the creation of al-
ternative income sources in the affected regions is of great importance. 
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The paper presents the evolution of the agro-food chain in Poland using the 
example of two important food products: Pork and apples. The paper analyses 
the inheritance of the former economic system, the influence of the transition 
period and the current situation in the fruit and pork markets. The goal of the 
research is to show links between producers, the processing sector and distri-
bution networks. The paper focuses on the position of small producers, their 
possibilities of self-organisation and the public support they receive. In addi-
tion, the results of a preliminary survey are presented, which stress the most 
important problems of small producers: Poor institutionalisation, especially in 
the area of self-organisation and very limited access to modern knowledge and 
technology. As a result, thousands of farms have reduced their ties with the 
market and produce only for the needs of their own farm households. There is 
lack of well-defined and efficient public support for small producers, most of 
whom feel like losers in the process of post-communist transformation and 
market reform. 
Keywords: Agro-food chain, apple market, pork market, Poland. 
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REGOVERNING AGRIFOOD MARKETS IN CEEC –  
POLAND'S PORK AND APPLE MARKETS




The structure of the Polish agro-food chain has changed dramatically during the 
post-communist transformation. During the socialist period, 75 % of land was in 
the private sector, which was a unique phenomenon in the Soviet block of coun-
tries. State control over the farming sector imposed several measures: Price con-
trol, establishing area limits to agricultural holdings, collectivisation (turning 
private property into state and cooperative property) of upstream and down-
stream sectors, administrative rationing of industrial inputs for farms, etc. State 
and cooperative companies, subordinate to the central planning bodies, con-
trolled the wholesale and retail trade of agro-food products. Due to shortages of 
basic food products during the martial law period in the 1980s, a rationing sys-
tem for primary food products was established. This system was abolished by 
the last communist government in July 1989. Price liberalisation was then 
started in Poland in area of agricultural and food products, the first act of market 
reforms preceding a whole package of systemic reforms introduced on January 
1
st, 1990 (known as the "Balcerowicz Plan").  
In the first stage of market reforms, hundreds of thousands of small shops and 
processing plants were established in food production and trade. Later, they be-
come the subject of concentration and competition from large international 
companies. After 15 years of transformation, over 98 % of trade is now in the 
private sector. In 2002 there were 845,000 retail sales outlets, including some 
450,000 shops, or 45 people per sales outlet, and 85 people per shop. There are 
174,000 shops selling food and beverages (GUS, 2003). 
During transition, the share of agriculture in gross domestic product (GDP) de-
creased from 14.5 % in 1988 to 3.9 % in 2002. In the same timeframe, food 
processing and trade developed quickly, and now the food industry is the largest 
in the Polish economy: Its share in the nation’s gross production in 2002 reached 
6.7 %. The food industry (including beverages and tobacco) is the largest branch 
of the Polish manufacturing sector, with a share of almost 20 % (URBAN, 2004, 
p. 11). Agri-food products do not play an important role in foreign trade in 
Poland: Their share of exports in 2003 was 8.4 %, and of imports, 5.9 %. The 
balance of trade in agri-food products has been negative during most of transi-
tion period, reaching a positive value of almost USD 500 million in 2003 due to 
the highly dynamic trade in processed food (ANALIZA, 2004, p. 265). 
The Agricultural Census of 2002 shows that there are 2,933,000 agricultural 
holdings, of which 1,896,000 operate on 1 hectare or more. Almost 10.5 million 
people live in households that use agricultural land, which is 27.4 % of the na-
tion’s population (PSR, 2002). Over 40 % of farms, especially smaller ones, 
produce mostly for their own needs. The average area of a farm is 5.76 ha, and in 
the group of farms with 1 ha or more, the average size is 8.44 ha. There are strong 
ties between the farm and households. In farm families, the self-supply of food is Jerzy Wilkin, Małgorzta Juchniewicz, Dominika Milczarek 
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very important: It amounted to 50.9 % of all food consumption in 1993, dropping 
to 38.8 % in 2002. The share of self-supply in food consumption for all house-
holds in the country declined from 14.8 % in 1992 to 8.1 % in 2002 (URBAN, 
2004, p. 35). It remains, however, much higher than in other EU member states.  
The average Polish family spent 26.6 % of its income for food, beverages and 
tobacco in 2002 (GUS, 2003). This share decreased from 40 % in 1989. In the 
1990s, the agro-food industry was a primary target of foreign direct investments 
(FDI). FDI in the Polish food industry jumped from USD 1 886 million in 1994 
to USD 6 402 million in 2002
2 (URBAN, 2004, p. 110). Growth of FDI over the 
years 2000-2003 slowed; the value of FDI in fruit and vegetable processing (to 
the end of 2002) was USD 318 million and in meat processing, USD 483 million.  
In the period from 1996-2000, 112 hypermarkets opened in Poland. The share of 
modern distribution channels, which include hypermarkets, supermarkets and 
discount stores have been increasing quickly. This share increased from 18 % in 
1998 to 32 % in 2002 (RETAIL, 2004, p. 69). In Spain it took 20 years to estab-
lish a similar number of hypermarkets. It is estimated that in 2010 the share of 
large retail networks in Poland will reach 75-80 % of retail trade, as it is now 
in West European economies. Recently, hypermarkets operating in Poland 
started to export Polish food products to their chain stores in other countries 
(RETAIL, 2004). The expansion of large international retail chains generates 
conflicts in some places with representatives of small, traditional stores. There 
were several campaigns on the national and local level aimed at stopping the lo-
calisation of new hyper- and supermarkets, as well as restricting their operation 
on Sundays. These campaigns have not achieved noticeable success. 
2 EVOLUTION OF THE FOOD CHAIN IN POLAND: THE CASE OF  
APPLES AND PORK PRODUCTION 
The evolution of the agro-food chain is analysed through two important food 
products: Pork and apples. Pork is the most popular meat in Poland, and the 
country is the 4
th largest pork producer in the EU and 6
th largest in the world. 
Poland is also one of the largest apple producers in the EU. Every fourth litre of 
apple juice in the world is produced from Polish apple extract. In short, Poland 
is a significant exporter of both products, especially for the UE market. 
                                                 
2  These amounts include only investments over 1 USD million. Regoverning agrifood markets in CEEC – Poland's pork and apple markets 
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2.1  Characteristics of the Polish apple market chain 
2.1.1  Inheritance of the former economic system and transition period on 
the fruit market 
Before the current systemic changes, private farmers dominated fruit and vege-
table production, food-processing plants belonged to the so-called socialised 
sector
3 and distribution networks consisted of both a private and socialised sec-
tor. Cooperatives were responsible for purchasing fruits and vegetables for the 
processing sector, export and partially for the internal market. Cooperatives 
were also responsible for providing several services such as storing, packing and 
transport, as well as the delivery of inputs. 
According to a law from 1990, the headquarters of horticulture and apiarian co-
operatives were liquidated. After the dramatic collapse of horticulture coopera-
tives, the traditional relationships between fruit market participants were broken. 
This resulted in the weaker position of most fruit-growing farms and contributed 
to increased competition between them (HALICKA, 2002; PIZŁO, 2002). To adapt 
to free market conditions, market-oriented fruit producers started to intensify 
production and to modernise their farms. This resulted in increased production 
levels and improved the quality of fruits.  
Due to the liberalisation process, traditionally export-oriented large state compa-
nies lost their dominant position. The fall of eastern markets created the necessity 
of looking for new foreign partners. In addition, growing domestic demand for 
processed fruits and vegetables in the beginning of 1990s allowed for the emer-
gence of many small processing plants. Processed fruit and vegetable production 
has been increasing in Poland since the beginning of 1990s, with the most dy-
namic development observed since the mid-1990s due to increased foreign in-
vestment
4 (HALICKA, 1999; KULISZ, 2002). The restructuring and modernisation 
of fruit and vegetable-processing companies included: A gradual reduction of 
employment in former state-owned companies; seeking permanent commercial 
partners; strengthening vertical connections; improvement of quality; increasing 
degree of specialisation, etc. (HALICKA, 1999; PLOCHARSKI et al., 2002). 
In the 1990s, changes in the fruit and vegetable (and food in general) distribu-
tion systems were influenced by the de-concentration of horticulture coopera-
tives, dispersion of wholesale trade and an increasing number of alimentary 
shops (PIZŁO, 2001). Also in the 1990s, the number of purchasers increased and 
new purchasers (super- and hypermarket chains) entered the market, which sub-
stantially changed conditions on the market. Fruit exchanges stopped playing an 
important role, while the platform of market chains took over their tasks. Also, 
                                                 
3  Socialized sector included cooperatives and state-owned companies. 
4  Both as a result of green field investment and the privatization of state companies. Jerzy Wilkin, Małgorzta Juchniewicz, Dominika Milczarek 
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producers started to sell directly to supermarket chains and fruit processing 
companies. 
During the first years of transformation, the most important problems of pro-
ducers, processing companies and distribution networks on the fruit market were 
the low level of stability on the market and an inefficient institutional environ-
ment. 
2.1.2  Current situation on the fruit market 
Production structure 
Fruit and vegetable production is an important branch of the agricultural sector 
in Poland, amounting to around 12 % of total agricultural production for sale. 
Arable land under fruit and vegetable growing covers around 640 thousand ha 
(4  % of the total farmland in Poland) including orchards of 270  thousand  ha 
(around 1.6 % of total farmland). Apple production dominates: It is conducted 
on over 50 % of orchards’ area (PSR, 2002; RYNEK OWOCÓW, 2004). 
Apple crops reach 1.6-2.4 million tons per year. In 2003, it amounted to around 
2.43 million tons. The highest share of apple production originates in central and 
southeast Poland
5. Despite a steady increase in apple production, large fluctua-
tions in the size of crops occur because of climate conditions and uncoordinated 
decisions of farmers. This results in significant price fluctuations (KUBIAK et al., 
2002; RYNEK OWOCÓW, 2004). 
From 1992-2000, around 40 % of total fresh fruit production in Poland was de-
livered directly for consumption, around 40 % was processed and 10 % was ex-
ported.
6 However, the share of processed fruits is increasing – in 2001 it reached 
50 % of total fresh fruit production and it currently amounts to around 60 % of 
total fruit crops (KUBIAK et al., 2002; RYNEK OWOCÓW, 2004). 
The majority of land under fruit production is owned by the private sector. In 
2000, 96.8 % of orchards’ area belonged to private owners and 3.2 % to the state 
sector. Cooperatives operated 0.6 % of orchards’ area, while foreign owners ac-
counted for just 0.1 %. Individual farmers comprised 92.6 % (KUBIAK et al., 
2002). 
Currently, fruit production is very dispersed. According to the Agricultural 
Census conducted in 2002, there were around 242,000 farms
7 producing apples 
and apple production covered over 147,000 ha
8. Most of the apple producing 
                                                 
5  In Mazowieckie voivodship, around 51 %, Lodzkie voivodship, 11 % and in Lubelskie 
voivodship, 10 % of total production in 2001 (KUBIAK et al., 2002). 
6  The remaining 10 % of total fresh fruit production was spoiled or used for non-consumption 
purposes. 
7  I.e. around 8 % of the total number of farms in Poland. 
8  I.e. around 1 % of the total farmland in Poland.  Regoverning agrifood markets in CEEC – Poland's pork and apple markets 
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farms (28 % of apple-growing farms) were very small (having a total farm area 
of less than 1 ha). However, their share of apple production was very small. The 
area of apple growing in these farms covered only around 4 % of the apple or-
chards’ area. Most apple production was concentrated in small and average 
farms operating from 5 to 15 ha of farmland (27 % of the total number of apple-
growing farms) and covering almost 50 % of the total area under apple produc-
tion. However, farmers who have apple orchards are diversifying their produc-
tion. The majority of them have less than 1 ha of apple orchards (87 % of total 
number of apple-producers) (PSR, 2002). Only around 10 % of farmers with 
apple orchards are specialised in apple production. This can be explained by the 
unstable situation on the apple market in Poland.  
The very dispersed structure of producers, lack of capital necessary for invest-
ments in farms and insufficient storage capacities influence the bargaining posi-
tion of apple producers. The main problems of apple producers are highly fluc-
tuating prices, unstable production conditions, high level of competition and 
problems with marketing of their products.  
In the case of processing apples, the main distribution channels for apple-
growing farmers are usually local trading companies and small wholesale com-
panies. The profit margin of trading companies usually amounts to 10-20 %. In 
the regions with a high level of production and fruit-processing concentration 
(such as in the central region of Poland) producers also sell directly to fruit-
processing companies. The role of trading companies in table apple turnover is 
very small. Small fruit-growing producers usually sell table apples directly at lo-
cal marketplaces (around 40-50 % of table apples sales) and to alimentary shops. 
They usually have oral contracts and prices for their products and sales amounts 
depend largely on seasonal conditions. Larger fruit-growing producers and 
members of producers’ groups tend to sell table apples directly to large purchas-
ers like super- and hypermarket chains or exporting companies. They usually 
have written short-term contracts that allows for sales stability and higher prices 
in comparison to other producers. Usually in the case of table apples, they can 
receive around 70 % of the final price. However, they have to adapt to long 
payment periods and high purchasers’ requirements on quality, short terms of 
delivery, etc. This shows the relative bargaining superiority of supermarket 
chains over producers
9. 
Despite the existence of many branch organisations and associations, a very low 
level of economic cooperation between producers characterises the fruit and 
vegetable markets. Current producers’ associations and horticulture cooperatives 
very often have organisational and financial problems and do not fulfil their 
statutory tasks.  
                                                 
9  Data were obtained from own survey and interviews with experts from IERiGŻ (Institute 




Fruit processing production is dominated by the production of juices and beve-
rages, chilled fruits and fruit juice extracts (mainly condensed apple juice). They 
constitute around 15 % of total Polish exports of agricultural products. Prices of 
chilled fruits and vegetables and of apple juice extract (products with a very high 
share in exports) fluctuate significantly according to the situation of demand and 
supply on the European and world markets. This results in important changes in 
the economic situation of processing companies during the given years. However, 
due to production concentration, the financial situation of fruit and vegetable 
processing companies has improved in recent years (KULISZ, 2002).  
There are around 1,300 fruit and vegetable processing companies in Poland; 
most of them (90 %) are small firms employing less than 50 persons. Large 
companies with more than 100 employees constitute around 2 % of the firms. 
Most fruit and vegetable processing companies are located in central Poland, 
which is in the region of the highest production concentration. In all branches of 
fruit and vegetable processing (except pickled and dried vegetables) foreign 
capital dominates (KULISZ, 2002). 
The increase in production of processed fruits and a lower demand on the domes-
tic market in recent years has resulted in lower prices and the emergence of a 
group of effective processing companies. Competition is causing a concentration 
of production and an increase of market share for a group of leaders (HALICKA, 
1999). 
Distribution networks 
Changes in fruit and vegetable distribution in Poland were influenced, to a large 
extent, by the transformation and integration process with the EU. Just as in the 
case of the production and processing sector, a high level of dispersion charac-
terises the wholesale and retail trade of fruits and vegetables.  
Due to the deregulation of the storage sector in the beginning of 1990s, small, 
independent wholesale companies developed and are currently dominating the 
market. According to the Central Statistical Office data, there are around 3,800 
companies for which fruit and vegetable trade is the main activity. The small 
wholesale companies usually deliver fruits and vegetables to fruit-processing 
companies, as well to local market places in towns. The role of local market 
places, whose number increased significantly in the beginning of 1990s after the 
liquidation of traditional distribution channels, is currently diminishing. In retail 
trade, the number of alimentary shops increased significantly in the 1990s and 
reached the number of around 140,000, while the number of specialised fruit and 
vegetable shops (very common in Poland prior to the 1990s) decreased to about 
6,700 in 2000 (HALICKA, 2002). Regoverning agrifood markets in CEEC – Poland's pork and apple markets 
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Changes in trade structure were also forced by the quick development of large, 
international super- and hypermarket chains. According to Pizło, super- and 
hypermarket chains in Poland are not able to compete with small local market 
places with fresh fruits and vegetables, as the chains' variety is limited in com-
parison, especially during summer season (PIZŁO, 2001). However, their share in 
total retail turnover of fruits is increasing, and currently amounts to 25  %
10 
(TRZĘSOWSKI and WAWRZYNIAK, 2002).  
As a consequence of the high level of dispersion and the lack of coordination 
between participants on the market, distributional networks for fruits and vege-
tables are not effective (PIZŁO, 2001). However, the process of further concen-
trating the wholesale and retail trade can be expected to occur in the next 10 
years. Therefore, the importance of traditional local market places, as well as of 
general alimentary and specialised vegetable and fruits shops will diminish 
while modern wholesale markets will improve their position. In addition, the 
development of producers’ groups of fruit and vegetable-growing farmers will 
allow for larger participation of so-called primary markets
11, i.e., local wholesale 
markets located in regions where fruit and vegetable production occurs. It is es-
timated that the role of super- and hypermarket chains will increase significantly 
and even reach a 50 % share of total fruit retail turnover by 2010 (TRZĘSOWSKI 
and WAWRZYNIAK, 2002). 
Results of a preliminary survey with apple producers and representatives of fruit 
processing companies 
A pilot survey with apple producers and representatives of fruit processing com-
panies was organised in two regions of Poland: Central Poland, where the largest 
share of fruit production is concentrated (and which is also called the "largest 
orchard of Europe") and in the southeastern region of Poland (close to the 
Ukrainian border).
12 The survey covered the following issues: Influence of the 
transition period on production conditions, the current situation and future de-
velopments on the market, the influence of government policy and accession to 
the European Union.  
According to the survey results, there are two important factors influencing 
opinions on problems related to apple production and marketing, as well as on 
the economic situation and the developmental possibilities of farms: Farm size 
and membership in a producers’ group. The smaller farmers, not associated in any 
producers’ group, tend to perceive their situation as difficult mainly because of a 
lack of capital necessary for investment and a lack of influence on the market. 
                                                 
10 These are rough estimates because of the lack of detailed information about the amount of 
products traded through different distribution channels (TRZĘSOWSKI and WAWRZYNIAK, 2002). 
11  These markets are also called producers’ markets (PIZŁO, 2001). 
12  11 interviews were made in the central region, and 10 in the southeastern region.  Jerzy Wilkin, Małgorzta Juchniewicz, Dominika Milczarek 
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In general, the most important issues for fruit producers in both the surveyed re-
gions are problems with marketing of products and the fluctuation of prices. All 
interviewed persons agreed that small farmers not associated with any producers’ 
group or cooperative have no chance to survive and develop. They emphasised 
that there is a strong need for modernising production, specialisation and im-
proving the quality of products.  
Farmers from the central region of Poland have already benefited from acces-
sion to the European Union (EU) (thanks to the SAPARD program and a higher 
demand for their products) and therefore they evaluate it much more positively 
than do farmers from the southeastern region. In both regions, apple producers 
expect government policies to support stable prices (i.e., contracting and mini-
mal prices) and farm modernisation (i.e., better access to credits). Such policies 
will improve the bargaining position of producers vis a vis supermarket chains 
and fruit processing companies, which (in the opinion of farmers) dictate condi-
tions on the market
13.  
A comparison of pilot studies’ results with farmers and representatives of fruit 
processing companies stresses the problem of a dispersed production structure 
and underdeveloped producers’ organisations (like producers’ groups). According 
to the interviewed persons, a stronger relationship (including long-term con-
tracts) would be beneficial for both producers and purchasers.  
Membership in producers’ groups allows for more stable production and mar-
keting conditions. Farmers who are members of producers’ groups have written, 
usually unlimited contracts with large companies such as supermarket chains, 
exporting companies and fruit processing companies. Independent farmers not 
associated in any producers’ groups or cooperatives very often sell to casual 
purchasers (i.e., trading companies) or based on oral contracts. Therefore, small 
independent farmers evaluate their position as very weak; they cannot enforce 
the terms of contracts and do not see any sense in applying for a court trial. 
In general, fruit processing companies’ representatives complain of a dispersed 
production system which results in fluctuating quality (acidity of apples) and 
unstable deliveries. Apple producers are unable to estimate the amount of their 
production as well as shares of production for consumption or processing. To 
guarantee supplies, some fruit-processing companies enter into a tight coopera-
tion with producers and support them in producing specific sub-species of apples 
needed for juice extract production. The manner of support includes training, 
crediting (by delivering means of plant protection), providing seedlings, etc.  
Results of the survey suggest that the next research steps should include an ex-
tended analysis of contracts and the creation of producers’ groups. If possible, 
                                                 
13 By imposing strong requirements such as a very short time frame for delivery, very high 
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the survey will also include other actors (such as representatives of super and 
hyper-market chains, and small wholesale companies).  
2.2  Evolution of the agro-food market during post-socialist transformation – 
The case of the pork market 
2.2.1  Inheritance of former system 
Large state-owned companies or cooperatives, associated in headquarters, were 
the main economic units in the meat-processing and distribution sectors of the 
centrally-planned economy in Poland. The headquarters managed these compa-
nies directly or indirectly using common administrative methods. Therefore, a 
high level of concentration characterised this structure.  
Government policy concerning the purchase of pigs for slaughter included com-
pulsory deliveries from 1945-1971 (except the years 1947-1951) and a contracting 
system. The goals of this system were: The enlargement of the pig population 
and an increase of purchasing by providing incentives, especially for small and 
medium-sized individual farmers, for selling animals to so-called socialised 
(state-owned and cooperative) purchasing centres. From 1946-1980, the pig 
population increased from around 2.65  million to around 21  million heads. 
However, economic problems in the 1980s caused a reduction of feed imports 
and an unbalanced production of pigs for slaughter; this resulted in the state con-
trol of food. In a situation of meat shortages on the market, the sale of the whole 
output of pig producers and state-owned meat processing companies was secured. 
The profitability of producing pigs for slaughter was assured by maintaining a 
given price relationship between pigs and other agricultural products, e.g. grain 
and potatoes. Artificial price relationships were controlled by state agencies. 
Such a policy created a very large demand for agricultural products, including 
meat and processed meat. The continuous surplus of demand resulted in a good 
economic situation of all small and medium-sized farms. These circumstances 
did not force farmers to introduce technological progress, to compete by de-
creasing costs, or to improve the quality of their products. 
Only in 1982 were prices admitted to be decisive parameters. As a result of re-
forms, three types of prices were introduced into the food processing sector: 
Administrative, regulated and contractual
14. Even though from 1982-1989, 
prices became an active instrument on the market, they did not play their role 
entirely. This was caused by the strong influence of other instruments on the 
market, such as state controls, central accounting and distribution, subsidies and 
                                                 
14  Administrative prices were decided on the central level based on average production costs in 
a given branch. Regulated prices covered a very small group of products which were recog-
nized as important for society, but which were not decided upon regarding value of food ex-
pense. Other products had contractual prices, i.e., decided by producers and negotiated with 
purchasers (retail companies) without state intervention. Jerzy Wilkin, Małgorzta Juchniewicz, Dominika Milczarek 
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tax exemptions. In the case of meat, a distribution system based on ration-cards 
was also played a very important role. The low efficiency of the market did not 
allow for either substantial production increases or a market balance.  
2.2.2  Characteristics of the transformation period and current market 
structure 
As a result of the 1989 reforms, systems of contracting, the administration of 
prices, the distribution of inputs, and subsidising production and consumption 
were all cancelled. Thereafter, the relations between actors in the food chain has 
been changing very quickly. There was a concentration process in the procure-
ment, processing and trade sectors and the position of these elements of the food 
chain has strengthened. The costs of these adjustments have mostly been paid by 
farmers. In general, the transition period of the meat market can be characterised 
by three stages. During the first stage (1988-1992) sharp price changes and sys-
temic changes in production and trade structures occurred. In the second stage 
(1992-1998) there was a fast process of privatisation and modernisation of the 
meat-processing industry. The third stage (1998-2003) was dominated by ad-
justments to EU conditions.  
Currently, one can observe a growing structural asymmetry on the meat market. 
On both ends of the food chain there are numerous groups of actors, i.e., 
1.1 million producers of primary products (farmers) and 12 million households. 
These groups form a highly competitive environment. In the middle there are the 
processing plants and traders, characterised by a growing level of concentration. In 
some regions, food processors or procurement companies have quasi-monopolistic 
positions and can dictate delivery prices and increase profits at the cost of agricul-
tural producers.  
Production structure 
Pig production in Poland is concentrated in private, usually small, family farms 
which have limited production capacities. In 1986, pig breeding was conducted on 
70 % of farms, and in 1996, on 50 % of farms. Thus, within 10 years, the number 
of pig producers fell from 1.66 million to 1.09 million, i.e., 35 %; but it is still 
very large. From 1986-1996, the average pig population per producer increased 
from 8 to 14 heads, i.e., by 75 %, but its level is still low. This is caused by the 
small scale of pig production in farms smaller than 10 ha, which dominate pig 
breeding. The average pig population of these farms amounted only to 7 heads in 
1996, while in farms of 10-15 ha it was 20 heads; in farms over 20 ha it was 42 
heads. Almost 90 % of farms breeding pigs have up to 49 pigs per farm. The 
average number of pigs in the largest farms increased by 110 %, and their share of 
total population increased from 25  % to 40  %, i.e., from 3.4  million to 
6.1 million heads. Sixteen percent of the population were in herds of less than 10 
heads, 46 % in herds up to 50 heads, 17 % in herds from 50 to 100 heads, and 
21 % were in herds of over 100 (JUCHNIEWICZ, 1998). In the EU, concentration Regoverning agrifood markets in CEEC – Poland's pork and apple markets 
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in pork production is high; there were 1 million farms producing pork in 1997. 
Over 50 % of production comes from farms of over 1,000 heads, and an addi-
tional 25  % from farms with herds over 400 (MALKOWSKI  and  ZAWADZKA, 
2000).  
It is very important for producers of pork to be integrated with meat processing 
companies. Those who do not contract with these companies receive at least 10 % 
lower price for pork deliveries. There is also an economy of scale benefit for big-
ger producers. It is estimated that the difference of costs between small and large 
producers is about 15 %. Meat processing companies are interested in contracting 
with larger producers that deliver products of high quality in large amounts. For 
small producers, the alternatives are to get bigger or to establish producer groups 
with other similar producers. 
However, the process of pig producers’ organisation is very slow. Currently, 
there are only 5 registered producers’ groups and 93 unregistered ones on the 
pig market. The main reasons for this are the attitudes of farmers (distrust of 
partnerships and cooperatives, tradition of individual activity, negative past ex-
periences); economics (large capital diversity of agricultural producers, unwill-
ingness of strong farms to participate in organisations which also include weak 
farms); lack of cooperation patterns in rural society; and the lack of leaders who 
would undertake the organisation of producers’ groups. It is expected that the 
processes of farm integration will proceed in an evolutionary way, as producers 
gain knowledge and change their attitudes toward cooperation (KNOBLAUCH and 
LIZIŃSKA, 2003). 
Before Poland’s accession to the EU, there were significant differences between the 
level of support for pork producers in Poland and in EU. The Polish government's 
main intervention instrument on the pork market before accession to the EU was 
the purchase of meat conducted by the state Agency for Agricultural Market 
(ARR). Purchased pork was offered on the domestic market or for export, de-
pending on the market situation. Poland’s accession to the EU forced the Polish 
government to significantly change the support system for meat products.  
Meat-processing industry 
The privatisation of state-owned companies in the meat industry was completed 
by 1998. A group of leading sector companies has emerged, both from priva-
tised companies as well as from small and medium-sized companies, which 
were created during the first phase of transformation. This was also the period of 
large investment, significant inflow of foreign capital and the improvement of 
their financial situation. 
During the last years of transformation, in the so-called second restructuring 
phase, meat-processing companies began to reduce redundant resources and to 
limit production profiles. From 2002-2003, they also accelerated the investment 
process to adapt to sanitary requirements in the EU, to implement quality systems Jerzy Wilkin, Małgorzta Juchniewicz, Dominika Milczarek 
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and to extend integration with pig producers. Contracting in the pig sector has 
been developing with increased competition since the mid-1990s. Currently, the 
best meat-processing companies use contracting to stabilise deliveries and to in-
fluence the quality of pigs for slaughter. The meat industry has again started to 
organise its own source of raw materials, to influence development and to reor-
ganise agricultural structures.  
However, meat processing is also dispersed in Poland. There are 4,200 firms in 
this branch of the food industry. 2,800 firms are dealing with slaughtering and 
cutting up of animals, 2,650 process red meat, 650 produce minced meat, and 70 
deals with the storage of meat. 870 meat processing plant employ over 5 people 
each. Among them there are 350 plants of medium and large size employing 
over 50 people each. Large and medium-sized plants control 41 % of slaughtering 
and 60 % of meat processing. The level of specialisation in the meat industry is 
relatively low. Utilisation of production capacity in meat processing plants is also 
at a low level and in most cases does not exceed 60 % (in slaughtering pigs – 
45 %, slaughtering cattle – 25 %, processing – 50 %, production of ham, sau-
sages. etc. – 33 %). Technical and technological standards of the meat industry 
are differentiated. Usually, high standards are found in processing plants and sig-
nificantly lower are found in slaughtering houses. The Polish meat industry is 
based mostly on domestic capital. Significant progress has been achieved in the 
last several years in the implementation of technological knowledge, development 
of domestic production of machinery for the meat industry, the durability of 
products, hygienic standards, packaging, labelling and the standardisation of de-
liveries (JUCHNIEWICZ, 1997). 
European integration has had an important impact on the meat processing sector. 
In 2003, investments in the meat industry reached USD 50 million, 50 % higher 
than the previous year (RYNEK MIĘSA, 2004). As a result of this tendency, the 
number of plants having licenses to export to the EU market is growing rapidly. 
Distribution channels 
At the beginning of 1990s, a common feature at all levels of product turnover 
was the liquidation or significant limitation of previous entities’ roles. This was 
a result of the sale of state-owned and cooperative retail outlets (such as 
"Samopomoc Chłopska", "Społem", Państwowy Hurt Spożywczy), which domi-
nated the distribution of agro-food products. Small trade companies were created 
from the former cooperative and state-owned outlets, and newly-founded private 
entities also overtook their place. The freedom of creating market relationships 
and the lack of administrative restrictions allowed for the development of new 
distribution channels in the pork market.  
The transformation of the Polish economy resulted in changes in the proportion of 
registered to unregistered animal procurement. In the first phase of transforma-
tion, the integration of relationships between pig producers with meat-processing Regoverning agrifood markets in CEEC – Poland's pork and apple markets 
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companies based on a contracting system collapsed. Rapid developments of 
small slaughterhouses and processing companies, the weaker position of state-
owned companies and the quick privatisation of retail trade companies occurred. 
The entrepreneurship of small companies, a lack of entry barriers for new enti-
ties, and their accessibility to a dispersed retail network all caused the state sec-
tor to lose its dominant market position in a very short time. It was also a result 
of delays in restructuring state-owned companies.  
In the 1990s, a brokerage of private wholesale companies became, for meat-
processing companies, a basic distribution channel for purchasing pigs for 
slaughter. Private wholesale companies usually cooperate with small and me-
dium-sized pig producers and with medium and large scale meat-processing 
companies. Traditional distributional channels in Poland were also local markets. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, they even played the role of distribution channel 
for the processing sector. However, their current importance is diminishing in the 
turnover of meat, even while it is still important for the fruit and vegetable trade. 
Exchanges and wholesale markets play a small role in the turnover of agricul-
tural products, including pigs for slaughter and pork. In the mid-1990s, there 
were tens of these type institutions of local character. At the end of the 1990s, 
their number had significantly decreased, and 6-8 regional exchanges emerged. 
Mostly spot transactions take place at these exchanges, unlike in other countries 
where forward transactions tend to dominate. There is also a small number of 
transactions and small turnover on these exchanges. In addition, a state agency – 
the Agricultural Market Agency – has the largest share of total turnover. 
Currently, there are 14,000 local wholesalers employing over 5 people each. 
This is 80 % of all wholesalers on the market. The sector of larger wholesalers 
included 5 nation-wide wholesale networks, 5 procurement groups, 60 regional 
wholesale networks and 500 regional wholesale firms. In retail trade, there are 
15,000  meat stores, 90,000  grocery stores, 1,800  large network stores and 
65,000 catering units. The share of large network shops in the distribution of 
meat and meat products is around 33 % (URBAN, 2004). Large retailers have the 
most noticeable impact on improving the quality of products, vertical and hori-
zontal integration and on the rationalisation of the delivery system. They also 
play a dominant role in consolidating the wholesale and retail trade in the Polish 
meat market. It is estimated that large food store chains will control 75-80 % of 
the grocery market in Poland in 2010, a similar share as in West European 
countries at the beginning of this decade (WRZOSEK, 2002). 
The size of procurement price fluctuations for pork and ham decreased in second 
half of the 1990s, a positive development which shows the declining price risk 
on the meat market. From 1992-2002, changes in retail prices for meat and meat 
products were smaller than the change of prices of livestock. The smallest 
changes can be observed in the case of boiled ham. The meat industry reacts to 
cyclical and seasonal changes in procurement prices and reduces fluctuations of Jerzy Wilkin, Małgorzta Juchniewicz, Dominika Milczarek 
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retail prices. There is a long-term tendency to decrease the share of procurement 
prices in retail and meat processor prices. The most unstable are prices at the 
primary producer level. Meat processing companies have a decisive impact on 
the price relation between farmers and retailers. 
Results of the preliminary survey with pork producers 
Results of a preliminary survey with pork producers show that over 70 % of in-
terviewed farmers entered into agreements with purchasers. Among them, 40 % 
had long-term written contracts, 40 % had one-year written contracts and only 
20 % had oral contracts. The contracts between farmers and meat processing 
companies can cover one or more years and usually include: Minimum delivery/ 
procurement per year, monthly or quarterly delivery amount, minimum pigs per 
delivery and payment periods for delivered pigs. Multi-year contracts include ad-
ditional premiums for delivery on time. Additionally, while signing multi-year 
contracts, meat processing companies offer advisory services regarding animal 
genetics, feeding, building modernisation, and environmental and veterinary as-
pects of pig production. Some companies offer also convenient credit lines. 
However, almost 30 % of those interviewed did not sign any contract. They ex-
plained their decision by citing the possibility of changing purchasers and thus 
gaining better price and payment conditions. On the other hand, they made at-
tempts to cooperate with other farmers, especially in buying inputs or machinery.  
In many local meat-processing companies, direct deliveries from farmers domi-
nated and farmers undertook all costs and risks connected to these deliveries. 
Results of the survey show that small pig producers usually deliver their products 
to small meat-processing companies while large farms establish distribution re-
lationships with large companies. 
For the interviewed farmers, the most important problems are high price fluctua-
tions and the uncertainty related to market conditions. The other important fac-
tors are problems with payments from contractors. In their opinion, market con-
ditions, including price relations on the meat market, are dictated by large meat 
processing plants and supermarket chains. All interviewed independent pig 
producers who had signed contracts with meat-processing companies had no 
influence on prices – the companies decided them. All surveyed farmers de-
clared that the concentration of production is necessary. They are aware that 
without membership in a producer group, it is difficult to significantly influence 




The study covers a period of fundamental changes in the economic and political 
systems in Poland. During the past 15 years, the Polish economy has been trans-
formed and prepared for accession with the European Union. The road from 
centrally-planned economy to open market economy has required profound 
changes in all institutional structures of the economy and society. These changes 
also took place in the agro-food sector. Agricultural and food products were the 
first in the process of market liberalisation, which started in 1989. In 2003, over 
95 % of food processing was in the private sector. Fast modernisation of the 
food-processing industry has mostly been a result of an inflow of foreign direct 
investments. In the mid-1990s, over 20 % of FDI in Poland went to the food 
processing industry; currently it is about 10 %.  
A very fast increase in the share of foreign trading companies in the food products 
market was also observed. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Poland has become 
an area of fast expansion for large retail store chains. For example, from 1996-
2000, 112 hypermarkets opened in Poland. It had taken almost 20 years in Spain 
to establish similar number of hypermarkets. In 2003, large retail stores con-
trolled about 35 % of the food retail market in Poland. It is estimated that this 
share will reach 75-80 % in 2010.  
The study analyses the evolution of the agro-food chain using the example of 
two important food products: Pork and apples. Poland is the 4
th largest producer 
of pork and one of the largest producers of apples in the EU. Poland is also a 
significant exporter of both products, especially for the UE market.  
Production of both products is very dispersed. There are over 1  million pig 
breeders in Poland who keep relatively small herds. This is almost the same num-
ber of farms breeding pigs as in the entire EU-15. Most apple-producing farms are 
diversified. Only 10 % of these farms are specialised in apple production. Over 
65 % of farms with an orchard are smaller than 5 hectares and the average size of 
orchards is only 0.86 ha.  
However, the concentration of production is observed due to changes in market 
structures and price relations. Large producers have much better access to the 
market and receive much higher prices than smaller ones from retailers and food-
processing plants. Pig producers with multi-year contracts with meat processor 
usually receive a 10 % higher price than other producers. The majority of fruit 
producers do not have written contracts with fruit processors or food stores. 
Larger producers and producer groups sell their products directly to large retail 
stores. Usually, they have short-term contracts with retail store chains or with 
fruit processing companies for one season, which allows for sales stability and 
higher prices in comparison to other producers.  
There is also a lack of well-organised producer groups in these sectors of agricul-
ture. Cooperation between farmers in the form of producer groups or cooperatives Jerzy Wilkin, Małgorzta Juchniewicz, Dominika Milczarek 
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is developing very slowly. In 2003, there were only five registered producer 
groups in pig production. Other 20-40 groups were established, but not yet regis-
tered. Strong individualism and a slow process of cooperation between farmers 
in Poland is partially a result of bad experience with collective farming during 
communist times. Results of the preliminary survey suggest that the next steps 
of research should include an extended analysis of contracts and a process of 
creating of producers’ groups. 
To conclude, Polish agriculture is still dominated by small producers, but their 
position is weakening year by year. The biggest problems which they face are 
poor institutionalisation, especially in the area of self-organisation, and very 
limited access to modern knowledge and technology. As a result, thousands of 
farms reduce their ties with the market and produce only for the needs of the 
farm households. There is lack of well-defined and efficient public support for 
small producers, most of whom feel like losers in the process of post-communist 
transformation and market reform. 
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This paper investigates the issue of regoverning markets in the vertical chain of 
the dairy sector during the last 15 years. As a consequence of the emergence of 
multinationals in the food chains, the structure of food wholesaling and retailing 
has changed considerably. Multinational firms have influenced not only the high 
number of small- and medium-size retail shops, but food manufacturing firms 
and agricultural producers as well. We focus on the activities and expansion of 
supermarkets and the adjustment strategies of small producers. The policy as-
pects of supporting small producers against super- and hypermarkets and the 
competitiveness of the dairy sector are also discussed.  
Keywords: Supermarket chains, dairy sector, competitiveness, regoverning mar-
kets. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
During the last 15 years, food chains have been considerably restructured in 
Hungary. The privatization of state owned, centrally-managed retailing outlets, a 
resulting high number of small retail shops, the privatization of national food 
wholesaling and retailing, and green field foreign investments in the sector have 
all resulted in a new structure in the Hungarian food chain. Moreover, a concen-
tration on the supply side has also influenced the relationship among market 
players within the vertical chain. These changes have significantly affected both 
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the small agricultural producers and food manufacturing companies. The share 
of super- and hypermarkets in food retailing has become crucial and ever-
expanding. We focus on the activities and expansion of supermarkets, which has 
influenced the business relationship with the upstream agents and adjustment 
opportunities of small producers in the milk chain. The paper is organized as fol-
lows. First, we outline the composition and structure of the milk chain. Second, 
we analyze the changes in demand and supply. Third, the links with upstream 
agents are examined. Policy issues are discussed in Section 5. The final Section 
contains a summary and some conclusions. 
2 COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
2.1  Composition of the food retail sector 
The political and economic transition at the beginning of the 1990s and the pri-
vatisation and emergence of multinational firms had significant effects on Hun-
garian food trading. A few Hungarian-owned supermarket chains were also 
created, some of them developing quite quickly. Nowadays, Hungarian trading 
businesses are dominated by small- and medium-size enterprises. Four periods 
can be distinguished. First is the period of spontaneous privatisation (1989-1990) 
when smaller shops were privatised and a large number of private shops were 
also established. Second is the period between 1991-96 when owners of larger 
food retail chains changed. Most of the shops in favourable areas have become 
the property of multinational chains, while some of the small private shops went 
into bankruptcy. The first part of this period is characterised by the launch of so-
called "forced"
2 enterprises, many of them only remaining in business for a short 
time. In the next period (1996-1997), concentration started to grow. However, in 
the first few years of the concentration period, until 2000, the number of shops 
and even the number of stores operated by sole proprietors increased. The num-
ber of food retail stores in the "break" of 1997 was due to the new system of re-
cording the number of shops, not only of those that were newly-opened, but 
closed as well (SÜVEGES, 2001). More than 50,000 food stores and mixed retail 
businesses were operating at the end of 2003 (Figure 1) indicating a decrease, 
following 2000, due to the rapid growth and diffusion of large food chains and 
strengthening competition (AGÁRDI and BAUER, 2000). 
                                                 
2  After the change of political system, unemployment increased drastically, thus thousands 
of people started their own small businesses, mostly employing only themselves or other 
members of the family. Imre Fertő, Csaba Forgács, Anikó Juhász, Gyöngyi Kürthy 
 
42
Figure 1:  The number of retail food stores and sales per store 
51


































































Source:  Own calculation from yearbooks and monthly bulletins of the CENTRAL STATISTICAL 
OFFICE (CSO), 1998-2004. 
Retail sales almost doubled in the given period, while only a mild increase could 
be detected in the number of stores, reflecting the process of concentration. The 
share of the largest ten food retailers of total sales increased dramatically, from 
52 % to 89 % (Figure 2). Despite the high concentration level, the number of re-
tail shops remained surprisingly high compared to other countries. 
In 2003, there were four so-called procurement associations (Co-op Hungary, 
CBA, Honiker, Reál) among the top 10 retailers. The presence and development 
of buyer associations are the main reasons for the much slower decrease in the 
number of stores. These small shop networks are characterized by quite high 
penetration (69.6 %) and frequency of shopping (35.3 %) but consumer spending 
per shopping visit is quite low (1,000 HUF). The over- represented groups are the 
low income, small settlement and downtown consumers, where the retail sector 
showed impressive growth during recent years. Besides the small stores, other 
important store formats are supermarkets and discount stores (mostly 201-400m
2 
and 401-2,500m
2). In 1997, seven of the top 10 retailers belonged to this category: 
Three were Hungarian and four foreign-owned. Since then, the structure of re-
tailing has changed considerably, and in 2003 only three of the top 10 compa-
nies: Spar (Spar-, Kaiser- supermarkets, and 16 Interspar hypermarkets) Penny 
Market (discount stores) and Csemege (Professional discount stores, Match, 
Smatch supermarkets) operated under the supermarket and discount store for-
mat. 
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Hypermarkets have an ever-increasing role in the Hungarian retail sector 
(2,500 nm
2). From the top 10 retailers in 1997, not one company operated a 
hypermarket, but in 2003 there were four companies which did: Tesco (33), 
Spar (16) Auchan (8) and Cora (6). These hypermarkets now account for 24 % of 
total food sales. An increasing share of the food business is concentrated in large 
stores, (hypermarkets and shopping centres) reaching approximately 18  % in 
2001 (CSO).  
2.2.  Chain of the dairy sector  
During the pre-reform period, producer and investment subsidies were used in 
order to generate incentives for milk production, while demand was also stimu-
lated by consumer subsidies. The government intervened during times of shortage 
by setting new prices and providing extra subsidies to increase production. In 
this period, the state (21.1 %) and collective farms (55.5 %) dominated milk 
production in 1989, respectively, compared to 23.4 % by private farms. The 
average herd sizes of the three main farm types were: State farms (1,300 cows), 
collective farms (300 cows) and small holders (1.4 cows). 
The structure of dairy production has changed considerably during the last 
14 years. The number of private dairy farms dramatically decreased between 
1996 and 2003, by 45 %, while the 12 % decline was more modest for agricul-
tural enterprises. Surprisingly, in agricultural enterprises the average herd size 
decreased from 326 to 298, whilst it grew from 2.9 to 4.4 in private farms. In 
2003, agricultural enterprises accounted for 69 % of output in terms of herd 
number, whilst the share of private farms was 31 %. The declining tendency of 
milk cows was not followed by reduced milk production because of increasing 
yields.  
The number of farms with milk production is also falling every year. Nowadays, 
around 700-800 agricultural enterprises and 20-25,000 private farmers keep 
cows. Compared to the former EU-15 countries, yields are still 5-20 % lower; 
but they are higher, by the same percentage, than other New Member State 
countries. The concentration tendencies in Hungary are in line with the produc-
tion trends of leading European countries: Decreasing cow numbers, but increas-
ing yields are providing the stable milk production level. 
During the analysed period in Hungary, 85-95 % (in 2004, 98 %) of the pur-
chased milk was "extra quality", which is the only category for human consump-
tion according to EU regulations. Differences between the small and large scale 
farms appear during the cooling, storing and transporting stages. 
The dairy farm structure is different in agricultural enterprises and private farms. 
95 % of private farms have less than 10 cows, while 74 % of agricultural enter-
prises have more than 100 cows. The share of farms below 10 cows in the herd 
stock is 71  % for private farms and 0.1  % for agricultural enterprises. The Regoverning markets in the Hungarian dairy sector 
 
45
emerging share of medium-sized dairy farms is only 13 %. In short, the polarised 
structure of Hungarian dairy farms did not change considerably during the ana-
lysed period. 
In Hungary, the structure of milk production can be divided into three main 
groups differing in concentration, technology, and in some respects, in market 
segmentation as well: 
•  Agricultural enterprises and a minority (3-7 %) of the private farmers 
mostly keep more than 100 milk cows (300-600 on average) for produc-
tion and sale to processors. 
•  Around 17-20 % of the private farmers have between 10 and 30 cows 
and try to produce for processors. 
•  And finally, most of the private farmers (71 %) have less than 10 cows. 
The agricultural enterprises of the first category may be viable in the future. But 
the future viability of the second group of farmers, those with 10-30 cows, is 
questionable. They are too large for direct sales, and at the present procurement 
prices, too small to be profitable with processors as their main market. The third 
group most probably will lose the processors – at least the large ones – as a mar-
ket, as direct consumer sales become more and more viable. 
2.3.  Concentration in processing 
Concentration in the milk processing sector started in the mid-1990s. The num-
ber of processors is still around 80, although the top 10 companies accounted for 
almost 80 % of net sales, while the top 5 accounted for 57 % (Figure 3). 
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Source:  Own calculation from AKII data. 
Those processors which are not able to comply with EU hygiene standards or 
are unable to accommodate growing competition will go out of business, while Imre Fertő, Csaba Forgács, Anikó Juhász, Gyöngyi Kürthy 
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the importance of the large (even multinational) companies will continue to grow 
since they are only interested in the middle- and small-size processor markets. 
Two years (1998 and 2002) were chosen to show the links and relations with up-
stream agents in the vertical links, and were divided into three stages: Produc-
tion, wholesale and retail/consumer. The vertical chart for 2002 can be seen in 
Annex 1.  
Production phase: The production of milk slightly grew from 1998 to 2002, 
mainly because of the increasing milk yield. In the vertical flow of milk, the role 
of processors is traditionally much more important. Raw milk consumption pro-
vides only around 5-10 % of the production. Sales to processors did not change 
significantly from 1998 to 2002. Consumption from own production was very 
low and even showed a declining trend due to the decreasing number of small 
holders (with 1 or 2 cows). A stagnating 4 % of production goes to other sales. 
Wholesale phase: Exports increased in the examined period. Hungary has al-
ways produced more milk than it has consumed, and compared to the domestic 
production base, import has a stable 7 % share. Concerning market channels, the 
processors' sale to the retail sector is by far the most important (app. 60 %). 
Retail level: Based on estimations, the share of HORECA in milk product con-
sumption increased to 12 %. An important trend is the decline of milk consump-
tion from own production, to 1 %, and direct sales to consumers to 4 % between 
1998 and 2002.  
Hypermarkets are the absolute winners of recent years, having become the sec-
ond most favoured retail source of dairy products.  
Concerning the price structure of the vertical chain, the share of industry price in 
retail price slightly increased, at the expense of farm price, between 1994 and 
2002. The proportion of farm price in retail price has decreased from 55 % to 46 %. 
3 SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN THE VERTICAL CHAIN 
3.1. Demand 
The standard of living, which fell until the mid-1990s, has since shown moderate 
growth. Inequality grew in the first years of political and economic transforma-
tion. In the second half of the 90s, inequality indices no longer showed growth, 
but there was considerable internal restructuring during this period (TÓTH, 2003). 
The poor have less of a chance to improve their position, and the economic 
growth failed to increase their mobility (MOLNÁR and KAPITÁNY, 2002). Due to 
the abolition of consumer support, increasing consumer prices, falling real in-
come, newly introduced taxes and infrastructure development, based on house-
holds’ investments the share of food of total household expenditures increased Regoverning markets in the Hungarian dairy sector 
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in the first half of the last decade, and then decreased slightly. In 2002 it 
amounted to 29.6 %.  
Investigating the structure of food consumption by socio-economic strata, the 
following important trends can be found (RÉDEY et al., 2002). The differences 
between two polar layers (first and tenth deciles) have increased both in terms of 
quantities and volume of expenditures. 
The relatively poorest households basically consist of those where children live 
with inactive earners. Their food expenditures have reached 70 % of the house-
holds with highest income in 2001, but the share of expenditure in total house-
holds’ expenditures was above 40 %. 
A recent study shows that consumer habits differ by socio-economic strata 
(VÁGI, 2001). Older people and households with more children usually buy 
foods in traditional shops, while young, singles and couples prefer supermarkets 
and shopping malls. 
Consumption out of home stagnated in the 1990s, while an increasing tendency 
started in 1999; then, consumption grew by more than 50 % until 2002, but still 
accounted for only 8 % of the whole food consumption in 2002, (11 % in 2003) 
still below that of developed countries. 
The share of food consumption from own production decreased by almost 20 % 
during the analysed period. The share of own production from consumption 
decreased, from 23 % to 16 %. 
3.2. Supply 
During the pre-reform period, Hungary's agriculture was dominated by large 
farms. Some half of GAO was produced by cooperatives, one-third of production 
came from small-scale farming (mainly household production of deeply integrated 
coop members) and less than one-fifth of output was produced by state farms. 
Agricultural reform consisted of price liberalisation, cutting agricultural subsi-
dies, trade liberalisation, privatisation and land reforms (FERTŐ, 1999). Between 
1989 and 1993, focus was given to building up the legal and institutional 
framework of the market economy. The reform steps from 1994 to 2004 dealt 
with the consolidation and recovery of agricultural reform concentrating on sta-
bilizing the domestic agricultural markets. 
GDP decreased in the beginning of the 1990s for both industry and agriculture. 
After 1994, manufacturing continuously increased, and its growth rate exceeded 
the growth rate of total GDP. However much agriculture shows solid signs of 
recovery during this period, in 2002 its level still was below that of 1991. 
Between 1991 and 2002, agriculture’s share of total GDP fell from 7.8 % to 
3.3 %, whilst its share of total employment fell by almost 50 %, from 11.9 % to 
6.2 %. In the food industry, the share of GDP also fell by a quarter, from 4.6 % Imre Fertő, Csaba Forgács, Anikó Juhász, Gyöngyi Kürthy 
 
48
to 3.3 %, whilst the share of total employment fell by more than one-sixth, from 
5.1 % to 4.1.  
The combined but differential effect of these declines has altered the sectors’ 
relative labour productivity. In both sectors, labour productivity fell after 1995, 
as falls in GDP share outstripped falls in employment share. Labour productivity 
increased in the food industry after 1999, and in agriculture after 2000.  
Foreign direct investments played a dominant role in the Hungarian food industry. 
At the end of 1995, foreign ownership already exceeded 50 % of the food in-
dustry. Although the number of foreign-owned companies decreased between 
1995 and 2002, their role in owners’ equity is more than 70 %, and their share in 
net sales exceeded 50 %. 
3.3.  The influence of changes on the milk chain 
According to the Food Balance dataset, the consumption of milk
4 constantly 
decreased in the first half of the 1990s, then from 1995 to 2000 started to in-
crease again, followed by a drop of 10.2 % in 2001. The yearly consumption per 
head was almost 8 litres less in 2002 than the average of 1996-2000. The 
Household Budget dataset shows similar tendencies though; the decrease starts 
as soon as 1998. The most important change was the 3 % growth of yoghurts 
and kefir consumption, from 9 to 12 %, within the whole dairy category. Fig-
ure  4 shows the same tendencies – decreasing milk consumption and the 
growth of soured (yoghurts, +30 %) and cheese and curd (+2 %) products in 
domestic sales. The decrease in milk consumption can be explained by the 
growing popularity of other drinks (beverages, mineral waters, fruit juices and 
"milk-like" products) and by increasing consumer prices. The share of food of 
whole expenditures decreased between 1993 and 2002, with a stagnating share 
until 1998. The difference of milk consumption between the highest and the 
lowest deciles is around 40 %.  
Milk production fluctuations, around 2,000 million litres per year, reflect the re-
sponse to changing economic and political conditions during the period in ques-
tion. The efficiency of milk production has grown in natural terms. However, 
the FADN data shows that the profitability of milk production differs by farm 
types between 1999 and 2002. Private farms were more profitable than agricul-
tural enterprises according to two income indicators. But standard gross margin 
is higher in agricultural enterprises than private farms.  
                                                 
4  Milk and milk products together in raw material, thus the change in the inner structure of 
milk consumption can significantly change the whole consumption trend. This is a problem 
because milk is a staple food, but cheese is much more price and income sensitive. Regoverning markets in the Hungarian dairy sector 
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Figure 4:  Domestic sales structure of the dairy products  


































Source: MILK PRODUCE COUNCIL, 2003. 
Gross production in the dairy industry continuously increased, at current prices, 
between 1996 and 2002. Gross income in the dairy industry reports an aggregate 
loss in 1998 and 1999, after it realised an increasing profit.  
The role of FDI is predominant in the Hungarian dairy industry – its share in 
owners’ equity exceeds 90 %. The share of FDI in the dairy industry is higher 
than in the food industry as a whole, and foreign ownership in the dairy industry 
is concentrated in larger enterprises, with increasing market share. The new 
foreign owners have had a dramatic effect on the milk chain in the following 
areas: Internal restructuring of production and marketing, procurement and 
quality control, performance and likely trends after accession to the European 
Union (GORTON and GUBA, 2001).  
4 THE LINK WITH UPSTREAM AGENTS 
4.1. Cooperation  with milk producers 
The share of small producers is 10  % of total production. These producers 
mainly keep old Hungarian red-spot cows. The average yield of small producers 
is about 4,500 litres/cow, well behind that of large cooperatives and corporate 
farms. The smaller farms have no cooling systems, and surplus is mostly mar-
keted through a milk collection agency located in the village. Local collectors 
sign a contract with small producers which covers quality and quantity issues on 
a monthly basis. In future, local milk collectors must consider the procurement 
prices of processors, and will only be able to realize a small margin, otherwise 
they will not be able to buy or sell the milk. Imre Fertő, Csaba Forgács, Anikó Juhász, Gyöngyi Kürthy 
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Reforming market coordination: The board of Milk Produce Council (MPC) 
has decided to reform its function as a result of EU membership. Everybody 
among the members have an empty sheet, and practically, anybody can leave the 
MPC if they want. However, leaving the MPC brings disadvantages for the pro-
ducers: E.g. more difficult access to markets, worse bargaining position for price 
negotiations with processors, loss of information on market developments, in-
creasing costs of finding new market niches.  
Supply of milk of a selected processor: The Processor has had contracts with 
farmers producing at least 50,000 litres of milk a year. Among the suppliers, one 
can find cooperatives, companies, limited holding companies and corporations. 
Milk is purchased only from those suppliers having a quota (buying milk from 
local collector agents may have risk elements connected with hygiene, quality, 
quantity delivered, efficiency of production, finding a new supplier). Payment is 
made mostly within a 30 day guideline. One processor company has maintained 
business links with 60-65 suppliers, providing the company with 80-90 million 
litres of milk annually.  
4.2.  Bargain position of a big processor 
The interviewed processing company has attempted to set up stable, long-term 
business linkages with suppliers. They select the partners carefully, taking into 
account the following issues: Traditional business links, location, size of produc-
tion of the supplier, quality, trust and professional background of the supplier. 
The processor expects suppliers to have HACCP. The cooperation with milk 
producers is based on an annual contract, and signing a basic contract for middle-
term (3-5 years) is also possible. The annual contract includes quality, quantity 
based on quota, scheduling delivery, price bargained and fixed for one year, 
conditions of delivery and deadline for payment (30 days). The processing com-
pany pays special attention to quality requirements and has introduced ISO 
9001, as well as HACCP. Putting TQM into practice is also underway. For mar-
keting the products, the processing company has three groups of buyers: Hyper-
markets (60 %), wholesalers (25 %) and retailers (15 %). 
The larger processors, which relied on a sizeable number of small producers for 
raw milk, have rationalised the number of actors they deal with. Frequently, 
dairies ensure their supplies via long-term skeleton contracts with the larger 
milk producers, while prices and quantities to be supplied are fixed annually. 
More formal contractual arrangements have tended to emerge to ensure supplies 
and reduce transaction costs. In a number of cases, relationships with producers 
have become more entwined by extending credits, assets (e.g. cooling equip-
ment) and the provision of technical advice and variable inputs. Contracting al-
lows dairies to have greater control over the agricultural production process. The 
development of intensive contracts has aided the development of medium-sized 
individual farms. Due to a shortage of capital (poor access to credit, etc.) and Regoverning markets in the Hungarian dairy sector 
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low profitability in the sector, only a few producers are able to expand their 
dairy farms to reach the "family farm" size, and these have overwhelmingly de-
pended on credits and support from foreign-owned dairies. 
Foreign-owned processors have also been instrumental in the drive to improve 
the quality of raw milk produced (GORTON and GUBA, 2001). Processors deter-
mine quality requirements and enforce them through the procurement system. 
Farmers are paid according to the quality of milk, with bonus payments for 'ex-
tra quality' milk, and penalties or the refusal to purchase milk below certain 
quality thresholds. These quality thresholds have had the effect of excluding 
small-scale (household) producers who cannot preserve the quality of milk due 
to the lack of adequate cooling facilities. The linkages between larger farms and 
processors have become stronger with more stringent quality requirements, 
complex payment terms, and in some cases the provision of credit, assets and 
inputs. These dairies are increasingly dealing with centralised retail buyers. 
FDI has a significant effect on the structure of the dairy industry, and buyer rela-
tionships at the retail level. These investors have developed along Western 
European lines by introducing and developing warehouse point distribution, own 
brands and systems for electronic data interchange (EDI). EDI is used for deter-
mining the size and frequency of deliveries, as orders are based on actual buying 
patterns rather than estimates. In these regards, Hungarian supply channels in-
creasingly mirror practices in Western Europe. Excluded agents (micro-
producers and small-scale Hungarian dairy processors) are involved in much 
more informal channels of distribution, characterised by own consumption or 
sale to neighbours and small traders. 
5 POLICIES IN PLACE TO SUPPORT THE INCLUSION OF SMALL AND 
MEDIUM AGRIFOOD ENTREPRENEURS 
5.1.  Private sector policies 
Agriculture is traditionally a risky business, but in transition countries agricul-
tural producers face additional difficulties. The absence of enforceable contracts 
for setting up any kind of vertical co-ordination has become extremely difficult. 
Therefore, searching for new partners for long run, relation-specific investments 
has been associated with high transaction costs for farmers. In addition, this 
creates severe barriers for price discovery involving high transaction costs to co-
ordinate market exchanges. In those sub-sectors where any type of production 
contract does exist, agricultural producers face hold-up problems (e.g. delayed 
payment for delivered products, or ex post price reduction by retailers), which are 
stressed by GOW and SWINNEN (1998). These problems are very severe for that 
sub-sector, and dominate the fragmented and small-scale farm sector. There is Imre Fertő, Csaba Forgács, Anikó Juhász, Gyöngyi Kürthy 
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very little information on private sectors policies to support small and medium 
size farms, therefore marketing type co-operatives can solve some problems 
arising from missing and embryonic market institutions (SZABÓ and FERTŐ, 2004).  
5.2. Public  policies 
Agricultural subsidies are provided through a system of minimum prices, 
budgetary support, and border measures. The Agricultural Market Regulation 
Act of 1993 directly regulates wheat markets (for human consumption), feed 
maize, milk, live cattle, and pigs for slaughter by providing market price support 
via minimum guaranteed prices, paid up to a production quota limit, and in the 
case of market instability, government purchases. Support for reducing farm in-
put costs includes capital grants linked to interest rate concessions for covering 
production costs, reduction of the fuel tax and payments for irrigation develop-
ment. Import tariffs and export subsidies are used for most important agricul-
tural products. Export subsidies constitute an important, albeit declining, policy 
instrument to regulate crops and animal product markets. Imports are regulated 
by ad valorem tariffs and tariff rate quotas.  
The milk sector is supported by several ways. First, there is an indicative price 
system, with the possibility of intervention. If producers do not find a buyer, 
they may, in theory, sell their quality milk to the State at a guaranteed price 
lower than the indicative price. In recent years, market prices were usually 
higher than the trigger price, therefore intervention has not been activated. Indi-
vidually, dairy quotas were introduced in 1996. Second are budgetary payments 
based on output, which mainly include quality and intervention payments. Third 
are area and headage payments, which were HUF 20,000 (USD 77) per dairy 
cow in 2002. Fourth are payments based on input use, including a subsidised in-
terest rate and guarantees for farm credit (around 45 % of total), capital grants 
(15 %) and fuel tax concessions (20 %). Market price support had a predominant 
role in subsidizing milk sectors. Payments based on input use and on output had 
an increasing role, but their share was below 25 % of total support. 
The National Land Fund was amended and a new institutional system was estab-
lished to reassess land policy. The main amendments entail giving anyone who 
is renting farmland priority over family farmers for the purchase or rent of arable 
land. The duration of land leases for National Land Fund lands will decline from 
50 to 20 years, while in the case of private persons, this will increase from 10 to 
20 years. Land sales to foreigners and legal entities are prohibited. Special atten-
tion and support is given to the creation and development of producer marketing 
organisations. Agricultural insurance is supported at a rate of 30 % of the fees 
charged. In the context of food safety, new labelling rules for dairy products, 
eggs, and most foods of vegetable origin entered into force as from April 2002. 
According to the Copenhagen Agreement, Hungary uses the Single Area Pay-
ment Scheme (SAPS). Hungarian farmers in 2004 received 305.81 million EUR Regoverning markets in the Hungarian dairy sector 
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in direct payments. Calculation of milk direct payments, due to the CNDP, is 
complicated. According to the CAP Reform, adaptation agreement in the milk 
sector CDNP is even higher than in the other sectors of agriculture, in total 
amounting to 60 %. The 85 % direct payment (25 % from the EU, 60 % from 
Hungary) with a 1,947,280-ton milk quota means 22.81 million EUR. From this 
amount, the subsidy paid, according to the SAPS, must be subtracted, which is 
5.84 million EUR.  When  the  16.97 million  EUR left over is divided by the 
quota, the result is 8.71 EUR in subsidy for a ton of milk.  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
During the transformation period, agriculture and food processing have been 
declining sectors. The share of individual farms is predominantly in milk pro-
duction, with moderate concentration, while the dairy industry reflects a grow-
ing concentration and the predominant role of multinational firms. Particular 
groups of agricultural producers use different vertical co-ordination mechanisms 
to connect with the food industry. Agricultural enterprises and co-operatives 
usually have a production contract, sometimes long-term, with the food industry. 
Where any type of production contracts does exist, agricultural producers face 
hold-up problems which raise the cost of market exchange and lead to strong 
barriers for the establishment of new market institutions. FDI in food industries 
encourages the solution of hold-up problems, mainly via long-term contracts, in 
the milk chain. However, where multinational firms have dominant market posi-
tions, they also may create a new type of hold-up problem: Only a minor share 
of agricultural producers has stable linkages with the food industry. Further-
more, a majority of farmers face significant market uncertainties without rea-
sonable risk-sharing techniques.  
On the demand side, producers should face rather stagnant or slightly increasing 
domestic demand. But market segmentation may help them exploit possibilities 
arising from niche markets. The increasing role of the modern retail sector re-
quires more collective action by producers and processors to countervail the 
market power of modern retailers. Farmers' problems cannot be solved simply 
by providing government support. Without establishing and developing efficient 
and transparent market institutions, sustainable growth in the agri-food sectors 
cannot be predicted. 
Public policies should focus on reducing transaction costs by financing invest-
ments in rural infrastructure, encouraging investment in post-harvest activities 
(storage, manipulations, and packages) and founding or improving intermediary 
organisations to reduce the exchange costs between farmers and their partners. 
Due to bad experiences during the transition period, trust does not exist between 
economic agents. The key factor of future successful supply chain management Imre Fertő, Csaba Forgács, Anikó Juhász, Gyöngyi Kürthy 
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is developing reliable contractual forms based on trust between partners and es-
tablishing the right conditions for enforcing contracts and thus avoiding hold-up 
problems.  
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The paper analyses the competitiveness of the Estonian milk sector and the impli-
cations of implementing the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In addi-
tion to milk farms, the study also considers processors, whose performance is 
important for analysing the impact of the CAP since their market price support 
measures are provided at the processed products level. The results indicate that 
competitiveness differs year-to-year for farms as well as for processors. At the 
farm level, differences in performance also occurred between farm types; in the 
processing sector, the choice of strategy appeared to be important. EU accession 
brings relief to the milk farms in the short term, but for processors, the outlook 
is less favourable. The analysis also showed that some of the divergences that 
occurred at the processor level were reversed at the farm level, which indicates 
that the performance of the processors is important for the farm sector's competi-
tiveness.  
Keywords: Milk sector, competitiveness, policy analysis matrix, Estonia. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of transition, Estonia has, unlike most of the other transition 
countries, pursued a liberal agricultural policy. But EU accession changed mar-
ket conditions as well as policies for the Estonian milk sector. What conse-
quences these developments have on the milk sector's competitiveness will be 
the focus of this paper.  
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Since the beginning of economic transition, extensive literature has emerged 
which analyses the competitiveness of transition countries' agriculture and its 
prospects in light of EU accession. Much less attention has been given to the 
role of the downstream sector and just a few studies have considered the full 
agro-food chain in transition economies (e.g. KRAY, 2002; GUBA, 2000; KUHAR 
and ERJAVEC, 2005). Furthermore, only a few studies have concentrated specifi-
cally on the competitiveness of milk production in Estonia (see, for example, 
HOLZNER, 2004; and BRANDT, 1998). 
In most cases, research has found that EU accession will increase the profitability 
of agriculture as the prices and support levels are anticipated to increase in Cen-
tral and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). Opinions about the future of the 
processing industry are different. As pointed out by TANGERMANN and SWINNEN 
(2000) the food industry in candidate countries would need to lower their mar-
gins and gain efficiency in order to stand the pressure of increasing competition 
from EU accession. 
The current study involves both milk producers and milk processors in order to 
analyse market developments, as well as changing policies due to accession, on 
the competitiveness in the value added chain. This approach is particularly help-
ful because the CAP's common organisation of the milk market also acts at the 
level of processed products. The following questions will be discussed in the 
paper: How competitive and efficient is the milk sector and what is the impact of 
EU accession? Are there distortions in the agro-food chain and do they influence 
the expected profitability after implementing the CAP? 
Competitiveness will be discussed at the sector level, focusing on cost competi-
tiveness. For that purpose, forward-looking measures of potential competitive-
ness are considered to be appropriate and the Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) is 
chosen to serve as a methodological basis of the study.  
The paper is structured as follows. The second section discusses the concept of PAM 
and reviews literature both on its merits and limits. The third part presents the charac-
teristics of the Estonian milk production and processing sector, as well as discusses 
the data, social valuation and model specification for the Estonian milk sector. Re-
sults are presented in the fourth section, and are followed by the paper's conclusions. 
2 CONCEPT OF POLICY ANALYSIS MATRIX AND ITS APPLICATION 
TO ESTONIAN MILK SECTOR 
The economic literature does not provide a single definition of competitiveness
1. 
It is a relative concept and can be applied to different levels within an economy or 
                                                 
1  For a discussion and overview of definitions, approaches and measures of competitiveness, 
see, for example FROHBERG and HARTMANN (1997); SIGGEL (2003).  Analysis of competitiveness, economic efficiency and distortions  
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used to compare different countries. In the current study, competitiveness is defined 
and measured through profits at the sector level. PAM, originally designed by 
MONKE and PEARSON in 1989, was selected as the suitable method for the analysis.  
PAM has been extensively used in the analysis of agricultural policy in transition 
economies (e.g. BOJNEC, 1999; KAVCIC et al., 2001; KRAY, 2002) as well as in 
developing countries (e.g. BOGALE et al., 2002). Although MONKE and PEARSON 
(1989) suggest the calculations of PAM for the whole commodity chain, including 
producers, processors and the marketing sector, most studies limit themselves to 
the analysis of agricultural production. Only a few studies have also considered 
downstream sectors (e.g. STAHL and SHAPIRO, 1994; and KRAY, 2002). There are 
also studies that have concentrated only on the processing level (e.g. GUBA, 2000; 
KÖTSCHAU et al., 2003). 
PAM allows for the quantitative measurement of competitiveness at the farm level 
as well as at the processor level. Transfers among the key interest groups – pro-
ducers, consumers and policy makers controlling the allocations from the govern-
ment budget, can be identified with the help of PAM (MONKE and PEARSON, 1989). 
Table 1 presents the structure of PAM. The idea is to construct two accounting 
identities for the activities under consideration, which consist of revenues, 
tradable costs, domestic factor costs and profits. The first identity (A, B, C, D) is 
measured under actual market conditions; the second one (E, F, G, H) in the 
"ideal world" conditions – in a hypothetical situation where no policy distortions 
or market failures exist. The former indicates the competitiveness of the activity; 
the latter determines economic efficiency or comparative advantage and is 
measured through the so-called economic prices
2. Comparison of these two re-
sults enables the determination of distortions arising from policy impacts or 
market distortions. These can be seen from the third row of PAM (I, J, K, L). 
A number of ratios can be calculated within the PAM framework that allow for 
comparison between different farm types or commodity systems. These are of 
three types: Competitiveness indicators, comparative advantage indicators and 
policy impact indicators.  
Interpreting PAM is relatively straightforward. The activity is competitive if 
private profits D are positive or when Private Cost Ratio (PCR) = C / (A - B) is 
less than 1. This occurs when private factor costs are less than the value added
3 
(A - B) in private prices.  
                                                 
2 Economic or social prices (also efficiency prices) reflect a situation where there are no policy 
effects and market distortions. For tradable goods, these are equivalent to world market 
prices; for domestic production factors with opportunity costs. 
3 There are a number of possible definitions of value added. In the current analysis, value 
added is defined by the sophisticated CORDEN method, where value added is the sum of the 
returns on domestic factors (land, labour, capital) and the amount of domestic factors em-
bodied in non-traded intermediary inputs (TSAKOK, 1990).  Piret Hein 
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Tradable Inputs  Domestic Factors 
Profits 
Valuation in Private Prices  A
  B C  D 
Valuation in Social Prices  E  F  G  H 
Transfers (divergences)  I  J  K  L 
Policy transfers   Ip   Jp   Kp   Lp 
Market transfers    Im    Jm    Km    Lm 
Private cost ratio (PCR):                                                        C/(A-B) 
Domestic resource cost ratio (DRC):                                           G/(E-F) 
Nominal protection coefficient on trandable outputs (NPCO):    A/E 
Nominal protection coefficient on tradable inputs (NPCI):          B/F 
Effective protection coefficient (EPC):                                       (A-B)/(E-F) 
Profitability coefficient (PC):                                                   (A-B-C)/(E-F-G) or D/H 
Subsidy ratio to producers (SRP):                                               L/E or (D-H)/E 
D = A-B-C (private profits); H = E-F-G (social profits); I = Ip+Im (output transfers);  
J = Jp+Jm (input transfers); K =
 Kp+Km (factor transfers); L = Lp+Lm (net transfers) 
Source: Adapted  from MONKE and PEARSON, 1989; KRAY, 2002; MORRISON and BALCOMBE, 
2000. 
The Domestic Resource Cost ratio (DRC = G / (E - F)) is the most widely used 
ratio that can be derived from PAM, and illustrates whether the activity has a 
comparative advantage. The ratio compares opportunity costs
4 to the value-added 
it generates in economic prices. A value of less than 1 indicates the comparative 
advantage of the activity, or that the activity makes efficient use of domestic re-
sources and is internationally competitive (BOJNEC, 1999). Instead of ‘compara-
tive advantage’, the term ‘economic efficiency’ can also be used, as the measure 
indicates whether the activity makes efficient use of resources at the national level.  
The Nominal Protection Coefficient on tradable outputs (NPCO = A / E) shows 
transfers on outputs, while the Nominal Protection Coefficient on tradable inputs 
(NPCI = B/F) indicates input transfers. Values other than 1 indicate implicit pro-
tection or the taxation of producers. The Effective Protection Coefficient com-
bines, in addition to prices, costs into the ratio (EPC = (A - B) / (E - F) and indi-
cates the implicit protection or taxation of an activity when the ratio is not 1. The 
Subsidy Ratio of Producers (SRP = L / E) shows the share of net policy transfers 
in the total revenues valued at the social prices. This indicator is similar to PSE 
(Producer Support Estimate) calculated by the OECD, which measures the annual 
                                                 
4   Opportunity costs of the non-tradable commodities that will be determined during the PAM 
analyses are the second best equilibrium values and relevant only under the current set of 
policy constraints. If policies were to change, so would the opportunity costs. Therefore, 
PAM is not satisfactory in terms of economic theory: It is based on partial equilibrium, rather 
than a general equilibrium approach. Although, as argued by some authors, PAM does include 
some elements of general equilibrium, as it incorporates interdependences between the prod-
ucts market under consideration and factor markets (NGUYEN and HEIDHUES, 2004).  Analysis of competitiveness, economic efficiency and distortions  
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monetary value of gross transfers to producers from taxpayers and consumers 
(MELYUKHINA, 2003). 
However, for interpreting the results, some limitations of the model should be 
kept in mind. PAM is a partial equilibrium framework and assumes perfect 
competition. It is static by nature, implying that it is only possible to analyse 
competitiveness for a certain point in time. The model is based on the Leontief-
fixed input-output coefficients and does not account for producers’ reactions to 
changes in domestic prices (MONKE and PEARSON, 1989).  
As the literature on PAM has increased during the last decade, it turns out that 
some of these limitations can still be overcome. Several extensions to PAM have 
been developed: For example, including environmental externalities (YAO, 
1999) or developing a dynamic comparative advantage (GUBA, 2000). In the 
current study, an extension of the traditional PAM approach proposed by 
MORRISON and BALCOMBE (2002) is used to separate distortions, calculated in 
the third row of PAM, to market distortions and policy effects. 
The average nature of the PCR and other PAM indicators are also limitations 
and have been subject to criticism. Although average figures do indicate whether 
the activity is competitive or not, it does not necessarily mean that all enterprises 
in the industry are competitive. There are always differences in technologies and 
efficiency among enterprises (GUBA, 2000, p. 42). To remedy this problem and 
improve the interpretation of PAM results, in this study the indicators are also 
calculated for individual farms and processors and presented as distributions that, 
when compared year-to-year, also provide a dynamic dimension to the analysis.  
The structure of the analysis and the relationships between the parts of the supply 
chain under analysis for the Estonian milk sector are sketched in Figure 1. The 
figure also shows the differences between Estonia's pre-accession agricultural 
policy and the EU's CAP. In Estonia, policy measures were only applied at the 
farm level (direct payments and payments based on input use); no effective price 
support policies were applied at the processing level
5. However, the common 
market organisation of milk in the EU includes policies at both the agricultural 
production and processed products levels. At the production level, similar types of 
income support measures are applied in the EU and Estonia. At the processing 
level, price support measures like intervention and export subsidies are applied in 
the EU, whose purpose is to stabilize markets (WILLIAMS, 1997, p. 23).  
 
                                                 
5 Although customs tariffs on agricultural products were introduced in 2000, they only applied 
to third-party countries and their effect was only redirection of some trade but no real effect 
on prices. Third-party countries were countries with which Estonia did not have a free trade 
agreement. Trade agreements were concluded with 13 countries that were also main trading 
partners (EU, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, EFTA and CEEC countries (except Romania) Fae-
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In the EU, price support is transferred to the farm level since the markets are de-
veloped and well functioning. In the case of a transition country like Estonia, 
markets are still immature. Existing market imperfections may therefore hinder 
full transmission. As an example of possible market imperfections, the compari-
son of price margins
6 in the milk processing industry in Estonia and the EU are 
presented in Figure 2. There are significant differences in the margins; however, 
the reasons for these findings can be manifold. High transaction costs, underde-
veloped institutions, the structure of the milk industry or inefficiency can all be 
reasons. This obviously questions the ability of the Estonian milk sector to com-
pete at the internal market of the EU.  
Consequently, PAM will be calculated for both levels of the value added chain 
(farm level and processing level) and for both policy situations (pre- and post-
accession). It is very likely that the market imperfections now present in the Es-
tonian milk sector will not disappear at the moment of accession. 
Figure 2:  Ratio of ex-factory price of skimmed milk powder to producer 



























































































































































The main advantages of PAM for the current study compared to other methods 
used in efficiency and competitiveness analysis are the detailed level of the 
analysis that PAM allows, as well as the possibility of quantifying the policy 
distortions and market imperfections that are present in the Estonian milk sector 
as indicated above. 
                                                 
6 Margin is defined as price spread – ratio of ex-factory price to farm price (for measuring 
price margins, see GARDNER, 1975). Piret Hein 
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3 DATA, ASSUMPTIONS AND SOCIAL VALUATION OF PAM FOR THE 
ESTONIAN MILK INDUSTRY 
Milk production is the most important agricultural sector in Estonia, accounting 
for 25 % of GAO, whereas the share of milk processing in the food industry was 
26 % in 2003. Estonia is a net exporter of milk; the level of self-sufficiency is 
estimated to be around 135 %. The EU is its main export partner: The share of 
milk products exported to the EU ranged between 53 % and 67 % of total ex-
ports of dairy products from 2000-2002; in 2003 the share increased to 80 %. 
The main export articles are milk powders, cheese and butter. The EU market is 
attractive for Estonia because of the higher price levels, as well as because access 
to the EU market was already good during the pre-accession years due to the im-
plementation of the so-called "double zero" and "double profit" agreements. 
Milk production is concentrated on large farms in Estonia. Farms with more 
than 100 cows provided 75 % of the total milk production in 2003, and the share 
has been increasing through the years. However, these farms account for only 
9 % of the total number of milk farms in Estonia
7, indicating the dual farm struc-
ture in milk production. The milk yield has increased over the years, and was 
5,189 kg per cow in 2003, whereas according to the data from the Animal Re-
cording Centre of Estonia, the milk yield per cow is higher in bigger herds. The 
number of raw milk processing enterprises was 31 in 2003, whereas eight of 
these enterprises purchased circa 90 % of the raw milk in 2003.  
In general, PAM is a tool for static and short-term analysis. In order to provide a 
more dynamic view of the patterns of competitiveness, four years, from 2000-2003, 
are included in the model. The sample includes 104 specialised milk farms that 
appear in the FADN
8 database through all four years. The share of milk of total 
sales of the farms accounted for 90 %, on average, across the farms in the sample. 
No attempt was made to disaggregate farm costs into the costs occurred in milk 
production and other costs. This would have necessitated many additional as-
sumptions as this data is not readily available.  
PAM entries, as well as ratios, are derived for each individual firm. In addition, 
farms are also divided according to their size into five groups in order to gain in-
sight to the competitiveness and performance of different sized groups which 
have quite different characteristics (e.g. yield, land and labour use, organisation 
type) as indicated in Table 2.  
Smaller farms are mostly family farms, while larger farms are mostly partner-
ships or limited liability companies. A striking difference between family farms 
and enterprises is the use of paid labour – the share of family farms lies between 
10-20 %, while larger farms rely almost 100 % on paid labour. The wages paid 
                                                 
7  Data from the YEARBOOK OF THE ANIMAL RECORDING CENTRE IN ESTONIA. 
8  FADN – Farm Accountancy Data Network. Analysis of competitiveness, economic efficiency and distortions  
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on bigger farms is twice as high as in the small family farms. This most likely 
reflects the differences in labour productivity. The share of rented land is high 
for all farms. 
Data for processing plants is based on business plans for the 9 largest enterprises 
in 2001-2004; however, all enterprises are not represented in the sample in all 
four years. The data for 2004 are estimates provided by the enterprises them-
selves. In 2003, the coverage of the analysed enterprises accounted for 88 of total 
raw milk processed in Estonia.  
In the EU scenarios, raw milk prices and milk product prices changed in line 
with the levels agreed on for CAP reform. Based on the hectares and animals in 
each individual farm, the Simplified Area Payment Scheme, as well as area and 
headage payments (top ups) for the years following accession are introduced.
 
Domestic factor costs are assumed to increase gradually.
9  
Table 2:  Characteristics of analysed milk farms in 2003 
  Farm groups according to number of cows 
 …19  20…49  50…99  100…199 200…  All 
Number of farms/family 
farms  39/39 37/37  12/8  8/1  8/0  104/85 
Average number of cows  13  32  70  136  421  67 
Share of milk produced %  7 %  18 %  11 %  14 %  49 %  100 % 
Share of milk in sales of a 
farm %  86 %  91 %  86 %  93 %  89 %  89 % 
Average  yield  (kg/cow)  5,704 5,846 5,192  5,211 5,573  5,648 
Average land usage ha  53  140  356  502  1,261  247 
…of which was rented  42 %  48 %  66 %  92 %  86 %  72 % 
Share of paid labour  10 %  21 %  70 %  98 %  100 %  72 % 
Average wage per hour 













Source:  Own calculations based on FADN database. 
Several assumptions are necessary to conduct the PAM calculations concerning 
estimations of social prices. The markets for tradable inputs are assumed to be 
undistorted and actual prices are used in calculations. The supply approach
10 is 
used to calculate the opportunity cost of capital in this study. For social valua-
tion, capital interest of long-term deposit was used. 
                                                 
9  The projections of the Ministry of Finance for wage increases are used; the increase in fuel 
excise tax is taken into account, as well as a gradual but small increase in land costs. 
10  For more discussion of the supply and demand approach in valuation of capital opportunity 
cost, see TSAKOK, 1990, pp. 110 ff. Piret Hein 
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Non-tradable intermediate inputs were disaggregated to domestic factors and 
traded components with the help of supply and use tables provided by the Statis-
tical Office of Estonia.  
For the social valuation of tradable inputs, estimating the equilibrium exchange 
rate is necessary. There are a number of studies conducted by the Bank of Esto-
nia which estimate the equilibrium exchange rate. The results of the studies dif-
fer slightly; however, the broad conclusion is that exchange rate misalignment 
(undervaluation) occurred before the Russian crisis (before 1998), but stabilised 
afterwards, and the overvaluation of the Estonian Kroon was between 0 % and 
1 % in 2000 and 2001
11, respectively. Hence, for the purposes of the current 
study, the assumption can be made that the exchange rate is in line with the 
equilibrium exchange rate. 
Twenty percent of Estonia's total agricultural land was not used in 2001
12. When 
land is abundant, traditional approaches for estimating opportunity cost by 
evaluating the returns of the land used in the next best alternative cannot be 
applied, because there is probably no better alternative. Therefore, the opportu-
nity cost of land is considered to be equal with the private value. 
Estimating the opportunity cost of labour is complicated in the agricultural sec-
tor. In the case of full employment, the average wage in the sector could be 
used. In Estonia, the average unemployment rate from 2000-2002 was 11.6 %. 
However, the unemployment in Estonia is in most cases "structural", meaning 
that there is a mismatch between the skills of the unemployed and existing job 
vacancies (JÄRV, 2003). For farms, the average wage in the agricultural sector is 
applied as an opportunity cost. In the processing sector, the average wage in the 
milk sector is used as an opportunity cost.  
The social valuation of raw milk is somewhat complicated, as raw milk is not 
tradable and there is no world market for raw milk. As Estonia is a net exporter 
of milk, the export prices (f.o.b.) are used to derive the representative raw milk 
price. The model suggested by SCHANK  (2003) for calculating a milk price 
equivalent specifically for Estonia is used, as it includes up-to-date processing, 
handling and transport costs as well as technical coefficients to derive the raw 
milk price equivalent from skimmed milk powder and butter prices.  
4 RESULTS 
Indicators of competitiveness and comparative advantage for farms are pre-
sented in Table 3. In total, farms were competitive (PCR below 1) throughout 
the entire period, except in 2000, although the ratios were very close to one in 
                                                 
11  See, for example, FILIPOZZI, 2000; COUDERT and COUHARDE, 2002. 
12  Agricultural Census, STATISTICAL OFFICE OF ESTONIA. Analysis of competitiveness, economic efficiency and distortions  
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other years. When looking at farm groups according to number of cows, the 
smallest farms, with less than 19 cows, were not competitive through the period 
(PCR above 1). The most competitive farm groups were those with 20 to 200 cows.  
Table 3:  Selected results for FADN milk farms 
   …19*  20…49*  50…99*  100…199* 200…*  All  farms 
2000 1.82 1.22 1.10 1.14 1.18 1.26 
2001 1.02 0.87 0.72 0.89 0.92 0.93 
2002 1.09 0.86 0.82 0.92 0.97 0.96 
PCR 
2003 1.16 0.75 0.80 0.74 0.97 0.94 
2000 2.59 1.79 1.50 1.28 1.15 1.36 
2001 0.98 0.83 0.67 0.72 0.80 0.87 
2002 1.49 1.19 1.14 1.29 1.03 1.29 
DRC 
 
2003 1.43 0.97 1.07 0.91 1.01 1.17 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Note:  * Number of cows. 
In Figure 3, the Kernel distributions of PCR for individual farms in the sample 
are shown for different years. We can observe that in 2000, the distribution 
curve had a significantly lower peak than the three following years which have 
similar shapes, indicating the worst situation for competitiveness in 2000.  
The introduction of the EU scenarios shifts the distribution curves further to the 
left, indicating that more farms become competitive. In spite of the ‘phasing in’ 
of direct payments, the results for the scenarios of 2005, 2007 and 2010 have very 
similar distributions. It seems likely that the increases in direct payments offset a 
gradual increase in production costs. Also, there does not appear to be significant 
a difference for the farms in the sample whether the payments are coupled or are 
decoupled, as indicated by the two scenarios for 2007 (2007_c with coupled pay-
ments, and 2007_d with decoupled payments).  
Figure 3:  Distribution of the PCR and DRC for milk farms 
































































































Source: Own  calculations. Piret Hein 
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Results for comparative advantage are not as favourable as for competitiveness. 
The only year when the average DRC indicator was below one, indicating com-
parative advantage, was 2001. That was mainly due to the favourable domestic 
and world market conditions. Also, in 2003 two groups of farms had a DRC ratio 
of less than one (see Table 3).  
The distribution of the DRC over time clearly indicates a favourable situation in 
2001 and the worst in 2000, whereas in 2002 and 2003, similar distributions are 
observed. This volatility of results from year-to-year can mainly be attributed to 
the lack of domestic raw milk price adjustment to the price developments in in-
ternational markets. The latter also points to the lack of stability for milk farms, 
as the situation on the Estonian milk market has been heavily dependent on ex-
port opportunities. 
Revenue transfers were negative in 2000 and 2001 (see Table 4). The decompo-
sition of the distortions shows that negative transfers were caused by market dis-
tortions and positive transfers from the government did not offset them. In 2003, 
market transfers were also negative. It appears that the milk producers were im-
plicitly taxed due to the distortions in the market. The EU scenario indicates that 
transfers to the farms will significantly increase due to explicit policies, as well 
as market price support.  
Table 4:  Revenue transfers for milk farms 
 Revenue  transfers 
 2000  2001  2002  2003  EU 
scenario 
Total transfers  -2.30  -16.89  51.02  28.34  171.63 
Policy transfers  29.97  29.67  44.75  35.43  74.63 
Market transfers  -32.27  -46.56  6.27  -7.09  97.00 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Results for the milk processors are relatively mixed for both competitiveness 
and comparative advantage. Some companies are competitive over the years un-
der analysis, but there are companies whose competitiveness improves or worsens 
during the period. Export-oriented enterprises, compared to those concentrating 
on the domestic market, are more competitive (the ratios are significantly below 
one). Enterprises oriented towards the domestic market were competitive only in 
2004, whereas in 2002-2003, the value added was less than factor costs (see 
Figure 4).  
Export-oriented processors' access to markets with higher price levels (mainly 
the EU) can explain these findings, although the export opportunities, as well as 
prices of exported products, vary over the years. Companies oriented toward the 
domestic market face relatively stable output prices, but the price level is de-
pendent on purchasing power. Nevertheless, the fact that consumer prices of 
milk products in Estonia are already relatively close to consumer prices in some Analysis of competitiveness, economic efficiency and distortions  
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EU countries (for example Germany) only confirms the inefficiency of these 
processors. However, the PRC ratio moved down towards one and was even be-
low one in 2004, which shows an increase in competitiveness and indicates im-
provement in efficiency. The ratio for the exporters, however, has moved closer 
to one year-to-year.  
The EU accession scenario shows a worsening in the competitiveness for ex-
port-oriented and domestic-oriented enterprises. The situation would be much 
more difficult for the domestic market-oriented enterprises, which is mainly due 
to increasing input costs, whereas no immediate increase is expected in output 
prices.  
The processing industry possesses no comparative advantage according to the 
development of the DRC indicator (see Figure 5). None of the analysed enter-
prises has a DRC ratio below one for any analysed years. However, domestic 
market-oriented enterprises have an indicator much closer to one, and even be-
low one in 2004. This suggests that in the longer term, considering the CAP re-
form and market liberalisation, the situation for export-oriented enterprises 
could turn unfavourable. 
Figure 4:  PCR results for export-oriented and domestic market-oriented 
milk processing enterprises 
Export oriented
0.91 






























Source: Own  calculations. Piret Hein 
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Figure 5:  DRC results for export-oriented and domestic market-oriented 



























Source: Own  calculations. 
Revenue transfers for processing enterprises have been positive through the 
years (except 2001); although the level of distortions has varied, and export-
oriented enterprises have enjoyed much higher transfers. On the cost side, dis-
tortions in 2001 and 2003 for domestic-oriented enterprises were negative, 
meaning that private input costs were lower than social costs and the industry 
was implicitly subsidised. In 2004, distortions in costs significantly increased 
and are expected to increase further after accession. The latter indicates implicit 
taxation of the processing industry through higher input costs. This is possible, 
as limited supplies of raw milk and the existing overcapacities of processing en-
terprises force them to increase raw milk purchase prices in order to guarantee 
supplies of raw milk and market share. 
The nominal protection coefficient on output (Table 5) shows that, on average, 
the industry received higher revenues than they would if no distortions were pre-
sent, with the exception of 2001. The nominal protection coefficient on inputs in-
dicates that in 2001, the input costs were lower than those calculated with social 
prices; it surpassed one in 2002, and increased during every one of the following 
years.  Analysis of competitiveness, economic efficiency and distortions  
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Table 5:  Selected PAM results for processing enterprises (EEK/100 kg 
processed raw milk) 
  Distortions 
in revenues 
Distortions  
in costs  Total distortions NPCO  NPCI 
























2001  -12.8 0.0 -20.2  -27.5 7.5 27.5  0.98  1.00  0.95  0.98 
2002 106.6  6.7  13.7  11.8  92.9  -5.0  1.31  1.01  1.02  1.01 
2003 124.8  14.4  10.6  -8.8  114.2  23.2  1.40  1.03  1.01  1.01 
2004 219.7  19.5  45.3  53.6  174.4  -34.0  1.62  1.03  1.07  1.06 
EU 214.5 14.5 105.0 82.3 109.5  -67.8  1.61  1.03 1.18  1.15 
Source: Own  calculations. 
According to the EU scenario, positive transfers in revenues will not increase, 
but decrease. Distortions in costs will increase. Total transfers after EU acces-
sion remain negative for domestic market-oriented processors and positive for 
export-oriented processors in the short term. The nominal protection coefficient 
on inputs for export-oriented enterprises increased significantly in 2004 and will 
stay the same level after the accession.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
A mixed picture arises from analysing the competitiveness of the Estonian milk 
sector. Competitiveness varies across different years as well as farm sizes. 
Farms with 20 to 200 cows were competitive through the period under the 
analysis. The projections of competitiveness after accession are rather favourable 
for milk farms in the short and medium term. A shift is expected after the 
enlargement in competitiveness, whereas "phasing in" direct payments later on 
will not improve the situation further, as input costs are also expected to in-
crease. Milk farms as a whole have no comparative advantage in Estonia and EU 
accession will not improve this situation. 
For milk processing enterprises, the choice of strategy appeared to be important. 
The results of the analysis for milk processors showed that exporters were more 
competitive than domestic market-oriented enterprises, although the latter create 
higher value added. There are several reasons for this. The EU granted favourable 
access for bulk products during the pre-accession years for Estonia. Higher price 
levels in the EU provided incentives for Estonian processors to take full advan-
tage of these concessions and motivated processors to develop. Consequently, 
low attention was given to the development of value added products, as well as 
on marketing and promotion activities. Only during recent years has attention 
turned to the development of more value added products.  Piret Hein 
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In general, EU accession is expected to decrease the competitiveness of milk 
processors. In the long term, particularly in the light of the CAP reform (as the 
market price support for bulk products is expected to decrease) the exporters of 
these products will face lower returns. Thus, the enterprises oriented towards 
higher value added products might gain an advantage over current exporters. 
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INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MARKETS 
      
 
JILL E. HOBBS 
1 
ABSTRACT 
The paper discusses the role of institutions in fostering a competitive market 
economy and encouraging growth and investment in the agri-food sectors of 
transition countries. The transition process has progressed with different degrees 
of success in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, as evidenced by 
striking differences in broad measures of economic performance. Embryonic or 
poorly functioning institutions explain some of the challenges to the transition 
process. The paper draws on Transaction Cost Economics to show how the insti-
tutional environment affects transaction costs, and the resulting implications for 
supply chain relationships. An array of institutions that guide the invisible hand 
of the market are discussed. These include, market information and quality 
measurement institutions, establishment and enforcement of property rights, 
credible contract law and dispute settlement mechanisms, corporate governance 
laws and financial institutions.  
Keywords: Transaction costs, institutions, contracts, information asymmetry, 
transition. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The transition from a centrally planned to a market economy is a long and diffi-
cult process. Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have been making 
this transition at different speeds and with varying degrees of success. A critical 
component of the transition process is the institutional environment within 
which transition occurs. The institutional environment guides the ‘invisible 
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hand’ of the marketplace. In most modern market economies, the institutional 
environment is often taken granted; it exists in the background, serving to facili-
tate the smooth functioning of market transactions and (usually) the maintenance 
of a stable investment climate. Transition involves the establishment and adapta-
tion of institutions, a process fraught with uncertainty. Failure to establish an ef-
ficient and credible institutional environment raises the transaction costs of doing 
business, stunting economic growth and deterring investment. This paper exam-
ines the effect of the institutional environment on transaction costs, investment 
and growth in agri-food supply chains in transition countries. 
After more than a decade of ‘transition’, the widening gulf between CEE coun-
tries with respect to economic performance is marked. Ten years after the onset 
of transition, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had achieved notably 
higher levels of real GDP compared with other transition countries, such as 
Lithuania. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries have 
tended to fare even more poorly, with average real GDP in 2000 estimated at an 
index value of 62 (1990=100) compared with an average of 106 for countries of 
Central and South-eastern Europe and the Baltics (WORLD BANK, 2002). Infla-
tion rates also differ markedly across these countries, with average inflation over 
1990-2000 ranging from 13  percent in the Czech Republic to 102  percent in 
Romania and 244  percent in Belarus (WORLD  BANK, 2002). Inequality, as 
measured by Gini coefficients, that relate the proportion of income earned to the 
proportion of the population, increased markedly in Ukraine and other CIS 
countries over the first decade of transition, compared to more modest increases 
in most CEE countries. Rather than educational premiums and wage dispersion, 
this inequality has been attributed to widespread corruption, rent seeking and 
state capture by vested interests (WORLD BANK, 2002), all of which are symp-
tomatic of a weak institutional environment.  
In an analysis of institutional performance in transition economies, WEDER (2001) 
identifies five clusters of countries, grouped by institutional performance
2. Po-
land, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia lie in the first (highest) 
cluster, while other CEE countries (e.g. Romania, the Slovak Republic), lie in 
the second cluster, with most CIS countries lying in the lowest three clusters. 
The clear message is that the ‘transition’ countries, although by no means uni-
form to start with, have undergone very different transition processes in terms of 
policy reform and institutional development. 
                                                 
2 W EDER’S measure of institutional performance is an amalgam of various aspects of the 
economic and business environment, derived from private sector surveys of firms and ex-
pert surveys of country risk assessment firms. The variables include evaluations of the rule 
of law, graft, regulatory burden, government effectiveness, political instability, credibility 
of government announcements, judiciary reliability, property rights enforcement, bribes, 
freedom from discretionary bureaucrats, and more. Building sustainable supply chains: The role of institutions 
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Initial conditions (geography, history, price and output distortions) and the ex-
ternal shocks associated with the break-up of the Soviet Union, war and civil 
strife may be valid explanations for much of the output decline witnessed in CIS 
countries in the early 1990s. However, it has been argued that these are far less 
persuasive explanations of later economic differences between transition coun-
tries. Instead, a key factor has been the effectiveness of policies and the evolving 
institutional environment in disciplining the ‘old’ (state) sector and encouraging 
growth and investment in the new business sector (WORLD BANK, 2002). 
Privatisation by itself, while a necessary condition for transition to an efficient 
functioning market economy, is by no means a sufficient condition. In the ab-
sence of an effective, credible and transparent institutional environment, the ex-
pected gains from privatisation will not be realised. The neoclassical economic 
paradigm, with its core assumptions of perfect information, efficient (unham-
pered) allocation of resources and competitive markets takes as given the institu-
tional environment within which transactions occur. Neoclassical economic 
analysis concentrates on equilibrium outcomes, without consideration of how 
transactions occur; by default it assumes a frictionless economic environment. 
To understand the challenges facing the CEE countries in encouraging economic 
growth and establishing a stable climate for business investment, it is necessary 
to augment the traditional neoclassical model of rational self-interested indi-
viduals and firms with insights from the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
branch of New Institutional Economics. 
2 TRANSACTION COSTS 
Transaction costs encompass a spectrum of institutional costs related to ex-
change, when we no longer assume information to be costless. Included are the 
costs of gathering information, of negotiation, of drawing up and enforcing con-
tracts, of delineating and policing property rights, of monitoring performance 
and enforcing contractual agreements (CHEUNG, 1987). 
TCE recognises that economic agents are boundedly rational in their capacities 
to evaluate all possible alternative outcomes of a decision (SIMON, 1961). When 
combined with situations of uncertainty and complexity, bounded rationality 
forces agents to incur higher transaction costs and may lead to sub-optimal deci-
sions. Uncertainty and complexity have been characteristics of transition 
economies as institutions emerge and evolve, the rules change, and new business 
relationships are formed (and flounder). Indeed, RADAEV (2001) argues that far 
from decreasing transaction costs, the uncertainty that emerged from the de-
velopment of new institutions increased the transaction costs facing firms due to 
poorly structured and weakly enforced rules.  Jill E. Hobbs 
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Opportunism, or self-interest seeking with guile (WILLIAMSON, 1979), becomes 
a problem in the presence of small-numbers bargaining when agents can exploit 
a situation to their own advantage. Bounded rationality implies that other agents 
cannot identify, with any degree of certainty ex ante, the potential for opportun-
istic behaviour. If the privatisation process has resulted in a monopoly or a small 
number of firms dominating an industry, then a small-numbers bargaining situa-
tion exists. It may also exist in industries with an outwardly competitive struc-
ture if investments in specific assets, which cannot be contractually safeguarded, 
reduce a firm’s effective transaction partners to a small-numbers bargaining 
situation.  
Asset specificity arises when one party to an exchange has invested in resources 
specific to that exchange, with little or no value in an alternative use (KLEIN et al., 
1978) and is vulnerable to the other party opportunistically attempting to appro-
priate rent from the investment. Bounded rationality and/or a weak institutional 
environment with poorly defined (and poorly enforced) property rights preclude 
the development of a fully contingent and enforceable contract to govern this 
transaction. In the absence of credible contractual protection, the hold-up prob-
lem occurs and prevents the transaction from occurring. The hold-up problem is 
particularly troublesome in a transitioning economy, wherein new investments 
are essential to long-term economic growth. 
Finally, TCE relaxes the full or perfect information assumption of the traditional 
neoclassical model, recognising that many transactions are characterised by in-
formation asymmetry. In the presence of adverse selection, institutions to reduce 
buyer measurement costs or protect the contractual rights of buyers are neces-
sary to prevent market failure. Bureaucratic rules may be subject to moral haz-
ard if officials can abuse their position of power within the institutional struc-
ture. Moral hazard can also be a problem in shareholder-managerial relations if 
actions by management to maximise their own self-interest at the expense of the 
shareholders are not directly observable by the owners of the enterprise. The 
practice of "tunnelling" is a prime example of moral hazard. Tunnelling involves 
the legal expropriation of income and shareholder assets, for example, through di-
verting cash flows and asset stripping. It has been identified as a particular prob-
lem in many transition economies (WORLD BANK, 2002; NUREEV and RUNOV, 
2001). 
Transaction costs arise in the process of searching for information prior to a 
transaction, in negotiating the transaction and in monitoring and enforcing the 
transaction.  Building sustainable supply chains: The role of institutions 
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2.1 Search  costs 
Search, or information, costs arise directly from the information asymmetry that 
characterises many transactions. Economic agents incur search costs in gathering 
information about products, prices, the reliability of buyers (suppliers), etc. A 
raft of private and public sector institutions act to reduce these information 
costs, for example, communication systems: Telecommunications, the Internet, 
postal systems, electronic (radio, television). Fostering competitive markets in 
the communications sector is an important role of government policy. 
The provision and dissemination of business information can also reduce informa-
tion costs. In many commodity markets, buyers and sellers have easy access to 
price information through a variety of institutions. These include print media (e.g. 
agricultural commodity prices are published regularly in the farming press and in 
local newspapers), commodity futures exchanges, and through industry associa-
tions that collate and publish price and market trend information (HOBBS et al., 
1997). 
Buyers incur information costs in ascertaining the true quality of a good, par-
ticularly when the product has experience or credence attributes that are impor-
tant to the purchase decision
3. BARZEL  (1982) argues that buyers use proxy 
measures of value, leading to measurement errors and a divergence between the 
price of a product and its valuation by the consumer. If buyers incur high 
measurement costs, the net price they are willing to pay for the product (posted 
price net of the costs of measurement) is reduced. Typically in consumer mar-
kets, multiple buyers must incur information costs as they sort goods to estimate 
their true value, whereas if a seller were to incur the costs of value measurement, 
products would be measured once. It is often in the seller’s interest to incur 
product quality measurement costs to reduce the incentive for costly sorting ac-
tivities on the part of buyers. BARZEL concludes that institutions arise to reduce 
the costs of measurement.  
Firm-level strategies to reduce buyers’ measurement cost include branding and 
product warranties. Industry-wide initiatives include commodity grading 
schemes, quality assurance and certification systems – usually with third party 
verification to strengthen the credibility of the quality signal. The government’s 
role in this case may be limited to ensuring that the institutional environment is 
in place to facilitate third party verification of grading schemes, quality assurance 
and certification systems. Establishing the regulatory environment to protect con-
sumers from fraudulent labelling claims and product adulteration is also an impor-
                                                 
3  Experience attributes are those that a consumer cannot evaluate until after purchasing and 
consuming the good, for example, the tenderness of a steak. Consumers are unable to de-
tect or evaluate credence attributes even after purchase and consumption, for example, or-
ganically produced food.  Jill E. Hobbs 
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tant function of government. The role of market information and quality verifica-
tion institutions in the agri-food sector of CEE countries is discussed in section 4.  
2.2 Negotiation  costs 
Negotiation costs arise from the physical act of the transaction, and include the 
costs of negotiation and drawing up contractual agreements, and the use of an 
intermediary, such as a broker, etc. In the presence of high levels of uncertainty 
and a weak institutional environment, writing fully contingent contracts is 
costly, or even impossible. Without effective commercial contract laws, negotia-
tion costs will be higher. Financial institutions reduce negotiation costs by facili-
tating payment over time and distance and by providing access to a source of 
credit. The role of financial institutions in the agri-food sectors of transition 
countries is discussed further in section 4. 
2.3  Monitoring and enforcement costs 
Monitoring and enforcement costs arise after the transaction has been agreed to, 
and include the costs of monitoring the actions of transaction parties, monitoring 
the quality of goods and, if necessary, enforcing the terms of the transaction in 
the event of abrogation by the other party. A transparent and enforceable system 
of property rights, an effective commercial legal system and judiciary, a reliable 
financial system and enforceable rules of corporate governance are all compo-
nents of the institutional environment that help to mitigate monitoring and en-
forcement costs. In the absence of these institutions, or if they are weak or un-
dermined by vacillating rules, opportunistic bureaucrats and inconsistent en-
forcement, the resulting uncertainty and high transaction costs will impede busi-
ness investment and economic growth. These problems are discussed in the con-
text of the agri-food sector in transition economies in section 4. 
TCE provides predictions regarding the effect of transaction costs on vertical co-
ordination in the agri-food sector. Contracts or vertical integration are expected 
to replace spot market transactions in the presence of asset specificity and uncer-
tainty. In the absence of effective contractual safeguards, the transaction will 
only occur through a vertically integrated firm, or may not occur at all. Thus, 
transaction costs have direct implications for the incentives to invest, for long-
term economic growth and for the structure of industries. The institutional envi-
ronment within which transactions occur is critically important in determining 
the nature, level and distribution of those transaction costs. Several facets of that 
institutional environment have already been alluded to, however, a number de-
serve closer attention within the context of transitioning economies. Marketing 
information institutions, legal institutions, particularly the system of property 
rights, financial institutions and the rules of corporate governance are areas in 
which considerable institutional uncertainty remains. Building sustainable supply chains: The role of institutions 
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3 EVOLVING SUPPLY CHAIN RELATIONSHIPS  
New supply chains are emerging in the agri-food sector, although in some cases, 
appropriate infrastructure to support these new supply chains has been slow to 
develop. A lack of institutions such as commodity exchanges, wholesale markets 
and auctions, and inadequate quality measurement and verification institutions 
has meant that clear market signals are lacking in some transition countries. Sup-
ply chain relationships run the spectrum from loose arrangements characterised 
largely by spot market transactions, through more formal contractual agreements, 
to internal co-ordination by a firm vertically integrated across several stages of 
production, processing or distribution. TCE posits that an organisational form 
will emerge that minimises the sum of production and transaction costs (WIL-
LIAMSON, 1979). Transaction costs are influenced by the institutional environ-
ment within which the transaction occurs. 
Auction markets can be an efficient price-discovery and market clearing mecha-
nism for agricultural commodities. Auction prices are usually public information 
and represent and an important source of price information to assist price discov-
ery in other direct sales relationships between producers and processors
4. Auc-
tions therefore reduce price information costs for farmers and processors even if 
these firms do not trade through the auction market directly (HOBBS, 1997).  
The auction company is a private entrepreneur, earning a commission from the 
seller of the auctioned item. The auctioneer acts as an intermediary between 
buyer and seller, usually paying the seller immediately following the sale, before 
seeking payment from the buyer. Therefore, auction companies can be an impor-
tant industry development institution in fledgling sectors when processors are 
prone to defaulting on payments, and farmers face high transaction costs in 
evaluating the reliability and financial stability of a potential buyer. However, 
this also means that auction companies will bear greater risks in transition 
economies, given higher levels of uncertainty. This is likely to be reflected in 
higher commissions charged by the auction company to reflect the increased risk 
of buyers defaulting on payment. Strengthening bankruptcy laws to protect 
creditors is an important institutional development in ensuring the effective opera-
tion of auction markets, and is discussed in more detail in section 4.3. An auc-
tion system also needs to be backed by an effective and enforceable commercial 
legal system that confers upon buyers a legal obligation to pay for commodities 
purchased at the auction (see section 4.4). 
In many agricultural commodity sectors in western Europe and North America, 
auction markets, while once prevalent, are becoming less important as transactions 
move away from a traditional spot market basis to closer vertical co-ordination 
                                                 
4  Provided that a sufficient volume is traded through the auction system, avoiding the thin 
market problem. Jill E. Hobbs 
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through direct sales relationships and contracts. Although auctions are a trans-
parent and competitive method of price discovery (assuming a sufficient number 
of buyers), for some products they may impede the efficiency with which price 
signals are transmitted from consumers to producers. In an auction, price is usually 
based on a visual assessment of quality and may not capture all of the quality 
dimensions of interest to buyers if these quality dimensions have experience and 
credence properties. For example, the baking qualities of wheat are difficult to 
determine on the basis of a visual inspection of the kernel. Production method 
attributes such as organic or environmentally friendly cropping practices and 
livestock feeding or welfare protocols cannot be determined on the basis of a 
visual inspection of the commodity or final product. Auctions may be inefficient 
price transmission mechanisms for these quality attributes. 
As an alternative to spot market transactions, contracts represent more formal, 
longer-term supply relationships. Contracts allow farmers to lock in a market for 
their product, and provide buyers with the opportunity to specify production 
processes that more closely match their market needs. However, viable contracts 
are dependent on the development of an appropriate institutional environment. If 
considerable uncertainty permeates business transactions in a transition economy, 
designing complete (fully contingent) contracts is problematic. Weak legal insti-
tutions for the enforcement of contracts compound this problem and deter in-
vestment. Firms will be reluctant to make asset-specific investments if there are 
insufficient safeguards to protect these investments
5.  
In many cases, the emerging private farm sector in transition economies has had 
to contend with downstream market power in the form of oligopsonistic or re-
gionally monopsonistic buyers. Market power in the first-stage of agricultural 
processing has long been a contentious issue in many developed western market 
economies. Joint marketing of farmers’ produce through co-operatives or collec-
tive bargaining has been an important feature of some sectors. LANG (1980) 
shows how collective bargaining in US crop and horticulture sectors was able to 
shift the risk of product quality deterioration from farmers to processors who 
were more easily able to control quality. Appropriately aligning incentives with 
the abilities of a party to reduce joint risk by making them the residual claimant 
to a transaction leads to a net gain in economic welfare. An effective commer-
cial legal system is necessary for the enforcement and long-term viability of col-
lective bargaining agreements in the agricultural sector.  
In the presence of high levels of uncertainty and asset specificity, inadequate insti-
tutions to safeguard investments will encourage firms to vertically integrate to in-
ternalise the uncertainty. This may have negative implications for competitiveness 
                                                 
5 See  BOGER (2001) for an analysis of the development of hog marketing channels in Poland 
that identifies a number of challenges related to missing or embryonic institutions and in-
formational barriers. Building sustainable supply chains: The role of institutions 
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in the long-run if vertical integration facilitates greater consolidation in the agri-
food sectors of transition economies. The following section examines the role of 
specific institutions in reducing transaction costs and facilitating the efficient 
functioning of markets. 
4 DEVELOPING INSTITUTIONS 
4.1  Information and quality measurement 
Institutions of particular importance in guiding the invisible hand in agri-food 
markets include quality measurement and verification institutions such as com-
modity grading systems and third party quality certification and accreditation. In 
the presence of information asymmetry with respect to product quality, these in-
stitutions facilitate price discovery and pricing efficiency by allowing prices to 
more closely reflect the qualities demanded by the end-user.  
Price information institutions are also important in facilitating the efficient func-
tioning of markets. As indicated above, auction markets can perform this role. 
However, in the absence of publicly available spot market prices, private sector 
agents or industry associations may fulfil the price information role. For example, 
CANFAX, is a market information service run by the Canadian Cattlemen’s As-
sociation that collects and disseminates price information and analysis. 
4.2  Defining and defending property rights 
Insecure property rights are a significant constraint on new investment and eco-
nomic growth. A comprehensive survey of enterprises
6 in 1999 found that over 
70 percent of enterprises surveyed in Russia and Ukraine lacked confidence in 
the security of property rights, compared to fewer than 30 percent in Poland, Es-
tonia and Croatia (WORLD BANK, 2002). To a large extent, differences in the se-
curity of property rights are determined by the effectiveness of legal drafting 
systems and the judiciary. Inadequate consultation with enterprises when draft-
ing new laws or policies and failure to publicise new rules before their imple-
mentation were identified as major problems by businesses in transition econo-
mies, with over 90 percent stating that they were seldom or never consulted or 
informed about new rules (WORLD BANK, 2002). Lack of confidence in the secu-
rity of property rights and the efficacy of the system of drafting rules that affect 
property rights is a serious impediment to investment. 
Well defined (and enforced) property rights enshrine the right to make choices 
about a property or resource, the right to extract rents from its ownership and the 
                                                 
6  The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey conducted a survey in 22 
transition countries across CEE and CIS countries. Jill E. Hobbs 
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right to transfer its ownership without restriction (CHEUNG, 1982). Resources 
can be allocated – and reallocated – efficiently among competing users. The 
economic value of the resource is maximised, and overuse from a common 
property problem is avoided. Since ownership of property rights confers poten-
tial wealth – or loss of wealth depending on the choices made – the distribution 
and protection of those property rights is crucial in determining whether re-
sources are allocated in response to economic signals or as a result of perverse 
bureaucratic incentives. 
HANISCH et al. (2001) argue that property rights reform in transition should be 
analysed as a process. They distinguish between formal and effective property 
rights. Although the reform process may begin with the establishment of formal 
property rights, rational actors then bargain to establish the effective rights to 
land given obscure formal laws or those subject to interpretation. Thus, there are 
numerous actors involved in the process of establishing effective property rights. 
Politicians establish the ‘rule of law’, these rules are implemented by lawyers 
and bureaucrats, and local actors play a role in determining how property rights 
are exchanged to become economic rights of action or effective property rights. 
Rent seeking and corruption cloud the relationship between formal and effective 
property rights. 
The security of property rights is also determined by the credibility of govern-
ment policies toward private assets. If policy announcements to the effect that 
governments will not expropriate privately held assets are not believable they 
will not elicit an increase in private sector investment. In an empirical model 
linking the institutional environment to the efficacy of property rights protection, 
KEEFER and KNACK (2001) find that countries with less secure property rights and 
with government decision makers less constrained by political institutions had a 
higher ratio of public to private investment. They conclude that the security of 
property rights is a direct product of the broad institutional and political environ-
ment in which governments make decisions. Institutional arrangements that en-
sure credibility by constraining decision makers’ ability to engage in aggressive 
or expropriatory action towards investors are deemed essential.  
4.3  Contract law and dispute settlement  
Long-term business relationships between firms reduce search and negotiation 
costs and are conducive to investment and economic growth. Regular transac-
tions with raw material suppliers mean that an enterprise does not have to under-
take costly search activities each time new supplies are needed. Quality control is 
made easier by regular supply relationships, where the quality of the input is 
known from previous experience. Negotiation costs are reduced if a long-standing 
agreement on price determination can be reached rather than being re-negotiated 
at each delivery. Similarly, regular business relationships with buyers reduce the 
search costs of locating new buyers for each transaction and in continuously  Building sustainable supply chains: The role of institutions 
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establishing the trustworthiness and creditworthiness of new players. Monitoring 
costs are reduced if a long-term relationship with a reliable distributor is developed. 
The (unobserved) actions of a distributor are particularly important for perishable 
products, as product handling and storage affects product quality throughout the 
marketing chain. Long-term relationships with a trusted distributor reduce the 
exposure to moral hazard. 
Regular business relationships often evolve naturally as the most efficient verti-
cal co-ordination mechanism. These relationships take on various degrees of 
formality in terms of the contractual environment in which they are consum-
mated. In the presence of low levels of uncertainty, information asymmetry and 
asset specificity, contracts may be self-enforcing. Where reputation is important 
and both parties have a stake in the long-term survival of the business relation-
ship, contractual terms are honoured even in the absence of third party enforce-
ment. Many business relationships exist on this basis within stable economic cli-
mates, where reputations are easily established and maintained, and the potential 
for moral hazard is low. Of course, even long-term business relationships can fail 
spectacularly, as was the case with the acrimonious break-up of the 95 year-old 
supply relationship between Firestone (Bridgestone) Tires and Ford in the US in 
2001
7.  
Self-enforcing contracts are prone to failure in environments where uncertainty 
is prevalent. Many CEE and CIS countries have exhibited high levels of eco-
nomic uncertainty during transition, with low growth rates, unemployment and 
opaque economic policies with respect to key macro-economic variables and 
business investment policy. Political uncertainty emerges from a bureaucratic 
system prone to graft, corruption and a bewildering array of informal rules.  
If self-enforcing contracts cannot be relied upon, enforceable contract law is 
necessary for the establishment of long-term stable business relationships and as 
an inducement to investment. "Enforceable" deserves emphasis. Enshrined in a 
system of contract law must be the credible threat that the coercive power of the 
state will be brought to bear on those parties that abrogate their contractual 
commitments. This threat, if credible, should discourage opportunistic behaviour 
in an attempt to appropriate rents from asset specific investments. Yet it would be 
naïve to conclude that business disputes do not occur even in the presence of this 
credible threat. Complex contractual relationships in environments of uncertainty 
mean that genuine disagreements may arise over the interpretation of contractual 
clauses. As the transaction environment becomes more complex, attempting to 
                                                 
7  Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford were forced to recall the Firestone tires on Ford Explorers 
in 2000 after a series of fatal accidents caused by tire blow-outs. Both companies were 
sued in subsequent civil lawsuits. Ford blamed Firestone Tires. The tire company blamed 
Ford for problems with the design of the vehicle body. Both companies accused the other 
of withholding information. The dispute brought a long-standing business relationship to 
an abrupt, and very public, end.  Jill E. Hobbs 
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write fully contingent contracts to cover every eventuality leads to ever-increasing 
transaction costs. Contractual gaps and the potential for legitimate contract dis-
putes also pave the way for opportunistic reneging on contractual obligations. 
An efficacious dispute-settlement institution fosters long-term business relation-
ships, investment and economic growth. 
Arbitration is a private sector institutional alternative to the court system for 
settling commercial disputes, and may be particularly effective in safeguarding 
(thereby encouraging) foreign investment. A number of arbitration systems exist 
and compete internationally. The arbitration details are specified in advance in a 
contractual agreement following well-established, yet flexible, rules for ap-
pointing arbitrators. Two parties to a contractual agreement in Poland might 
agree, in the event of a dispute, to use a Swiss arbitration centre, a French arbi-
trator and follow Canadian arbitration rules.  
Parties to a dispute voluntarily agree to be bound by the decision of an arbitra-
tor. As there is no legal enforcement of arbitration decisions per se, it cannot 
prevent overt opportunism. Nevertheless, the same could probably be said of the 
court system given the complexity of enforcing complex contractual agreements 
through the courts in an uncertain economic environment. Arbitration is useful 
in resolving genuine disagreements over contractual terms and obligations in a 
speedy, transparent and transaction-cost reducing manner. Firms may also use 
compliance with arbitration decisions (which are a matter of public record) to 
signal reputation – thus reducing information costs in establishing the credibility 
of new business partners (HOBBS et al., 1997). 
Policies that foster the development of private sector commercial arbitration 
centres in transition economies, together with educating the business sector 
about the uses of commercial arbitration could be beneficial. Arbitration is a 
complement to, rather than a substitute for, a commercial legal system. Private 
sector commercial arbitration systems survive on the basis of their success in re-
solving commercial disputes. Critical to this success is credibility, which in 
large part is a function of whether parties to a dispute abide by the decision of 
the arbitrator. A supportive legal framework that enforces arbitration decisions 
is important. However, arbitration cannot work if the legal system is used fre-
quently to overturn arbitration decisions – a particular danger when a dispute 
arises between a domestic firm and a foreign firm. In those situations, national 
courts might overturn arbitration decisions if they are seen to contravene domes-
tic legislation, if third parties might be adversely affected by the arbitration deci-
sion, or if the arbitration decision was not in the national interest. Uncertainty 
over the enforcement of arbitration decisions deters the use of arbitration, and by 
default may deter investment and economic growth. Domestic legislation can 
reduce this uncertainty by avoiding the temptation to place restrictive limits on 
arbitration awards, and only allowing appeal to domestic courts if compliance 
with the award would put the party in violation of domestic law. Building sustainable supply chains: The role of institutions 
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4.4  Rules of corporate governance 
The rules of corporate governance are important in establishing transparency in 
shareholder-management relationships. Both corporate governance and the pro-
cedures for exit and bankruptcy are critical for long-term access to equity and 
investment. This includes enforceable rules to protect minority shareholders, 
prevent insider deals and conflicts of interest, and ensure adequate accounting 
and auditing (WORLD BANK, 2002). 
It could be argued that too little attention has been given to establishing efficient 
and credible institutions for corporate governance. In some cases, these prob-
lems can be traced back to the privatisation process that left existing directors of 
state enterprises or local bureaucrats in charge, effectively making these indi-
viduals residual claimants to the assets of the enterprise. This has been a particu-
lar problem in Russia. Rampant tunnelling activities resulted, including asset 
stripping and cash diversion. Theft and corruption are also major problems. 
Effective legal protection is a prerequisite for inducing suppliers of finance to 
commit resources to an enterprise for a return on their investment. Specific pro-
vision for legal protection of investors and a credible regulatory system for fi-
nancial intermediaries, such as investment funds, brokers and stock markets is 
essential (JOHNSON and SHLIEFER, 2001). If insider-ownership structures domi-
nate, there are perverse incentives for managers to act in their own self-interest, 
thereby deterring outside investment. 
Stock option plans are commonly used in western economies to provide manag-
ers with incentives to maximise shareholder return. The success of these plans is 
contingent upon an appropriate institutional structure, including an efficient 
capital market, fair and transparent price evaluation and accounting processes 
and a legal framework governing the establishment and operation of stock-
option plans (OECD, 2002). Without the appropriate institutions, the introduc-
tion of stock option plans would be open to manipulation and abuse by vested 
interests. As such, they would likely fail as a device to align the interests of 
managers with outside shareholders, fail to enhance corporate performance and, 
ultimately, fail to encourage outside investment.  
A system of credible third party auditing is necessary for the long-term devel-
opment of efficient and sustainable capital markets and in maintaining long-term 
investor confidence. Manipulation of audit statements and widespread fraud can 
be major problems. Policy measures are necessary in the form of auditing laws 
to provide regulatory oversight of the auditing process to reduce the opportuni-
ties for manipulation by insider vested interests. Without these policy measures, 
lack of transparency will weaken shareholder confidence and deter investment.  
Bankruptcy laws are also important in bringing the discipline of the market to 
bear on poor management, and have a direct effect on the long run availability 
of financing. In developed market economies, bankruptcy proceedings tend to Jill E. Hobbs 
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give first priority to secured creditors, and then to reimbursing owed salaries, tax, 
supplier credits, etc., leaving shareholders as the residual claimant (GRAY, 1993). 
In some transition countries, initial bankruptcy laws shifted the priorities in fa-
vour of salaries and severance pay for workers over secured creditors. In the 
long run this is likely to limit access to secured credit as a source of enterprise 
financing. Nevertheless, it is also important to distinguish between appropriate 
rules during a period of transition compared with a post-transition equilibrium. 
Giving suppliers who have extended credit priority in bankruptcy proceedings 
may be necessary as a temporary transition step, given the importance of inter-
firm credit and the potential cascade effect of a bankruptcy within a fledgling 
supply chain. Although cushioning inter-firm credit may be applicable in the 
short-run, financial intermediaries are a more sustainable institution in the long 
run; being generally more transaction-cost efficient in terms of evaluating 
creditworthiness and risk. 
In the aftermath of privatisation, transparent and rigorously enforced competi-
tion laws can help expose poor management to the disciplines of the market-
place. The challenge lies in designing these laws to encourage competition, 
without inhibiting investment. Transition economies, in particular, face unique 
obstacles in this regard. Enforcement of these laws and further institutional de-
velopment of competition policies to establish and maintain competitive market 
environments are ongoing concerns (OECD, 2001). 
Typically, competition laws deal with industry structure, such as the number and 
size distribution of firms in an industry, and firm conduct – pricing strategies, 
strategic creation of entry and exit barriers, etc. It is often difficult to distinguish 
between predatory behaviour that is contrary to the public interest and firm 
strategies that are a natural part of the competitive process within that the indus-
try. In transition economies, the structure of industries formerly organised as 
state enterprises is largely a result of the privatisation process. Where that process 
led to the creation of bilateral monopoly situations, distortions inevitably arise. 
Strict anti-monopoly laws may inhibit investment at critical junctures of the 
transition process. Nevertheless, rules outlawing – and penalising – cartel behav-
iour are an essential component of market reforms in CEE countries. 
4.5 Financial  institutions 
A competitive, stable and market-driven banking system plays a key role in en-
couraging long-term investment and economic growth. Banks, as financial in-
termediaries, lower the negotiation costs of doing business by facilitating pay-
ment over time and over distance. The ability to clear cheques through an inte-
grated banking system eliminates the need for costly and risky cash-based trans-
actions. The large amounts of cash required to finance cash-based transactions 
poses a security risk and raises internal monitoring costs for firms in guarding 
against pilfering. Inventory management is made easier by the use of delayed Building sustainable supply chains: The role of institutions 
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payment practices that simply would not be possible in a cash-based transaction 
environment. 
In market economies, banks are also an important source of financing for new 
investments. Transition countries differ markedly with respect to the importance 
of domestic credit. For example, in 1999-2000 in Russia, only three percent of 
total investment was sourced from banks. Commercial bank loans represented 
only 14.6  percent of Russian GDP, compared to over 20  percent of GDP in 
Hungary and over 40 percent in the Czech Republic (OECD, 2002).  
Poorly managed firms that subsequently perform poorly, are subject to the dis-
ciplines of the market through equity and financing constraints. A competitive 
private commercial banking sector is a key institution in a market economy. Re-
forming the banking system has been a critical component of the transition 
process. The entry of new banks is fundamental to building a competitive banking 
sector in the long run. In the short run, however, rapid entry can mean a high 
level of bank failures and a weakening of depositor confidence in the new banking 
sector (WORLD BANK, 1996). This can lead to a low level of trust in the banking 
system, with only a very low level of deposits. For example, in Russia, bank de-
posits are only 6.6 % of GDP, and most of these deposits are short-term. Private 
deposits in Russian commercial banks are reported to cover only 6 percent of 
their assets, compared with 31 percent in Poland and 48 percent in the Czech 
Republic (OECD, 2002). A credible system of deposit insurance helps maintain 
depositor confidence. High transaction costs for insurance firms in evaluating 
the sustainability of a commercial bank, and the potential size of losses, are 
market failure arguments in favour of public sector provision of deposit insurance. 
Deposit insurance is also important in preventing widespread depositor panic 
and spillover effects across the banking sector in the event of a single bank failure. 
It is clear that policy measures to guide the invisible hand of the market are also 
necessary in maintaining a stable banking sector. 
Nonetheless, failed banks should be allowed to exit the banking system, particu-
larly if bank failures are a direct result of poor lending and investment decisions. 
Policies to ensure good corporate governance reduce information and monitoring 
costs for banks, thereby reducing the risk of bank failure due to information 
asymmetry rather than simply poor lending decisions. Regulatory oversight of 
the banking system is also critical in ensuring that banking failures do not desta-
bilise the entire sector. At the same time, regulatory oversight of new banks re-
duces search and monitoring costs for depositors in requiring that these firms 
meet certain capital requirement standards. Entry by reputable foreign banks 
may also provide a source of capital, managerial expertise and competition, pro-
vided that foreign banks are subject to the same domestic regulatory environ-




Transaction cost economics provides insights into the nature of the firm and the 
structure of inter-firm relationships. By focusing on how and why economic 
transactions occur, TCE highlights the factors that encourage or impede invest-
ment and economic growth. 
In the presence of uncertainty and asymmetric information, boundedly rational 
individuals face transaction costs in safeguarding asset specific investments 
against opportunistic behaviour. Investment is deterred, or may only incur 
within vertically integrated firms, thus placing capital constraints on long-term 
investments. Fundamentally, businesses dislike uncertainty; yet high levels of 
uncertainty characterise an economy in transition with embryonic or dysfunc-
tional market institutions. Getting the institutional environment right is an im-
portant prerequisite to lowering transaction costs and facilitating economic 
growth. 
Commercial contract law and effective dispute settlement mechanisms, either 
through the courts or through commercial arbitration processes, reduce transac-
tion costs and facilitate the development of new supply chains. Weak corporate 
governance, graft and corruption will undermine investor and public confidence 
and pose a serious threat to economic growth and investment. Policies that enable 
the market to discipline poorly managed firms, while encouraging growth and 
investment in new enterprises are important. For the most part, this requires that 
policymakers in transition countries concentrate on establishing the necessary 
institutions that allow market forces to work, rather than interfering directly in 
the market. 
Clearly there are many institutions that guide the invisible hand of the market, 
and to discuss them all is beyond the scope of this paper. Information and quality 
measurement institutions will become increasingly important as the agri-food 
sectors in CEE countries seek to respond to increasingly sophisticated consumer 
demands in their domestic market and in export markets. A sustainable commer-
cial banking sector, effective contract law, close attention to corporate governance, 
and clear delineation and protection of property rights remain key components 
of the wider institutional environment. For those CEE countries belonging to the 
European Union, these factors will be particularly important in allowing the 
agri-food sector to compete within the new reality of the Common Market.  
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This paper discusses the difficulties, in transition economies, of grounding the 
paradigm of the invisible hand on a balance between exclusion and governance. 
It argues that pure property rights are not the solution to the problem of finding 
optimal institutions in the food sector of transition countries. A society that is 
faced with high transaction costs and the modulation of benefits from rent seeking 
may seek a mixture of exclusion and governance. Drawing from the proposition 
of Henry Smith, that precision in the development of rights is the core issue of 
institutional and technological change, it is suggested that the transition of the 
food sector cannot avoid involving administrative activities that direct the change. 
Searching for institutions that promote adaptation to local resource and tech-
nology problems and that provide innovative solutions, an invisible hand para-
digm based on pure exclusion, is considered inefficient. This view is supple-
mented by the findings of Saleth and Dinar, who have shown that a subjective 
interpretation of institutions and ideology plays a major role in promoting suc-
cessful transition and technological innovation in the water sector. 
Keywords: Institution economics, governance, exclusion, transaction costs.  
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As the development of western economies, and in particular the performance of 
the food sector of market-oriented countries over the last century has shown, a 
certain trust in the mechanisms behind the invisible hand may finally result in 
(1) the most sophisticated modern farm technologies, (2) efficient food proces-
sing, as well as marketing industries, and (3) ever more satisfied consumers. So, 
why not wait and see similar things happen in transition countries? Such delibera-
tions include open trade regimes, liberalised land markets, rural labour markets, 
etc., and it has been expected that private property, that is, the exclusion of 
rights, as well as strong competition for resources, result in positive adjustments 
such as: (1) an immediate increase of food production, (2) better food quality, 
(3) attractive new products, etc., on the product market level, but also: (4) land 
consolidation in the hands of efficient farmers, (5) a market-based determination 
of farm sizes, (6) immediate integration of labour forces in new farm structures, 
(7) investments in modern equipment, etc., on the input markets. However, these 
expectations and perceptions mean that the invisible hand and price mechanism 
is a generic device to generate welfare, that no further governance is needed, and 
that no exceptions to the functioning of that mechanism exist. The only policy 
advice which then remains is the rapid assurance of private ownership and a se-
quencing of reform that builds on property rights and individualisation (though 
admittedly, in reality it is more complicated: LERMAN et al., 2004). In contrast to 
that vision, one could argue that the success in some countries, so far, have been 
an exception, that transition needs more time, and, given the conditions in CEE 
Countries, that it cannot be directly carried over from the West to the East. 
In this context, at least, it is understandable that policy makers in transition 
countries seek access to similar standards of market performance, also on input 
markets, as were prevalent in the old EU and that they want to know the "right" 
and immediate recipe for replicating success. But can we see the invisible hand 
as a recipe, and does it work without any other ingredients? At this point, per-
haps, we should go into a deeper analysis of causalities (1) to make the invisible 
hand function, (2) to look at market interactions and failures, (3) to appreciate 
other, complementary, institutional arrangements that may bring about the posi-
tive change strived for, and (4) to reconsider policy as the governance of change. 
To enable the successful operation of a modern food sector, necessary and suffi-
cient conditions are, perhaps, needed that assure market development, and it 
cannot be assumed that the development for market coordination of economic 
plans can be taken for granted. This is even more so if the prerequisite for the 
workings of the invisible hand, the setting of rights, is not automatic. In particu-
lar, an approach to the determinants of changes towards appropriate technolo-
gies in resource use and favourable institutions in the food sector, such as re-
sponding to the needs of landowners and labourers, is required. It is the objecti-
ve of this paper to look at complementary institutional aspects (1) to improve, How effective is the invisible hand on technological and institutional change 
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i.e., reduce transaction costs, (2) to obtain new transaction arrangements in food 
production, and (3) to encourage investments. The analysis studies impediments 
to and searches for core elements of making the invisible hand function better; 
not to substitute it, but rather to supplement it with governance. 
The paper draws on the contribution of Henry E. Smith in "Exclusion versus 
Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights" (SMITH, 2002), 
published in a special issue of the "Journal of Legal Studies" on the evolution of 
property rights, which will be reviewed first. This review will highlight the cur-
rent situation in the CEECs regarding institutional change and property rights. 
The paper then applies Smith's suggested framework to the problem of techno-
logical and institutional change in the food sector of transition countries. As op-
posed to the initial "Demsetz" hypothesis (DEMSETZ, 1967), which states that the 
rule of law is the core and that institutional change emerges as a matter of supply 
and demand for institutions (DEMSETZ, 2002), Henry Smith theorises that gov-
ernance is at the centre and that we cannot trust ourselves in a simple ‘supply 
and demand’ of institutions. Smith states that private property rights, such as the 
exclusion right, are not always the best institutions. Rather, he sees a spectrum 
of institutions where governance is on the one side of the angle and pure private 
property is on the other side. Thus, institutional change is a consequence of 
cause and effects as well as the interaction of private property and governance. 
This view implies that governance or "good governance", as normatively 
phrased, has a stake in the performance of markets and institutional change. 
Governance in this context means, for instance, that a public authority   
(1) guarantees standards, (2) seeks the fulfilment of contracts, (3) contemplates 
the planning of farm structures, and (4) provides a platform for land and labour 
arrangements; basically it becomes involved. A government can (5) decide on 
settlement patterns, (6) may control land transfer and regional land prices, and (7) 
limit competition. To make the paper more than just theoretical, the role of gover-
nance and the involvement of public organisations are further elaborated by using 
evidence from institutional change in the water sector (SALETH and DINAR, 2004). 
Saleth and Dinar argue that the policy formation for common pool property re-
sources such as land and water, which are typical for the food sector, needs a 
profound interaction of private entities, administrations, and the policy-making 
sector. Their findings will help us to make Smith’s arguments more grounded on 
empirical evidence from the transition of rights.  
The paper is organised according to the sequence of (1) theoretical background, 
(2) the supplementation of evidence from a complementary field, (3) the detec-
tion of deficits in the food sector of transition countries, (4) suggestions for im-
provement, and, finally, (5) some practical remarks. Further, it (6) provides an 
outline of Henry Smith's arguments, (7) reviews Saleth and Dinar’s findings, (8) 
sheds some light on the complementary detection of institutional and political 
problems using Smith's new paradigm, and (9) analyses how far the frameworks Ernst-August Nuppenau 
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of Smith, Saleth and Dinar can be applied to the mitigation of the current transi-
tion problems in the agro-food sector of transition CEE countries, especially 
with respect to questions of framing institutions for landownership and labour 
regulations. We (10) will discuss what institutional arrangements, besides the 
operation of the invisible hand, can be practically derived from the analysis of 
Smith, for instance, for the better functioning of land and labour allocation in a 
vacuum of no government interference. Note that during the discussion we per-
ceive the better functioning of resource allocation as a dynamic concept that in-
cludes innovation in technologies and institutions. This will become clearer when 
we go into the historical components of Smith’s arguments for land development, 
productivity increase, and ownership regulations.  
2 THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Initially, we should apply a broad analysis, including an additional transaction 
cost approach, of what is involved in the transition process itself (ANDERSON 
and HILL, 1975). To make it clear, we have to distinguish between three layers 
of transaction costs: (1) Direct transaction costs appearing in food production 
and the allocation of resources to produce food (including information, marketing, 
and retailing costs). (2) Indirect transaction costs, such as the guarantee of con-
tract fulfilment, the supervision of property, hindering others from reaping bene-
fits from private investments, etc., involved in getting long-term commitments 
from property owners. These costs are broadly recognised as either exclusion or 
governance costs. (3) Special transaction costs appearing if changes of the sys-
tem are envisaged (such as the new demarcation of property, a vision of those 
who lose collective benefits, the preparedness of using force to sustain property, 
of forming group trust, etc.). These costs especially occur in turbulent periods of 
rapid social change and may prohibit the invisible hand from fully functioning. 
Not functioning fully means, in the meta-sense of a market for institutional 
change, that the supply side does not meet the optimal demand for new institu-
tions. Rules on where and what to deliver in terms of labour, inputs, etc., are not 
supplied. Note that further transaction costs cannot immediately be translated 
into price signals (i.e., marginal costs equals price), even if it is known who 
bears the costs.  
It cannot be expected that price signals alone encourage entrepreneurs to alter 
the modes of transactions and to come up with technological innovations de-
signed to set up better rules of conduct. To give an example of technologies and 
regulations needed if privatisation in a community of potential farmers is to 
work, let us shortly imagine all the problems emerging from land re-distribution. 
Land distribution, besides raising important questions like restitutions versus 
vouchers, restructuring versus whole farm privatisation, etc., on the global level 
(LERMAN et al., 2004), cannot avoid going into details and problems given on How effective is the invisible hand on technological and institutional change 
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local levels. It should work on local conditions involving methods that are pro-
vided through: (1) a possible cadastral delineation of land parcels, which is a 
problem in itself due to questions such as: Which parcel, what size, what land-
marks, etc., are institution and technology driven; (2) means of property assurance 
which are not self-evident, since questions about fencing, the quality of security 
guards (if needed), remote sensing, etc., are also perhaps due to innovations; and 
(3) means of agreeing on communication in disputes and conflicts, which are 
normal even in seemingly well-established right systems. 
Note that some of the technologies and institutions needed for private ownership 
are, perhaps, for most of us taken for granted. Not at all do we infer that transac-
tion costs are system and technology dependent. For those who have had prob-
lems with their neighbours about noise and overhanging trees in their gardens, 
problems might be more understandable than for those who live in isolated 
apartment houses. As will be further outlined below, technologies for excluding 
others, which is basically considered a right, have different costs in different en-
vironments. For instance, countries that have vast tracks of land will have high 
costs in establishing fences, while collective grazing arrangements are cheaper 
to enforce. The question emerges: How or by what technology is the control of 
animals and people achieved? There is a need to think about institutions as a 
spectrum ranging from full property rights (exclusion) to public affairs (gover-
nance) which have to be settled by policy. Such a spectrum reveals the need for 
individual and public coordination to assure the function of (input) markets 
(SMITH, 2002). 
  
2.1  The generic argument of Henry Smith 
Henry Smith starts his arguments with the common sense proposition that, 
"…exclusive property rights is said to help solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’" 
(SMITH, 2002, p. S453). He also cites Demsetz by phrasing, " …’property rights’ 
are said to develop in response to changes in the cost and benefits of internalising 
potential externalities" (ibid.). But then he takes a broader view and includes 
"definition and enforcement" costs. From a methodological point, Smith sug-
gests a complex view on rights by seeing them as a continuum between purely 
exclusive, i.e., private rights (for instance defined as 1 or 100 % private) on the 
one hand, and collective, public, i.e., governmental rights on the other (defined 
as 0 or 0 % private). Note the definition of governmental rights interfering in 
private rights, i.e., the reduced functioning of the invisible hand, is mirrored. If 
public rights expand, private rights diminish and vice versa. Having many rights, 
for instance in the daily operation of life, humans work with a knowledge of dif-
ferent types of control over their actions and judge the level of governance inter-
fering in them. Smith cites the example of grazing rights to make the case per-
ceivable: He suggests that using a commons for grazing is in the middle of the 
spectrum between private (exclusion) and public rights (governance). Herders Ernst-August Nuppenau 
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can graze and have private rights on animals, but grazing is controlled by the 
number of animals, by the time to graze, by access to individual pastures, etc. 
The reason is that the costs of exclusion may sometimes be too high to assign pure 
private rights on pastures; imagine a pastoralist fencing sparsely grazed areas. But 
this is only half of the argument. Also, including risk aspects and insurance for 
survival can be considered implicit costs (RUNGE, 1981) of exclusion. For in-
stance, rain may be scattered and only collective action assures a livelihood for 
the individual. Benefit functions from exclusion are frequently not purely indi-
vidual, though strong individuals in a group sometimes think they could survive 
without neighbours. 
Smith then posits that under certain conditions, individual property can even be 
dismantled and substituted by increased elements of common property. He does 
not see the emergence of private property as unidirectional; as happened in me-
dieval England for ecological reasons, private land ownership was converted 
into commons. A major argument is that land ownership can start with pure in-
dividual property rights and, due to a population increase and resource degrada-
tion, common property management becomes important. For instance, as an in-
novation and technology change, a collective rotation system emerged in 
Europe. Smith attributes the subsequent enclosure of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth century to rising wool prices and the intensification of sheep production.  
However, these are examples and we have (1) to generalize the problem of the 
choice and dynamics of institutions, and (2) to apply it to some findings related 
to the current situation of the functioning or non-functioning of the invisible 
hand in transition economies. In particular, we have to understand the theory of 
institutional change in the food sector more deeply. In this respect, Smith makes 
it very clear (ibid., p. 463) that some externalities are not worth being internal-
ised due to the high costs of internalisation. This also applies to the third level: 
Transition. In other words, on a meta-level, marginal costs of internalisation and 
marginal benefits should match and, at least theoretically, ill-defined private 
property rights result. For a set of full arguments, please follow arguments on 
incursion and exclusion costs, (ibid., p. S464) as well as exclusion and govern-
ance along the organisational dimension (ibid, p.  S467). Smith’s arguments 
show that, additionally, the dimension of property is not always easy to define. 
Especially if land is the property to be traded and the invisible hand has to work 
on land, a misperception may occur relating to what is to be governed. From an 
ecological point of view, sustaining land quality as a function of providing food 
and directing property rights to functions and not to physical trade, it is difficult 
to view land as a collateral or property for serving capital accumulation and 
trading purposes. How effective is the invisible hand on technological and institutional change 
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2.2 The  exclusion  cost  argument of Henry Smith 
Acknowledging, according to Smith, that the prerequisite for the pure operation 
of the invisible hand for economic co-ordination are pure private property rights, 
we have to appreciate (1) that it would make no economic sense to simply rely on 
the invisible hand if rights enforcement is too expensive. We would do better to 
envision (2) that a complementary choice between government interference and 
market coordination exists, dependent on transaction costs. The correct degree of 
interference, again, can be expressed artificially as a percentage between no in-
terference (pure invisible hand) and complete government control (pure com-
mand economy). The observation that institutional choice depends on the mar-
ginal costs and benefits of the definition and the enforcement of rights opens up 
the question of dimensions which reveal a basis for calculating the costs and 
benefits of exclusion. For the dimensional problem, Smith suggests that (1) the 
"cost" of exclusion and (2) a "precision" of rights approach should be combined 
(ibid., S471ff.). Admittedly, it is difficult to determine the respective marginal 
cost and benefit functions for unknown dimensions of rights. Nevertheless, we 
have to acknowledge that there is a need for a precise definition of rights on a 
perceivable dimension and to make the dimension operational. In Smith’s view, 
precision opens a venue for seeing institutional and technological innovations as 
if precision increases and costs diminish simultaneously. Only then does the 
food sector move towards more sophisticated rules of resource allocation.  
For the moment, we have to continue with the argument of Smith, who considers 
changes in exclusion costs as a driving force for institutional change first, and 
benefits, second. Figure 1, which is adopted from Smith, provides the arguments 
graphically. Smith himself borrows from a model of Field (quote ibid, p. S465) 
in which the number of commons is to be determined and savings in transaction 
costs are benefits. To understand the model building, one should start with the 
presumption that the low precision of institutional design is what humans face in 
the beginning when they organise societies (origin in Figure 1). At this origin, 
we have a large, though merely one, common with N users. Because of the low 
cost of handling an "imprecise" common, its definition is primitive. As we move 
from the origin to the right, the size of the common decreases, the number of 
commons increases and also the precision of definition (finally towards private 
property, now defined as an ultimate small single common in terms of transac-
tion costs). The general message is: The more commons, the more detailed the 
management. However, Tm shows the marginal benefits of enforcement of the 
common (m1* is the size of the government) intersecting the marginal costs. Em 
represents the marginal costs of exclusion (Smith calls it boundary management 
and it increases with more private property). Em as Em3 can lie outside the range 
of Tm. For that we have corner solutions.  Ernst-August Nuppenau 
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Source: SMITH, 2002. 
An optimal degree of commons can be translated into precision and a detailed 
definition of resource use. A definition of rights, for instance, can mean land 
parcelisation, functional rights, etc.. Note that graphically, the optimal m1* is gi-
ven for a static intersection of Em1 and Tm. A question is why is Em changing? 
Smith argues that it makes no sense to distinguish between exclusion and gover-
nance (p. S467). And, so far, the costs and benefits have not been assigned to 
entities. 
2.3  The precision argument of Henry Smith 
I would argue even further, that we have to add a subjective component to the 
determination of the marginal cost curve of exclusion (see below, taking the 
view of Saleth and Dinar). To continue here with Smith’s exclusion and gover-
nance approach, two poles in a spectrum of rules occur. Exclusion is an activity 
used to concentrate the benefits from investment and specialisation in the hand 
of a private beneficiary. So we have to define entities of beneficiaries and cost 
takers. The benefits depend on the attributes of the property. If they are difficult 
to measure, no market for exclusion service will appear. Exclusion costs relate 
to governance and governments. To clarify the point with an example: A cow’s 
mouthful of grass should be the ultimate measure of using a common. But nor-
mally one can only charge for the number of animals that graze. To inspect 
mouths is too costly. We cannot even measure the grass in the mouth precisely. 
The easiest way is to measure land and fix boundaries. Then access is con-
trolled. Now the understanding of functional (performance) versus property (ob-
jective related) rights matters. Governance does not only mean controlling ac-
cess, rather it means allowing different users holding different types of access in 
accordance with a cost-benefit or damage-versus-food calculus. "Governance, in 
contrast, consists of a set of norms picking out important uses use of the asset." How effective is the invisible hand on technological and institutional change 
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…"A question, at hand, is, how precise can the rules be set? "…"…all input and 
output rules depend on proxy measurement, and the cost of rules will depend in 
part on ease of substitution along various margins and the costs of measuring 
those margins."(ibid., p. 471). Additionally, costs are shared by the community. 
To reflect for a moment, in transition economics one can presume that it is diffi-
cult to set very precise rules. Rather, proxies have to be easily understood, visible, 
and have minimal control and coercion costs. This means that the prerequisite 
for the working of the pure invisible hand is precision; a full definition of prop-
erty rights is not possible; or at least costs are fairly high. So it is understandable 
that governance will avoid the full specification of rights and will look for other 
means to assure their social function of "good" governance. However, the preci-
sion of rights is the issue and a wrong question is will an administration or a 
market do a better job? Rather, both should work together. 
Smith sees the jumps between different technologies (costs) of exclusion as re-
lated to the precision of defining rights in a society and he introduces costs of 
governance as related to the precision of the need to reign in a society. For this 
he provides Figure  2 (copied from ibid., Figure 4,  p. S476).  With  different 
downward sloping marginal benefits of exclusion, we have multiple solutions. 
Though an immediate question is who is shifting marginal benefits (MB), one 
can conclude that in the dynamics of institutional choices it makes sense not to 
fully develop property rights in the mode of exclusion rights. Rather, it makes 
sense to tolerate invaders and let property rights be imprecise (governance, ibid., 
p. S475 and see where MCG1 and MCG2 curves intersect the MB curves in 
Figure 2). "Servitudes and Covenants" (ibid., p. S476) are solutions that fit in the 
marginal costs curves for governance and exclusion on the one hand, and mar-
ginal benefits for both types of ruling on the other. 
As a major hypothesis, Smith states that the marginal costs for setting property 
rights may increase rapidly, while the marginal costs of governance may in-
crease less rapidly if an increase in the precision of the operation of an economy 
is required. Here, as a first criticism against Smith’s argument, one can state that 
the alternative "governance" is not clearly defined; defining governance tools 
takes time. So it is difficult to derive the marginal cost and benefit functions of 
increased precision in societal coordination as related to a time frame. Ernst-August Nuppenau 
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Figure 2:  Exclusion and governance 
Source: SMITH, 2002. 
In this regard, a more concrete hint for what is meant by governance can be still 
retrieved from examples given by Smith. For instance, he states that "boundary 
configurations and governance are substitute methods of controlling strategic 
behaviour: 'Peasants with private ownership of unfenced strips for grain growing 
had to throw open those strips for communal grazing.' …'The existence of both 
regimes would give commoners an incentive to strategically appropriate benefits 
(manure) and dump costs (trampling) on the basis of who owned what in the pe-
riod of private use. … I have called a semicommons" (ibid., p. S480). To add on 
common regimes, common management is visible (as opposed to the invisible 
hand paradigm); i.e., common pool property management is achieved by a visible 
hand. "Scattering of strips in a system of temporarily interleaved rights func-
tioned like governance rules that prescribed proper grazing."…"…scattering be-
came more precise over course of open field periods." (ibid., p. S480-S481).  
Maybe this is history. But it shows the need for precision. Note again in this 
context that the move from individual resource exploitation to the common 
property management of soils can be considered an innovation to maintaining 
soil fertility. Manure application for maintaining soil fertility is not a technology 
that has been developed by an institution based on the invisible hand. The in-
visible hand implies the trading of land between individuals, soil exploitation, 
and setting prices for more or less fertile soils based on asymmetric information. 
It can be put forward that innovation comes as a collective action and the gover-
nance of commons can be considered as an institutional framework conducive 
for innovations. For this, Smith again cites other findings, for instance from 
Maitland that "… in sum, the simple traditional story of a universal trend from 
communal to private tenure … is untenable. …the broad trend was …from 
vague to definite" (ibid., p. S483). This phrasing may allow us to think more 
marginal value
precision
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about institutions that promote land intensification in particular, promote the 
food sector in general, and fit into the framework of transition. 
3 OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENT OF SALETH AND DINAR 
In their chapter on "Evaluating institutional linkages: Toward an alternative 
methodology" in the book, "The Institutional Economics of Water," SALETH and 
DINAR (2004) introduce a "subjective theory of institutional change". This theory 
very much relates to the question of how institutions can emerge that better fit 
into the social and economic framework of transition. Saleth and Kinar object to 
the strategy of prescribing a single matched institution, such as given by the trin-
ity of "private property, exclusion rights, and the invisible hand". Also, in their 
opinion, as devices used for an institutional economic foundation of exchange 
activities in a society where natural resources are strongly involved, humans 
should better match governance and exclusion. Looking at the complex interac-
tion of governance structures and exclusion rights, as has just been portrayed, a 
spectrum between pure governance and pure exclusion is also preferred in their 
book. Specifically, the authors ask how institutional change that brings about the 
most appropriate set of governance (including exclusion, as a partial device 
only) can emerge. Reckoning the dynamics of institutional change, we could 
imagine that an evolutionary process, with a certain directional guide, is needed. 
Saleth and Dinar explicitly consider the process of institutional change as a 
process constituted of several stages and instituted by a duality between individ-
ual and collective rights and knowledge and rationality. Their central hypothesis 
is that individuals are the promoters of change. But individuals rely on percep-
tions and, to promote change, they conduct cost-benefit analyses for their be-
haviour. A "subjective perception" is important throughout the process of insti-
tutional change" (ibid., p. 83). In the vein of Smith's above argument, the mar-
ginal benefits of exclusion and governance depend, to a large extent, on subjec-
tive notions. It is important to know what is meant by benefits and costs, and 
how one can increase the likelihoods that benefits accrue to individuals. A 
probability assessment is needed to make the arguments of Smith applicable.  
Again, basically, Saleth and Dinar have a broader view than the invisible hand 
paradigm suggests. By a cycle, depicted in Figure 3, they portray crucial ele-
ments of a subjective theory of institutional change. Innovations in technologies 
that manage natural resources in agriculture such as soil, water, pastures, etc., 
institutions play the crucial role of governance structure. Starting with the defi-
cits of the market, i.e., the invisible hand and its prerequisite, the exclusion 
mechanism, Saleth and Dinar state that market failures are so frequent that or-
ganisational structures have emerged that overcome information asymmetry, 
knowledge scarcity, transaction costs and lack of coercion (ibid., p. 88). Their 
institution decomposition analysis, IDA, is a multidisciplinary approach.   Ernst-August Nuppenau 
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(1) IDA provides a typology of institutional choices. For the performance of in-
stitutions, a decomposition means that laws regulating resource use, policies 
governing resource users, and administrations controlling and interacting are 
identified and screened. (2) At the end of a detailed discussion, Saleth and Dinar 
posit that, "While a (water-) rights system is a means for improving sector per-
formance, it is also an end from the standpoint of institution building. …the 
cause-effect categorization is path dependent in the sense that a ‘cause’ can be 
an ‘effect’ and vice versa depending upon the objective of the evaluation and the 
route through … evaluation proceeds" (ibid., p. 145). 













Source: SALETH and DINAR, 2004. 
What does this mean for the question of institutions that shall foster the process 
of finding and developing technologies that fit in the framework of transition 
countries, and why is it worthwhile to study the transition of water rights in re-
gard to the transition of the food sector in CEECs? (1) We have to reconsider 
that institutional change is an equilibrium between marginal transaction costs 
and marginal benefits. Marginal benefits are actually opportunity costs which 
appear, for instance, if the system further deteriorates. (2) One can, at least 
theoretically, expect a market solution where marginal costs and benefits inter-
sect in the tradition of having a market for transition determining the speed of 
change. (3) But the invisible hand does not direct the speed. Rather, as has been 
identified by Saleth and Dinar: "Variation … of institutional reform … provide 
evidence for the powerful effects that factors both endogenous and exogenous to 
the (water) sector have on the opportunity and transaction costs of institutional 
change. These factors act together to raise the opportunity costs of institutional 
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form" (ibid., p. 184). "… a strategy also affords a political economy advantage…" 
(ibid., p. 185). Evidence is "… policy-related channels have a larger impact than 
the law-related channels …" (ibid., p. 275) and "… administration related chan-
nels are more important than other channels …" (ibid., p. 293). 
By summarizing and transferring the experiences of Saleth and Dinar in the 
transition of institutions in the water sector to our question of transition of the 
food sector in general, we have to keep in mind how many problems are related 
to natural resource use and the precision of rights definition. From the detailed 
writing of Saleth and Dinar, it becomes understandable that the precision of go-
vernance is related to the capacity of an administration to manage resources and 
to the endeavour of achieving higher precision in setting advanced rules and 
tasks. This finding supports Smith’s hypothesis that institutional change is not 
unilateral and a balance between exclusion and governance is important. To create 
the balance, subjective elements of mind-setting and ideology questions emerge 
that cannot be overlooked. Importantly, Saleth and Dinar add subjective ele-
ments to Smith’s more objective theory. This means that the "ideology" of the 
"invisible hand", as opposed to the "common pool" paradigm, can play a role in 
hampering transition. Being pertinent to the administration, "ideologies" play a 
major role in creating an atmosphere that is conducive to better economic per-
formance, including necessary incentives for technological change. Cost saving, 
competitiveness, etc., are one side of the coin. Sustaining resource bases and 
creating livelihoods for a majority of those living from agriculture is the other 
side. In the next section we will further discuss what the above arguments could 
mean for the praxis of institutional change in transition.  
4 IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION OF APPLICABILITY 
4.1  Integration of observations from the first period of transition 
The above discussion has several implications for the debate of the functioning of 
the invisible hand in the transition of the farm and food sector of CEECs. How-
ever, (1) we have to further acknowledge that empirical evidence (MACOURS and 
SWINNEN, 2000) shows that privatisation has resulted in production decline and, 
even more pronounced, in yield decline. (2) Transition does not seem to be as 
smooth as it was expected. Indicators can also be misleading. Increases of labour 
productivity, for instance, mostly observable in large scale farm operations after 
privatisation, can also be considered as part of the problem. Because it reveals 
that less productive labour does get work and produces food on large farms, the 
pure recognition of labour productivity as a success is misleading. Attributing the 
aspect of labour primarily to the observation that unproductive labour has left the 
agricultural sector as a consequence of the specific functioning of the invisible 
hand, we have to be careful when judging the quality of that institutional framing. Ernst-August Nuppenau 
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Having high unemployment in both rural and urban areas of transition countries, 
it is an indicator that markets do not match supply and demand. (3) Also, the 
adoption of technologies imported from Western countries, primarily on large 
farms, does not seem to match with scarcities. There seems to be a problem with 
the institutional set-up that accompanies privatisation and the search for markets 
and technologies, including input and innovation markets. 
However, is should be noted in this context that the author is not against private 
ownership, rather a more specific view on land and labour relationships, as 
above portrayed, might have brought out different results with respect to unem-
ployment, land productivity, food supply, innovations and distribution. As it is 
the major hypothesis of this paper, a joint exercise of governance and exclusion 
on land and labour "markets" may have given and, perhaps, will give, "better" 
results. The performance of the agricultural sector in many transition countries, 
at the moment, might be hampered by overly vague institutional reforms. It is 
also not the intention to criticize what has been achieved (LERMAN and CSAKI, 
2004), but rather to inspire thoughts to do better in the future. In particular, the 
question is how to facilitate a governance structure that allows a more precise 
definition of rights in the process of institutional change.  
4.2  Current problems and suggestions 
So again, what are the institutional problems that the agricultural sector now faces? 
(1) Privatisation, restitution and land transactions should have meant that pricing 
for land would occur and, naively speaking, "land moved to the best tiller, i.e., 
efficient", and very rapidly. But, in almost all transition countries, land markets 
and frequent transactions are rarely observable. Rather, farmers stick to collec-
tive forms of farming, and even remain in large cooperative farms (LERMAN and 
CSAKI, 2004, p. 123, pdf-version). This is not only true for countries where tran-
sition was slow, but also for the rapidly privatised countries which face similar 
situations of inactive land markets and low technical efficiency (ibid., p. 130). 
(2) A vague problem and a hypothesis still to be researched is who are those po-
tentially capable and willing to start farming? Can the invisible hand decide that 
or can governance help? Based on the scope of developing land transactions and 
providing farmers with necessary resources (young persons), do we have precise 
instruments to judge future performance? Access to land may be a far away vi-
sion for some people, especially if privatisation is a large-scale operation. So in 
agriculture, those that remain are either workers or entrepreneurs, but maybe not 
peasants. 
There are incidences of successful restructuring, especially in many new EU 
countries. For instance, profiting from price increases and technological advances, 
some farmers in Poland think that they can gain from big investments in meat 
production. Nevertheless, there are concerns in the same country (CYGLICKI, 
2004) that only few farmers gain and a duality is emerging; not to mention a How effective is the invisible hand on technological and institutional change 
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replication of all the environmental problems that emerged with specialised, 
large-scale farming in Western countries. The gains may be only temporary and 
more fundamental long-lasting questions are not solved, even with respect to the 
path dependency of modernisation and income expectations. 
But the invisible hand is blind to such developments. In particular, (1) the 
emerging concern of what is an appropriate farm structure for transition countries 
(duality of large- and small-scale or, generally, more medium-sized) (SARRIS et al., 
1999), (2) the question of who needs land, and (3) the emerging problem of 
duality between regions reveal that most rural areas are in disarray (disfa-
voured). Few areas receive investment (hot spots) and there are indicators that 
the functioning of the invisible hand results in imbalance. Imbalances are, per 
se, not a problem if they are transitory, but are they?  
At the end of all those problems, the problem of optimal food pricing through 
markets in developing agriculture (Cheap food for consumers?, TIMMER, 1995) 
is not completely solved by the invisible hand. It is very dangerous to consider 
institutional aspects purely as a functioning of the invisible hand for the sake of 
cheap food for the urban sector. The exclusion of considerable populations from 
the access to land may result in large food problems in phases of crisis. Notably, 
the household food self-sufficiency system (YEFIMOW, 2003) that is still preva-
lent in many countries of the former USSR, is part of governance, and might ex-
pand. To see the invisible hand merely under the current conditions of cheap 
food at world market pricing is too narrow. Alternative scenarios have to be build 
around: (1) seeing institutional reforms under the imperative of establishing struc-
tures that are flexible enough in the long run to cope with different scarcities and 
development paths of societies; (2) questioning the relative importance of indus-
trialisation, resource extraction industries, settlement patterns, demographics, 
etc.; (3) thinking about institutional set-ups that allow smooth adjustments and 
most importantly the build-up of social capital (PETRO, 2001), also in rural areas; 
and (4) coping with a changing agriculture environment. For this, the right mix-
ture of precision has to be anticipated and permanently developed. Requiring 
precision in governance is a dynamic task and perhaps, as will be finally out-
lined, needs a different type of collective action, such as participatory planning. 
Planning or laying down definitions for property rights in land use are related is-
sues. Here I see possibility for returning to the planning of pre-socialist times 
(Stolypin reform, at least, in Russia) which has already been an approach that 
envisaged governance by searching for the precision of correct definitions. 
4.3  Past experiences to be adapted (the Solypin reform) 
When looking at the most backward transition countries in terms of a reform 
process that brings exclusion rights and ownership, the CIS countries, perhaps 
even a utopian input in ideology as the second phase of the Stolypin land reform 
(PALLOT, 2000) may matter. We should acknowledge that remembrance for such Ernst-August Nuppenau 
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mixed types of exclusion and governance is partly well-established in CIS coun-
tries (MACEY, 2002), and has perhaps been too abruptly abandoned. A question 
at hand is why not plan with field strips rather than consolidated land? A modern 
version of the design of villages and peasant farms may have resulted (still could 
result) in providing the input for changing the marginal transaction costs and the 
marginal benefits for exclusion as has been outlined above. Admittedly, a more 
detailed discussion of the designing and setting up of the plan needs a paper of 
its own. Here, I can merely further elaborate on transferring the abstract delibera-
tions of an institutional economist, such as Smith, into a more operational prob-
lem as was foreseen by the protagonists of the Stolypin reform. To make the 
ideas of Smith applicable, one has to outline a range of things, from the request 
to endeavour more precise options to manage resources, notably with a wide 
range of property rights specified around the use of resources, to immediate op-
portunities for initiating a governance approach.  
Looking, additionally, at the obstacles to reform (PALLOT, 2000, p. 281), one 
immediately recognises that the issue of a full enclosure or a partial definition of 
rights, as well as of fixed or flexible "planning" already appeared around the 
year 1900. Further major issues, best expressed in the modern vocabulary of in-
stitutional economics, are: How (1) to reach the participation of farmers, how (2) 
to go about a defection of enclosures, what pattern (3) to use (strips or blocs), 
etc. However, ground plans (ibid., p. 286) seem to be the measures that enable 
precision and hopefully create incentives to look for individual and collective 
innovations for local food producing units. As a remark to those who perhaps in-
tuitively react by thinking that the design of villages is old fashioned, please no-
tice that modern, more flexible technologies of planning have decreased, at least, 
as part of incurring the transaction costs of drawing plans, envisioning the con-
sequences of land redistribution, consolidation, etc. Farms need not be chess 
board-like as in the American Midwest, and rights can be better controlled to-
day. To govern local affairs on land, experimental forms have to be envisaged. 
A difficulty is that knowledge of food production is either confined to the large-
scale operation or to the household subsidiary food producer. Medium-sized te-
chnologies must evolve locally and the issue of the division of labour is unclear. 
5 CONCLUSION 
A certain precision in the planning of land use seems to be necessary to achieve 
the more flexible allocation of land to potential beneficiaries of land reforms and 
starting a process of collective action and social capital building. The discussion 
of a renaissance of the Stolypin ideas of land planning should be seen against the 
difficulties with a pure definition of rights through exclusion rights and a defini-
tion through governance (SMITH, 2002). In particular, this task is given to em-
pirical research. However, a consequence is that governments take an active role How effective is the invisible hand on technological and institutional change 
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in, and the responsibility for transition. For a scientific approach to accommo-
dating the need for an increased precision of rights, as has been the result of 
marginal costs and benefits of exclusion necessary for technological change, we 
can only conduct experiments of feasible land use planning and document the 
social processes. To develop more precise allocation mechanisms through 
"governance" and "exclusion" in a normative approach to policy advice, one can 
go along the mode for regional outlets, that of governing the process of estab-
lishing social units that control resources.  
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ANALYTICAL APPROACHES FOR MEASURING  
MARKET EFFICIENCY  
   
 
BERNHARD BRÜMMER, SERGIY ZORYA
1 
ABSTRACT 
The analysis of price transmission between raw and processed agricultural 
products on their way from plan to market in transition countries is complicated 
by frequently changing conditions and still pervasive policy interventions. We 
utilise a Markov-switching vector error correction model to allow for multiple 
regime shifts in the price relationship between wheat and wheat flour in Ukraine 
from June 2000 to November 2004. The analysis reveals four regimes. The ob-
served temporal pattern of these regimes can be matched with certain political 
and economic events in Ukraine. In particular, we find a strong link between the 
‘high uncertainty’ regime and discretionary policy interventions in 2003. 
Keywords: Markov-switching vector error correction model, vertical price 
transmission, regime shifts, grain policies, Ukraine. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Prices play an extraordinary role in a market economy, allowing the decisions of 
producers and consumers to be coordinated, and allocating scarce resources in the 
most efficient way. Transition from planned to market economies in the post-
Soviet countries has induced price liberalisation, which not only improves re-
source allocation, but also leads to higher price volatility in comparison with ad-
ministratively fixed prices. This is especially true for farm prices characterised by 
relatively high volatility due to a number of reasons, among which seasonality, 
weather effects, inelastic demand and supply of agricultural products are the most 
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important. Policy-makers often intervene in the markets in an attempt to reduce 
price volatility.  
In Ukraine, for example, policy-makers actively intervene in the price formation 
of wheat and wheat products. In recent years, the price relationship on the wheat 
and wheat/flour markets in Ukraine has been affected by many shocks. These 
shocks mainly originated from the wheat side and were not only of a market, but 
also a political nature. Since the relatively outdated farm technologies in Ukraine 
lead to a high sensitivity of agricultural production to climatic conditions, the 
weather greatly contributed to shifting Ukraine from the position of a net exporter 
(in 2001, 2002 and 2004) to a net importer (in 2000 and 2003) of wheat (see 
Figures 1 and 2). These shifts negatively affected not only wheat producers, but 
also wheat processors, traders, and certainly consumers due to increased price and 
margin fluctuations. In order to ‘neutralise’ these market failures, the policy-
makers introduced many interventions which aimed to 
 sustain the myth that "people can fine-tune markets" (VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 
2004, p. 185). They certainly changed the path of vertical price relationship and 
increased the uncertainty in the market. 
We aim to study the vertical price transmission between wheat and wheat flour in 
Ukraine from 2000-2004, and the effects of policy changes on this transmission. 
Section 2 presents recent developments in the wheat market in Ukraine, with par-
ticular attention paid to changes in the relevant policies. In Section 3 we present 
the methodology used. Since the price relations are presumably affected by the 
numerous policy changes during the observation period, the method must be able 
to capture the structural breaks that might result from the frequent changes. 
Hence, we apply a Markov-switching vector error correction model, which allows 
for these structural breaks in the price adjustment process. We identify different 
regimes that correspond to different parameters for short-run price adjustments 
and for residual variances. These regimes allow an explanation of vertical price 
transmission both in ‘clear-cut’ phases and ‘transition’ periods (e.g., in the course 
of shifts from export and import situation and vice versa). Section 4 presents the 
empirical results and links the regime probabilities with the economic policy in 
Ukraine. The paper concludes in Section 5 with a set of policy implications.  
2 POLICY DEVELOPMENTS ON WHEAT AND WHEAT FLOUR  
MARKETS IN UKRAINE  
The policies for Ukrainian grain markets, and wheat markets in particular, have 
always been politicised. In the course of transition from planned to market eco-
nomy, Ukraine did not succeed in completely abolishing policy interventions, 
which were designed and implemented in the old central planning style. Grain is 
considered ‘strategic’, and agricultural policy-makers consider "the size of the How effective is the visible hand of the government 
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grain harvest [as] a barometer of conditions in agriculture"  
(VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 2001, p. 103). Thus, so far the grain market has never 
fully enjoyed the spirit of the ‘market economy’.  
In the mid-1990s, the Ukrainian government entrenched itself in its agricultural 
markets. Through various schemes, the state parastatals supplied the key inputs to 
the large farms, while other state parastatals collected grain as a payment for these 
inputs (STRIEWE and VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 1999). Since the bankruptcy of 
large farms has remained a ‘taboo’, non-payments proliferated. ‘Soft budget 
constraints’ predestined the frequent bail-outs from the budget (for example, in 
1997 and 1998, then later in 2000). Direct support for the large former state 
farms in the form of budget support was nevertheless accompanied by a simul-
taneous taxation of wheat farmers through depressed farm-gate prices. Before 
the year 2000, Ukraine was in a net export situation and since export marketing 
costs were excessively high, some experts report that farmers received only 
40 % of the FOB export price, compared to 70 % in Germany (STRIEWE and 
VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 1999). In conjunction with the adjustment pressure of 
transition, these low wheat prices and heavy state interventions led to a fall in 
production (see Figure 1). As a reaction, many regional administrations at the 
Oblast level regularly set bans on movements of grains among regions to   
‘enhance’ regional food security. Hence, the national wheat market was frag-
mented, the policies were difficult to predict, and thus, price forecasts were domi-
nated by substantial uncertainty. 
Figure 1:  Production and net export of wheat in Ukraine,  
in 1,000 tonnes, 1990-2004 
 
Source: UKRAGROCONSULT (1998-2004) and FAS/USDA (2000-2004). Bernhard Brümmer, Sergiy Zorya 
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In the marketing year 2000/01, Ukraine's wheat harvest dropped to the decade’s 
lowest, 11 mill tonnes, and the country became a net importer of wheat. As a re-
action, the government launched a set of progressive reforms, effectively with-
drawing from the input and output markets, while the previously abstaining 
banking sector was encouraged to credit the farms by introducing partial com-
pensation of interest rates from the national budget, thus putting the hard budget 
constraints on the farms, enhancing large farm restructuring, and granting sig-
nificant tax privileges to the farmers (DEMYANENKO and ZORYA, 2004;   
VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 2001). But when the country's switch from net ex-
porter to net importer (mainly due to the excessively high marketing costs) raised 
domestic wheat prices over the world market level (Figure 2), policy-makers 
reacted inadequately. Since many Ukrainian policy-makers still have an inaccu-
rate understanding of market mechanisms and price formation in the market 
economy, measures to stabilise wheat prices were improperly designed. The gov-
ernment made the traders ‘guilty’ of high wheat prices, introduced grain export 
certification, fixed bread prices and attempted to create the pledge price system.
2 
To increase the wheat supply, the policy-makers temporary cancelled the import 
duty of wheat and simplified the wheat import regimes, while many regional ad-
ministrations renewed the bread price regulations. Since those actions were not 
always transparent and their timing was far from perfect, the uncertainty of price 
development remained high.  
The high prices and low supply of wheat, coupled with the uncertainty concerning 
future market developments negatively affected the flour producers. Domestic 
flour production decreased and prices sharply increased (see Figure 3). And since 
the bread prices were fixed at low levels, the millers could not fully transmit the 
increase of wheat prices to the bakeries. The flour market began to stabilise only 
after Ukraine imported much flour, mainly duty-free from the members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States free-trade zone.  
Thanks to high wheat prices, progress in reforms and, certainly, favourable 
weather, in 2001 the wheat harvest reached the decade’s record highest level. The 
consequent year was similarly successful for the output-oriented policy-makers 
(Figure 1). Ukraine became a large wheat exporter – in the marketing years of 
2001/02 and 2002/03, Ukraine exported almost 12 mill tonnes of wheat. Domestic 
prices dropped, and during this period policy-makers were preoccupied with the 
‘market regulation’ to raise wheat prices. This drop was especially severe in the 
first months after harvest, since the farmers, facing the liquidity constraints of fi-
nancing the fall seeding campaign, had to sell their grain immediately, as they 
were unwilling to store the grain in the state-run elevators due to contract en-
forcement problems and high storage costs, and since future price developments 
                                                 
2  See Presidential Decree No. 823, "On immediate measures to stimulate grain production and 
to develop the grain market" from July 29, 2000. How effective is the visible hand of the government 
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were hardly predictable. The government repeatedly tried to introduce the pledge 
price system, together with the intervention system, but in every year the lack of 
budget financing predetermined failure.
3 In addition, the government continued 
regulating exports by prohibiting wheat exports without their contract being regis-
tered on the agrarian exchanges. In this period, however, the government also 
made efforts to reduce marketing costs and encourage private investments into the 
market infrastructure, especially sea ports and storage facilities. But in spite of 
these positive efforts, the ‘stop-and-go reforms’ continued to strain Ukrainian 
wheat market actors. 
In this period of time, Ukrainian millers almost fully satisfied domestic demand. 
Domestic flour production grew from 3.5  mill  tonnes in 2000/01, to 
3.65  mill  tonnes, on average, in the 2001/2002 and 2002/03 marketing years 
(APK-INFORM, 2004). Flour prices gradually declined along with wheat prices 
(Figure 3) and flour imports did not exceed 2 % of the total flour supply.  
Figure 2:  Domestic and world wheat market prices in Ukraine,  
1998-2004, UAH per tonne 
 
Source: UKRAGROCONSULT (1998-2004) and FAO (2004). 
In early 2003, severe winterkill greatly damaged the winter crops. "When this was 
followed by a prolonged drought in the late spring and early summer of that year, 
it became apparent that Ukraine was likely to become a net importer of food grain 
in 2003/04" (VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 2004, p. 183). The wheat harvest equalled 
roughly 5 mill tonnes (Figure 1) and domestic wheat prices, with the expectation 
of a low harvest, skyrocketed in the early winter of 2003 (Figure 2). The govern-
ment issued several resolutions, including provisions concerning the personal 
                                                 
3  See Cabinet of Ministers Resolutions, "On determination of pledge prices and financial sup-
port of pledge purchasing of grain" from April 29, 2002, and "On additional measures to 
manage the pledge and intervention operations" from June 27, 2003. Bernhard Brümmer, Sergiy Zorya 
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responsibility of regional politicians, the investigation of traders’ activities, and 
the empowerment of regional authorities to monitor food wheat movements and 
bread prices.
4 Later, the government also announced agreements with Russia and 
Kazakhstan to purchase about 2 mill tonnes of wheat at ‘reasonable prices’, which 
in this context implied at a price below the world market level. The press was full 
of rumours about new and intensified regulation of grain markets in Ukraine and 
this crisis really provided anti-reform forces with a pretext for the re-introduction 
of intervention measures. Some experts state, therefore, "that it may be more ap-
propriate to speak of a crisis in agricultural policy making in 2003 than of a ‘cri-
sis’ in Ukrainian agriculture" (VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 2004, p. 185). 
The above developments, along with the reluctance to quickly abolish wheat im-
port duties and an import value-added tax, led to the unwillingness of private im-
porters to import wheat under arbitrary legislation and price uncertainty. Due to 
the temporarily low food wheat supply and inelastic domestic demand, wheat 
prices significantly fluctuated. Only after large imports in the last three months of 
2003 (about 3 mill tonnes) (UKRAGROCONSULT, 1998-2004) did price volatility 
fall. In the course of the marketing year, wheat prices slowly fell, but not to less 
than 600 UAH per tonne. Low wheat stocks, uncertainty about the 2004 harvest, 
and continuously intense policy interventions due to the presidential election at 
the end of 2004 all kept the food wheat prices high and volatile. 
The low wheat harvest and the manner of resolving the wheat crisis itself led to a 
sharp fall in flour stocks and a subsequent rise in flour prices. While during 2001-
2002, the flour price averaged 900  UAH  per tonne, in June  2003 it reached 
1,800 UAH per tonne and in November 2003 it came very close to 2,000 UAH per 
tonne (Figure 3). High flour prices and unpredictability concerning food wheat 
imports caused large flour surges, mainly from Russia and Kazakhstan. In the mar-
keting year 2003/04, Ukraine imported 5 % of its total flour supply, or 207,000 
tonnes (APK-INFORM, 2004). In addition to flour imports, the State Material Re-
serve of Ukraine began to finance the milling and selling of flour in large quanti-
ties. This ‘state’ flour, however, was arbitrarily available to only large regional 
mills. These state interventions crowded out the private mills and seriously in-
creased uncertainty concerning flour stocks, equal access to these stocks and flour 
market prices. In the course of 2004, flour prices stabilised and gradually de-
creased.  
                                                 
4  Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 1150, "On failures of some executive branches to en-
sure food security, and measures to stabilize the markets of main staple foods" from July 24, 
2003. How effective is the visible hand of the government 
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3 MARKOV-SWITCHING MODEL 
The Markov-switching vector error correction model (MSVECM) is a special 
case of the general Markov-switching vector autoregressive model, which was 
initially proposed by HAMILTON (1989) for analysing the US business cycle. The 
applicability of this model is, however, not restricted to this specific research 
question but can be viewed as a general framework for analysing time series with 
different regimes whenever the corresponding state variable is not observed. 
KROLZIG et al., (2002) and KROLZIG and TORO (2001) use the MSVECM to ana-
lyse business cycles with a special emphasis on employment. Here, we use a 
MSVECM for analysing vertical market integration between the markets for 
wheat and wheat flour in Ukraine. If the markets are integrated, there should exist 
a long-run relationship between the prices on each market. Price changes on any 
of the markets depend both on short-run dynamics and on the deviation from the 
long-run equilibrium so that the familiar vector error correction model would pro-
vide a congruent representation of the data generating process. However, with the 
frequent policy adjustments and changes in the net trade position, it is reasonable 
to expect structural changes over time, which renders the simple error correction 
model into an incongruent representation. Hence, a MSVECM, i.e., a vector error 
correction model with shifts in some of the parameters according to the state of 
the system, can be expected to be more appropriate in this setting: 
  t k t t k t t t t t t t t + ) (s D + + ) (s D + ) (s D + ) )( (s + ) (s = ε p p p p β α α p 0 − − − − ∆ … ∆ ∆ ∆ 2 2 1 1 1
′  (1) 




t)’ is the vector of market prices for wheat flour (superscript f) 
and wheat (superscript w), respectively, α0 denotes the vector of intercept terms, 
α is the vector of adjustment coefficients, β is the cointegrating (long-run equilib-
rium) vector, ∆ indicates first differences, and D1, D2, … , Dk are matrices of 
short-run coefficients. The vector εt contains the residual errors of the flour and 
wheat equation, for which the usual assumptions apply. The state variable 
st = 1, … ,M indicates which of the M possible regimes governs the MSVECM at 
time t. However, the state of the system is not observed; the most general specifi-
cation would make the probability of being in state st dependent on the entire his-
tory of regimes St-1, and on the history of all the variables on the RHS of Equation 
(1). This general specification would leave the system unidentified unless some 
structure is imposed. The basic idea of a Markov-switching model is to assume an 
ergodic Markov process for the probabilities of observing a certain state, so that 
the probability for st depends only on st-1 and a matrix Π of transition probabilities. 
  Π) , s | Pr(s = ) P , P , S | Pr(s t t t t t t 1 1
′
1 1 − − − − ∆ β   (2) 
An element πij of Π gives the transition probability from state i to state j. Hence, 
the sum of each row of Π must equal one so that the number of unknowns in Π is Bernhard Brümmer, Sergiy Zorya 
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equal to M (M-1). Note that the vector does not vary between systems since the 
long-run equilibrium relation is assumed to be constant over time. However, the 
intercept term in (1) changes over time so that there may be regime-dependent 
changes in the margin.  
The estimation of the MSVECM is based on the maximum likelihood principle. 
The maximands of the likelihood function consist of the parameters in (1), a set 
of parameters corresponding to dummy variables indicating the value of the 
state variable st, and the transition probabilities pij. KROLZIG (1997) advocates 
the use of a variant of the Expectation-Maximisation algorithm (DEMPSTER et al., 
1977). This iterative procedure breaks the maximisation down into two steps. 
First, the state parameters and transition probabilities are estimated conditional 
on a set of starting values for the coefficients in (1). In the second step, these lat-
ter parameters are updated using the first order conditions for the maximisation 
of the likelihood function with respect to the error correction model parameters. 
This sequence is repeated until the procedure converges, i.e., the state parame-
ters no longer change between two subsequent iterations. The estimation proce-
dure is available in the MSVAR package (KROLZIG, 2004) for the matrix pro-
gramming language Ox (DOORNIK, 2002). 
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1  Data and unit root tests 
The estimation results are based on 227 weekly observations (June 2000 to No-
vember 2004) on the average price for III class milling wheat, and of the whole 
sale price for top quality flour in Ukraine. Figure 3 gives an overview of the de-
velopment of the price series in the observation period.  
Figure 3:  Weekly prices of wheat and flour as well as margin in Ukraine, 
UAH per ton, June 2000-November 2004 (227 observations) 
 
Source: UKRAGROCONSULT, 1998-2004. How effective is the visible hand of the government 
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Both series are characterised by substantial shifts, both in level and in variance 
over time. As discussed in Section 2, the level shifts for the wheat price series are 
strongly influenced by the expected net trade balance for wheat in Ukraine, e.g. 
the sharp decreases in late summer 2001 and 2004. The two price series develop 
in a roughly parallel way over time. On the other hand, the variation in the margin 
over time is considerable, in particular at times when any of the series exhibits 
unusual dynamics. These characteristics raise doubt concerning the stability of the 
price relationships in terms of dynamics, and underline the necessity of taking 
into account structural breaks in the further analysis.  
As a prerequisite for the cointegration analysis, we first establish the time series 
properties of the price series (in natural logarithms). The usual ADF test statistic 
is supplemented with an additional unit root test for processes with level shifts 
(LANNE et al., 2002). For this latter test, the unknown break point was found 
through a grid search of all possible break dates with a sufficiently large lag order. 
The date which gave the minimal residual sum in the auxiliary regression was 
then chosen. The null hypothesis of a unit root in the undifferentiated series can-
not be rejected by any of the two tests. However, the tests provide strong evidence 
against the null hypothesis of a unit root in first difference series of both the (logs 
of) flour and wheat prices (Table 1). Even when structural change is taken into 
account, both price series (in logs) seem to be appropriately modelled as inte-
grated processes of order 1. 
Table 1:  Results of unit root tests 
 Augmented  Dickey-Fuller Test   Unit root test with level shift 
Series Test   
statistic Specification 5 % criti-
cal value 
Test  




t  -1.556  (6 lags,  




t  -1.336  (3 lags, con-
stant) 
-2.86 
























4.2 Cointegration  analysis 
For integrated variables, an estimating equation consisting of I(0) variables alone 
is given by the VECM representation. We apply the usual Johansen trace test, 
which is based on a successive reduced rank regression of the vector autoregres-Bernhard Brümmer, Sergiy Zorya 
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sive representation with 4 lags. The first test, with a null hypothesis of no cointe-
grating relations, is rejected against the alternative of at least one cointegrating re-
lation with a p-value of less than 0.1 % (LR
trace = 30.048). The next test, with a 
corresponding null that the number of cointegrating vectors is one, against the al-
ternative that the number of cointegrating vectors is larger than one, cannot be re-
jected (LR
trace = 1.922, p-value = 0.167). The two series may hence be linearly 
combined so that the residual term is stationary. The long-run relationship (in-
cluding a constant term) is given in Equation (3), with standard errors in parenthe-
ses.  
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The corresponding adjustment coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) are 
α
f = - 0.1274 (0.026) for the flour equation, and α
w = 0.0211 (0.041) for the wheat 
price equation, respectively. Since the deviations from the long-run equilibrium 
are obtained from the cointegrating vector normalised with respect to the flour 
price, both adjustment coefficients have the expected sign. The adjustment 
coefficient in the wheat price equation, however, is not statistically significant. 
Hence, the adjustment process towards the long-run equilibrium takes place 
through price changes for flour, with half of a unit deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium being corrected within 5 weeks. 
Diagnostic tests of the corresponding vector error correction model reveal several 
problems. First, autocorrelation was checked by means of a vector autocorrelation 
test up to lag order 12. The corresponding Lagrange multiplier test statistic is 
52.648, which compares to a critical χ
2 value at the 5 % level, with 48 degrees of 
freedom of 65.17. The residuals of the system seem not t o  b e  a f f e c t e d  b y  a  
significant extent of autocorrelation. The situation is worse with regard to the 
vector tests for heteroscedasticity and non-normality. The full White test for 
vector heteroscedasticity yields a test statistic of 268.35, which exceeds the 
critical χ
2 value with 105 degrees of freedom (129.92) substantially. A similar 
picture arises for the non-normality test, where the null hypothesis of normal 
residuals is rejected with a p-value of less than 0.01 %. A closer look at the single 
equations reveal that most of these problems originate from the flour equation. 
However, increasing the lag length above the order suggested by the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) failed to resolve the problems with heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation. 
Thick tails in the distribution of the residuals and heteroskedasticity could both be 
caused by instability of the underlying price series. Hence, the system is checked 
for stability by means of a Chow forecast test. The null hypothesis is that all 
parameters of the system remain constant over time, which is tested against the 
alternative, that the parameters (all coefficients except for b plus the residual How effective is the visible hand of the government 
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covariance matrix) change over time. The Chow test statistic is asymptotically χ
2 
distributed; however, the actual distribution under the null was found to be 
non-standard in CANDELON and LÜTKEPOHL (2000) so that the bootstrap provides 
a feasible alternative. We employ the procedure implemented in JmulTi to 
calculate the empirical p-values for different breakpoints.
5  
Figure  3 shows the bootstrapped p-values of the Chow forecast test for the 
sample; every 4
th week was used as a possible break date. 
Figure 3:  Graph of bootstrapped Chow forecast test p-values  
(based on 500 replications 
 
 
The p-values for the vast majority of the searched break date lie substantially be-
low the 5 % level (dotted line in Figure 4). Hence, the system seems to be affected 
by structural breaks; the representation of the price movements on Ukrainian 
wheat flour and wheat markets as a single, time-invariant error correction model 
is not appropriate. The following subsection provides the results of an alternative 
model based on a MSVECM representation, which is found to be better suited for 
this data set. 
4.3  Markov-switching vector error correction model 
The number of lags and the number of regimes in the MSVECM have been se-
lected according to the AIC. A formal test for the number of regimes M against 
the alternative M+1 is difficult because a number of parameters of the unrestricted 
model are not identified under the null hypothesis, leading to a non-standard dis-
                                                 
5  For more details about JmulTi visit <http://www.jmulti.org>. Bernhard Brümmer, Sergiy Zorya 
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tribution of the usual likelihood-based test statistics. Nevertheless, the AIC turned 
out to be strongly in favour of the specification with 4 regimes and 3 lags in the 
VECM. The residual diagnostics for this model are in line with the usual assump-
tions: Neither vector autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity nor non-normality seem 
to be problematic for the MSVECM. Hence, this model might be viewed as a 
congruent representation of the underlying process.  
The estimated parameters of the final MSVECM specification using data from 
June 2000 to November 2004 are presented in Table 2. One interesting feature is 
the drop in the speed of adjustment coefficients in comparison to the simple 
VECM. The magnitude of the significant coefficient in the flour equation is re-
duced by factor 3 (regimes 1-3) and factor 6 (regime 4). The speed of adjustment 
coefficient in the wheat equation remains statistically insignificant across all re-
gimes. Another intriguing feature is the distinct variation in the residual standard 
errors σε
f and σε
w between the regimes. Speed of adjustment, residual standard er-
rors and the resulting margin in the long-run relation (which may be calculated 
from the estimated coefficient for the regime-specific constant and the corre-
sponding speed of adjustment coefficient estimate) allow for a more detailed in-
terpretation of the single regimes. 
•  Regime 1:  "Normal trade" is characterised by relatively small values 
for the residual standard errors  f
ε σ  and  w
ε σ ; both the margin (which de-
pends on the constant, once restricted to the error correction term) and the 
speed of adjustment parameter in the flour equation is at its usual level 
(α
f = -0.04). 
•  Regime 2:  "Calming" exhibits still-increased residual standard errors 
( f
ε σ : factor 1.5, 
w
ε σ : factor 3 relative to regime 1); margin and α
f are back 
at the usual levels. 
•  Regime 3:  "Alert" shows a strong increase in the variability of the er-
rors for flour ( f
ε σ : factor 7,  w
ε σ : factor 2 relative to regime 1); the margin 
is slightly reduced by about 12 %, and α
f is still unchanged. 
•  Regime 4:  "Disarray" has the highest residual standard errors in both 
equations ( f
ε σ : factor 10, 
w
ε σ : factor 12 relative to regime 1); the margin is 
exceptionably high, and the speed of adjustment in the flour price change 
equation is halved. How effective is the visible hand of the government 
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Table 2:  Markov-switching vector error correction model  
(MS(4)-VECM(3)) 















  (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.021)  (0.011)  (0.021)
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* 0.043 0.097 -0.035 -0.124 0.051  0.789
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t-3  0.044 0.432
* 0.068 0.508
* 0.222
* -0.026 0.160  2.941
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  (0.032) (0.054) (0.040) (0.130) (0.056) (0.032)  (0.395)  (0.725)
ECTt-1  -0.041




  (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.018)
        
w f
ε σ
/   0.0034 0.0056 0.0052 0.0170 0.0229 0.0123  0.0368  0.0631







-1.5604   -1.5301 -1.4489   -2.4179 
Source:  Own calculations using MSVAR for Ox (KROLZIG, 2004; DOORNIK, 2002). 
Notes:  All data is in natural logarithm. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
* Means statistical significance at 1 %.  
The transition matrix Π in Table 3 contains the transition probabilities from re-
gime st-1 to regime st. The values on the main diagonal indicate the probability of 
no change in the regime. Regimes 1 and 2 are found to be the most persistent, 
which is also indicated by the average duration of each regime. While regimes 1 
and 2 both last for about 4 weeks on average, regime 3 is only 2 weeks on average, 
and regime 4 only has a mean duration of 1½ weeks. From either regime 1 or 2, 
if a regime change takes place, regime 3 is the most likely outcome in the subse-
quent period (probabilities of 14 and 15 %, respectively). From regime 3, the 
system might either calm down (regime 2: 24 %; regime 1: 12 %), or the uncer-
tainty in the market might culminate in disarray (regime 3: 12 %). Once in re-
gime 4, the usual route of calming goes via regime 3 as an intermediate step 
(37 %) or directly into regime 1 with a 19 % probability. Note, however, that Bernhard Brümmer, Sergiy Zorya 
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even this state of disorientation in the market has some persistence, with a 
probability of no change of 37 %.  
Table 3:  Transition matrix for the MSVECM with 4 regimes 




1 2 3 4 
1 0.736  0.067  0.142  0.055 
2 0.121  0.728  0.151  0.000 
3 0.117  0.236  0.528  0.119 
4 0.194  0.069  0.370  0.367 
 
Figure 5 provides more information on the duration of each regime. The graph 
plots the cumulative probability on the y-axis against the duration of the regime 
on the x-axis. Regimes 1 and 2 follow virtually indistinguishable routes, while re-
gime 3 is substantially shorter. The "disarray" of regime 4 is not very stable; the 
probability of observing it for more than 3 subsequent weeks is less than 5 %. 
Figure 4:  Cumulative probabilities for duration of regime st less than or 
equal to t weeks 
 
















In Section 2, we discussed various factors which might have been important de-
terminants of market integration in Ukrainian flour and wheat markets during the 
observation period. In the next step, we try to link these events to the observed re-
gimes of the MSVECM. In particular, regime 4 is the most interesting, because 
the lack of adjustment and the inflated uncertainties in the price equations imply a 
substantial social cost for the Ukrainian wheat economy. In Figure 6, the devel-
opment of the two price series in the top panel is compared with the smoothed 
probabilities for regime 4 in the bottom panel. These latter indicate the probability How effective is the visible hand of the government 
 
129
that the system state is in regime 4 at time t. The distinct peaks of the graph high-
light that regime 4 is clearly identified, although it is the most rare of the four re-
gimes. 
Figure 5:  Price development for flour and wheat in Ukraine and  
probabilities of regime 4, 2000-2004  





Flour price  Wheat price 




1.00 Probabilities of Regime 4
smoothed 
 
The peaks for the probability of observing regime 4 occur at times when the flour 
and wheat markets in Ukraine were subject to major shocks. The first peak corre-
sponds to the second half of July 2001. This corresponds to the start of an ex-
traordinarily good harvest, which also initiated a change in the net trade balance 
for wheat, from a net import situation to a net export situation. The price for 
wheat dropped more rapidly than the price for wheat flour, leading to an above-
average margin. The following period, to the beginning of 2003, seems to be 
rather stable; the first indication of "disarray" shows up no earlier than the end of 
January, 2003. At that time, the first news concerning the severe winterkill of the 
wheat crop in Ukraine began to spread. The subsequent one-period occurrences of 
regime 4 in the 9
th and 11
th week of 2003 belong to the same category; they are 
probably influenced by partially conflicting information about the actual extent of 
the damage to the wheat crop caused by winterkill.  
In the course of the year 2003, several other peaks can be observed which are of 
particular interest since they can be linked to direct policy interventions on the Bernhard Brümmer, Sergiy Zorya 
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market for wheat and wheat flour. The first set occurs in the summer, begins 
with a duration of three weeks (24
th-26
th week of 2003), and is followed by a 
one-period observation in week 29. These dates coincide with heavy political 
activity; both on June 29 and July 24, important cabinet resolutions were is-
sued which set out the intended government reaction to the low harvest and to 
the possible shortage of domestic wheat. The temporal lead of two weeks, ob-
served in regime 4, is explained by the intense public discussion preceding the 
official resolutions. The interventionist character of many of the proposed 
measures, e.g. allowing for the regional control of physical grain shipments, or 
regulating bread prices, set the normal market relationships into turmoil, as 
signalled by the high probability for regime 4. After this period, a "calming" is 
observed. However, this lasted for just approximately four weeks. Then, ru-
mours spread concerning wheat imports from Kazakhstan and Russia at very 
favourable conditions. Indeed, the official announcement of the import falls 
within this block, which consists of three single-period observations of re-
gime 4 in weeks 35, 37, and 39. With the beginning of October, the error cor-
rection model between flour and wheat markets shifted again towards the more 
stable regimes. Figure 7 provides a more aggregate view by only distinguishing 
between ‘normal’ regimes (1 and 2), which are characterised by relatively low 
residual standard errors, and ‘alert’ regimes  (3 and 4), which exhibit much 
higher residual standard errors. According to this graph, most of the year 2003 
must be viewed as a period in which the markets where functioning in a far from 
stable manner. This supports the view by, VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL  (2004), 
amongst others, that the perceived crisis is more likely due to agricultural policy, 
and not a crisis of agriculture itself. 
Both Figure 6 and Figure 7 indicate that regimes 3 and 4 dominate the markets 
again beginning in July 2004. These recent regime shifts can be linked to the 
campaign for the presidential election. Both candidates explicitly referred to 
the regulations of wheat trade, and those of bread price control in their election 
programmes. It seems as if the ups and downs of the pre-election opinion polls 
corresponded, at least partially, to the price relationships of wheat flour and 
wheat. How effective is the visible hand of the government 
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Figure 6:  ‘Normal’ (1&2) and ‘alert’ (3&4) regimes of the MSVECM for 
wheat and flour prices in Ukraine, 2000-2004 
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This paper analysed vertical market integration between the markets for wheat 
and wheat flour in Ukraine over the years 2000-2004. The political interventions 
on these markets have been manifold, and the impact of many of these interven-
tions on the functioning of the markets remains questionable. In particular, politi-
cal reactions to changes in the net trade balance for wheat were discussed. These 
reactions were often neither transparent nor consistent; their credibility was often 
unclear. Also, most of the acts and resolutions passed by the cabinet were often 
accompanied by rumours in the market.  
In view of this background, we assume that structural stability of the price rela-
tionship between wheat and wheat flour might be too strong an assumption. The 
suspicion of structural instability was found to be confirmed in the analysis of the 
basic vector error correction model by means of a Chow forecast test. Instead of 
this standard model, we explored the usefulness of the Markov-switching vector 
error correction model (MSVECM) for the case at hand. The MSVECM has 
found increasing popularity in the business cycle literature in recent years. We 
employ this model for the analysis of market integration between wheat and flour 
markets in Ukraine, using 228 weekly observations on the price of wheat and 
flour from June  2000 to November 2004. The MSVECM specification for the Bernhard Brümmer, Sergiy Zorya 
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logarithmic price series with three lags (in differences) and four regimes was 
found to be a congruent representation of the underlying process.  
The endogenously estimated regimes could be interpreted as different conditions 
which govern the price relationship between flour and wheat at a given point in 
time. Differences in the residual standard errors, the margin between the two 
prices and the magnitude of the speed of adjustment coefficient all constitute the 
main characteristics of each regime. The most imprecise regime, i.e., the one with 
the highest residual variance and most volatile margin, is the estimated re-
gime No. 4. The prevalence of this regime over time could be linked to the de-
velopment of certain factors outside the model. In particular, for the year 2003, 
and the latter part of 2004, political interventions and high probabilities for re-
gime 4 movement occur concurrently; this is a particular negative feature since 
the proclaimed goal of many of the interventionist measures was to dampen insta-
bilities on the wheat market. The social cost of pushing otherwise well-
functioning markets in a regime of "disarray" is considerable. Finally, it was 
shown that the relationship between wheat and wheat flour prices was also af-
fected by the turbulence of the 2004 presidential campaign. The future develop-
ment of agricultural policy in Ukraine should acknowledge these results and re-
frain from discretionary interventions in the markets to avoid increased uncer-
tainty regarding price relationships. 
The approach, although already found useful in its present form, could be ex-
tended by aiming at the direct incorporation of policy variables. For example, 
based on the rigorous screening of newspapers and similar media, it could be used 
to construct an index of awareness for new developments on the corresponding 
markets. Such information could then be utilised in the econometric procedure of 
checking whether a re-estimation of the MSVECM, taking this prior information 
on the state variable into account, provides a similar picture or not. 
REFERENCES  
APK-INFORM (2004): Ukrainian grain market, Weekly Analytical and Statistical Report, APK 
Inform, July, Kyiv/Ukraine. 
CANDELON, B., LÜTKEPOHL, H. (2000): On the reliability of chow type tests for parameter con-
stancy in multivariate dynamic models, HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN (ed.): Discussion 
Paper. 
DEMYANENKO, S., ZORYA, S. (2004): Taxation and Ukrainian agriculture, in: VON CRAMON-
TAUBADEL, S., DEMYANENKO, S., KUHN, A. (eds.). Ukrainian Agriculture – Crisis and Re-
covery, Shaker Verlag, Aachen, pp. 25-39. 
DOORNIK, J. (2002): Object-oriented matrix programming using Ox, 3rd ed., Timberlake Con-
sultants Press and Oxford London, <www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/Doornik>. 
FAO (2004): World market prices of wheat, U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation, 
<http://www.fao.org>. How effective is the visible hand of the government 
 
133
FAS/USDA (2000-2004): Grain market reports, Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, Kyiv/Ukraine. 
KROLZIG, H.-M. (2004): MSVAR – An Ox package designed for the econometric modelling of 
univariate and multiple time series subject to shifts in regime, Version  1.31k, 
<http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/research/hendry/krolzig/msvar.html>. 
KROLZIG, H.-M., TORO, J. (2001): A new approach to the analysis of business cycle transi-
tions in a model of output and employment, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF 
OXFORd (ed.): Discussion Paper Series No. 59. 
KROLZIG, H.-M., MARCELLINO, M., MIZON, G. E. (2002): A Markov-switching vector equilib-
rium correction model of the UK labour market, Empirical Economics, Vol. 7(2), pp. 33-254. 
LANNE, M., LÜTKEPOHL, H., SAIKKONEN, P. (2002): Comparison of unit root tests for time se-
ries with level shifts, Journal of Time Series Analysis.  
STRIEWE, L., VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL, S. (1999): Die Getreideproduktion der Ukraine: 
Verpasste Chancen und dringender Handlungsbedarf, in: VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, S., 
STRIEWE, L. (eds.): Die Transformation der Landwirtschaft in der Ukraine: Ein weites Feld, 
Wissenschaftsverlag Vauk Kiel KG, pp. 74-87. 
UKRAGROCONSULT (1998-2004): Agrinews, Weekly Issues, Kyiv/Ukraine. 
VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, S. (2001): Price determination and government policy on Ukrainian 
grain markets, in: VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, S., ZORYA, S., STRIEWE, L. (eds): Policies and 
Agricultural Development in Ukraine, Shaker Verlag, Aachen, pp. 103-112. 
VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, S. (2002): Grain market regulation in Ukraine: Options and evalua-
tion, INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND POLICY CONSULTING IN UKRAINE (ed.): Advi-
sory Paper S6, <www.ier.kiev.ua>. 
VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL, S. (2004): The 2003 wheat harvest: Crisis! What crisis?, in:   
VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, S., DEMYANENKO, S., KUHN, A. (eds.): Ukrainian Agriculture – 
Crisis and Recovery, Shaker Verlag, Aachen, pp. 183-200. 






The analysis of the vertical price relationship along the supply chain between 
producers to consumers has become, over recent decades, a popular tool for 
evaluating the efficiency and degree of competition in agri-food systems. There 
is a wealth of literature on the farm-retail price spread for different commodities 
and countries. However, with one exception (BOJNEC, 2002) none have studied 
price transmission and marketing margins in the transition economies. It is a 
common belief that because of distorted markets inherited from the pre-1989 pe-
riod, the deficiency of the price-discovery mechanisms, and unpredictable policy 
interventions, marketing margins are generally larger in the transition economies 
than in competitive markets. Using cointegration analysis, we find that producer 
and retail pork prices are cointegrated, with the retail prices entering the cointe-
gration space as weakly exogenous variables. Structural tests imposing homoge-
neity conditions are carried out and show a competitive pricing strategy. Price 
transmission modelling suggests that, despite the common belief, price transmis-
sion on the Hungarian pork market is symmetric. 
Keywords: Marketing margins, asymmetric price transmission, error correction, 
pork market. 
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MARKETING MARGINS AND PRICE TRANSMISSION ON THE  




Measuring the spread of vertical price relationships and analysing the nature of 
price transmission along the supply chain from the producer to consumer have 
evolved as widely-used methods to gain insight into the functioning of, and de-
gree of competition in, food markets. Asymmetric price transmission has been 
studied by numerous authors using different econometric methods, from the 
classical WOLFFRAM (1971) and HOUCK (1977) specification to cointegration 
(VON  CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 1998) and threshold autoregressive models (e.g. 
GOODWIN and HARPER, 2000). However, none of these studies (except BOJNEC, 
2002) focus on a transition economy. Because of the inherited pre-1989 dis-
torted markets, under-developed price-discovery mechanisms and often ad-hoc 
policy interventions, transitional economies could be expected to have generally 
larger marketing margins and more pronounced price transmission asymmetries.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the dynamics of the marketing margin on 
the Hungarian pork market. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly 
describes the development of the Hungarian pork sector during the past decade. 
Section 3 reviews some of the theoretical literature concerning marketing mar-
gins and price transmission, while Section 4 describes the empirical procedures 
we apply. Our data and results are reported and discussed in Section 5, with a 
summary and some conclusions presented in Section 6. 
2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN PORK SECTOR 
Hungarian agriculture was traditionally considered a success story amongst the 
Central and East European Countries. However, like most post-1989 agricultural 
markets, the pork sector has experienced numerous structural changes in the past 
12 years. From 9.5 million head in September 1990, the pig stock decreased to 
4.3 million by December 1994, and has fluctuated at around 5 million head ever 
since. One important feature of the Hungarian pig sector is the large number of 
small-scale farms. Even before the privatisation, small-scale farms accounted for 
50 % of the total pig stock, a number which has not significantly changed. Many 
of these small-scale farms do not have commercial activity, i.e., they are subsis-
tence farms. However, a large proportion do sell their products, forming a two-
tier commercial and family pork production system. Price is the main indicator 
for both farm types, and links the different market levels of the food industry to 
the retail sector. The Hungarian food industry is characterised by a distorted 
market structure emphasised by the large number of small, not very cost-
efficient firms. The dramatic decrease of raw material production left many of 
the formerly-efficient larger companies struggling with unused processing ca-
pacity. JANSIK (2000) studying foreign direct investment (FDI) in Hungary, 
finds that industries characterised by a monopolistic market structure (sugar, Lajos Zoltán Bakucs, Imre Fertő 
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vegetable oil, tobacco, soft drinks, starch) were privatised in the early 1990s, 
having over 70 % foreign ownership of their capital. Meat processing is the 
largest food industry, accounting for over 18 % of the total Hungarian food proces-
sing output (JANSIK, 2000, p. 99). However, Hungarian privatisation started late – 
in the mid 1990s – and was characterised by low FDI, with now approximately 
40  % foreign ownership in its capital. Thus, the much needed concentration 
process was delayed, the four-firm concentration ratio in the meat industry being 
34.1 % in 1996 and 46.1 % in 1998 (GUBA, 2001). An often chaotic government 
intervention policy only added to market unpredictability. The producer subsidy 
equivalent (PSE) for pork producers ranged from -37.2% in 1996 to 22.6 % in 
1998 and that of pork processors from -20.3  % in 1998 to 10.6  % in 1994 
(GUBA, 2001).  
3 MARKETING MARGIN AND PRICE TRANSMISSION 
3.1 Theoretical  background 
The marketing margin is the difference between the retail and the producer or 
farm gate price. This represents marketing costs such as transport, storage, proces-
sing, wholesaling, retailing, advertising, etc.  
P
R = P
P +  M                                                 ( 1 )  
M, the marketing margin, is composed of an absolute amount and a percentage 
or mark-up of the retail price: 
M = a + b*P
R, where a ≥ 0 and 0 ≤b< 1.                                     (2) 
On a competitive market b=0, therefore, M will be the constant a equalling the 
marginal cost. However, if the market structure is monopolistic, the processors 
and retailers will try to push the marketing margin above the marginal cost, by b 
percent of the consumer price, where 0<b<1. Substituting (2) in (1) we have: 
P
R = a + b*P
R + P













1                                              ( 4 )  
If there is perfect competition on the market, and b= 0, equation (4) is reduced to 
P
R = a + P
P, and thus M= a.  
The traditional belief is that responses to price increases differ from responses to 
price decreases. More exactly, retailers tend to more rapidly pass price increases 
to consumers, whilst it takes longer for consumer prices to adjust to producer 
prices if the latter decrease. There are several major explanations for the exis-
tence of price asymmetries. First, asymmetrical price transmission occurs when 
firms can take advantage of quickly changing prices. This is explained by the Marketing margins and price transmission on the Hungarian pork market 
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theory of the search costs (MILLER and HAYENGA, 2001). They occur in locally-
imperfect markets, where retailers can exercise their local market power. Al-
though customers would have a finite number of choices, they might face diffi-
culties in quickly gathering information about the pricing of competing stores 
because of search costs. Thus, firms can quickly raise the retail price as the pro-
ducer's price rises, and reduce much slower retail prices when upstream prices 
decline. Second comes the problem of perishable goods (WARD, 1982), which 
prevents retailers from raising prices as producer prices rise. Wholesalers and re-
tailers in possession of perishable goods may resist the temptation of increasing 
prices because they risk lower demand and ultimately being left with the spoiled 
product. Third, the adjustment costs or menu costs (GOODWIn and HOLT, 1999) 
may underlie asymmetric price adjustments. Menu costs involve all the cost oc-
curring with the re-pricing and the adoption of a new pricing strategy. As with 
perishable goods, menu costs also act against retailers changing prices. Finally, 
the exercise of oligopolistic power can favour asymmetric price transmission. 
This appears in markets with highly inelastic demand and concentrated supply; 
many food chains have such market organisation characteristics. It must be men-
tioned that such collusive behaviour is rather difficult to maintain in long run 
because of the incentive for one firm to cheat the others (MILLER and HAYENGA, 
2001, p. 554).  
3.2 Empirical  evidence 
There are a great number of empirical studies dealing with marketing margin 
and asymmetry problems in livestock markets. VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL (1998) 
finds asymmetrical price transmission on the German pork market. DAWSON and 
TIFFIN (2000) identify a long-run price relationship between UK lamb farm-
retail prices, and study the seasonal and structural break properties of the series, 
concluding that the direction of Granger causality is due to retail to producer 
prices; thus, lamb prices are set in the retail market. Threshold Autoregressive 
Models were developed by GOODWIN and HOLT (1999), GOODWIN and HARPER 
(2000) and BEN-KAABIA, GIL and BOSHNJAKU (2002) studying the US beef sec-
tor, US pork sector and Spanish lamb sector, respectively. GOODWIN and HOLT 
(1999) find that farm markets do adjust to wholesale market shocks, whilst the ef-
fect of the retail market shocks are largely confined to retail markets. GOODWIN 
and HARPER (2000) in their pork market study find a unidirectional price infor-
mation flow from farm to wholesale and retail levels. Farm markets adjust to 
wholesale market shocks, but retail level shocks are not passed on to wholesale 
or farm levels. BEN-KAABIA, GIL and BOSHNJAKU (2002) establish a symmetric 
price transmission, concluding a long-run perfect price transmission, where any 
supply or demand shocks are fully transmitted through the system. They also 
observe that an increased horizontal concentration allows retailers to exercise 
market power. Lajos Zoltán Bakucs, Imre Fertő 
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ABDULAI (2002) uses a Momentum-Threshold Autoregressive Model (M-TAR) 
for studying price transmission on the Swiss pork market. He also concludes that 
price transmission between producer and retailer market levels is asymmetric, 
i.e., increases in producer prices that would diminish the marketing margin are 
passed on more quickly than producer price decreases that widen marketing 
margins. MILLER and HAYENGA (2001) study the US pork market price transmis-
sion in conjunction with price cycles, concluding that wholesale prices adjust 
asymmetrically to changes in farm prices in all cycle frequencies. BOJNEC (2002) 
finds that both the Slovenian farm-gate beef and pork markets are weakly exoge-
nous in the long run, with a mark-up long-run price strategy for beef and a com-
petitive price strategy for the pork market. REZITIS (2003) applies a Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) approach when studying 
causality, price transmission and volatility spillover effects in lamb, beef, pork 
and poultry markets in Greece.  
The results emphasise the presence of feedback between the different market 
levels, and support the imperfect price transmission between farm and retail 
markets in all meat categories studied. In short, most studies find asymmetrical 
price transmission in livestock markets, and also establish a mostly unidirec-
tional price information flow from farm to wholesale, and finally to retail levels.  
4 EMPIRICAL PROCEDURE 
Ever since NELSON and PLOSSER‘S (1982) seminal work, we know that most 
macroeconomic time series are not stationary over time, i.e., they contain unit 
roots. That is, their mean and variance are not constant over time. Utilising the 
standard classical estimation methods (OLS) and statistical inference can result 
in biased estimates and/or spurious regressions.  
Even though many individual time series contain stochastic trends (i.e., they are 
not stationary at levels), many of them tend to move together over the long run, 
suggesting the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship. Two or more 
non-stationary variables are cointegrated if there exists one or more linear com-
binations of the variables that are stationary. This implies that the stochastic 
trends of the variables are linked over time, moving towards the same long-term 
equilibrium.  
4.1  Testing for unit roots 
Consider the first order autoregressive process, AR(1): 
yt = ρyt-1 + et  t =…,-1,0,1,2,…, where et is white noise.                                          (5) 
The process is considered stationary if ⎥ ρ⎥ < 1, thus testing for stationarity is 
equivalent with testing for unit roots (ρ= 1). (5) is rewritten to obtain: Marketing margins and price transmission on the Hungarian pork market 
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∆yt = δyt-1 + et , where δ = 1 - ρ                                                                        (6) 
and thus the test becomes:  
H0 : δ = 0 against the alternative H1: δ < 0. 
Of several ways to test for unit roots, we applied the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test (DICKEY and FULLER, 1979; 1981). The test consists of estimating 
equation (7) using OLS: 
∆yt = α+ βt + δyt-1 +  t
p
i p t i y ε θ + ∆ ∑ = − 1                                                       (7) 
where α is the drift term, β is the intercept, and ∑ = − ∆
p
i p t i y
1θ  are lagged values of 
the independent variable to account for the autocorrelations in the residuals. 
Critical values to test the null of a unit root are tabulated in DICKEY and FULLER 
(1979). 
4.2 Cointegration  analysis 
The two most widely used cointegration tests are the Engle-Granger two-step 
method (ENGLE and GRANGER, 1987) and JOHANSEN’S multivariate approach 
(JOHANSEN, 1988). ENGLE and GRANGER base their analysis on testing the sta-
tionarity of the error term in the cointegrating relationship. An OLS regression is 
run and the residuals are tested for unit roots. If the null of non-stationarity can 
be rejected, the variables are considered to be cointegrated.  
The JOHANSEN testing procedure has the advantage of allowing for the existence 
of more than one cointegrating relationship (vector) and the speed of adjustment 
towards the long-term equilibrium is easily computed. The procedure is a 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) approach in a multivariate autoregressive frame-
work with enough lags introduced to have a well-behaved disturbance term. It is 
based on estimation of the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) of the form: 
∆Zt = Γ1∆Zt-1 + …+ Γk-1∆Zt-k+1 + ΠZt-k + ΨD + ut                                  (8) 




t]’, a (2 x 1) vector containing the farm and retail prices, both 
I(1), Γ1 ,….Γk+1 are (2x2) vectors of the short-run parameters, Π is (2x2) matrix 
of the long-run parameters, Ψ is a (2x11) matrix of parameters, D are 11 centred 
seasonal dummies and ut is the white noise stochastic term. 
Π = αβ`, where matrix α represents the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium and 
β is a matrix which represents up to (n - 1) cointegrating relationships between the 
non-stationary variables. There are several realistically-possible models in (8) de-
pending on the intercepts and linear trends. Following HARRIS  (1995) these 
models, defined as models 2-4, are: M2 where the intercept is restricted to the 
cointegration space – in the present application this can represent a constant ab-
solute component of the marketing and processing margin (BOJNEC, 2002); M3 
with unrestricted intercept but no trends – the intercept in the cointegration 
space combines with the intercept in the short-run model, resulting in an overall Lajos Zoltán Bakucs, Imre Fertő 
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intercept contained in the short-run model; M4 where if there exists an exoge-
nous linear growth not accounted for by the model, the cointegration space in-
cludes time as a trend stationary variable.  
Because it is usually not known a priori which model to apply, the Pantula prin-
ciple (HARRIS, 1995) is used to simultaneously test for the model and the cointe-
gration rank. 
The VECM lag length is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and the Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion (SBC), then the cointegration rank is 
selected by the trace and maximum Eigen values.  
4.3  Causality and the nature of the marketing margin 
Once (8) is estimated we can proceed to test for weak exogeneity and then for 
linear restrictions on the β vector. The terms of vector α (factor loading matrix) 
measure the speed at which the variables adjust towards the long-run equilib-
rium after a price shock. Testing for weak exogeneity equals testing the number 
of 0 rows in α. The α vector of the weakly exogenous variable equals zero.  
To find the direction of the Granger causality between the two price series, re-
strictions are tested on the α vectors. 
Structural tests are carried out to establish whether the pork market is competitive. 
A market is considered competitive if the farm gate and retail prices are linked 
through a constant absolute margin. The test consists of imposing a homogeneity 
constraint on the price coefficients of the following form:   H0 : βPR = - βPP. 
A likelihood ratio test is used to test the restriction. 
4.4  Asymmetrical error correction representation 
Most asymmetry analysis uses the following WARD (1982) specification, based 
on the earlier Woffram (1971) and Houck (1977) specification: 
∆Pt














P t-j+1) + γt                                 (9) 
Here, the first differences of the producer prices are split into increasing and de-
creasing phases by the D
- and D
+ dummy variables. Asymmetry is tested using a 
standard F-test to determine whether βj
+ and βj
- are significantly different. 
These approaches do not pay attention to the time series properties of the data 
and many of them suffer serial autocorrelation, which usually suggests spurious 
regression. 
With the development of cointegration techniques, attempts were made to test asym-
metry in a cointegration framework. VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL (1998) demonstra-
ted that the Wolffram-Houck type specifications are fundamentally inconsistent 








































t-1 are the segmented error correction terms resulting from the 
long-run (cointegration) relationship: 
ECTt-1 = µt-1= P
R
t-1 – α0 – α1P
P






t-1.                                                          (12) 
Using an VECM representation as in (10), both the short-run and the long-run 
symmetry hypothesis can be tested using standard tests. Valid inference requires 
one price to be weakly exogenous in both the long- and short-run with respect to 
the parameters in (10). We have presented the long-run exogeneity tests when 
discussed the interpretation of the α, the speed of adjustment vector. Following 
BOSWIJK and URBAIN (1997) we test for the short-run exogeneity by estimating 
the marginal model (13), then perform a variable addition test of the fitted re-
siduals ν
^




 = ψ0 + ψ1(L) ∆P
R
t-1 +  ψ2(L) ∆P
F
t-1 +  νt                                                    (13) 
For a more detailed discussion of exogeneity conditions in VECM see VON 
CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 1998. 
5 DATA AND RESULTS 
Monthly  (January 1992-December 2002)  farm-gate and producer prices were 
used, resulting in 132 observations. Farm-gate prices are represented by the 
monthly average nominal market price of live pigs and porkers for slaughter in 
Hungarian Forint (HUF) per kilogram.  
The Hungarian Central Statistical Office supplied all price data. Liveweight 
prices were transformed to slaughter weight prices using a 0.72 conversion fac-
tor. Two retail price data series, RP1
1 and RP2
2 were constructed as the 
weighted average of different meat cuts. All data were deflated to January 1992 
prices, using the monthly Hungarian Consumer Price Index (CPI).  
Pork prices have exhibited large fluctuations over the last 10 years, especially 
during the 1992-1996 time period (Figure 1).  
                                                 
1  RP1=  Pork with bones*0.45 + Pork without bones*0.40+ Rolled ham*0.05 + Dry sau-
sage*0.05 +Bologna and casserole sausage*0.05. 
2  RP2= (price of pork chops with bones +price of spare rib with bones+ price of pork belly 
with bones +price of pork leg without bones)/4. Lajos Zoltán Bakucs, Imre Fertő 
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From January 1996 to December 2002 the series are characterised by a much 
more stable evolution (Figure 2).  
Figure 1:  Monthly real farm-gate and retail prices in HUF/kg 











Source:  Author’s own calculations, data supplied by the CENTRAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE. 
Figure 2:  Monthly real farm-gate and retail prices in HUF/kg 














Source:  Author’s own calculations, data supplied by the CENTRAL STATISTICAL INSTITUTE. Marketing margins and price transmission on the Hungarian pork market 
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5.1  Stationarity and integration tests 
Unit roots were tested in two retail and one farm gate price series using the ADF 
procedure. The test results are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1:  Unit root test results 
1992-2002 period  Lags  FP  Lags  RP1  Lags  RP2 
With constant  0   -2.5887
  2 -2.4108
  1 -3.3360
** 
With cons. and trend  0  -2.8310  2  -3.2214
*  1 -4.4023
** 
1996-2002 period  Lags  FP  Lags  RP1  Lags     RP2 
With constant  0  -1.6471  1  -2.5950
*  1 -2.6270
* 
With cons. and trend  0  -1.8289  1  -2.7216
  1 -2.7559 
Notes: 
*,** Denote a 0.90 and 0.95 significance level, respectively. Critical values on a 0.90 
(0.95) significance level, ADF tests with a constant are -2.57 (-2.88), and with a 
trend are -3.13 (-3.43). Lags are selected by the SBC criteria. 
The tests indicate that the farm prices are I(1), but the retail price series are sta-
tionary at a 0.95 significance level (RP2) or trend stationary at a 0.90 signifi-
cance level (RP1). Because the 1992-1996 time period appears to exhibit greater 
fluctuation than the 1996-2002 time period (see Figure 2), the tests were re-
peated for the 1996-2002 time period. All series except RP2 (which appears to 
be stationary at a 0.90 significance level) are integrated by the order of one. 
Therefore, it was concluded that all three series contain unit roots. Hereafter, 
only the January 1996 to December 2002 time period is dealt with. 
We now proceed to the cointegration analysis and find one cointegrating vector 
for each pair of prices. The results of the cointegration analysis are presented in 
Table 2. 
Table 2:  Cointegration analysis 
Cointegration vector 






and r>1)  RP1 RP2  FP Constant





6.93  1.00 – -1.363  -68.527 





7.78  – 1.00  -1.419  -46.256 
Note:   * Denote a 0.90 significance level. 11 centered seasonal dummies included. 
As expected, both the trace and Lambda-max statistics choose one cointegration 
vector, and there is no evidence of serial autocorrelation in the residuals (Table 3). 
The farm gate – retail price relationship can be written as: 
RP1  =  68.527  +  1.363*FP                                     (14) 
RP2  =  46.256  +  1.419*FP                                   (15) 
At this stage, the results indicate that marketing margin on the pork market is 
made up of an absolute amount and a mark-up of the retail price. Using the  Lajos Zoltán Bakucs, Imre Fertő 
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notation introduced in equation (2), a = 93.54 and b = 0.266 for equation (14), 
and a = 65.704 and b = 0.295 for equations (15).  
Table 3:  Tests on the residuals 








FP-RP1 0.69  0.77 0.72  0.00
* 
FP-RP2 0.64  0.81 0.63  0.00
* 
Note:   
* Non-normality – implies that the test results must be interpreted with care, although  
asymptotic results do hold for a wider class of distributions (VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 
1998). 
5.2  Exogeneity and price spread analysis 
The factor-loading matrix in Table 4 measures the speed of adjustment of the 
variables towards the long-run equilibrium. 
The α parameters have positive signs, and those associated to the farm gate 
prices are larger than those associated with retail prices. This suggests that the 
farm gate prices react more intensively to unanticipated shocks than do the retail 
prices. However, their magnitude (0.191-0.201) is small, suggesting a rather 
moderate intensity of price adjustment when unexpected shocks occur. None of 
the α values associated with retail prices was statistically significant at conven-
tional levels. 
Table 4:  Factor loading matrix (α) 
Model Variable  α t-value 
FP 0.201  3.490
* 
FP-RP1 
RP1 0.036  0.550 
FP 0.191  3.708
* 
FP-RP2 
RP2 0.047  0.721 
Note:   
* Denote a 0.95 significance level. 
Table 5:  Weak exogeneity tests 





FP  αFP = 0  χ
2(1)=4.75 0.03  FP-RP1 
RP1  αRP1 = 0  χ
2(1)=0.13 0.72 
FP  αFP = 0  χ
2(1)=5.12 0.02  FP-RP2 
RP2  αRP2 = 0  χ
2(1)=0.22 0.64 
 
Weak exogeneity tests show that in both models the retail prices (RP1, RP2) are 
weakly exogenous in the long-run, and that farm gate prices react to changes in 
retail prices. Price changes were mainly due to retail side factors, as only the farm 
gate price responds to deviations from the long-run equilibrium. Thus, there is a 
long-run unidirectional Granger causality from retail to producer price. The statis-
tical properties can be improved if the models are re-estimated as partial models, Marketing margins and price transmission on the Hungarian pork market 
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where the retail prices enter the model as weakly exogenous variables. Table 6 
presents the re-estimated cointegration models, normalised to the farm prices 
and some diagnostic tests on the residuals. 
Table 6:  Re-estimated models 








FP-RP1  -0.77 -  1.00  58.15  0.64 0.73 0.68 0.00
* 
FP-RP2  – -0.75  1.00  42.45  0.57 0.78 0.58 0.00
* 
Note:  
* Non-normality – Implies that the test results must be interpreted with care, although  
  asymptotic results do hold for a wider class of distributions (VON CRAMON- TAUBADEL,  
  1998). 
Thus, the long run price relation between the farm-gate price and the two retail 
prices for the January 1996 to December 2002 period are: 
FP = - 58.158 + 0.773*RP1                                                 (16) 
FP = - 42.454 + 0.759*RP2                                                 (17) 
The results of the structural tests are presented in Table 7.  
Table 7:  Structural tests – Restrictions on β vectors 
Model Test  RP1  RP2  FP  Constant  p-value 
FP-RP1  βRP1 =  - βFP  -1  – 1 104.35  0.34 
FP-RP2  βRP2 = -  βFP  –  -1 1 87.571  0.32 
 
The null of a competitive pricing process cannot be rejected. This means that the 
marketing margin in the pork market is a constant absolute margin.  
The producer-retail price relationship can be reformulated as: 
FP  =  -104.35  +  RP1                                       (18) 
FP  =  -87.571  +  RP2                                       (19) 
In relation to equations (2) and (4), the results indicate that the mark-up, b, is 
zero, suggesting perfect competition on the Hungarian pork market.  
5.3  Price transmission analysis 
The residuals of (18) and (19) are saved and segmented into negative and posi-
tive phases. The first differences of the retail prices are also split into negative and 
positive sections as follows: ∆RP1M, ∆RP1P, ∆RP2M, ∆RP2P. The transformed 
equation (10) was first estimated with 4 lags, and then reduced to more parsimo-
nious models. The marginal models (13), not shown here, were also estimated, 
and the fitted residuals  ν
^
t saved. Table 8 and 9 present the regression estimates, 
symmetry tests and some diagnostic tests. The two models are well-specified, and 
there are no traces of serial autocorrelation of order 1, 4, and 12. The Ljung-Box 
Q statistic does not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation amongst the Lajos Zoltán Bakucs, Imre Fertő 
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first 20 residuals. The Chow test does not reject the stable parameters null hy-
pothesis and there is no evidence of homoskedasticity or the use of a wrong 
functional form. The residuals are non-normal, which implies that the test results 
must be interpreted with care, although asymptotic results do hold for a wider 
class of distributions (VON CRAMON-TAUBADEL, 1998). The variable addition 
tests indicate that the marginal equations’ residuals are not significant in the 
models, therefore the null hypothesis that the retail prices are weakly exogenous 
with respect to the short-run parameters too, cannot be rejected. The error cor-
rection terms (ECTP and ECTM) have the right sign, and ECTM causes a 
greater change in the farm price than ECTP. However, the F-test of long-run 
symmetry null hypotheses cannot be rejected (p = 0.804 and p = 0.857 respec-
tively), suggesting price transmission symmetry. The short-run symmetry hy-
potheses are then tested using an F-test and the nulls of symmetry cannot be re-
jected in this case either (p = 0.641 and p = 0.689, respectively). 
Table 8:  Symmetry tests: FP – RP1 model, dependent variable ∆FP 
Independent variables  Coefficients T-stat.  Significance 
(p-value) 
∆RP1Mt  0.763 4.235 0.00006 
∆RP1Pt  0.371 3.335 0.00135 
∆RP1Pt-1  0.437 3.547 0.00069 
∆FPt-1  -0.478 -4.104  0.00010 
∆FPt-2  -0.224 -2.295  0.02468 
ECT1Pt-1  -0.147 -2.121  0.03737 
ECT1Mt-1  -0.176 -2.134  0.03623 
Specification and diagnostic tests 
  Test Test  statistic  Significance  
(p-value) 
Adjusted R
2  2 R   0.387 – 
LM(1)   F(1.68) = 0.000  0.97548 
LM(4)  F(4.62) =  1.347  0.26238 
LM(12)  F(12.46) = 1.002  0.46215 
Autocorrelation 
Ljung – Box Q 
statistic  Q(20) = 16.894  0.65982 
Parameter stability  CHOW  F(64.7) = 0.649  0.82987 
Normality Jarque-Bera  χ
2(2) = 1.644  0.43942 
Heteroskedasticity WHITE  χ
2(35) = 31.12  0.65596 
Functional form  RESET  F(1.70) = 0.074  0.7861 
Variable addition test 
(the marginal model 
residuals) 
WALD  F(1.69) = 1.76  0.18894 
Asymmetry tests 
Long-run symmetry  WALD  F(1.71) = 0.061  0.80473 
Short-run symmetry  WALD  F(1.72) = 0.218  0.64158 Marketing margins and price transmission on the Hungarian pork market 
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Table 9:  Symmetry tests: FP – RP2 model, dependent variable ∆FP 
Independent variables  Coefficients T-stat.  Significance 
(p-value) 
∆RP2Mt  0.686 4.1  0.00010 
∆RP2Pt  0.320 3.257  0.00172 
∆RP2Pt-1  0.407 3.751  0.00035 
∆FPt-1  -0.474 -4.076  0.00011 
∆FPt-2  -0.213 -2.194  0.03145 
ECT2Pt-1  -0.14 -2.328  0.02274 
ECT2Mt-1  -0.158 -2.163  0.03386 
Specification and diagnostic tests 
  Test Test  statistic  Significance  
(p-value) 
Adjusted R
2  2 R   0.384 – 
LM(1)   F(1.68) = 0.002  0.95723 
LM(4)  F(4.62) = 1.559  0.19626 
LM(12)  F(12.46) = 1.255  0.27678 
Autocorrelation 
Ljung – Box Q 
statistic  Q(20) = 17.427  0.62509 
Parameter stability  CHOW  F(64.7) = 0.71  0.78209 
Normality Jarque-Bera  χ
2(2) = 1.526  0.4662 
Heteroskedasticity WHITE  χ
2(35) = 34.39  0.49734 
Functional form  RESET  F(1.70) = 0.046  0.83048 
Variable addition test 
(the residuals of the 
marginal) 
WALD  F(1.69) = 1.32  0.25451 
Asymmetry tests 
Long-run symmetry  WALD  F(1.71) = 0.032  0.85741 
Short-run symmetry  WALD  F(1.72) = 0.161  0.68905 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Along with many empirical studies of livestock markets in developed countries, 
we have examined how retail price is formed and how price transmission works 
in a transition country’s livestock market. We analysed the long-run relationship 
between two retail prices and the farm-gate price for pork in Hungary. Vertical 
price transmission was analysed in the cointegration framework, using Johansen’s 
maximum likelihood approach. Because of the highly volatile 1992-1996 time 
period, we split our data in two, and carried out the research on the more settled 
1996-2002 data set. Results indicate that retail and farm gate prices in the Hun-
garian pork market move together in the long run, that is, they are cointegrated 
for the January 1996 to December 2002 time period. The exogeneity tests found 
the retail prices were weakly exogenous in both the long- and short-run and estab-
lished a unidirectional long-run Granger causality from retail to producer prices. 
Prices are set on the retail market and the retailers make ‘offers’ to producers Lajos Zoltán Bakucs, Imre Fertő 
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further down the marketing chain. Our causality findings are in line with those 
of DAWSON and TIFFIN (2000) on the British lamb market, who established a 
unidirectional retail-to-producer price Granger causality. Structural tests found 
that there is a constant absolute margin linking the retail and producer prices, in-
dicating the existence of a competitive processing and retailing market. The exis-
tence of a constant absolute margin, and thus the hypothesis of a competitive 
pork market, concur with BOJNEC (2002) who studied marketing margins on the 
Slovenian pork market. These results suggest that even the less-developed mar-
kets in transition economies can perform as competitive markets. However, we 
conclude that on the Hungarian pork market, farm prices react to changes in re-
tail prices. We carried out both short- and long-run asymmetry tests, and, contrary 
to popular belief, we found that the null of symmetrical price transmission can-
not be rejected in either case. This result contradicts the findings of studies set in 
developed markets, which usually establish asymmetrical price transmission on 
livestock markets and farms to a wholesale to retail price information flow.  
In the present study, the price series used for the analysis were deflated by the 
CPI. It can be argued that the strong inflationary environment that characterised 
the Hungarian economy in the 1990s cannot be simply neglected when analysing 
price transmission. Future research on the topic could be an extension of the pre-
sent analysis to include the effect of inflation in the model, and thus capture any 
impact on price transmission.  
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The paper analyses changes in the Slovenian retailing sector, focusing on 
agricultural and food products during transition and the adjustments undertaken 
while working towards European Union (EU) membership. Market structures are 
analysed by considering the patterns in marketing type characteristics. Non-
specialized stores, predominantly food stores or supermarkets, are the most 
important for retail trade in agricultural and food products. The patterns in 
marketing margins for food staples are analysed through developments in real 
farm-gate and real retail prices for the main food chains. Among analysed food 
marketing chains, the diverging patterns between real farm-gate price declines 
and real retail price stability or its increases – and thus the increase in the farm-
gate to retail-price spread – are confirmed for the following marketing chains: 
Wheat-flour-bread, cattle-beef, and to a lesser extent for sugar beet-sugar and 
pigs-pork. The milk-dairy marketing chain experienced real price increases until 
1998-1999, but reductions thereafter. The real farm-gate and real retail prices tend 
to decline for sugar beet-sugar and eggs-chicken, and to a lesser extent for wine 
grapes-wine marketing chains. Further price adjustments have occurred since 
Slovenia became an EU member. 
Keywords: Market structures, farm-gate and retail prices, marketing margin, 
Slovenia. 
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The food market chains in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have 
considerably changed during transition to a market economy (HARTMANN  and 
WANDEL, 1999). During the previous economic system, most CEE countries 
experienced shortages of several products, including diversified food products 
(e.g. KORNAI, 1992). Under government control were prices and marketing 
margins of several agricultural and food products. Since the collapse of the 
previous system, agricultural and food markets have experienced liberalization and 
deregulation, which has led to quality improvements as a result of food 
importation, restructuring in the agriculture and food sectors, and restructuring in 
the trade and retailing sector with the increasing role of supermarkets (DRIES et al., 
2004; REARDON and SWINNEN, 2004). 
Competition policy, privatisation and deregulation have been the key elements in 
changing the business environment at the micro- and macro-economic levels. For 
various reasons, in the initial market structures in CEE countries, a monopolistic 
position and market power were considerable constraints to market and business 
efficiency. The economic literature argues that there are static and dynamic benefits 
from competition (e.g. CHRYSTAL and LIPSEY, 1997; MCALEESE, 2004). Among 
static benefits are greater output at the market for consumers, at lower costs and 
lower prices, which reduces or eliminates deadweight loss. Among dynamic 
benefits, there are at least three efficiency gains: Making firms more cost efficient; 
allowing more efficient firms to expand and inefficient firms to exit through the 
market selection process, and; providing incentives for innovation. Besides static 
and dynamic efficiency improvements, there is also the equity consideration, where 
small competitors such as small farmers, suppliers of inputs and consumers are 
protected from the abuse of monopolistic power. 
This paper presents developments in the Slovenian retailing market structures, real 
farm-gate price and real retail price developments for the main agricultural and 
food marketing chains. Patterns in real price developments at the farm-gate and 
retail level indicate the size of marketing margins for the main food chains. In the 
initial phase of transition, the retail sector in most CEE countries, including 
Slovenia, was relatively less competitive than in the neighbouring EU countries due 
to rather limited varieties of goods and retail services at relatively high retail prices. 
Therefore, lack of costs, quality, and price competitiveness in CEE countries was 
possible to notice when purchasing products in neighbouring EU countries (for 
example, in Austria and Italy). While in the past, retail shops were largely 
concentrated in town centres and residential areas, another change during recent 
years has been the establishment of new supermarkets in the suburbs for customers 
buying in a larger quantity, usually for a whole week, and coming by car. 
In the initial phase of transition, there was the typical entry of small-scale private 
shops to fulfil market niches. However, small shops that have not been able to Štefan Bojnec 
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organise prompt delivery of high quality products at reasonable prices are losing 
market share. Since the mid-1990s, there have been shifts in retail market 
structures, with fewer new entries of small shops, but more mergers and the 
concentration of retail sales outlets through the entry of supermarkets. In 
Slovenia, some supermarkets were present in the past and until the second half of 
the 1990s, most retailing activities were conducted within the Slovenian retailing 
shops and supermarkets. During the initial stage of transition, the largest Slovenian 
retailers tried to carry out efficient reorganisation of retail shops to gain some of the 
advantages presented by western-style trade chains and supermarkets. This has 
been sped up through an intense process of mergers and take-overs by the largest 
Slovenian retailer, Mercator, to rationalise cost structures using economies of scale. 
Take-overs and mergers between retail trade organisations were seen as a way to 
create stronger and more competitive domestic retailing. Since the mid-1990s, 
Mercator has set up western-style supermarkets outside of Slovenia, in the largest 
cities of the former Yugoslav republics. On the other hand, some foreign 
supermarket chains, particularly the Austrian firm Spar/Interspar, have entered the 
Slovenian retailing structure. 
The trade and retailing sector in Slovenia are important for job creation, but also for 
rationalisation in the production, processing and marketing chains. During recent 
years, competitive pressures in the markets have increased. There are some real 
retail price reductions, such as in the milk and dairy chains. For some main 
agricultural and food products, consumer prices in Slovenia were higher than in 
most other CEE countries, and for some products even higher than in some EU 
countries (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2004). The increased competitive pressures on 
the reduction of producers and/or processors margins and prices within the 
marketing chains therefore create pressures on efficiency improvements and cost 
reductions. Domestic retailers and supermarkets have tried to imitate some 
developments typical of Western economies in terms of retail shops location, 
size, operation and management. With the Slovenian negotiation and 
adjustment to EU membership, Slovenian retailing markets have been 
gradually liberalised, allowing easier entry into the Slovenian retailing 
markets. The increased competitive pressures in the supermarket chains 
created pressures on the rationalisation and efficiency improvements of 
introducing measures for greater competitiveness, such as more advanced food 
quality regulations, food standards, packaging and marketing approaches.
1 Under 
these increasing competitive pressures, the retailing sector has been growing 
                                                 
1  An inflow of foreign retail chains in CEE countries started in Hungary (e.g., by "Tesco" and 
some others supermarket chains), the Czech Republic, Poland, and later in other CEE 
countries particularly bordering the EU countries as well as in some largest CEE cities (e.g. 
Moscow and St. Petersburg). They have been set in different ways as foreign direct 
investments (FDIs), joint ventures with domestic chains, and even as domestically owned 
retail chains (see also DRIES et al., 2004; REARDON and SWINNEN, 2004). Slovenian retailing market structures 
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more efficient. Since the mid-1990s, domestic and foreign-owned food chains 
have largely tried to increase efficiency through the rationalisation of retailing 
with a diversification of supply and new products, new ways of purchasing 
products (particularly the rationalisation of the trade margin by using economies of 
scale with substantial reduction of labour and some other operational and marketing 
costs) and new ways of doing business, for example by building new, large shops 
in the suburbs. During the most recent years, few foreign retailing chains have 
entered the Slovenian retailing markets. The increased competitive pressures in 
trade have impacts on farm and consumer prices, marketing margins, the 
redistribution of rents and welfare implications for producers, traders and 
consumers. 
2 MARKETING OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
The marketing of agricultural products during transition has changed, as several 
agricultural purchasing organizations collapsed or were rationalized to reduce the 
costs of intermediation. The food processing and distribution sectors in CEE 
countries have largely been efficiently improved (HARTMANN and WANDEL, 1999). 
During the previous system in the 1980s, the prevailing private agricultural 
households in Slovenian agriculture sold the major part of their directly marketed 
agricultural production through agricultural cooperatives and socially-owned 
enterprises, usually based on contracts. From 1980-1985, about 75 percent of the 
agricultural products sold by private agricultural households were sold through 
agricultural organizations, about 7.3  percent through trade and industrial 
organizations, and about 17.7 percent through forest organizations. On the other 
hand, the socially owned farms were a part of the vertically integrated regional 
monopolistic organizations for food processing, wholesale and retail trade 
(BOJNEC, 1994). 
The structure of marketing agricultural products changed during the 1990s. In 
2003, milk and dairy products, livestock, poultry and eggs accounted for around 
72 percent of the value of purchased agricultural products in Slovenia (Table 1). 
This clearly reveals the significance of livestock-based agricultural production in 
Slovenia. Milk and dairy products are the most important single product group in 
terms of the value of sold agricultural products through different marketing 
channels, particularly trough dairies. The importance of livestock in the value of 
purchased agricultural products increased until the mid-1990s, with a slight 
reduction thereafter. The significance of poultry and eggs has tended to decline as 
well. Cereals and industrial plants account for less than 7 percent of the value of 
directly marketed agricultural production, while vegetables account for less than 
2 percent; vegetables also comprise less than 6 percent of the value of purchased 
agricultural products. Štefan Bojnec 
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Table 1:  Value of purchased agricultural products (million current SIT
1) 
  1990  %  1995  % 2000 % 2003 % 
TOTAL  7,377  100.0  65,103 100.0 88,851 100.0  103,311  100.0
Livestock 2,039  27.6  19,031 29.2 23,563 26.5  23,404  22.7
Poultry and eggs  1,862  25.2  12,504 19.2 14,706 16.6  19,451  18.8
Milk and dairy 
products  1,257  17.0  15,446  23.7 26,047 29.3 31,417 30.4 
Hides and wool  22  0.3  79 0.1 33 0.0  1,093  1.1
Cereals 337  4.6  3,364 5.2 4,048 4.6  3,710  3.6
Industrial plants  268  3.6  2,719 4.2 3,328 3.7  3,175  3.1
Fodder plants  4  0.1  43 0.1 40 0.0  64  0.1
Vegetables 158  2.1  681 1.0 1,098 1.2  1,897  1.8
Fruits
2) 433  5.9  2,584 4.0 5,346 6.0  5,497  5.3
Alcoholic drinks  360  4.9  3,970 6.1 5,088 5.7  5,951  5.8
Wood
3) 458  6.2  3,256 5.0 4,121 4.6  5,085  4.9
Fishes 52  0.7  400 0.6 445 0.5  663  0.6
Other products  127  1.7  1,026 1.6 988 1.1  1,904  1.8
Source: Author’s  calculations from data given from STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
various issues. 
Notes: 
1) For 1990, in Dinars. 
 
2) Fruit for industry included. 
 
3)  Purchase of wood from private forests bought via co-operatives and forest   
    management organisations. 
3 FOOD RETAILING 
With liberalization, privatisation and restructuring in CEE countries, agricultural 
and food marketing channels have developed a greater trading role for 
supermarkets (DRIES  et al., 2004; REARDON  and  SWINNEN, 2004), and similar 
changes have been observed in Slovenia. The local peasant markets and the free-
markets existed in the cities, and the value and quantities marketed at these places 
were not very significant (BOJNEC and MÜNCH, 2000). More competitive retailers 
and supermarkets are increasing their shares in the food marketing channels. 
The value of agricultural and food products sold through newly-emerging 
marketing and retailing channels has been increasing. Food, alcoholic and non-
alcoholic beverages, and tobacco and tobacco products account for 30 percent of 
the total retail trade in Slovenia, while the specialized retail trade shops with food 
represents 36.3 percent of the total retail trade (Table 2). More than 94 percent of 
food is traded in the retail trade shops specialising in food. Most alcoholic and non-
alcoholic beverages and tobacco and tobacco products are also traded in these 
shops. This suggests a rather high specialization of the retail food trade, as well as 
beverages and tobacco products within the retail shops and supermarkets. Slovenian retailing market structures 
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Table 2:  Turnover including value added tax in retail trade activities, 
2003 (million SIT) 
Value by groups of retail trade activities 




% of total 
retail trade 
TOTAL TRADE 2,184,739 100.0 793,449  36.3 
Food 449,092 20.6 423,144  94.2 
Non-alcoholic beverages  81,831 3.7 75,654  92.5 
Alcoholic beverages  63,553 2.9 58,191  91.6 
Tobacco and tobacco products  61,510 2.8 37,784  61.4 
Other products  1,528,753 70.0 198,676  13.0 
Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
2004. 
Note:  The data were collected with a sample and grossed to the total observed activity. 
The number of retail trade organizations and sales outlets in Slovenia has increased 
steadily, aside from the sharp increase in 1997 (Figure  1), which is biased to 
statistical data changes. Between 1993 and 1996, evidence included only 
enterprises with at least two persons in paid employment, while evidence between 
1997 and 2003 was collected by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 
(SORS) with a sample and adjusted to the total observed activity. Due to the 
changes in weighting methodology in 2000, and the comparability of the series, the 
evidence for 1997-1999 was revised by the SORS. 
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Source:  Data is taken from SORS, 2004. 
As illustrated in Figure  1, the number of retail organizations and sales outlets 
declined beginning in 1997, and then experienced an increase in 2000; since then, 
however, they have further concentrated, which has led to decline. 
Table  3 analyses the decline in more detail. In 2000, 28.5  percent of retail 
enterprises and other organizations in retail activities were engaged in retail trade 
with food, beverages and tobacco products, while 37.2 percent were in 2003. Their 
increase in relative importance occurred irrespective of the absolute decline in the Štefan Bojnec 
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number of retail trade organizations with food, beverages and tobacco products. 
Within the retail trade of food, beverages and tobacco products, in 2000, around 
76 percent of organizations were non-specialized stores with predominantly food, 
with 22.5  percent specialized stores for food and beverages, and 1.6  percent 
specialized stores for tobacco products. The most recent tendency is the increase in 
the absolute number, and thus the increase in the relative importance of specialized 
stores for food and beverages and the reduction in both absolute and relative 
importance of the prevailing non-specialized stores, predominantly with food, and 
to a lesser extent specialized stores for tobacco products. 
Table 3:  Enterprises and other organisations by retail activity 
   2000  %  2003  % 
TOTAL 6,993 4,674 
Retail trade with food, beverages, tobacco  1,996 100.0 1,738  100.0
Food and beverages (specialized stores)  450 22.5 481  27.7
Tobacco (specialized stores)  32 1.6 22  1.3
Non-specialized stores, predominantly with food 1,514 75.9 1,235  71.1
Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
2004. 
There are some similarities, but also differences, between patterns in the 
development of retail organizations and retail sales outlets (Figure 1 and Table 4). 
It is evident that retail enterprises and other similar organizations have undergone 
more considerable changes which resulted from transformation and organisational 
changes, and particularly statistical changes in the capturing of data. Statistical 
changes seem to be less considerable for the number of retail sales outlets 
(Table 4), with their number increasing during the 1990s. In 2000, they counted for 
around 12.5 thousand, which was the greater number of retail sales outlets. Since 
then their number has declined, as some retail shops have been taken over by larger 
supermarkets in the suburbs of the towns, while some small shops in towns and 
villages have been closed due to economic reasons. 
In the structure of retail sales outlets, enterprises and other retail trade organizations 
experienced an increase in their absolute number and in their relative importance 
until 2000, but with an observed decline since then. Stores of agricultural 
enterprises and similar organizations have experienced their absolute and their 
relative declines with more stable developments since 2000. The retail sales outlets 
experienced greater volatility in their number and their relative importance, with 
declines in the mid-1990s and their subsequent recovery. Slovenian retailing market structures 
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Table 4:  Retail sales outlets
1 
   1990  %  1995  %  2000  %  2003  % 
TOTAL 6,638  100.0 6,972  100.0 12,457 100.0  10,751  100.0
Enterprises and other 
organisations in retail trade  3,647 54.9 4,428 63.5 8,559 68.7  6,698  62.3 
Stores of agricultural 
enterprises and other 
organisations
2) 
808 12.2 685 9.8  269  2.2  268  2.5 
Other 2,183  32.9  1,859  26.7  3,629  29.1  3,785  35.2 
Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
(various issues). 
Notes: 
1) 1990 and 1995 data include only enterprises with at least two persons in paid  
        employment. 2000 and 2003 were collected with a sample and grossed with   
    weighting methodology to the total observed activity. 
 2)    Retail outlets for forestry, hunting and fishing enterprises and organisations are  
     included. 
Since 2000, the number of retail stores has declined, which is consistent with the 
substitution of small retail shops by more efficient supermarkets. The number of 
stores in retail trade with food, beverages and tobacco increased until 2002, but 
declined in 2003. The specialized food and beverages stores oscillate over time, but 
tend towards declining. The declining tendency also holds for specialized stores 
with tobacco products. Non-specialized stores, predominantly with food, increased 
until 2002, but declined in 2003. The reduction in the number of retail trade shops 
with food, beverages and tobacco in 2003 clearly suggests some changes in 
concentration and shifts from smaller retail trade shops towards larger 
supermarkets, which is caused by a greater entry of foreign retail supermarkets 
such as Spar/Interspar, the ongoing process of mergers and concentration of retail 
trade by the largest Slovenian retail chain Mercator, and the entry of the new 
Slovenian supermarket chain, Tuš. Of course, there are also some other retail 
chains (e.g. Hardi) and retail trade shops. 
Table 5:  Stores in retail activity 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
TOTAL  11,553 12,457 11,970 10,885 10,751
Retail trade with food, beverages, tobacco  4,538 4,512 4,587  4,604  4,356
Food beverages (specialized stores)  1,047 916 988  930  915
Tobacco  (specialized  stores)  357 330 298 286 280
Non-specialized stores, predominantly with food 3,134 3,267 3,301  3,389  3,161
Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
2004. 
During the previous system, the number of inhabitants per sales outlet in retail trade 
in Slovenia was increasing (Figure 2). In spite of the statistical break in data, with 
the entry of small retail shops during the 1990s, the number of inhabitants per 
sales outlets in retail trade declined. With the process of mergers among the Štefan Bojnec 
 
158
Slovenian retailers and the entry of other domestic and foreign supermarkets, the 
number of inhabitants per sales outlet in retail trade has slightly increased since 
1997, but it remains at a much lower level than during the previous system. 
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Source:  Data is taken from SORS, 2004. 
The number of employees in retail and wholesale trade in Slovenia has increased 
(Figure 3). Since the mid-1990s, the increase has been more remarkable, suggesting 
that both retail and wholesale trade have been important sectors for generating 
new jobs. In the past the major portion of employees in trade were in traditional, 
socially-owned trade enterprises. Although to a certain extent, small ice cream and 
small-scale family run shops already existed during the previous system, small and 
medium-sized private enterprises in trade have been promoted since the end of the 
1980s, which has also created new jobs. However, since the mid-1990s, mergers 
and takeovers have been important for the new process of trade concentration, 
which focuses on the creation of more efficient and cost-, margin- and price-
competitive supermarkets. 
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Source:  Data is taken from SORS, 2004. 
Table 6 clearly reveals that the number of persons working in trade enterprises and 
other trade organizations during transition to a market economy has increased. Slovenian retailing market structures 
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The most remarkable increase is recorded in enterprises and other organisations in 
retail trade, and to a lesser extent, in enterprises and other organisations in 
wholesale trade. On the other hand, there is a recorded decline for persons 
working in the stores of agricultural enterprises and similar organisations, and in 
other trade enterprises and organisations. 
Table 6:  Persons working in trade enterprises and other organizations 
    1990  % 1995 % 2000 % 2003 % 
TOTAL 39,331 100.0 35,472 100.0 50,897  100.0  53,658  100.0
Enterprises and other 
organisations in retail trade  25,113 63.9 24,160 68.1 35,493 69.7  37,045 69.0
Enterprises and other 
organisations in wholesale trade  4,998 12.7 4,974 14.0 7,206 14.2  9,202 17.1
Stores of agricultural enterprises 
and other organisations  2,625 6.7 2,196 6.2 798 1.6  1,155 2.2
Other 6,595 16.8 4,142 11.7 7,400  14.5  6,256  11.7
Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
(various issues). 
Note:  Until 1995, only persons in paid employment in retail trade. 
Within retail trade with food, beverages and tobacco, the greatest number of 
employees work in non-specialized stores predominantly with food (Table 7). Their 
absolute number and their relative importance are further increasing, while there 
are declining tendencies for persons working in specialized stores for food and 
beverages and for specialized stores for tobacco products. The increase in the 
former largely includes supermarkets, whose role is increasing, while the decline 
in the latter includes small specialized shops, whose role is declining. In 1999, 
43.8 percent of persons working in trade enterprises and other trade organisations 
were working in retail trade with food, beverages and tobacco products, while in 
2003 their share was 49.4 percent. 
Table 7:  Persons working in trade with food, beverages and tobacco 
    1999 % 2001  % 2003 % 
TOTAL TRADE ORGANIZATIONS 48,729 52,011   53,658 
Retail trade with food, beverages, 
tobacco  21,337 100.0 22,086 100.0 26,523  100.0
Food beverages (specialized stores)  3,157 14.8 2,890 13.1  2,549  9.6
Tobacco (specialized stores)  443 2.1 305 1.4  245  0.9
Non-specialized stores, predominantly 
with food  17,737 83.1 18,891 85.5 23,729  89.5
Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
2004. 
However, retail trade with food, beverages and tobacco products experienced less 
significant turnover than in employment, suggesting that their productivity is less 
than in other trade enterprises and trade organizations. In 1999, 30.9 percent of the Štefan Bojnec 
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turnover in trade was realized by retail trade with food, beverages and tobacco, 
while this figure was 37.4  percent in 2003 (Table  8).
2 Non-specialized stores, 
predominantly with food, conducted more than 81 percent in 1999 and in 2003 
almost 91  percent of turnover in retail trade with food, beverages and tobacco 
products. The decline, even in nominal and in relative turnover, is recorded for 
specialized stores with food and beverages and to a lesser extent for specialized 
stores for tobacco products. 
Table 8:  Turnover by trade activity of enterprises/organisations  
(in million current SIT) 
   1999  %  2001  %  2003  % 
TOTAL TRADE 1,555,043 1,684,770   1,881,185 
Retail trade with food, beverages, 
tobacco  480,147 100.0 577,512 100.0 703,814 100.0
Food and beverages  
(specialized stores)  77,071 16.1 67,386 11.7 51,891  7.4
Tobacco (specialized stores)  13,609 2.8 12,267 2.1  13,691  1.9
Non-specialized stores, 
predominantly with food  389,467 81.1 497,859 86.2 638,232  90.7
Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
2004. 
4 FARM-GATE TO RETAIL PRICES AND MARKETING MARGINS 
The farm-gate price is the average purchase price of directly-marketed agricultural 
produce through different marketing channels without subsidies. The farm-gate 
prices of cattle and pigs are recorded in live-weight. The average retail price is 
price achieved for a certain product in retail trade. To exclude the impact of 
inflation and to get a real price, prices at the farm-gate and at retail levels are 
deflated by the consumer price index with 1994 as the base year. The converging, 
diverging or more stable developmental patterns in real-farm gate prices vis-à-vis 
real retail prices will indicate whether marketing margin is declining, increasing or 
staying at approximately a similar level. 
4.1 Wheat-flour-bread  chain 
Divergent patterns in marketing margin are observed in the wheat-flour-bread 
chain. As it is clearly illustrated in Figure  4, the real farm-gate wheat price 
(without direct subsidy payments for wheat producers) since the mid-1990s has 
declined, while the real retail white flour prices have remained rather stable, and 
                                                 
2  In 2003, the value-added tax for total trade was 13.9 percent and for retail trade with food, 
beverages and tobacco products,  11.3 percent  (9.7 percent for food and beverages in 
specialized stores, 13.9 percent for tobacco products in specialized stores, and 11.4 percent for 
products in non-specialized stores, predominantly with food). Slovenian retailing market structures 
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the real retail white bread prices and brown bread prices have increased 
substantially. In 2003 there seems to have been greater stability in developments in 
real prices in the wheat-flour-bread chain, suggesting that competitive pressures are 
squeezing further increases, particularly in the real retail bread prices. 
Figure 4:  Real farm-gate wheat prices and real retail white flour and bread 







1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
R_brown bread R_white bread R_white flour F_wheat
 
Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
(various issues). 
Note:   R – retail and F – farm-gate. 
4.2  Sugar beet-sugar chain 
The declining tendency in real farm-gate sugar beet and real retail sugar prices are 
observed in the sugar beet-sugar chain (Figure 5). Real farm-gate sugar beet prices 
without subsidy payments to producers have declined even more substantially, 
suggesting a certain increase in marketing margin in the sugar market before 
Slovenian membership in the EU.
3 Since 2000, there can be observed a certain 
recovery in real farm-gate sugar beet prices, while real retail sugar prices further 
declined. 
Figure 5:  Real  farm-gate  sugar beet prices and real retail sugar prices in 
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Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
(various issues). 
                                                 
3  The rapid increase in real farm-gate sugar beet prices in 1993 was associated with diverse 
weather conditions due to draught, and relatively low yields. Štefan Bojnec 
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4.3 Milk-dairy  chain 
The real farm-gate milk price achieved its peak in 1998 (Figure 6). In the same 
year, real retail yoghurt price also achieved its peak. The real retail sterilised milk 
prices started to decline in 1997, as did the real tetra packed milk prices in 1999. 
These real milk price developments for Slovenia clearly indicate that within more 
closed Slovenian milk and dairy markets prior to 1998-1999, real milk and dairy 
prices were increasing. With trade liberalization and particularly with adjustments 
to the EU markets, under the pressures of the increased import competition the 
Slovenian real milk and dairy prices have started to decline, coming closer to the 
levels, in real terms, of the year 1991, when Slovenia became independent. Further 
real milk and dairy price declines are also observed after 2003, under the increased 
competition created by rival supermarket chains. 
Figure 6:  Real farm-gate milk prices and real retail milk and yoghurt prices 
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Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
(various issues). 
Note:  R – retail and F – farm-gate. 
4.4 Pigs-pork  chain 
Real farm-gate pig prices have cyclically declined. The sharper declines are 
observed for real farm-gate prices for fat pigs over 150 kg than for the real farm-
gate price for fattening pigs between 50 and 150 kg (Figure 7). This is consistent 
with consumer preferences and thus greater demands towards fattening pigs than 
fat pigs. The real retail price for boneless pork declined between 1992 and 1998. 
With a slight increase in real farm-gate pig prices, there is an even more 
considerable increase in real retail price for pork, which achieved its most recent 
peak in 2001. Since 2001, the real-farm gate pig prices, as well as the real retail 
prices for boneless pork have declined. It seems that the marketing margin has 
slightly increased, particularly since 1998. This is consistent with the finding by 
BOJNEC and PETER, 2002. The most recent increase in the marketing margin can be 
due to the greater significance of pork sold in the packed form. This requires some 
additional handling and marketing costs. Slovenian retailing market structures 
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R_unboned pork F-fat pigs under 150 kg F-fattening pigs, 50-150 kg
 
Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
(various issues). 
Note:  R – retail and F – farm-gate. 
4.5 Cattle-beef  chain 
With Slovenian independence in 1991, there was a surplus in demand in the 
protected Slovenian cattle-beef chain, which resulted in the rapid increase in retail 
beef prices (BOJNEC, 1994; BOJNEC and PETER, 2002). With the introduction of 
beef price controls and trade liberalisation to encourage greater competition, the 
real retail beef price declined in 1993, but since then has cyclically increased 
(Figure 8). On the other hand, the real farm-gate cattle price has declined since 
1995. As clearly illustrated in Figure 8, the gap in the patterns in development 
between the declining real farm-gate cattle price and the increasing real retail 
unboned beef price has occurred, clearly indicating the increase in the marketing 
margin in the cattle-beef marketing chain. This finding is consistent with the 
findings by BOJNEC and PETER, 2002) who argue that marketing margins in the 
cattle-beef marketing chain increased due to the reduction in farm-gate cattle price, 
while the retail beef price was more stable or even slightly increased. 
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Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA,  
(various issues). Štefan Bojnec 
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4.6 Eggs-chicken  chain 
The eggs-chicken chain has experienced declines in real farm-gate and real retail 
prices for both eggs and chicken (Figure 9). The declines in farm-gate prices are 
even a bit more considerable than for retail prices, suggesting that marketing 
margins have not declined, but remained stable or even slightly increased. The 
declines in real prices in the eggs-chicken chain are likely to be a consequence of 
increased competition and efficiency improvements, particularly at the farm level. 
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Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA,  
(various issues). 
Note:  R – retail and F – farm-gate. 
4.7 Wine  grapes-wine  chain 
Figure  10:   Real farm-gate wine grapes and wine prices and real retail   
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Source:  Author's calculations from data given from STATISTICAL  YEARBOOK OF SLOVENIA, 
(various issues). 
Relatively high price volatility is observed for the real farm-gate price for wine 
grapes, but with its rapid reduction in 1998, which was likely caused by an increase Slovenian retailing market structures 
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in imports. After that, the patterns in development of these prices are more stable 
(Figure 10). Real farm-gate and real retail prices for wine increased prior to 1997. 
Since then, they have tended to decline, particularly at the farm-gate level. At the 
retail level, since 2001 there has been some recovery in white wine real retail 
prices. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
During the last fifteen years, the Slovenian agricultural and food marketing chains 
have experienced considerable changes which have been associated with many 
factors. First was the transition process, including agricultural and food sector 
transformation, privatisation and restructuring. This process has led to the 
diminishing role of traditional production and marketing structures. Second was 
Slovenian independence, which caused some disruption in the previous traditional 
upstream and downstream marketing links and induced some shifts in agricultural 
and food prices. Third was the liberalization of trade, the deregulation of markets 
and agricultural and food marketing chain adjustments to comply with EU 
membership. These processes brought with them related changes in retailing and 
agricultural and food marketing. 
Within the structure of retail trade for food, beverages and tobacco products, the 
non-specialized stores, predominantly with food or supermarkets, are of the 
greatest importance and their significance has further increased, while the 
specialized food and specialized tobacco shops have shrunken. In the initial stage 
of transition, the entry of small shops was significant, but later developments in 
the Slovenian retailing sector have been associated with takeovers and mergers 
within the largest Slovenian retailers, such as Mercator, which is currently also 
represented abroad in the former Yugoslav markets. Agricultural and food 
products are also traded within another Slovenian chain of supermarkets, Tuš. The 
entry of foreign supermarkets, particularly Spar/Interspar, Hardi and some others 
have created competitive pressures on retail prices and marketing margin 
reductions, which have been clearly illustrated in the milk and dairy (the most 
important Slovenian agriculture and food chain) price reductions since 1998. 
After Slovenian independence in 1991, several agricultural and food prices in real 
terms increased as a consequence of more protectionist domestic policy measures 
and limited competition in the relatively closed Slovenian markets. With trade 
liberalization and adjustments towards EU membership allowing the entry of new 
domestic and, particularly, foreign competition in retail trade, especially 
supermarkets, some real retail food prices have declined. The main exceptions 
were bread prices (until 2003), beef, and pork prices (until 2001). The tendency 
towards real price declines seems to be consistent with the price adjustments 
towards the levels in neighbouring countries, whereas in the past, several foreign 
shopping centres specifically focused on customers coming from Slovenia and Štefan Bojnec 
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other countries in the region to do their shopping. The entry of different 
supermarkets in the Slovenian retailing market has led to quality and price 
adjustments, including some real price declines. This adjustment process has 
reduced transaction and actual consumer costs for buying several basic food 
products. Irrespective of these emerging and increasing competitive pressures, 
the rationalisation in marketing and the retailing of agricultural and food products, 
the wholesale and retail trade sector has continued to be an important source of job 
creation. 
Real-farm gate and real retail price development have been analysed more in-depth, 
and indicate the size of marketing margins in Slovenia for main food products. The 
impact of competitive pressures on developments in different food chains varies. 
As has been clearly illustrated, there are some similarities, but also differences in 
real price and marketing margins developments in vertical food chains. The 
diverging patterns in real price developments at farm-gate and at retail levels are 
confirmed for the wheat-flour-bread chain, suggesting an increase in the marketing 
margin. Real farm-gate wheat prices have declined due to trade liberalization and a 
policy shift from market-price support towards direct payments. The increased real 
consumer prices for bread may indicate that in the past bread prices were regulated 
at relatively low levels and have thus increased with price deregulation. This 
increase may also capture structural changes in quality improvements. Yet, it may 
also indicate the presence of monopolistic competition in local and regional 
markets and thus might be a consequence of a lack of competition in these markets. 
Their price stabilisation in 2003 may reflect an increase in competitive pressures to 
a level of fulfilment of market niches. The diverging patterns with real farm-gate 
prices decline and real retail price stability increases, thus the increase in the farm-
gate to retail-price spread are also confirmed for the cattle-beef chain, and to a 
lesser extent for the sugar beet-sugar and pigs-pork chains. Finally, the real farm-
gate and real retail prices tend to decline as well for the sugar beet-sugar and eggs-
chicken chain, and to a lesser extent for the wine grapes-wine marketing chain.  
Since Slovenia became an EU member on 1 May 2004, there have been further 
price adjustments. Among the most important are the continuation in the 
introduction of retailer’s brand names in supermarkets for processed food and 
beverages. There has been also a further drop, now stabilized, in consumer milk 
and dairy prices. For drink producers and consumers, there has been an increase in 
sugar prices. Quality and price adjustments with the Single European Market, 
particularly with neighbouring countries, have been an ongoing process under more 
severe competitive market pressures by supermarkets and their contractual 
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The aim of this paper is to offer a theoretical framework for revealing farms' 
preferences based on a data envelopment model and to test a hypothesis regarding 
short-term profit maximising behaviour of Moscow region corporate farms. Data 
from 2002 and 2003 are used. The initial hypothesis is rejected in favour of 
Baumol's oligopolistic (revenue-maximising) behaviour. Non-monetary utility 
components do not pertain to the revealed corporate farms preferences. With 
respect to the revealed preferences, the scarcest resources in 2002 and 2003 are 
machinery (56.3 and 50.6 % of farms, respectively), cows (47.7 and 37.6 %), 
haylands and pastures (39.2 and 50.6 %). The political implication of this study 
is a need for institutional improvements which aim to lower transaction costs, 
improve access to market information, and increase competition within the mar-
ket environment. 
Keywords: Utility function, revealed preferences, Data Envelopment Analysis, 
corporate farms, Moscow region, oligopoly. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
For the purpose of developing a regional agrarian policy, it is necessary to know 
the preferences which determine farm level decision-making. This knowledge: 
•  Facilitates the correct prediction of farms' reactions to a given change in 
either a political or market environment; 
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•  Justifies microeconomic models, since being based on an incorrect as-
sumption about farm utility, the modelling commonly ends in biased es-
timations or even fails. 
Methodological issues of approaching farm's utility are discussed in AMADOR et al., 
(1998), LIEN and HARDAKER (2001). These papers suggest a set of survey and 
data processing tools that aim to identify decision-making determinants. How-
ever, it is possible that the reported and revealed preferences may differ. 
Discussion of Russian farm preferences mostly concentrates on the validity of 
the profit-maximising behaviour assumption. SEROVA (1999) argues that this as-
sumption cannot be applied to Russian farms for historical and institutional rea-
sons. In BEZLEPKINA (2004) the opposite position is taken and shown to be in 
accordance with the available data on Moscow region corporate farms. SVETLOV 
(2002b), by means of a farm sample approach, shows that, in addition to short-
term profit (which is imposed), farm utility is sensitive to depreciation, wages 
and herd population. 
These differences can be caused by both temporary and methodological reasons. 
Therefore, at least two research tasks can be identified: Improving methodology 
by making it simple, reliable and transparent; regularly monitoring preferences 
in order to register and explain observable changes. 
The aims of this study are: 
•  To offer a theoretical framework for revealing farms' preferences; 
•  To test the hypothesis regarding short-term profit maximising behaviour 
displayed by Moscow region corporate farms; 
•  To measure the scarcity of resources used by Moscow region corporate 
farms in order to identify institutional imperfections and to help develop 
reasonable agrarian policies. 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A theoretical base for revealing preferences, developed in SVETLOV (2002a), 
rely on classical results in mathematical programming (KUHN  and TUCKER, 
1951; UZAWA, 1958) and on the general reciprocity theorem by LOURIER (1966). 
The latter, unlike duality theory, deals with the reciprocal exchange of an objec-
tive function and a bound constraint. Following this theorem, a reciprocal prob-
lem has the same optimum as an original one, and the Lagrangean vectors of 
both problems differ only in scale and order of the components. This result 
spans all mathematical programming problems, regardless of (non)convexity, 
providing that their feasible sets are closed. Nikolay Svetlov 
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Briefly, the theoretical framework is the following: Assume that 
** *
12 *(,,,) n x xx = x K  
is an optimum of the problem 
 m a x (() | ) , uX ∈
x xx  (1) 
where x = (x1,x2,…,xn) is a vector of state variables, u(x) is an objective function 
and X is a set of feasible solutions. If this problem is convex, then 
 max(‹ , ›| ), X ∈
x xx ϕ  (2) 
where ‹φ,x› is a tangent to u(x) in x*, yields the same optimum x*. From 
UZAWA (1958) and LOURIER (1966) it follows that, having defined h = (x2,…,xn) 
and 
**
2 *(,,) , n x x = h K  the optimal solution of the problem 
  11 max( | , *) xX ϕ ∈ =
x xh h , (3) 
is also x*, and Lagrangean multipliers for the equation h = h* are φ2…φn pro-
viding that φ = (φ1, φ2,…, φn). It is assumed here that the optimum and the tan-
gent are both unique; SVETLOV (2002a) spans the general case. 
Presume now that (1) represents an economic agent that makes a choice from 
among the technologies belonging to a technological set X by maximising a utility 
represented by an unknown function u(x), which moves this agent to an observ-
able position x*. Then, as follows from the aforementioned transformations, it is 
possible to recover φ by solving the problem (3), thus revealing a tangent to u(x) 
in x*. This tangent represents the local preferences of the economic agent (1) in a 
vicinity of x*.  
3 EMPIRICAL MODEL 
In this study, the empirical specification relies on data envelopment method of 
representing a technological set (CHARNES et al.,1978). The empirical model is 
formulated as 
  ,1 ,2 , max( | , , ,‹ , › 1), im im m im m im m im k hk h k −≤ ≥ = =
λ A λ aB λ bH λ hi λ  (4) 
where aim and bim are actual inputs and outputs on a farm i accessing m-th tech-
nological set; him = (him,1, him,2, …, him,6) is a vector of utility components on the 
same farm; i is a vector of ones; matrices Am = (aim), Bm = (bim), Hm = (him); λ is a 
vector of intensities of available technologies; k is a scalar.  
The utility components, which compose him, are revenue (him,1, thousand roubles), 
short-term costs (him,2, thousand roubles), wages (him,3, thousand roubles), short-term Scarcity and preferences 
 
171
loans (him,4, thousand roubles), long-term loans (him,5, thousand roubles), and cow 
population (him,6, thousand roubles). 
Some of the named utility components need special comments. Loans appear 
here, on one hand, as a possible source of liquidity, which is valuable under the 
Russian conditions characterised by the hindered access of farms to sources of 
financing; on the other hand, some managers are seen as displaying loan-averse 
behaviour because they are uncertain about their ability to repay them due to 
high risks, both market and political, and inaccessible (too expensive) insurance. 
The available literature suggests that managers may overestimate herd utility 
(see e.g.  BEZLEPKINA, 2004), which justifies the presence of cow population 
among utility components. 
Depreciation is excluded from costs, as this specification deals with the short-
term profit maximisation hypothesis. 
There are 9 inputs: Arable land (ha); pastures and haylands (ha); agricultural la-
bour (number of agricultural workers); sources of financing production costs 
(thousand roubles per year); number of sows; number of cows; number of sheep; 
fixed production assets (thousand roubles); machinery (approximated by spare 
part expenses, in thousand roubles). 
Arable land is represented by an actually available area on the right hand side of 
the  mi m ≤ A λ a  constraint, but for a sown area on its left hand side. The reason is 
that many farms waste arable land due to a lack of machinery, lack of short-term 
financing or difficult competition against imports. Thus, arable land area cannot 
be used as an indicator of technologically-justified consumption of arable land, 
which must appear on the left hand side of this equation. As beef cattle are not 
bred in the Moscow region, there is no need to split cows in the model into dairy 
and meat breeds. Beef is produced only through the rejection of calves or dairy 
cows. 
The outputs are grains (kg×100); potatoes (kg×100); vegetables (kg×100); other 
crops (thousand roubles); beef (kg×100); pork (kg×100); mutton (kg×100); other 
meat (kg×100); milk (kg×100); wool (kg×100); other animal production (thou-
sand roubles); and non-agricultural production (thousand roubles). Poultry farms 
are not included in this study. 
The objective function of (4) is equivalent to minimising k from the point of 
view of the resulting optimal solution. However, the form of short-term profit 
maximisation, which is actually used in (4), allows a monetary measure of 
shadow prices, which is convenient for the analysis. Nikolay Svetlov 
 
172 
The hypothesis is that the farms display shout-term profit-maximizing behaviour. 
This is tested in the following way: 
•  The vectors γim of shadow prices for the constraint  , mi m = H λ h  which 
correspond to φ in problem (2), are obtained from (4) for each farm i re-
gardless of the corresponding m; 
•  The components of these vectors are statistically tested for differences 
from zero by means of t-test. According to the hypothesis, those which 
relate to revenue and short-term costs are expected to significantly differ 
from zero and to be close to 1 and -1, respectively. The rest of the com-
ponents are not expected to differ from zero. 
Scarcity of a resource is signalled by a non-zero component in a vector of 
shadow prices relating to the  mi m ≤ A λ a  constraint. Widespread non-zero com-
ponents throughout a set of farms indicates the prevalence of scarcity. 
Shadow prices that characterise the constraint  mi m ≥ B λ b  are analysed by means 
of comparison against market prices. A large difference suggests one of the fol-
lowing: 
•  Large transaction costs; 
•  Misreported prices; 
•  A large difference between financial and economic prices (presence of a 
hidden utility attached to the output). 
4 DATA 
Moscow region corporate farm data from 2003 (364 farms) is used. For com-
parison and robustness tests, the model was also run using similar data from 
2002 (381 farms). The source of data is the State Statistical Committee of the 
Russian Federation, which holds a database of approximately 250 variables re-
garding Russian corporate farms that have submitted their annual reports to the 
regional statistical institutions. The subset used in this study includes variables 
from all the utility components, inputs and outputs mentioned in Section 3 and, 
additionally, average prices of all outputs except those measured with revenue 
from sales. The prices are calculated as a revenue from sales of a particular out-
put (thousand roubles) per amount of sales (kg×100). 
The data envelopment approach commonly presumes that all technologies that 
are actually applied by farms appearing in the data set are available to any other 
farm. This is often true in the long run, providing that the farms have sufficient 
investment opportunities for adjusting their technological capacity. This is hardly 
the case of the studied farms, since their assets were formed under a very different Scarcity and preferences 
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institutional system and price structure. A lot of time and money is required for 
complete technical restructuring, which often requires developing branches of 
agricultural production that are completely new for a particular farm. 
Following the experience of an earlier study (SVETLOV, 2004), a simple and 
practical means of avoiding this problem are used. They are based on the as-
sumption that if a farm does not sell a given output, then the technologies that 
produce this output are unavailable to this farm in the short run. 
In order to implement this approach, the initial data sets from 2003 and 2002 are 
classified into subsets so that all farms in a subset produce exactly the same set 
of outputs. The criterion of forming such sets is later called a production pattern. 
Different production patterns correspond to different values of subscript m in (4). 
As soon as the production patterns are defined, the specific matrices Am, Bm and 
Hm are formed for each subset. This facilitates defining a production frontier that 
is specific for a particular production pattern. Among all the production patterns 
available from the data set of 2003, only six were used in this study, since others 
were represented by too few farms. In 2002, seven patterns were found to meet 
the requirements of this study. As a result, this study uses only 178 data items of 
the 364 available in 2003, and 199 of 381 data items available in 2002. 
The definition of patterns is presented in Table 1. 
BEZLEPKINA (2004) admits that Russian farms might misreport an amount of in-
puts and outputs (and, consequently, financial results). Commonly, the purpose 
of false reports is to hide thefts and illegal transactions. Since many farms neither 
really consider the option to be lenders, nor intend to raise the value of their 
shares, they have no reason to display good financial results and high production 
efficiency. That is why, commonly, they over-report inputs and under-report 
outputs. Consequently, using non-frontier data processing methodologies like 
OLS, a researcher can come up with confusing results. 
In the case of data envelopment representation of a technological set, the farms 
that misreport their status in the described manner just move to the downside of 
the frontier and are unlikely to affect results considerably. At worst, this effect 
partially hides an existing technological capacity. Under these conditions, it is 
not possible to identify the distortions caused by this problem. Unless there are 
explicit reasons for attaching a certain outcome of the model to the problem of 
misreporting, one should interpret the outcome as "the best of available know-
ledge", since the data envelopment approach is less sensitive to this problem 
than non-frontier modelling. Nikolay Svetlov 
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Table 1:  Production patterns involved in the analysis 
Production patterns  Outputs 
I  II III  IV V VI  VII 
2003 
Grains  + + – + – – × 
Potatoes  – + – + – –  × 
Vegetables  – – – + – –  × 
Other crops  + + + + – +  × 
Beef  + + + + – +  × 
Pork  – – – – – +  × 
Milk  + + + + – +  × 
Other animal production  + + + + + +  × 
Non-agricultural production  + + + + + +  × 
Number of farms  62 44 28 23 11 10 × 
2002 
Grains  + + + – + + – 
Potatoes  – + + – + –  + 
Vegetables  – – + – + –  + 
Other  crops  + + + + + +  + 
Beef  + + + + + +  + 
Pork  – – – – + +  – 
Milk  + + + + + +  + 
Other  animal  production  + + + + + +  + 
Non-agricultural production  + + + + + +  + 
Number  of  farms  59 54 29 21 12 12  12 
Source:  Author's calculations based on data of Moscow Region farm registry (2002, 2003; 
unpublished). 
Notes:  ‘+’ means presence of the output in the production pattern, ‘–’ means absence, ‘×’ 
denotes a meaningless cell. The outputs that are absent in all modeled production 
patterns are omitted. 
5 RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the statistical characteristics of the components of γim obtained 
from (4) having been solved 377 times. This Table characterises the tangent to 
the revealed preferences of the studied farms in their actual states. Scarcity and preferences 
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Table 2:  Statistical characteristics of tangents to revealed preferences 
functions in the actually observed state of a farm 








2003: Average  1.049  -0.041  -0.264  -0.254  0.007  -12.139 
2003: Standard deviation  0.540 0.604 2.058  0.944 2.037  40.361 
2003: p-value  0.948  0.054 0.102  0.212 0.003  -0.236 
2002: Average  0.765  -0.095  -0.106  -0.290  0.486  6.448 
2002: Standard deviation  0.439 0.345 1.341  6.757 3.093  16.239 
2002: p-value  0.919  0.217 0.063  0.034 0.125 0.309 
Source:  Author's calculations based on data from the Moscow Region farm registry (2002, 
2003; unpublished). 
Note:  Bold values indicate a significant difference from zero at a 90 % confidence level. 
The components of γim are empirically distributed nearly symmetrically. The ex-
cess of the empirical distributions is considerably higher than that of a normal 
distribution. Because of this, the t-test is applied here with the reservation that 
the rejection of the hypothesis regarding the zero value of a component is even 
more reliable than follows from the confidence level. However, if the hypothesis 
is not rejected, it is not wholly convincing that it would not also be rejected if 
one knew the true distribution. 
As follows from Table 2, the data from 2003 reject the null hypothesis of this 
study, which is formulated in Section 3, at a 90 % level of confidence. No utility 
components except revenue are shown to reliably belong to the true utility func-
tion: The hypotheses regarding their insignificance are not rejected. Surprisingly, 
the revealed preferences miss costs: γ2 ≈ 0, where γ = (γ1…γ6) is a vector of avera-
ges throughout γim. As for the revenue, γ1 ≈ 1 (difference from unity is rejected at 
a 90 % confidence level). This perfectly conforms to BAUMOL'S (1967) theory, 
which suggests the revenue maximizing behaviour of agents acting under the 
conditions of oligopoly-type competition, concerned mostly with preserving and 
increasing their share of the available market. 
The data from 2002 yield similar results, but the marginal utility of the revenue 
noticeably, although not significantly in a statistical sense, differs from 1 (mean 
value is 0.77). The possible cause is that in 2002, the farms (especially vegetable 
producers) made their decisions under very unstable prices, which made it 
scarcely possible to optimize production programmes. 
With respect to the above-reported results, the question can arise whether the 
test throughout the set of γim-vectors obtained from subsets based on different 
production patterns is valid. The data from Table 3 suggest that the heterogeneity 
possibly caused by differences in production patterns cannot be attributed to the 
corporate farms utility function. Nikolay Svetlov 
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In Table 3, the values of γim are averaged over m, except for the least numerous 
subsets, which are joined together. In 2003, the conclusion regarding the re-
vealed preferences in all subsets remains the same throughout all production pat-
terns. 
Table 3:  Average tangents to revealed preferences functions in the actually 
observed state of a farm (by subsets) 




























































































































Source:  Author's calculations based on data from the Moscow Region farm registry (2002, 
2003; unpublished). 
Notes:  Bold values relate to a significant difference from zero at a 90 % confidence level; 
values in brackets are p-values. 
As for year the 2002, in subsets I/2002 and V-VII/2002 γim vary too widely to 
form any conclusion about preferences, but p-values associated with revenue 
utility are the largest. Subsets II/2002 and III/2002 yield the typical result, which 
is in line with Baumol's theory. Noticeably, farms of subset IV/2002, spanning 
strictly specialised dairy farms, display short-term credit-averse behaviour. As a 
farm is not the only actor making a decision whether or not to access short-term 
loans, this result rather indicates that banks tend to hamper the access of dairy 
farms to short-term loans. Yet, the reason for such differences in the revealed 
preferences is not clear: Unlike subsets I/2002-III/2002, farms of subset IV/2002 
are profitable, on average, in 2002. It is likely that this outstanding result is just 
occasional, which is quite possible in the subset of only 21 farms. Scarcity and preferences 
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Although not statistically significant, in 2002 a herd population is rather attrac-
tive to farms in all subsets, contrary to 2003 when the situation is opposite. It is 
possible that the difference is not occasional. The reason is that in 2002-2003, 
the production costs of dairy farming kept growing (by 9.9 %, according to the 
data sets used in this study), while milk and meat prices barely changed (growth 
of 2.1 %). This likely resulted in increasing fears about the commercial effi-
ciency of milk production in the long run. 
To conclude, in 2002 the set of farms is less homogenous with respect to γim than 
in 2003; however, the observed differences are not large enough to doubt the 
above formulated conclusion about revealed preferences. 
Findings regarding resource scarcity in 2002 support most of the earlier results 
for the same year reported in SVETLOV (2004): The scarcest resources are found 
to be machinery (56.3 % of farms), cows (47.7 %) and land (haylands and pas-
tures – 39.2 %, arable land – 26.6 %). The difference is that the model (4) shows 
low scarcity of the sources of production cost financing (10.6 %). This is ex-
plained by the constraint on short-term loans, which, unlike in SVETLOV (2004), 
explicitly appeared in the model (4): In 27.1 % of farms, at least one of these 
two constraints is bound. The presence of a long-term credit constraint also par-
tially captures the effect of short-term financian shortages: Omitting this con-
straint, when it is bound, often leads to turning short-term financing into a scarce 
resource. In 2003, the situation barely changed: Scarcity of machinery is regis-
tered in 53.4 % of farms, of haylands and pastures – in 50.6 %, of cows – in 
37.6 %, of arable land – in 36.5 %. The share of farms lacking sources of pro-
duction cost financing increased to 24.2 % (either of themselves or of short-term 
credit – to 34.8 %).This is an expected change, as the year 2002 was characterized 
by lower profits than the previous two years. 
Other fixed inputs rarely constrain farms' utility function. 
Mean values of shadow prices for inputs are shown in Table 4. This table in-
cludes four inputs that are not considered as utility components, represented by 
data from both years and used in the majority of farms, thus providing represen-
tative statistics. Due to decreased profitability, an average shadow price of arable 
land decreases in 2003. So the positive changes in land shadow prices in 2002, 
in comparison to earlier periods, noted in SVETLOV (2004), appeared to be tem-
porary. For haylands and pastures, however, the shadow prices remained nearly 
unchanged. Due to the continuing reduction of the number of employees and the 
growth of wages, the shadow price of agricultural workers more than doubled. 
Finally, the incentives to expand machinery usage quadrupled.  
The above presented results remain robust throughout numerous tests by means 
of changing the empirical model specification: Varying control for return to 
scale, trying different combinations of utility components, including deprecia-
tion into costs, and omitting outstanding technologies. Nikolay Svetlov 
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In the majority of solutions, despite a particular model specification, k in (4) is 
equal to 1. Hence, the revealed preferences are attached to the actual state of the 
studied farms in 2002 and 2003. This note addresses the methodological prob-
lem originating at the possible difference of tangents to a true utility function in 
actual and optimal, with respect to (4), states of farms. 
Table 4:  Average values of shadow prices of inputs,  
thousand roubles per unit 











2003 1.81  4.51  104.30  7.20 
2002 4.19  4.17  50.85  1.92 
Growth -2.39  0.34  53.45  5.28 
Source:  Author's calculations based on data from the Moscow Region farm registry (2002, 
2003; unpublished). 
Note:  The values are mean values. 
The difference between shadow prices and actual prices barely changes in 2003 
compared to 2002 for all outputs (Table 5), giving no reason to presume large 
biases in shadow price estimations. The data on pork are not presented in this 
table, as, due to relatively heterogeneous subsets of pork-producing farms, the 
estimated value varies too widely in robustness tests. 
Table  5 suggests that the potatoes, vegetables and milk markets are close to 
equilibrium: Average market prices are close to average shadow prices in both 
years. 
As for grains and beef, we observe the evidence of either serious market distor-
tions persisting through time or of misreported revenues or sales. In the case of 
grain, as data show, this problem deepens in 2003. In our case, both explana-
tions are possible. In particular, it is to be expected that the reported sales might 
include grain used by farm employees for feeding own cattle. However, a spe-
cial study is necessary to split possible causes of the observed difference be-
tween actual and shadow prices. Scarcity and preferences 
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Table 5:  Average values of actual and shadow prices of outputs, roubles 
per unit 
 
































Prices 2003  2.76  5.97  4.68  1.00  18.15  5.84 1.00  1.00 
 2002  2.19  4.89  4.33  1.00  19.50  5.60 1.00  1.00 
Shadow   2003  8.65  5.37  4.17  11.70  37.72  5.19 2.77  1.93 
prices 2002  6.18  6.70  3.60  5.26  40.96  5.51 1.16  2.51 
Shadow 
per actual  2003 3.13  0.90 0.89 11.70 2.08  0.89 2.77  1.93 
prices  
ratio  2002 2.82  1.37 0.83  5.26 2.10  0.98 1.16  2.51 
Source:  Author's calculations based on data from the Moscow Region farm registry (2002, 
2003; unpublished). 
Notes:  The values are mean values. Actual prices are calculated using reported revenues 
and amounts of sales. 
The greatest changes in shadow prices between the two years are observed for 
outputs measured in a monetary form. This is explained by structural changes in 
the composition of these outputs. The difference between shadow and actual 
prices of these outputs is larger than that of others. In the case of crop produc-
tion other than grains, potatoes and vegetables is the largest. This effect can be 
caused by unavailability to the majority or farms of a specific technology (for 
instance, strawberry production) used by a single farm located at the production 
frontier. Hence, there is no reason to attach an economic meaning to this value. 
The tests for robustness by means of changing the model specification show that 
the estimations presented in Tables 4 and 5 are robust enough to justify eco-
nomic conclusions. 
6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
1  The study presented in this paper argues that the behaviour of Moscow 
region corporate farms is close to revenue maximising behaviour, which 
is theoretically expected in the case of oligopoly. Having occupied a 
sizeable share of a regional market of agricultural production, each farm 
tends to keep this share occupied rather than to care about costs. 
2  It is found that the revealed preferences are homogenous with respect to 
production patterns reflecting farm production specialisation, and display 
robustness to changes in the empirical model specification within the 
justified theoretical framework. Nikolay Svetlov 
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3  Increasingly widespread land scarcity compared to the late 1990s is an 
important positive change creating preconditions of efficient resource al-
location. However, the estimations for 2003 show that the arable land 
shadow price growth was not caused by long-term processes that could 
be expected to persist under the absence of a purposeful land value policy. 
The lack of machinery has surpassed the problem of lack of sources of 
production cost financing, which was a central constraining factor of ag-
ricultural production in the first decade of market reforms in agriculture.  
4  Since an oligopolistic behaviour results in lower outputs and higher 
consumer prices compared to a profit-maximizing behaviour, this study 
suggests seeking institutional improvements that would allow lower 
transaction costs, easier access to market information and a more com-
petitive market environment. It should be noted that splitting existing 
production units can raise transaction costs instead of the expected posi-
tive impact on competitiveness. Alternatively, creating new farms, either 
corporate or family, due to capital inflow from other branches of the 
economy (for instance, from food processing enterprises lacking a re-
source base) might improve resource usage and increase competitiveness 
without a considerable negative influence on transaction costs. 
Future studies of corporate farms utility is justified by the following problems 
that remain unsolved. 
1  Although the variance of herd population utility proves that the difference 
of this utility component from zero is occasional, the uniform sign of this 
component within a year, as displayed in Table 3, suggests that in fact 
this utility component might be reliably different from zero, at least in 
some of the studied farms. It is important to provide a methodology that 
would allow identifying such farms. The possible significance of the 
herd population utility is also justified by the highly excessive (the excess 
is 2.07) empirical distribution of herd population utility. A theoretical base 
of possible significance for this utility component (at least for some 
farms) is a large time gap between making decisions about herd popula-
tion and its effect, which makes expectations regarding the future effec-
tiveness of milk production a noticeable factor of farm preferences. In 
this respect, the utility of herd population is a subject for more detailed 
study. 
2 The results of this study allow another interpretation: The monopoly or 
oligopoly of suppliers might hinder the ability of farms to control their 
costs. This reasoning is in line with a position of many Russian agrarian 
economists, who stress a much higher rate of farm input price growth in 
farms in the most appropriate way. Although the production patterns ap-
proach is simple and handy, the strict evidence that it perfectly facilitates 
throughout the set of farms. Finally, there exists the problem of a grouping Scarcity and preferences 
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technique which would reflect the availability of technologies to ported 
by the empirical model. Nevertheless, a detailed study of the relations 
between the studied farms and their suppliers seems to be necessary in 
order to ensure the validity of the foremost conclusion of this study. 
3 It is possible that the utility of short-term loans is not reliably homoge-
nous within the studied data sets. The factors that could influence it need 
a special study. One of the possible factors is the relation between banks 
and farms, which are not uniform throughout the set of farms. 
4 Finally, there exists the problem of a grouping technique which would 
reflect the availability of technologies to farms in the most appropriate 
way. Although the production patterns approach is simple and handy, the 
strict evidence that it perfectly facilitates the purpose it is engaged for is 
currently missing. Testing alternative grouping approaches is one more 
promising direction of future studies. 
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This article explores an issue which has been largely neglected in the 
explanation of land contract choice: Namely, what determines the choice 
between the sale and rent of land. The paper argues that it is not sufficient to 
look at transaction costs alone to understand farmers’ and landowners’ 
decisions, but that the "costs of exchange", i.e., the full opportunity costs 
connected with a contracting decision, must be taken into consideration. Thus, 
the impact of the additional benefits of land ownership (such as its function as 
insurance, storage of wealth, object for speculation and conveyor of status), 
which form one important element of decision-making, can be brought into the 
equation. The empirical investigation focuses on land contracting decisions of 
Polish family farms by analysing data from a survey, as well as three village 
case studies. The outcome is that farmers and landowners attach a high value to 
long-term security and the additional benefits of ownership, expressing a general 
preference to purchase and a reluctance to sell, respectively. Consequently, the 
land market is very tight and strongly contested. However, on the demand side 
there is also a strong influence against land purchase in the form of the high 
transaction costs involved in financing. 
Keywords: Land market, contract choice, costs of exchange, transaction costs, 
Poland. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The choice between various types of tenancy contracts is one of the classical 
questions for economists studying contract choice and has brought forward a 
substantial body of theories to explain why fixed rent, wage labour and share 
tenancy contracts coexist. Rental arrangements have, thus, been treated in great 
detail and with numerous variations in the assumptions about human behaviour 
and environmental conditions. But surprisingly few economists have included in 
their land contract theories the more fundamental question of what influences a 
land user’s or landowner’s decision between renting land in (in any form) or 
buying it or, respectively, renting it out or selling it. It is this imbalance which 
prompts HAYAMI and OTSUKA’s (1993, p. 177) statement that attempts to ex-
plain how the decision between different governance forms in land contracts 
"have so far been partial without considering the whole range of contract 
choice". 
In this article I attempt to adopt a broader view on the issue by identifying and 
discussing various aspects of farmers’ decision-making with respect to the ques-
tion of whether to opt for the sale or rental of land. Some insights as to possible 
factors of importance can be gained from the rental contract literature, such as 
the necessity of paying attention to transaction costs, properties of the transac-
tion and the separate choice process of landowners and buyers/tenants. The ar-
gument that credit restrictions may prevent farmers from buying land is also 
considered. Furthermore, the analysis pays attention to the additional functions 
that land performs (apart from being a factor of agricultural production) such as 
being a means of insurance and speculation as well as conveying power and 
identity. 
In trying to capture and evaluate these differing influences, I make use of the 
idea that it is the total "costs of exchange", defined by BENHAM and BENHAM 
(2001, p. 4) as "the opportunity cost faced by an individual to obtain a specified 
good using a given form of exchange within a given institutional setting", which 
form the basis of the contracting decision of farmers and landowners. Thus, I 
hope to be able to contribute to a more complete picture of contract choice in 
land transactions in line with the demand that "we have to broaden our perspec-
tive on contract choice" (HAYAMI and OTSUKA, 1993, p. 177).  
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section two elucidates the 
theoretical background by reviewing the most important arguments in the dis-
cussion of land contract choice and presenting the "costs of exchange" approach. 
The third section outlines the setting and methodology of the empirical investi-
gation carried out in Poland. Section four presents and discusses the results of 
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2 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The first part of this section briefly reviews the extensive literature on land 
rental. Furthermore, arguments on credit rationing, which is often considered to 
be the main obstacle for farmers seeking to buy land, are presented. Attention is 
also devoted to the notion that in addition to being a factor of production, land 
has other important functions. The second part of the section presents the theo-
retical concept used in this article to address the sale or rent question. It is based 
on the idea that the costs of exchange are the basis on which land contract 
choice is founded. 
2.1  Land rental contracts, credit rationing and additional functions of land 
ALLEN and LUECK (2002, p. 49) observe that "[o]ver the years economists have 
devoted an enormous effort examining the rationale for sharecropping"
1. The 
works are devoted to the question of what determines the choice between share 
tenancy, fixed wage and fixed rent contracts for land that cannot be cultivated by 
the owner alone. Sharecropping has long been believed to be an inefficient form 
of land cultivation, inferior to both fixed rent and fixed wage contracts because 
the tenant receives only a fraction of the marginal product of his labour and thus 
reduces his work effort if the landlord is unable to enforce work input (Marshal-
lian view, cf. HAYAMI and OTSUKA, 1993, pp. 34-39). The fact that share tenancy 
exists and persists despite this alleged inefficiency has motivated a number of 
theories that explain why and under which circumstances sharecropping can be 
an efficient arrangement. 
One set of explanations centres around various assumptions about the existence 
of risk and the attitudes towards it by tenant/worker and landlord, respectively 
(cf. CHEUNG, 1968; 1969). Other theories draw attention to the problem that 
work effort is not perfectly enforceable by taking into account transaction costs 
"broadly defined to include shirking, negotiation and enforcement costs due to 
both land and labour shirking" (TASLIM, 1992, p. 271) and costs due to the need 
for "specification and monitoring of output" (BARZEL, 1997, p. 49). These models 
explain contract choice either as a trade-off between risk-sharing and transaction 
costs (cf. CHEUNG 1969a; 1969b) or, assuming both parties' risk neutrality, as a 
minimisation of total transaction costs (cf. BARZEL, 1997; DATTA, O’HARA and 
NUGENT, 1986). Another group of models explains the selection of either fixed 
wage, fixed rent or sharecropping contracts with imperfections on other markets, 
such as credit (cf. LAFFONT and MATOUSSI, 1995) and labour (cf. RAY, 1999). 
ESWARAN and KOTWAL (1985) develop a double-sided moral hazard model fo-
cussing on the unmarketed inputs of labour supervision and management ability, 
which can only be obtained by involving the factor owner in the production 
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process. A fourth element considered is the use of contracts as screening instru-
ments, either for the landlord to gain knowledge on the abilities of ten-
ants/workers (cf. HALLAGAN, 1978) or for the tenant to gain information about 
land quality (cf. MURRELL, 1983). 
ALLEN and LUECK (1992) regard the duration and content of land lease contracts 
in Nebraska and South Dakota. They point out that low asset-specificity and low 
insecurity due to a well-developed body of common law and close intimate 
knowledge between the contracting parties combine to reduce transaction costs 
to very low levels in land rental contracts and make very simple, vague and 
short-term contracts possible. BECKMANN (2000, pp. 165-170), the only author 
reviewed here who includes sale contracts into his explanation, works along 
similar lines by picking out the transaction cost effect of site- and land-specific 
investments. He argues that the value and duration of such investments deter-
mine the choice between different duration periods of rental and sale contracts. 
As mentioned above, the focus of the models of contract choice presented lies 
almost exclusively on rental contracts, while the aspect of land sale is largely 
neglected. The most frequently used explanation as to why farmers would prefer 
renting in land over buying is taken from the discussion on credit rationing by 
banks, which suggests that small agricultural producers may face difficulties in 
financing land purchases. The phenomenon of credit rationing, explored by 
STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981), exists due to the fact that credit markets are charac-
terised by imperfect information since the lender (principal) cannot fully assess 
the riskiness of a borrower (agent). This agency situation results in adverse se-
lection because more risky borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates due 
to the reduced likelihood that they will repay the loan at all. Thus, banks use in-
terest rates as a screening devise to distinguish between high and low risk bor-
rowers and are unwilling to raise interest in case of excess demand, which re-
sults in credit markets not being cleared. Certain demanders, as a result, are 
credit constrained because they "cannot get the credit [they demand] at the pre-
vailing contract rate […] with the extent of the constraint given by the gap be-
tween the amount demanded and received" (BARHAM, BOUNCER and CARTER, 
1996, pp. 794f). BARHAM, BOUNCER and CARTER (1996) point out that credit 
rationing associated with excess demand is likely to be wealth-biased because 
the transaction costs of providing credit to smallholders are much higher than 
that of providing credit to wealthier borrowers. 
Where difficulties in financing and access to credit make land rental the preferable 
or the only feasible option for farmers seeking to increase their holdings, the 
problem may be intensified by disproportionately high land purchase prices. The 
reason for this price phenomenon is that land ownership offers advantages that go 
beyond the possibility of gaining income from cultivating the land. Thus, own 
land can serve as a means of accumulating wealth and transferring it between 
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for saving and transfer exist, e.g. when the rural population is cut off from or un-
familiar with the banking system. Furthermore, land provides the option to be 
used as collateral for loans, and property ownership may offer tax advantages, 
opportunities for speculation and security as an inflation hedge. Apart from 
these economic functions, land plays an important social role in that it can con-
vey high social status and political power and has an identity-giving meaning 
(cf. DEININGER and FEDER, 1998, pp. 1; 18; BARDHAN and UDRY, 1999, p. 61). 
All of these additional advantages are gained to their full extent only when land 
is actually owned, not when it is rented in. As a result, the special functions of 
land ownership are likely to become capitalised in land sale prices with the effect 
that they are higher than the capitalised rent (cf. BECKMANN, 2000, p.  171). 
Thus, even if farmers manage to obtain credit for land purchase, this loan can of-
ten not be repaid from agricultural profits alone, while rental payments for the 
same land could be met from this source. 
2.2  The costs of exchange 
Although the cropshare theories referred to above rely on different assumptions 
and focus on a variety of influencing factors and conditions, they can be found 
to contain one main, shared argument. This most frequently explored aspect is 
that the desire to minimise transaction costs plays a major role in farmers’ and 
landowners’ decision-making, which suggests that Transaction Costs Economics 
(TCE), with its focus on insecurity, asset-specificity and frequency as the most 
important sources of transaction costs, is a potent theoretical approach to be 
employed in the explanation of contract choice. 
Another crucial point underscored in many contributions to the sharecropping 
literature is the need to regard the contract choice calculation from the side of 
landowners and that of tenants separately, because each acts according to his 
own preferences and factors of influence. Agreements, however, will only come 
into existence in a certain form if this is favourable for both parties. The need for 
a differentiated analysis of the behaviour of both transaction partners applies 
similarly in the case of the choice between sale and rental contracts and is an 
important element in the theoretical approach and empirical investigation in this 
article. 
With respect to transaction costs, I choose to follow the rather restrictive classi-
fication of FURUBOTN and RICHTER (1998, p. 43f.), who differentiate between 
market transaction costs, managerial transaction costs and political transaction 
costs. Within the market transaction costs category, costs are further divided ac-
cording to the sort of activity within the contracting process on the markets that 
causes them, creating the groups of search and information costs, bargaining 
and decision costs and supervision and enforcement costs. For the topic of this 
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argument within the transaction cost framework by considering the costs that 
arise during the process of demanding credit and supervising agreements. 
BENHAM and BENHAM (2001, p. 4) stress that the measurement of transaction 
costs poses a problem since there exists a difficulty in differentiating transaction 
costs from the costs of the good itself: "Estimation is problematic because pro-
duction and transaction costs are jointly determined" (cf. also BECKMANN, 2000, 
pp. 39-42). In order to overcome both this and the transaction cost measurement 
problem, they propose a related measure for costs, referred to as "costs of ex-
change", which represents the full opportunity costs of an individual’s choice, 
i.e., the price of the good itself and the transaction costs the actor incurs in ob-
taining the good. 
I employ the "costs of exchange" concept as inspiration in the context of this in-
vestigation because I am convinced that it can be used to capture many aspects 
of farmers’ and landowners’ calculations in land market decision-making that 
are extremely important and cannot be explained by Transaction Cost Economics 
alone. The original idea of BENHAM and BENHAM (2001) is slightly extended in 
this work for two reasons demanded by the subject matter. First, due to the fact 
that the issue addressed here concerns a resource and factor of production, while 
the original approach only explicitly addresses the market for goods and ser-
vices, the sources for opportunity costs considered have to be widened. Thus, in 
order to arrive at the total costs of exchange in a land transaction, the "worth" of 
the additional functions of land ownership must be taken into account by re-
versing them into the opportunity costs of not attaining or losing ownership. 
Second, since this article sets out to study the choices of both those demanding 
and those supplying land, while BENHAM and BENHAM (2001) consider only 
costs for obtaining a good for the demand side, two independent cost calcula-
tions must be regarded here. 
On the demand side, the costs of exchange for purchase (p) or renting in (ri) on 
land markets are assumed to be composed of three elements. These are the 
(rental or purchase) price of land, the transaction costs (TC) connected with the 
transaction and the other opportunity costs created by the exchange: 
Costs of exchangep,ri  = Land price p,ri  + TC p,ri  + other opportunity costs p,ri 
As stated above, the transaction costs of demanders may include, among other 
things, the expenditures connected with financing a possible land purchase. 
Among other opportunity costs are the benefits forgone by making the contracting 
choice. Thus, a farmer who rents in instead of buying loses the opportunity to 
gain, for example, the insurance or speculation function of one's own land. A 
farmer who buys does not have these costs directly, but the purchase price he 
pays may reflect some of them and be high in comparison to rent. Furthermore, 
there is another aspect connected with credit and financing contained in the 
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strongly in purchase – faces the opportunity costs connected with not having in-
vested his money in an altogether different area. 
For the supply side, the calculation of the costs of exchange when selling (s) or 
renting out (ro) contains only the elements of transaction costs and other oppor-
tunity costs: 
Costs of exchanges, ro = TC s, ro + other opportunity costs s, ro 
The other opportunity costs, here, are of a complex nature because they include 
not only the costs of the loss of additional functions of land ownership in the 
case of sale, but also capture forgone opportunities with respect to price as well 
as the investment of money received in case of sale. Thus, if land is rented out 
and the capitalised rent does not equal the price alternatively gained through 
sale, the difference must be counted as an element of opportunity costs. This 
shows that, even within the category of other opportunity costs, landowners 
must weigh two positions of costs against each other in order to establish their 
costs of exchange. It should be pointed out that the term "costs of exchange" is 
slightly misleading here, since the calculations presented above also represent 
the "costs of non-exchange", i.e., the costs encountered when the demand or 
supply side do not carry out any land transactions. 
A final word should be dedicated to the role of the institutional environment. 
Quite obviously, both legal regulations (e.g. by granting tax exemptions or 
preferential credit in the case of purchase) and informal norms and customs 
(e.g. by establishing higher esteem for purchase than rental) can have a consi-
derable effect on the costs of sale and rent. The reason why the institutional set-
ting is not explicitly included as a factor in the cost calculations, despite this un-
doubted influence, is that most of its consequences for the costs of exchange are 
in fact already captured in the existing categories price, TC and other opportu-
nity costs. 
3 EMPIRICAL SETTING AND METHODOLOGY 
The empirical investigation was carried out in Poland, in two structurally different 
areas representing the contrast between a prosperous region and one that has 
fallen behind in agricultural and general economic development. The first area, 
the territory of the former voivodship Poznan in western Poland, is characterised 
by a diversified and dynamic economy with an important share of industrial out-
put, and by agricultural production in individual family farms larger than the na-
tional average and with some degree of specialisation. The second area, the for-
mer voivodship Sieradz in central Poland, shows relatively poor general eco-
nomic performance and a dominance of rather small and unspecialised family 
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The empirical study draws on two sources of information: The first is a survey 
of farms where quantitative data was collected, while the second source is three 
village case studies that yielded qualitative data. The timeframe covered in both 
sources are the years since the system change in Poland in 1989. 
The survey data, which contains observations on 111 family farms in the 
voivodship Poznan and 110 in the voivodship Sieradz, was collected as part of 
the larger research project KATO in 1999
2. The survey data covers general as-
pects of farm structure, production and inputs and was analysed by means of 
simple descriptive statistical procedures. 
The three village case studies were carried out in autumn and winter 2003, with 
two being conducted in the Poznan region (villages referred to as P1 and P2 in 
the following) and one in the Sieradz region (referred to as S). P1 is a village 
composed mainly of commercially-oriented family farms that are rather large by 
Polish standards, (farms where interviews took place comprised, on average, 
26 ha) and which specialise in pig rearing and arable production, including sugar 
beet and vegetables. A production cooperative exists in the village and has been 
losing members – and with them their land – as well as selling off its own land 
since 1989. P2 is a neighbouring village of P1, where large family farms (average 
33 ha, specialised as in P1) coexist with a commercial Spanish enterprise that 
bought and rented land during the privatisation of the former local state farm 
and which produces asparagus and strawberries. The specialisation of farms is 
similar to the situation in P1. S is a village consisting only of private family 
farms, which are rather small (average 14 ha) and in most cases unspecialised.  
In the three villages, as many family farmers and private landowners as possible 
were interviewed (altogether, 37 interviews were carried out) with a question-
naire composed of open-ended questions based on a manual that addressed 
various areas of land market activity. For the analysis of case study data, a 
transaction databank was produced that contained information on every land 
transaction carried out by the interviewed farmers/landowners detailing the type 
of transaction (sale/rent), the transaction partner, the reason for carrying out the 
transaction, the time and effort involved in closing the transaction, etc. 
4 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
The discussion of results is divided into three subsections. The first focuses on 
the credit rationing argument with respect to the Polish case; it draws mainly on 
evidence gained from studies on the situation of rural financial markets in Poland 
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and extracts possible impacts on the choice between sale and rent. In the second 
subsection, the survey data is analysed. General trends in the land purchase/sale 
and renting in/renting out behaviour of farmers and landowners are shown and 
initial explanations for these observations proposed. Subsection three goes 
deeper into investigating the rationale behind decisions through evidence gained 
in the case studies. In doing so, it focuses on the impact of different elements of 
the costs of exchange, i.e., transaction costs, price and other opportunity costs on 
the demand for land, as well as the land supply side. 
4.1  Evidence for the credit argument 
There is ample evidence that Polish farmers face the problem of being credit 
constrained and also encounter additional difficulties concerning borrowing. 
While my own work yields few insights into the functioning of the Polish credit 
market and farmers’ borrowing behaviour, it draws on important results from re-
search on these topics by the WORLD BANK (2001), PETRICK (2002; 2004), 
PETRICK and LATRUFFE (2003) and LATRUFFE (2004). All of these studies, how-
ever, look at credit access in general, and not specifically for the purpose of land 
purchase. 
To briefly summarise, the information gained through these detailed analyses of 
the Polish rural credit market is that credit rationing and high borrowing costs 
are likely to have the effect of making it difficult and sometimes even impossible 
for farmers to borrow money in order to make investments. Small farmers are 
especially affected by this situation. Together with limited household savings 
and the rare occurrence of informal lending that the studies report, this situation 
could be expected to influence the decision of Polish farmers towards land rental 
rather than purchase, since renting land does not require access to large amounts 
of money at once and saves the related high expenditures due to transaction 
costs. 
4.2  Results from the analysis of survey data 
A first look at observations from the survey data on family farms in Poznan and 
Sieradz seems to support this assumption insofar as renting is found to be much 
more important for increases in family farm sizes between 1989 and 1998 than 
purchase. Thus, the amount of farms' owned land has grown by +0.28  ha 
(+0.40 ha for Poznan and +0,16 ha for Sieradz) and the amount of rented land by 
1.11 ha (1.99 ha for Poznan and 0.24 ha for Sieradz). However, these numbers 
have to be regarded bearing in mind that they do not provide any information on 
the question of whether the driving force behind the higher incidence of rental 
over sale transactions is, indeed, the demand side, or is, in fact, the supply side 
of the market. Interestingly, the source of the majority of rented land is other 
private farmers, while the privatisation agency AWRSP plays a very limited 
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farmers have not only increased their holdings to a much larger degree, but have 
also achieved a higher proportion of this increase through renting land in than 
have their counterparts in Sieradz. 
In the survey, predominantly active farmers were interviewed, while very few 
individuals who gave up farming and sold or rented out their whole estate were 
included. The possibility of gaining information on the decision-making of land-
owners who want to stop farming is limited, but some clues can be taken from 
the answers to a question that asks farmers about their future plans for land mar-
ket activities. The results confirm the generally higher level of (planned) activity 
in the Poznan region, as in Sieradz, 71 % of all farmers do not plan any transac-
tions against only 56 % in Poznan. For the rental market, there is a uniform 
trend in the whole sample, and both regions, that the supply of land for rent will 
be higher than the demand (in number of transactions) if the planned activities 
are realised. With respect to the sales market, the overall situation is exactly the 
opposite: Demand to buy will be higher than the willingness to sell. Notably, 
this discrepancy is very strong in Poznan, but reversed in Sieradz, where plans 
to sell are more common than to buy. 
Table 1:  Perception of problems in land purchase and rental 
  Whole sample 
(n=221)  Poznan (n=111)  Sieradz (n=110) 
Problem


















No land on offer in the 
area 
3 4 2 3 4 5 
Purchase/rental price 
too high 
3 4 3 3 3 4 
Too  many  competitors  4 4 4 4 5 5 
Difficulties in obtaining 
information 
5 5 5 5 5 5 
Personal contacts to 
key persons needed 
5 5 5 5 5 5 
Lack of legal titles, le-
gal insecurity 
5 5 5 5 5 5 
Lack of capital/renting 
in does not make sense 
2 2 2 3 2 2 
Source:  Own presentation based on KATO survey data. 
Notes: 
a Evaluated on a scale of 1=very big problem, 2=big problem, 3=some problem, 
4=relatively unproblematic, 5=no problem. 
Interestingly, this information does not fit with the idea that the land demand 
side is generally discouraged from wanting to purchase by the problem of credit 
rationing or lack of access to financing. It shows that a large number of farmers is 
interested in buying despite these difficulties and that the share of those planning 
to buy is substantially higher than those planning to rent in. On the supply side, Buying or renting in? Selling or renting out?  195
the situation is less clear, as Poznan landowners favour the option of renting out 
over selling, while their Sieradz counterparts have a strong preference for selling. 
It is possible that these numbers reflect the particularly poor economic situation 
of some of the generally smaller Sieradz farms, as well as the demographic fac-
tor that Sieradz farmers in the sample are, on average, older than farmers from 
Poznan. The findings indicate that in Sieradz, the reasons for few sales of land 
may be the demand side (possible influenced by difficult access to financing) 
rather than the supply side. 
Table 1 presents the perceptions of the respondents concerning problems ex-
pected when carrying out land purchase and land rental transactions. Considering 
the land market from the perspective of the (potential) land demand side, it sup-
ports the assumption of a better position of demanders on rental than on sales 
markets, because problems with respect to lack of land on offer are considered 
less severe when wanting to rent in than when wanting to buy. This perception 
applies to both sample sections as well as the whole. The observations on diffi-
culties with prices point in the same direction, since, according to market logic, 
higher prices indicate greater scarcity and the perception that "prices are too 
high" is stronger in purchase than rental. The numbers underscore that sale and 
rental markets are more actively contested in Poznan than in Sieradz – in fact the 
discrepancy of two points each in "no land offered" is remarkably high. This is 
in accordance with the information of greater willingness to sell and rent out 
than buy and rent in in Sieradz. A lack of capital is evaluated as the greatest 
problem of all in land purchase transactions, which supports the validity of the 
studies quoted above, which find problems concerning financing, credit rationing 
and access to capital in Poland. 
4.3  Results from the analysis of case study data 
Figure 1 provides a summary of the reasons that were mentioned in the case 
study interviews by landowners on the one hand, and buyers/tenants on the 
other, as determinants in their choice between sale and rent of land. In order to 
make sense of this information within the costs of exchange approach, I will dif-
ferentiate the elements according to the cost category they represent. 
As far as transaction costs are concerned, they play a major role and may even 
be prohibitively high where the costs of access to financing are regarded. It is 
remarkable, however, that as far as the search for and bargaining with the other 
side of the transaction are concerned, transaction costs differences between sale 
and rent are not mentioned, and, thus, do not seem to have a strong influence. 
The costs that accrue after rental contracts are closed, e.g. for the supervision, 
enforcement and adjustment of contracts, appear equally low and largely irrele-
vant for decision-making. The main reason for this finding is likely that insecu-
rity and the danger of opportunistic behaviour are rather low in the studied cases 
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setting (cf. HURRELMANN, 2004; ALLEN and LUECK, 1992). As a result, transac-
tion cost differences between sale and rent that are caused by impacts other than 
financial difficulties are so small for both suppliers and demanders that they are 
negligible in explaining contract choice between sale and rent. 
The land price is of importance since a sales price that is considered "too high" 
can prevent purchase. Unfortunately, the role of prices in general remains shadowy 
since it is hard to establish whether and to what extent other benefits are cap-
tured in land prices. This could concern the additional functions of land gained 
through ownership, which would increase sales prices. It could also reflect the 
meaning of rental as passing land into temporal use and care for a transitory pe-
riod (e.g. until heirs are willing to take over the farm), which would suppress 
rental prices. The discrepancies between the often merely symbolic prices for 
rental and the substantial prices for sale suggest that such an effect is present, 
but the current work is unable to specify it in detail.  










Source: Own  presentation. 
Most of the factors mentioned as decisive for decision-making come from the 
category of other opportunity costs. On the demand side, the security provided 
by land ownership for current and future production, as well as investments in 
the enterprise, is valued very highly by the respondents. Generally, the advan-
tages of ownership are believed to outweigh the connected difficulties of access 
to finance and relatively high prices to be paid in sales transactions. Another rea-
son for buying is that own land increases the status of a farmer much more than 
rented land. For suppliers, very strong reasons against selling are the desire to 
keep the insurance function provided by own land in case the economic condition 
of the family declines, the storage function that allows wealth in the form of 
property to be passed on and the speculation function that allows them to wait for 
higher land prices in the future. Even old landowners who give up production 





Urgent need for money 
No heirs present or heirs not 
interested in land 
Expectation of rising land prices
Desire to pass on stored wealth
in form of land








Desire for planning security in 
agricultural production and 
investment 
Desire for high status as landowner 
No means of financing (access to
credit or own savings)
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afraid of losing these additional benefits connected with land ownership. Oppor-
tunity costs that suggest selling, in contrast, are the consequences of not receiving 
money when it is urgently needed in a difficult financial situation, or being stuck 
with an estate when it is clear that no heir is present or interested in taking over 
the farm. 
These insights are in line with the two main observations extracted from the sur-
vey data; namely, that sale markets are more contested than rental markets and 
that the degree of contest on sale markets is lower in Sieradz than in Poznan. 
Responsibility for the first point is attributed to the extreme import of the oppor-
tunity costs, which speak in favour of land ownership. This holds for both the 
demand and the supply side, leading to the situation that landowners are reluc-
tant to sell their land, while active farmers prefer purchase over renting in. The 
result of this is a sales market with excess demand, making land purchase diffi-
cult for farmers, and a rental market with excess supply, forcing landowners to 
offer favourable conditions to tenants. On the whole, sale and rental prices do 
not seem to fully internalise these conditions and do not, therefore, produce 
balanced markets with matching demand and supply. The differences between 
the two studied regions can be explained through the poorer economic condi-
tions of farms in Sieradz, which serves to reduce demand for land purchase since 
small farms have particular problems with access to finance and increasing land 
sales, since many farmers urgently need the money to meet current expenses or 
pay debts. This leads to the situation that the imbalance between demand and 
supply on the sales market in Sieradz is less pronounced than in the more affluent 
Poznan. Interestingly, the effect is not mirrored in higher demand on Sieradz’s 
rental market, which can be attributed to the scepticism in this area that "renting 
does not make sense". It is likely that the frequent inability of farmers to buy 
and the non-acceptance of renting in as an alternative in Sieradz is one factor 
contributing to the generally lower level of transaction activities than in Poznan.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The study presented in this article shows that the choice between sale and rent of 
land is a complex decision, involving a comparison of different kinds of costs 
and benefits accruing from contracting alternatives – and this is not only calcu-
lated according to current, but also future developments, states of production 
and needs of the family. Although the abundant literature on rental contract 
choice provides some clues for answering the question of what influences the 
sale versus rent decision, it alone is not able to provide a satisfactory answer. 
This is mainly because land ownership conveys special advantages that do not 
exist in rental but form an extremely important element of decision-making in 
the issue regarded here. Furthermore, financial aspects that play a peripheral role 
in rental decisions are of crucial importance where sale is regarded, which Annette Hurrelmann  198 
makes it necessary to devote attention to the transaction cost effect of access to 
capital. In order to adequately consider all these aspects, it was decided to regard 
the contracting decisions of landowners and farmers as a result of the attempt to 
minimise the total costs of exchange, i.e., the full opportunity costs caused by 
the actor’s choice of a particular contract. This measure allowed the study to 
take account of the fact that transaction costs form only one factor in the calcula-
tions of landowners and buyers/tenants, and that land price effects, as well as the 
benefits resulting from different contracts – or, formulated in a cost-framework, 
the opportunity costs of not making another kind of contract – also play a role. 
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THE ORGANISATION OF BUYER – SUPPLIER RELATIONS IN THE 
FOOD CHAIN: THE CASE OF THE GERMAN FRUIT PROCESSING 





Procurement in the German fruit processing industry has been characterized by 
an uncertain supply situation and rising costs for years. Berries processed for 
canned products, jam and fruit preparation for the dairy industry are almost ex-
clusively imported from the CEEC, in particular from Poland. The cultivation of 
berries in Poland is characterized by strong fluctuations in yield, acreage and 
prices, which affects procurement costs. Vertical contractual agreements can 
substantially reduce these fluctuations. In principle, Polish farmers are interested 
in co-operating with the processing industry. One prerequisite for successful, 
ongoing co-operation is the well-balanced distribution of risks and risk premiums 
between the farmer and processor. This is necessary because berry production is 
characterised by a high initial investment, an unproductive first year (or years) 
of cultivation and a long pay-off period. 
Keywords: Poland, Germany, berries, processing industry, organisational ar-
rangements. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Germany’s degree of self sufficiency in berry fruits for processing has traditionally 
been extremely low; estimates range from 1 % to 5 % depending on the sort. 
Berries processed for canned products, jam and fruit preparation for the dairy 
industry are almost exclusively imported from the CEEC, in particular from Po-
land. Since the end of the 1980s, supply and prices have heavily fluctuated due 
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to problems in the transition processes of these economies, especially institu-
tional and organisational failures such as lack of market information, breakdown 
of former state-owned marketing boards and large-scale berry production, uncer-
tain contract performance by small-scale, often part-time farmers. The reasons 
for varying quantity and prices are seen, on the one hand, in missing cultivation 
contracts and co-operation between farmers and processing, and on the other 
hand in the short-term-orientated procurement function of the processing industry 
(SWIETLIK, 2004; GALIZZI and VENTURINI, 1999). A close and long-term co-
operation makes the realization of capability and cost potential possible 
(HARTMANN, 1994). A requirement for this, however, is a suitable co-operation 
plan, with a well-balanced distribution of risks and risk premiums, which pro-
vides efficient incentives for the participants involved (FISCHER, 1993).  
The study thereby concentrates on the market transactions between Polish pro-
ducers and the German fruit processing industry, as Poland is the largest supplier 
of berries for the German processing industry. Since vertical contractual co-
operation still rarely occurs in the processing industry, the specific production 
conditions for berries are pointed out, as are those conducive to a durable verti-
cal co-operation. In addition, this study provides a missing overview of the mar-
ket structures of the German fruit processing industry and of the Polish berry 
market. 
2 METHODS 
The lack of statistical data regarding berry industry procurements and finished 
products prevents a precise overview of the processing industry. However, con-
clusions from available official and unofficial information, from personal inter-
views of parties involved in the production-marketing system and from expert 
opinions of food technologists familiar with the sector allow the description of 
market structures and provide valuable information on business relations be-
tween the fruit processing industry and farmers. In addition, 10 in-depth inter-
views were held with representatives of Polish co-operations. Due to the com-
plexity of the problem, a qualitative research design was deemed appropriate. 
The results were qualitatively evaluated using organizational-theoretical ap-
proaches, in particular behavioural scientific approaches. The organisation of buyer – Supplier relations in the food chain  203
3 MARKET STRUCTURES AND GENERAL INFORMATION 
REGARDING THE PROCUREMENT AND CULTIVATION OF BERRIES 
Poland produces, on average, about 500,000 tonnes of berries per year, over 
70 % of which are sold to the processing industry. Poland is the major supplier 
of berries for the German processing industry. 
3.1  Fruit processing industry in Germany 
The value of production of canned fruits, jam and fruit preparations amounted, 
in 2002, to about 1.1 b. EUR; scarcely half of this amount was finished products 
from berries. The market for processed fruit products is oligopolistic. Due to 
structural transformations, the number of individual manufacturers of jam and 
canned fruits has fallen in recent years, to approximately 28 in 2002 (BOGK, 
2002; WERNER, 2000). Two large manufacturers comprise approximately 70 % 
of the jam market, which points to a large concentration of buying power in rela-
tion to farmers. Fruit preparations are produced by only 10 large enterprises, the 
output of which is approximately as high as the production of jams and canned 
fruits. The highest quality of fruit is needed to produce canned fruits, whereas 
fruit preparations are subject to less restrictive quality requirements. Further in-
vestigation into the product assortments of the three categories reveals that in 
terms of quantity, approximately 15 %, 55 %, and 65 % of the total production 
of canned fruits, jam and fruit preparations, respectively, contains berries as in-
put material. Total supply needs are estimated to be approximately 130,000 tons 
per year, made up of 40 % strawberries and 20 % raspberries (SCHMIDT and 
MAACK, 2001). Of the berries processed, 9 %, 47 %, and 44 % goes to the can-
ning industry, jam, and fruit preparations, respectively. The costs for berries in 
berry-containing cans, jam, and fruit preparations accounts for 34 %, 32 %, and 
28  %, respectively, of the unit price for finished products, emphasising the 
strong dependency on berry prices (Figure 1). This is especially true with respect 
to canned fruits, for which quality requirements are much higher than for other 
product categories; berries of high quality get a higher premium in years of short 
supply. Figure 1: Reveals one additional fact pertaining to the competitive posi-
tion of the industry: Combining the time series of the cost/shares breakdown 
with the time series of the import unit value of berries shows a significant posi-
tive correlation (the coefficients of determination were 0.73, 0.96, and 0.86 for 
cans, jam and fruit preparations, respectively). Clearly, the industry is not able to 
shift price increases to consumers, whereas price reductions are shifted to the 
demand side without any time lag. This situation corresponds to the well-known 
countervailing power of the food retailing system in Germany, and again con-
firms that the industry is highly vulnerable to price and supply fluctuations. The 
importance of supply shortages is readily apparent when a company is not able Kai Maack  204 
to provide finished products in terms of the quantity and price demanded; it 
will inevitably be excluded from the supplier list, and it is extremely hard to 
re-establish such business relations. 
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Source: BOGK;  SCHMIDT and MAACK, 2001; IERiGZ and own calculations. 
Note:  
1) No dates available.  
For technical and logistic reasons, the industry mainly uses frozen berries, the 
share of which amounts to about 90 % of all processed berries, and of which Po-
land is by far the largest supplier. The share of Polish frozen strawberries 
amounted, in the last 10 years, to between 60 % and 70 %, and in individual 
years even to about 80 % (Figure 2). Imports increased, from about 30,000 tons 
in 1990 to 70,000 tons in 2003, which is justified mainly by the increased need 
in producing fruit preparations. These figures confirm the high degree of de-
pendency of the processing industry on the supply of berries as a raw material. The organisation of buyer – Supplier relations in the food chain  205
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Source: GUS;  SCHMIDT and MAACK, 2001; IERiGZ and own calculations. 
3.2  Fruit processing industry in Poland 
The food industry is one of the most important sectors of the Polish economy in 
terms of the volume of production sold (over 20 % of total sales value), number 
of industrial establishments (about 30,000) and employment (411,000 people, 
i.e., 8.4 % of total national employment, and about 16 % of total industrial em-
ployment). Fruit and vegetable processing is extremely dispersed and currently 
includes between 1,400 and 1,500 processing plants. About 90 % of the process-
sing plants are small and employ between 1-50 people. The proportion of large 
processing companies is about 5 % of the total number of processing plants. 
Since the majority of berries are imported frozen, the Polish freezers play a par-
ticularly important role. Since 1989, the centrally-planned and owned Polish 
food processing industry has been successfully privatized, and foreign compa-
nies have majority ownership in nearly all sectors of the Polish food industry. 
The processing industry significantly gained during these political changes. Tra-
ditional fruit and vegetable processing in Poland is characterized by a small 
structure (BWA, 2002). The food processing sector is becoming more concentra-
ted as less efficient companies close down. In the Polish cold freezing industry, 
about 200 enterprises are active, of which fewer than 100 enterprises freeze fruit – 
a figure with a decreasing tendency (SCHWIERZ, 2000). Growth in the Polish food 
processing sector, through improved technology and production quality, is ham-
pered by serious problems, including: Shortage of domestic capital; an unstable Kai Maack  206 
raw material base in the case of many industrial establishments (loss of contract 
links with raw material suppliers); lack of strong processors' groups; crop dis-
persion; the lack of cold storage, and the lack of a homogenous quality of raw 
materials. The structural differences between the Polish food economy and the 
European Union are significant, and convergence will take many years (BWA, 
2002). 
3.3  Structure of the Polish berry production 
After the political transformation, fruit production did not experience drastic 
changes as state-owned enterprises became private, in contrast to industry and 
trade. This was because of the low share, about 20 %, of state-owned enterprises 
in fruit production. Also, the agricultural production cooperatives which were 
created by order of the communist government never became as important as in 
most other CEEC. In 1988, 2,086 agricultural production cooperatives were 
farming 2.8 % of the arable land and had 177,000 members. Their productivity 
was, to some extent, comparable to that of state farms, although usually slightly 
higher, as a few aspects of private ownership were maintained. Besides these 
production-oriented cooperatives, there were four distinct types of "coopera-
tives" in the communist period: Peasant self-aid supply and marketing coopera-
tives, dairy cooperatives, horticultural co-operatives and agricultural coopera-
tives (KOWALAK, 1993). The objective of these cooperatives was closer to the 
principles of a real cooperative. Though the members could not freely decide 
under the communist regime, the support/marketing functions of these coopera-
tives were useful. For Polish berry production, horticulture cooperatives were 
the most important association. In 1988, 140 horticulture cooperatives produced 
fruits and vegetables and had a very strong position on the home market (about 
50 % of the total turnover) (KOWALAK, 1993), and affiliated 372,600 individual 
farm owners producing fruit, vegetables and honey. Their main function was to 
market fruit, vegetables and honey produced by their members and to supply 
member farms with inputs and special services. They also rendered consulting 
services, and organized training courses for members and employees, as well as 
exhibitions. These co-operatives employed 55,500 persons, owned and ran 6,500 
shops, over 1,100 fruit and vegetable collection points and 210 processing 
plants. Their specialized foreign trade enterprise had a virtual monopoly on the 
export of fruit, vegetables and honey. The communist regime also violated the 
abiding principles of cooperatives in a number of ways, such as the imperative 
of meeting central-planning objectives which in essence eliminated the right of 
cooperatives to make their own decisions. After the beginning of transition in 
1989, the impact of these cooperatives fell and thus, so did interest in being their 
member. Unlike other cooperatives, the horticultural cooperatives did not estab-
lish a national organisation to take over the advisory and other functions from 
the Central Union. In 2000, the number of members dropped to 90,000 with a The organisation of buyer – Supplier relations in the food chain  207
market share of only 8 %. But besides the old form of co-operations, new forms 
were established, which are usually engaged in very basic activities, i.e., collecting 
and marketing (VAN BEKKUM and SCHILTHUIS, 1999).  
Table 1:  Number of Polish farms producing berries (2002) 
  Total Up to 1ha  1-2  2-5  5-10  10-15  15-20  20-30 
Currants 82000  75000  1400  2000  621  160  50  89 
Raspberries  50000  48000  1600  400  - - - - 
Strawberries 196000 99000 77000 13000  5000  1700  200  100 
 
Source: MAKOSZ, 2004. 
Because of the great share of private land, the greatly-dispersed structures of land 
and crop rotation remained largely unchanged. Of about 800,000 farms, more than 
90 % cultivate under one hectare and only about 2,000 enterprises own modern 
plants (MAKOSZ, 2003). Strawberries were produced on about 195,000 farms, 
Currants on 80,000, and raspberries on about 50,000 (MAKOSZ, 2004). Many of 
these small-sized farms cultivate the berries for their own use, with occasional 
sales. The border between self-sufficiency and market production is very low. 
Additionally, the share of medium-sized enterprises with on-site cold-storage is 
becoming larger (ELLINGER, 2003a). Besides the cultivation of apples and sour 
cherries, the cultivation of berries plays, with a share of about 40 % of the entire 
fruit cultivated area, an important part. In particular, the cultivation of strawber-
ries (with 40-50 %) black currants (30-40 %) and raspberries (approx. 15 %) 
dominate the cultivation of berries. About 60 % of fruit production goes into 
processing and 20-30 % of the total production is sold to hypermarkets or di-
rectly to retail shops. Up to 10 % of the berries are bought directly by consumers 
on the farm, and street-trading is of great importance (BWA, 2002). Polish ana-
lysts expect exports of fresh products to increase further in the next 3-5 years 
as Polish farmers increase production of table varieties. 
The structure of fruit cultivating farms crucially affects marketing. Large-sized 
farms sell their berries directly to the processing industry; small-sized farms de-
liver their berries to a collecting point. Usually, in each larger region cultivating 
berries a collecting point exists to which the fruits are delivered once a day during 
harvest. The collecting points are organized either by traders or freezing compa-
nies. Afterwards the fresh berries will be frozen and stored in cold- storage de-
pots and sold to the processing industry during the year. Delivery to the collecting 
point usually takes place without previous arrangements. Kai Maack  208 
Table 2:  Structure of berry production in Poland
1)
  1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  2002  2003
Strawberries 
Acreage  1,000 ha  61  41 61 54 50 53 58 62  66  38  35
Yield  t/ha  3,3  3,1 3,5 3,4 3,1 2,9 3,1 2,8  3,7  4,0  3,3
Producer price: Processing  Zl/Kg  1,01  2,44 0,91 1,11 1,81 3,15 2,02 1,44  0,96  2,02  3,80
Producer price: Fresh market  
2 Zl/Kg  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 2,00 3,50 2,30 1,80  3,00  2,50  3,50
Production  1,000 t  200  142 211 181 163 150 178 171  242  153  115
Export  1,000 t  106  96 95 136 122 99 84 105  148  144  95
fresh  1,000 t  17  14 21 22 15 15 12 11  21  17  14
frozen  1,000 t  89  82 73 114 107 84 72 93  127  127  81
Export content  %  53  68 45 75 75 66 47 61  61  94  82
Raspberries 
Acreage  1,000 ha  10  10 12 13 13 13 13 13  13  13  15
Yield  t/ha  3,3  2,9 3,3 2,9 3,2 3,5 3,4 3,4  3,5  3,3  2,7
Producer price: Processing  Zl/Kg  1,68  3,66 3,45 1,32 1,21 2,60 1,80 2,50  2,00  2,80  2,9
Producer price: Fresh market  Zl/Kg  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,80 2,80 2,50 3,20  3,00  3,20  3,4
Production  1,000 t  32  30 40 36 40 45 43 40  45  45  43
Export  1,000 t  32  26 28 34 34 32 34 39  29  30  42
fresh  1,000 t  17  14 16 20 21 20 13 18  17  17  23
frozen  1,000 t  15  12 12 15 13 12 21 20  12  13  19
Export content  %  100  87 71 95 83 71 80 98  64  66  97
Black Currents 
Acreage  1,000 ha  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 30 23 23  25  30  n.a.
Yield  t/ha  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4,3 4,5 4,4  5,1  3,7  n.a.
Producer price: Processing  Zl/Kg  0,17  0,41 1,00 0,85 0,80 2,90 3,50 3,80  2,00  1,60  n.a.
Production  1,000 t  122  100 75 115 82 108 96 93  110  90  n.a.
Export  1,000 t  29  31 30 44 47 54 45 59  76  52  n.a.
fresh  1,000 t  8  7 10 15 11 11 14 21  20  13  n.a.
frozen  1,000 t  21  25 20 21 27 19 23 19  20  17  n.a.
concentrate  
3  1,000 t  n.a.  n.a. n.a. 9 10 23 9 19  36  23  n.a.
Export content  %  24  31 40 39 58 50 47 63  69  58  n.a. 
Source:  GUS; IERiGZ and own calculations. 
Notes: 
1) Prices are in Zlotys: 2003 – 100 EUR = 439.78 Zlotys;  
   2) In 2 Kg basket, weighted averaged price; 
3) Converted in fresh berries: 1 Kg con 
    centrate = 6.5 Kg fresh black currants. 
•  Strawberries: The cultivation of strawberries shows strong fluctuations 
(Table 2). The cultivated area changed markedly, often within a short 
time, between 40,000 and 65,000 ha, with strong yield fluctuations. 
Profitability varies sharply from year to year. The degree of cost cove-
rage varies from 40  % to 170  % (ELLINGER, 2003a). Interviews and 
surveys of industry experts and food technologists revealed that straw-
berries have special requirements for processing in terms of colour, tex-
ture, aroma and flavour. According to the findings, the ideal and almost 
exclusively-used variety is ‘senga sengana’. This variety is characterized 
by low yields, small fruits and a low resistance to diseases. The average 
yield of 3-4 t/ha is very low in comparison to German yields (10t/ha). 
As ‘senga sengana’ is replaced on the market by new, more productive 
varieties, its share of the entire acreage of strawberries has fallen in the 
last 5 years from 80 to about 60 %. There has been increased interest in 
the cultivation of fresh market varieties like ‘Elsanta’. Polish farmers The organisation of buyer – Supplier relations in the food chain  209
are aware that fresh table varieties attract higher prices and could in-
crease the profitability of their operations (SWIETLIK, 2004). 
•  Raspberries: The cultivation of raspberries has stabilized in the recent 
years. In the high-price years of 1994 and 1995, cultivation expanded 
by around 30 %. However, in the following years, low prices provided 
consistent acreage of about 13,000 ha. Nevertheless, production costs of 
about 2.70 Zl/Kg are not obtained each year. About 80 % of the berries 
go to processing, both fresh and frozen. Although productivity has ob-
viously increased, it is still rather low, with 3.5 t/ha compared with other 
countries. Serbia, as Germany's largest supplier, has yields of 6-8 t/ha. 
•  Black Currants: The cultivation of black currants exhibits, like the other 
berries, strong fluctuations, particularly relating to price (Table 2). 
Thus, the producer's price totalled, in 1993, only 0.17 Zl/Kg, while in 
2000 it increased to a maximum value of 3.80 Zl/Kg. After overproduc-
tion in the first half of the 1990s, many trees were rooted, which 
brought a strong price increase beginning in 1998. Since then, the Polish 
average has again greatly expanded. Marketing is conducted almost ex-
clusively by the industry (about 90 %). 
4 GENERAL SPECIFICATION OF APPROPRIATE INSTITUTIONAL AND 
ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS  
Prior to 1990, many western European firms already had either permanent or 
seasonal representation on the Polish market. The reasons were the previously 
complicated import regulations for berries: Different import tariff quotas for dif-
ferent countries, different periods, different varieties, different qualities (whole, 
whole & broken, broken) and various conditions or aggregates of the fruits 
(fresh, preserved, individual quick frozen (IQF) or frozen to blocks, etc. (BEHR 
and ELLINGER, 1994). Many companies purchased fresh products locally from 
traders, contracted with Polish freezers for fruit-processing and then transported 
frozen berries to the destination markets (FIGURSKA, 2003). According to trade 
sources, Poland’s accession to the EU had no major effects on the berry trade or 
industry (ELLINGER, 2003b). Besides this kind of procurement, even more Ger-
man processing companies prefer the supply of raw materials directly from pro-
ducers or producer associations (SCHMIDT and MAACK, 2001). One prerequisite 
for direct procurement is the offer of a sufficient amount of berries, which only 
large farms or associations are able to deliver.  
The reason for the relatively weak development of Polish producer organisations 
in comparison with overall EU development are more the different conditions of 
farming in Poland than a permanent unwillingness to co-operate (SAEPR, 2000; Kai Maack  210 
CHLOUPKOVA, 2002). This will be witnessed through the establishment of new 
forms of co-operations, which have a much more homogeneous membership, 
often composed of viable farmers of more or less similar scale, age and degree 
of specialization. Their internal solidarity is relatively strong. Attempts are being 
made to organize Polish growers into associations (as required by the EU) in 
order to obtain financial assistance, but have not been very successful (MAKOSZ, 
2004). Until now, only a few associations applied for producer organisations of 
the common market organisation in fruit and vegetables (CMO). The financial 
situation of most cooperatives is rather poor. Because of the limited profitability 
of the agricultural sector, capital for modernization and investment is lacking 
(VAN BEKKUM and SCHILTHUIS, 1999). Due to the difficult financial situation of 
most Polish farms and the accompanying low use of inputs, a strong reduction of 
yield fluctuations or an increase in productivity are not expected in the fore-
seeable future (MAKOSZ, 2004). 
The cultivation of berries for the processing industry is marked by special charac-
teristics compared with other crops in Poland. Acreage and prices are subject to 
very large fluctuations. Thus, the cultivation of strawberries was reduced by 
40 % in 2002 compared with the previous year. This development was due to 
very low prices, which only covered about 40 % of the costs. In the two following 
years, the producer price nearly quadrupled, even higher than the producer price 
on the Polish fresh market (SWIETLIK, 2004). This shows that the Polish pro-
ducers' reactions are very price-sensitive. In addition, the large yield fluctuations 
are a considerable problem. The reasons are connected to small-sized farms, 
which usually propagate their own plants and use very low plant protection. 
Contractual co-operation represents a possibility of reducing these fluctuations. 
The main problem is in defining well-balanced rights and duties by a contract in 
order to prevent moral hazards and the hold-up problem. These situations can 
particularly appear with production of black currants and strawberries. In future, 
the varieties demanded by the industry will be marketed less on the fresh mar-
ket. By those increasingly specific investments, the number of potential transac-
tion partners will decrease, and the market will enter a small numbers condition. 
This small numbers condition will be enhanced by the market structure of the 
fruit processing industry, with few customers holding a relatively large market 
share and facing the reduced transportability of the berries. The processors 
might exploit the buyer’s power, knowing that growers have very little alterna-
tive in the short-term, and even in the long run. Due to the characteristics of 
berry cultivation, the farmers are locked into these relationships: High funding 
needs relative to other arable crops, a high strain on liquidity in the unproductive 
years before the first yield, long operating life and duration of capital tie-up and 
a long pay-off period all make it tough to recover employed capital. One innova-
tive and promising element of contracts is capital-sharing between growers and The organisation of buyer – Supplier relations in the food chain  211
processors. This provision introduces an additional institution or rule to foster 
the mutual interest of the two contracting parties. 
There is currently one promising example near Warsaw which may and should 
serve as a model: In the late 1990s, one company and one association of 
150 farmers set up a contractual agreement defining price, quantity and quality 
provisions. This co-operation was initiated in 1998 by a German fruit processing 
enterprise. The contractual agreements for the cultivation of the strawberry variety 
‘senga sengana’ were firmly agreed upon for the entire 4-year contract period. 
The average yield increased by over 10t/ha through support of the industry with 
credit intake, the common use of machines and cultivation consultation. This 
example shows very obviously that a contractual agreement can considerably in-
crease productivity and that such a co-operation can be profitable for both sides. 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The cultivation of berries in Poland is characterized by strong fluctuations in 
yield, acreage and prices which affect procurement costs for the industry. Verti-
cal contractual agreements can reduce these fluctuations substantially. The in-
dustry is not succeeding in transferring the varying raw material costs on the re-
tail level; the share of costs for berries is high; imports depend on only a few 
supplier countries; and the increasing requirements of food security and tracea-
bility all increase the industry's interest in securing at least a part of the berries 
contractually. The important motives for co-operation are the sufficient and safe 
purchase of raw materials, constant prices and a more reliable basis for calcula-
tion. A special advantage of cultivation under contract is that improvements in 
quality production, quality control and quality security, through the exertion of 
influence on cultivation, can be achieved.  
Within the context of the study, the farmers interviewed have, in principle, a 
positive attitude regarding vertical co-operation with the processing industry. 
The central motive was not only the achievement of higher prices, but the savings 
of sales and thus a reliable basis for calculation. One prerequisite for successful, 
ongoing co-operation is the well-balanced distribution of risks and risk premiums 
between the farmer and processor. This is necessary because berry production is 
characterised by a high initial investment, an unproductive first year (or years) 
of cultivation and a long pay-off period. By the increasingly specific invest-
ments of producers, the number of potential transaction partners will decrease 
and a small numbers condition will emerge. This condition will be enhanced by 
the market structure of the fruit processing industry, with few customers posses-
sing a relatively large market share. This will lead to unilateral dependence and a 
lack of market transparency, connected with the unequal distribution of market 
power. One innovative and promising element of co-operation is capital-sharing Kai Maack  212 
between growers and processors, which has been included in the aforementioned 
contract. Despite the many substantial and yet unsolved problems, the few existing 
contracts between processors and growers in Poland show that the contracting 
parties are able to negotiate contracts with a well-balanced distribution of risks 
and risk premiums. Generally, while existing contracts in Poland may not cope 
with all problems involved in the supply-demand relations of the parties, they 
may serve as models for additional agreements.  
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Traditionally, most agricultural goods were considered to be commodities. For 
this reason, suppliers could be easily substituted. Therefore, to create counter-
vailing power, horizontal co-operations have been functioning in agribusiness 
for more than 100 years. Whereas co-operatives have historically been the pre-
dominant form of co-operation, today networks are being formed. 
The questions of how such chain networks should be designed and which gover-
nance structure best fits have been addressed in several well-known articles. 
However, questions dealing with chain strategy and management have not been 
discussed satisfyingly. Thus, the paper will address these questions by using 
strategic management theories and concepts, as well as institutional economics. 
Keywords: Agri-Food Business, networks, chain management. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of food processing, the product flow has not been changed 
substantially. However, this is certainly not true for the food products them-
selves. Instead of being merely an inspection and experience good, today food is 
perceived as a complex bundle of inspection, experience, and credence characteris-
tics. This development has been brought about by various circumstances. 
Though there have been many influencing factors, for this paper the conse-
quences resulting from the crisis of the winter of 2000/01 are of major impor-
tance. After Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and Foot and Mouth 
Disease (FMD) hit Germany, transparency of the whole production process was 
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demanded by consumers and politicians. As a result, quality was newly defined 
by 1) customer needs, 2) the product’s "fitness of use", and 3) the orientation of 
the whole chain's process. The first consequence of this redefinition was that 
animal feed had to be treated with the same precautions as food products. Fur-
thermore, the demands that the production of organic food should be increased 
and animal welfare extended can be regarded as effects of the crisis. The EU 
directive "178/2002" on traceability can be seen as the most recent repercussion. 
Additionally, the contemporary discussion of labelling of GMOs adds to the 
complexity of modern food products.  
The requirements of food products have led to the demand of a transparent pro-
duction chain, which in turn has led to a demand for information availability, 
thus making information a competitive must. Nevertheless, in order to gain a 
competitive advantage, this information requirement must be transformed into 
knowledge, creating an inimitable and non-substitutable asset. In consideration 
of these aspects, the food chain is in the process of being re-designed into verti-
cally co-ordinated organisations. Hence, the nature of competition in the agri-
food business is being altered from traditional (spot) market exchange to the 
competition of vertically co-ordinated food chains. Such chain systems can have 
various forms of co-operation or even be vertically integrated firms. However, 
several studies have shown that the majority of vertical chain organisations are 
co-operations of a number of firms. Co-operations that contain various firms and 
are sequentially connected can be called Supply Chain Networks.  
The questions of how such chain networks must be designed and which gover-
nance structure best fits have been addressed in several well-known articles 
(GULATI et al., 2000; HENDRIKSE, 2003; OMTA et al., 2001; LAZZARINI et al., 
2001). The aim of this paper is not to improve the discussion of the government 
of chain networks. Instead, enhancing the discussion on the co-ordination of ver-
tical networks, i.e., chain management, is the goal.  
First, the German agri-food business and the changes of food quality will be out-
lined. Thereafter, the concept of networks and Supply Chain Networks will be 
introduced, including elaboration on the questions of a chain management. Fi-
nally, conclusions will be drawn.  
2 AGRI-FOOD BUSINESS AND FOOD QUALITY 
2.1 Agri-food  business 
The agri-food business is characterised as an entity comprised of participants 
involved in the production and distribution of food products. Additionally, every 
task of securing food safety is an important matter. Widely defined, banks, in-
surance companies, and other services are linked to the food chain. The Ger-
man food retail sector is mainly in the hands of a small number of big players. Jon H. Hanf 
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In 1998, the CR5 accounted for more than 60 % (OLBRICH, 2001) and in 2002 
the CR5 still made up 63.3  % (LEBENSMITTELZEITUNG, 2003). This constant 
market share, which is also true for the development of the CR10 (stable at 
about 85  %) (LEBENSMITTELZEITUNG, 2003) indicates that the consolidation 
process has reached its peak. Taking a more differentiated look at the top five, 
two retailers are fast growing discount chains (Aldi and Lidl) two are co-
operatives (Edeka and Rewe) and only the market leader (Metro group) is an 
investor-owned firm. Even though the co-operatives are counted as a single 
group, they consist, among other business formats, of self-employed retailers, 
whereas the processor sector is more heterogeneous. Besides some multinationals 
such as Nestle and Unilever Bestfoods, several big national players like Nord-
milch and Haribo are active on the market. However, the majority of processors 
consists of small and medium-sized companies. Some branches are still domi-
nated by co-operatives; for example the dairy business. The food handicraft busi-
nesses are especially small, family-run enterprises consisting of more than 
41,000 firms (GÜNTERBERG and WOLTER, 2002). However, the number of crafts-
men running multiple stores is increasing. The wholesale business is dominated 
by numerous co-operatives and some privately owned family businesses, 
whereas the agronomist sector consists of small, family run and, often, low 
profit farms. Overall, there are more than 500,000 farms in Germany, about half 
of which are run by full time farmers. Farm suppliers are again rather heteroge-
neous. This branch is composed of multinationals, large national enterprises and 
medium-sized companies. (HANF and KÜHL, 2002) 
2.2 Food  quality 
Traditionally, commodities were produced by farmers and afterwards transferred 
into food products, with the emphasis being on the quantity produced. Today, 
the food chain is more complex. This increase of complexity can be particularly 
observed in the context of food scares. After BSE and FMD hit Germany in the 
winter of 2000/01, transparency of the whole production process was demanded 
by consumers and politicians, with the result being that the food chain is in the 
process of being re-designed. 
The key driver for the re-design of the food chain is the reliable transfer of trust 
attributes regarding product quality to the consumer. The distinction between 
various product attributes, first introduced by NELSON (1970) and the introduc-
tion of trust attributes in the economic literature by DARBY and KARNI (1973) 
changed the perception of food products. It became apparent that these attributes 
altered food products from rather uncomplicated raw commodities to somewhat 
more complex goods. Since the beginning of the 1990s, these findings have been 
used extensively in the literature on agricultural economics. Since the mid-
1990s, works on trust attributes have become more popular and have been fre-
quently used in publications (ANDERSEN, 1994). Trust attributes are characterised 
as product and service characteristics which cannot be detected under ordinary Supply Chain Networks 
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circumstances by the buyer, neither before nor after the buying process has  
finished. For experience goods, the verification of the attributes’ correctness can 
be exercised immediately after the purchase. For search goods the buyer is able to 
find evidence of the attributes even prior to the purchase (HANF, 2000; PICOT et al., 
2001).  
The above-mentioned food quality crises (BSE, etc.) caused food products to be 
perceived as shopping, experience and trust attributes by consumers. Knowing 
their inability to prove the correctness of trust attributes themselves, people re-
acted in the case of food crises with a sharp reduction of food demand (BÖCKER 
and HANF, 2000). For food products, trust attributes can be divided into: Meta-
physical/credence attributes like "organic", "animal welfare" and "produced in a 
special region", chain transparency and traceability, or risk-related trust attributes 
like "salmonella-free" and "free of cholesterol" (HANF, 2000). 
While metaphysical trust attributes are generally affiliated with the production 
process, risk related attributes are generally part of the product itself. Bounded 
rationality, asymmetric information and time restraints are factors that create a 
situation in which consumers are not able or willing to prove the quality of 
food products. Most of the trust attributes are considered to be components of 
quality by the consumers. With the increased sophistication of control and 
measurement technologies, credence attributes alter to experience attributes 
(HANF and DRESCHER, 1994). However, on the other hand, there are always new 
credence attributes evolving. In particular are credence characteristics which are 
related to ethical and emotional topics such as animal welfare, etc. (HANF and 
KÜHL, 2003). Demonstrating that quality is a multi-attributed construct, this per-
spective will have some interesting implications for the understanding of construct 
quality, which can be divided into at least three dimensions: 
•  Customer orientation, i.e., quality attributes must be recognised by the 
customer); 
•  Process orientation, i.e., the whole production process must be included, 
e.g. from farm to fork; 
•  The fitness of use of the product (GARVIN, 1987). 
Bearing these dimensions of quality in mind, a dynamic change in the perception 
of quality by the consumer can be ascertained. A few years ago, the majority of 
German consumers attached little or no value to the information of traceability 
throughout the whole chain. Nowadays, it is a competitive necessity for every 
meat producer to deliver a record of traceability and transparency.  
This chapter has demonstrated the complexity of the agri-food business. Being 
confronted with saturated markets, the participants of the food chain have adopted 
a more customer-orientated approach. This means that the firms must react to the 
wishes, demands and needs of their customers. Especially after the BSE and FMD Jon H. Hanf 
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scares, people demand trust as a major dimension of quality. Consequently, the 
biggest challenge for participants in agri-food business is to signal trust worthi-
ness.  
3 SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORKS 
3.1 Networks 
Traditionally, economics has discussed two forms of business transactions. One 
was through (spot) market transactions and the other was by vertical integration. 
Institutional economics introduced different approaches in the form of hybrid 
organisational concepts. Hybrid forms are the systematic optimisation of activi-
ties through inter-firm co-ordination and co-operation. In general, market trans-
actions are perceived as being unable to pool capabilities and resources of dif-
ferent economic actors, while with vertical integration, flexibility and market 
incentives are lost (ILIOPOULOS, 2003). In the following chapters I will concen-
trate on one specific form of hybrid – the network approach. Thus, in 3.1, I will 
introduce networks and explain their rationality in general, while in 3.2 I will 
elaborate on a special type of network – Supply Chain Networks. 
Network is a term widely spread throughout sociology and management sciences. 
This term covers all arrangements defining recurrent contractual ties among 
autonomous entities (MENARD, 2002). Generally, networks can be defined as 
"specific properties of the transaction relationships, typified by relational rela-
tionships in which formal and informal sharing and trust building mechanisms 
are crucial," (ZYLBERSZTJN and FARINA, 2003). As Fig. 1 shows, networks do 
not particularly address vertically organised ties. Rather, they more generally 
address all questions on inter-organisational relationships of more than two 
firms (LAZZARINI et al., 2001).  
In network science, collaboration is determined by different forces e.g. comple-
mentary abilities of the involved firms and risk reduction (MENARD, 2002). 
However, the rent of collaboration is not only risk reduction. Instead, by com-
bining complementary abilities, higher efficiency and performance can be 
gained. This viewpoint is attached to the resource-based view of a firm, i.e., the 
success of an enterprise is determined by its ability to focus on its own strength 
and competencies. These strategic resources are heterogeneously distributed 
across firms and differ among each firm, leading to the question about the core 
competencies, which are a central concept of the resource-based view of the 
firm (BARNEY, 1991). Core competencies are defined "as the collective learning 
in the organisation, especially how to co-ordinate divers production skills and 
integrate multiple streams of technologies," (PRAHALAD and HAMEL, 1990). Supply Chain Networks 
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While the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) traditionally focused on the 
intra-firm creation of core competencies as a competitive advantage (BARNEY, 
1991; PRAHALAD and HAMEL, 1990) GULATI et al., (2000) amplified the RBV in 
such a way that networks can be seen as an origin of inimitable resources creating 
inimitable, and non-substitutable value. As inputs into the networks, production 
process resources became an important issue since they have the potential for 
achieving superior organisational performance (BARNEY, 1991). Mainly, rare, 
valuable, inimitable and non-substitutable resources are important for providing 
sustainable competitive advantage: These resources can be separated into property-
based and knowledge-based. Property-based resources are traditional, tangible 
input factors, while knowledge-based resources are bundles of intangible factors 
(MILLER and SHAMSIES, 1996). As inimitability and non-substitutability are re-
quired, intangible resources particularly gain in importance. Besides image and 
culture, knowledge was identified as a major production factor and an intangible 
resource for organisations, thus enabling employees and organisations to combine 
and transform tangible resources for unique production processes and products 
(STEWART, 1997). Through comparison of a multiunit organisation with a net-
work, TSAI (2000) showed that units rich in social capital and strategic related-
ness are more likely to realise potential synergies in related business operations. 
Organisations are more capable of ascertaining and utilising new opportunities 
and reacting accurately to potential changes, as well as strategic and tactical ac-
tions, in both the internal and external environment (WIKLUND and SHEPHERD, 
2003). The transfer and creation of explicit and implicit knowledge within the 
network through co-operation especially permits the network to be more competi-
tive. Mainly organisational knowledge gains importance, as it has the ability to 
serve as a source of sustainable differentiation, and as it inherently promises diffi-
culties to imitate. By formal and informal knowledge, e.g. routines, contractual Jon H. Hanf 
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rules can be substituted by lowering transaction cost and information asym-
metries. In an environment in which the survival of organisations depends on the 
ability to be innovative (HAYEK, 1949) the firm’s success is determined by its 
dynamic capabilities, i.e., the ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal 
and external resources and competencies (TEECE et al., 1997). Particularly for 
product innovations, the co-ordination of knowledge between the different ties of 
a network chain might enhance the chance of creating a successful new product. 
Within networks, firms are embedded in upstream and downstream flows of re-
sources, information, and knowledge. Hence, networks can influence the nature 
of competition and the profitability beyond traditional measures of industrial 
competition (GULATI et al., 2000). 
By focusing on core competencies, a single company, on the one hand, is able to 
capture the returns of applying economies of learning, scale and scope. On the 
other hand, this firm faces the high risk of a specialised production orientation. 
Through collaboration, specialised firms are able to share their strengths to create 
a more competitive entity and simultaneously reduce a firm's individual risks, as 
well as to increase sales and revenues (ARBEITSKREIS, 1995). Besides such fi-
nancial incentives, non-pecuniary incentives like knowledge generation, power, 
and trust are key concepts in the network theory of motivating economic actors 
to co-operate (UZZI, 1997). The role the single firm plays within the network is 
determined by its power, its competencies, its interests, existing rules, and the 
aim of the network (OMTA et al., 2001). Through mutual dependency of assets 
developed within networks, companies can secure the investments they have 
made to sustain the network (MENARD, 2002). The degree of dependency of a 
single firm also determines the role it plays within the network. However, even 
if a supplier is highly dependent on the focal company, this supplier still has 
some power. Similar to the resource dependency theory, the focal company can-
not totally dispose of this firm (PFEFFER and SALANCIK, 1978). This implies that 
both parties have an interest in a true partnership, which implies that within a 
network, common values exist based on loyalty and trustworthiness. ALBACH 
(1992) used the term of a "strategic family". An example of a strategic family in 
the food business is the network of McDonald's, which calls itself the McDonald's 
family. However, there are also some constraints: Divergent aims of the actors, 
information asymmetries, partitioning of gains and losses, opportunistic behaviour, 
etc. (ARBEITSKREIS, 1995). To overcome constraints and to achieve gains, a col-
laboration ought to have shared values, trustworthiness, as well as shared 
knowledge and a shared strategy. Such efforts lead to the creation of a "unique 
relationship proposition", defined as an exclusive benefit perceived within a 
loyal and long-lasting relationship between at least two economic actors striving 
for a common goal by co-operation (HANF and KÜHL, 2003). 
A more differentiated approach to networks is taken by BURR (1999), who 
classifies four typologies: Spontaneous network, self-organising network, Supply Chain Networks 
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project-orientated network, and strategic network. This typology is derived from 
the intensity of a relation, its co-ordination mechanism, and the existence of a 
broker. Unlike BURR (1999) who has highlighted self-organising networks, I will 
focus on strategic networks. In such a pyramidal-hierarchic network with a bro-
ker, a strategy-leading focal company builds the core element of the network as 
either a manufacturer or a retailer. The focal firm is expected to manage the sys-
tem in order to realize the strategic objectives. Hence, the focal firm is thereby, in 
general, that firm identified by consumers as being ‘responsible’ for the specific 
food item, e.g. the producer in the case of a producer brand, and the retail firm in 
the pyramidal-hierarchic case of a private brand. Because of long-lasting explicit 
or implicit contracts, the other network actors are heavily dependent on the focal 
company, whereas the level of dependency is higher for vertical than for hori-
zontal ties (WILDEMANN, 1997). Even though it seems as if dependency is rather 
unilateral, when applying the Resource Dependency Theory a mutual dependency 
becomes evident. The influence of an institution matters to the degree of re-
source dependency it has in its relationships with other institutions (PFEFFER and 
SALANCIK, 1978). If the focal organisation is itself dependent on critical inputs 
from other organisations, these organisations have some power over the focal 
company (MEDCOF, 2001).  
3.2  Supply Chain Networks 
Having outlined the essentials of network theory, it has been shown that net-
works could be used for the organisation of horizontal and vertical co-
operations. However, as shown, today in the agri-food business, vertical link-
ages are relevant in order to guarantee the consumer the correctness of credence 
attributes such as organically-produced. Due to this, an explicit vertical form of 
networks will be introduced. A supply chain network is the joint and co-
operative behaviour of companies, related by vertical product and information 
flows in the supply chain, in order to provide a product or service to the end 
consumer. The objective of most Supply Chain Networks is to produce higher 
quality and/or greater efficiency by co-operation rather than by the full integration 
of the supply chain or by market transactions (HANF and KÜHL, 2002). Supply 
Chain Networks can also be named netchains (LAZZARINI et al., 2001; NEVES, 
2003; ZYLBERSZTJN and FARINA, 2003). Within such pyramidal-hierarchic stra-
tegic networks, the focal company or chain captain is liable, with its reputation, 
for the correctness of each product being produced by its supply chain network 
(SCN). The increasing importance of reputation or brand image can be observed 
in retailer’s efforts to create a brand for their own company. and the building of 
"blockbuster brands" (brands with more than 1 billion € turnover) by manufac-
tures (HANF and HANF, 2003). The following graph presents a generic SCN, 
consisting of several independent firms which aim to serve the heterogeneous 
customer demand. Jon H. Hanf 
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Figure 2:  Supply chain network of a retailer (HANF and KÜHL, 2003) 
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Figure 2 demonstrates the growing complexity and organisational tasks for the 
focal company as more supply chains have to be coordinated (for the sake of 
simplicity I will explain this figure for just one retailer). The retailer's range of 
products consists of thousands of products. However, for the retailer’s own la-
belled products, the retailer is considered to be the focal company responsible, 
e.g. for traceability and quality assurance. Since the chain captain is liable with-
out limitation for the correctness of the production, i.e., for all credence charac-
teristics, he must avoid any type of defect within the entire network.  
Hence, the focal company has to set incentives for creating a situation in which 
every actor has a self interest for securing the sustainable stability of the whole 
network (PICOT  et al., 2001). On the one hand, these incentives must be of 
monetary nature to create a short-term win/win situation (i.e., higher profits). On 
the other hand, the incentives have to be of none-pecuniary nature to create a 
long-lasting "unique relationship proposition", which cannot be easily imitated 
by competitors. These exclusive benefits could be higher profits, future joint 
growth, or, for some participants, merely staying in business. The co-operation 
in Supply Chain Networks relies on confidence and understanding. These char-
acteristics have to be cultivated over a long time and create the space for achiev-
ing a superior joint solution of a problem (HANF and KÜHL, 2003).  Supply Chain Networks 
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Especially in the food business, where numerous small and medium-sized firms 
are active, co-operative networks give those firms the chance to concentrate on 
their core competencies. By co-operating, SME (small and medium enterprises) 
can better exploit their core competencies and reduce inherent risk by focussing 
on single activities. In the German agri-food sector, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) play a critical role. Because of this structure, the focal com-
pany has to take into account that such companies possess neither a sophisti-
cated IT-infrastructure nor high manpower. Additionally, single SMEs do not 
possess a sufficient quantity of commodities in order to supply the whole de-
mand of the network. Especially for agricultural goods, the total amount of supply 
needed has to be delivered by various farmers. For this reason, horizontal co-
operations have to be installed and be managed by the focal company itself or a 
by system supplier.  
4 STRATEGIC CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
4.1 The  co-ordination  task of the focal firm 
During the last decade, consumers and politicians have revised their method of 
valuing food quality in the light of many food scandals. Prior to the food scan-
dals, shopping and experience attributes almost entirely formed the basis of con-
sumer judgment; thereafter, credence attributes became the dominant properties. 
Certainly the overestimation of risk properties relating to food scandals will 
wear off during calmer times. However, the general public's attention to these 
type of food properties will endure. As a consequence of these changed percep-
tions, as well as economic, political and public pressures, actors in the food 
chain have been encouraged to think about redesigning the organization of the 
food supply system in order to avoid similar scares in the future. 
Food supply systems can be characterized as pyramidal-hierarchic strategic net-
works. Such networks possess a focal firm that is expected to manage the system 
in order to realize strategic objectives. The focal firm is thereby, in general, that 
firm identified by the consumers as being ‘responsible’ for the specific food 
item, e.g. the producer in the case of a producer brand and the retail firm in the 
pyramidal-hierarchic case of a private brand. If the focal firm is widely regarded 
as being responsible for the safety of the food, then the focal firm will and 
should establish a network management system that effectively prevents the fur-
ther recurrence of food scares. This is a very difficult and comprehensive task.  
4.2  Management of chains 
Supply chains consist of a number of consecutive stages, and at any given stage, 
one or more independent firms. Material flows must be coordinated regarding 
timing, quantity, quality and other factors. Vertical co-operation between firms 
requires a great deal of co-ordination between partners and these can only be Jon H. Hanf 
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efficiently aligned by a sophisticated management concept (BOGASCHEWSKY, 
1995). ZAHRA (2003) shows that the development of operative management and 
of a strategic concept is crucial for the success of an organization. HANF (2004) 
deduces that strategic and management concepts are equally important for the 
frictionless functioning of chain networks. Because strategic networks are com-
parable to conglomerates, similar concepts can be utilized to co-ordinate an SCN 
(HANF and ANDREÄ, 2004). The focal company should be able to co-ordinate the 
information and product flows throughout the whole network – such managerial 
co-ordination preserves the resources of all participating firms, creating a sus-
tainable win-win situation. 
Although the managerial concepts of single enterprises can, in principle, also be 
used in networks, a much more detailed analysis has to be conducted in order to 
enlarge these managerial concepts for netchains. The management literature 
usually only distinguishes between the two types of strategies – corporate and 
business strategies. This distinction is not sufficient for adequate consideration 
of the multiple linkages which exist between interdependent organizations 
within a chain network (BRESSER and HARL, 1986). Thus, various authors have 
introduced the concept of collective strategies (ASTLEY, 1984; CARNEY, 1987; 
EDSTRÖM  et al., 1984). Collective strategies are defined as systematic ap-
proaches by collaborating organizations which are jointly developed and imple-
mented (BRESSER, 1989). Originally, collective strategies were only regarded as 
instruments dealing with variation in the inter-organizational environment, i.e., 
they aimed to stabilise and dominate the interdependent task environment 
(BRESSER  and HARL, 1986). Collective strategies can be re-active, absorbing 
variation within an environment, or they can be pro-active, forestalling unpre-
dictable behaviour by other organisations (ASTLEY and FOMBRUN, 1983). 
If collective strategies are introduced in order to gain market power, they obviously 
violate the competition law. One reason to implement collective strategies in 
non-power orientated co-operations is to overcome the coordination difficulties 
which arise from interdependency among the firms. Interdependency is created 
when decisions and actions by one partner influence the decisions and actions of 
partnering firms (THEUVSEN, 2004). There are three types of interdependencies: 
i) horizontal or pooled interdependencies between firms competing in the same 
market, ii) vertical interdependencies between firms operating in different mar-
kets but linked by sequential work flows, where the output of one is the input of 
the other, and iii) symbiotic interdependencies between firms that complement 
each other or have reciprocal product and/or information flows (ASTLEY and 
FOMBRUN, 1983; LAZZARINI et al., 2001; THEUVSEN, 2004). 
The focal company is the centralized decision-making unit (JARILLO, 1988) in a 
pyramidal-hierarchical strategic network. The focal company exerts influence on 
the decision which members take on tasks securing super-ordinate network aims 
(WILDEMANN, 1997). Furthermore, in designing its network, collective strategy Supply Chain Networks 
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and co-ordination mechanisms, the focal company has to consider the three dif-
ferent types of interdependencies. LAZZARINI et al. (2001) provide advice for ex-
erting managerial discretion for sequential (vertical) interdependencies. For pooled 
interdependencies they recommend the achievement of process standardization, 
and for reciprocal interdependencies they suggest co-ordination through mutual 
adjustments. For instance, when launching the "kanban" practice, Toyota formed 
strong direct ties with its suppliers with a norm of reciprocal obligations estab-
lished through consulting assistance (DYER and NOBEOKA, 2000).  
Besides employing the right approach to the interdependencies chain, manage-
ment must also analyze co-operations on three different levels: The firm, dyadic 
and network level (DUYSTERS et al., 2004). Those authors arrived at the following 
findings: i) Analyses at the firm level show that successful co-operation employs 
a significant number of managerial constructs known from single firms. Examples 
are partner programs, alliance databases, joint business planning, and alliance 
managers. ii) Analyses at the dyadic level demonstrated that the costs of spe-
cialization are frequently higher than the costs of co-ordination, making co-
operation a favourable opportunity. Because of this, the governance structure 
has a large impact on performance. Further, investigations at the dyadic level 
stress the critical role that trust and commitment play in the success of coordina-
tion. iii) Studies at the network level emphasize the role of social capital in en-
hancing and bringing about information exchange, which results in information 
advantages (UZZI and GILLESPIE, 2002). Furthermore, the capabilities, knowledge, 
and skills that partner firms possess are recognised as sources of competitive 
advantage. Consequently, network performance is related to the current ties and 
to ties with potential partners. iv) Altogether, DUYSTERS et al. (2004) point out 
that for the successful management of a netchain co-operation, it is essential to 
consider all three levels and not to merely focus on a single one.  
Moreover, a further important point of chain management is the topic of partnering, 
which addresses issues associated with the design of relationships within a supply 
chain. Partnerships exhibit a certain degree of continuity and the focus of the 
relationships goes beyond price (MENTZER  et al., 2000). Considering Supply 
Chain Networks and the heterogeneity of their member firms, it can be expected 
that along the whole chain the optimal mode of partnerships varies widely. Thus, 
the focal company has to work out how the partnerships should be designed. 
WEBSTER (1992) proposed a continuum ranging from independent partnerships 
to strategic partnerships. In this paper, I use the typology of MENTZER et al. 
(2000) which divides partnering into strategic and operational partnering. They 
also define strategic partnering as an "on-going, long-term, interfirm relationship 
for achieving strategic goals, which deliver value to customers and profitability to 
partners", (MENTZER et al., 2000, p. 550). The aim of strategic partnering is to 
improve or dramatically alter a company’s competitive position through the 
development of new products, technologies and markets (WEBSTER, 1992). Jon H. Hanf 
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Additionally, strategic partnering should also include exclusivity and non-
imitatability (MENTZER  et al., 2000). Operational partnering is defined as a 
"needed, short-term relationship for obtaining parity with competitors" 
(MENTZER et al., 2000, p. 550). Thus, an operational partnering strategy seeks to 
improve operational efficiency and effectiveness. Such strategic orientation in-
volves shorter time spans and less organisational resources. Therefore, opera-
tional partnership is much easier to implement, and also to reverse, than strategic 
partnership (MENTZER et al., 2000).  
To summarise, the creation of a management system for a whole SCN is a tre-
mendous organizational task that the focal firm has to accomplish if network 
advantages are to be utilized. Possible network advantages are the creation of 
intangible network resources, risk reduction, gaining economies of scale and 
scope, and the reduction of transaction costs. 
•  The co-ordination task must be carried out in the interest of the whole 
chain. The creation of a shared chain vision and the development of a 
collective strategy for legally-independent firms are essential presuppo-
sitions. The participating firms have to be persuaded to abandon some 
authority and not to behave opportunistically. Therefore, a major task 
for Strategic Chain Management is to create within the chain a culture 
of honesty and mutual trust among the members.  
•  Moreover, such a chain management concept turns out to be a "unique 
relationship proposition" attracting firms to join in. Hence, participating 
firms are challenged to keep up with their competitors, thus enhancing 
their overall efficiency. And if new enterprises join, then new know-
ledge, capabilities and competencies enrich the SCN and help it to pre-
vail in an environment of co-opetition.  
•  Another major task of chain management is to install co-ordination 
mechanisms which address the three different types of interdependen-
cies in the best way (HANF and KÜHL, 2004; HANF, 2004). Additionally, 
the design of a SCN has to take into account the variation of the inten-
sity of relationships, i.e., the issue of strategic and operative partnering 
has to be borne in mind.  
Therefore, an SCN can be called a "strategy-focused supply chain network" if it 
highlights a collective strategy, a strategic partnering orientation, and Strategic 
Chain Management. The major constraint is the complexity of a "strategy-
focused SCN". KAPLAN and NORTON (2001) show that the complexity and di-
versity of interests within a single enterprise frequently hinders the implementa-
tion of the overall strategy throughout a single company. It is certainly much 
more ambitious to create a strategy for networks that are composed of a multi-
tude of firms. Supply Chain Networks 
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4.3  Existing chain management concepts 
Since the end of the 1980s, the process as a whole was the key element of every 
modern management system, starting with Total Quality Management (TQM). 
TQM can be characterised as a customer-orientated quality management concept 
that concentrates on the quality of processes controlling the (end) quality of single 
products, i.e., instead of an "end-of-pipe orientation", a process-based orienta-
tion is taken, which leads to overall quality optimisation. In the mid 1990s the 
customer-orientated Supply Chain Management (SCM) and Efficient Consumer 
Response (ECR) were introduced. In this schema, critical and sensitive informa-
tion (e.g. scanner data, amount of stocks) based on logistics, should be passed 
throughout the whole chain. In the late 1990s, Collaborative Planning Forecasting 
and Replenishment (CPFR) emerged, based on the ideas and aims of ECR and 
SCM. Even though these concepts consider the whole chain, the concepts them-
selves are mainly designed for a single company, to optimise the product and 
information flow between sequenced ties. Widely used in the agri-food business, 
TQM has evolved over time from a management system to the implementation 
of ISO certification. Consequently, TQM nowadays can be seen as a competitive 
must and not as a competitive advantage. In a literature survey of monographs 
on Supply Chain Management MÜLLER et al. (2003) showed that the majority of 
monographs made no clear distinction between SCM and logistic concepts. Spe-
cifically, the perspective of interfirm co-operation was only addressed in some 
exceptions. Additionally, only in the last two years have the first attempts to ad-
just the ideas of SME to address the majority of German agri-food enterprises 
been made. Therefore, SCM and ECR are still used in projects rather than in 
everyday business. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
Horizontal co-operations have been found in the agri-food business for more 
than one hundred years. However, for some years, several developments – espe-
cially the change of food quality – have catalysed the establishment of vertical 
co-operations covering every stage of the food chain. If such vertical co-
operations include a number of firms, they can be called Supply Chain Networks. 
SCN are characterised by having a pyramidal-hierarchic structure, a central de-
cision-making instance (focal company), and a medium- to long-term orientation 
of the participating firms. Therefore, SCN can be regarded as strategic networks. 
Being regarded as the trustee of the food quality for the whole network, the focal 
company has to ensure that the network functions well. Thus, for the design of 
its vertical network, the focal company has to take into account that the majority 
of the agri-food sector consists of SMEs. In the context of the co-ordination of 
networks pooled, sequential and reciprocal interdependencies have to be con-
sidered. Jon H. Hanf 
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As I have shown, the co-ordination tasks can be completed via chain manage-
ment. Such a concept has to take into consideration that high amounts of infor-
mation must be made available, enriched knowledge has to be created and inde-
pendent companies have to be co-ordinated. Additionally, a common strategy 
and a common culture have to be developed. In this regard, the creation of trust 
among the network participants is essential. Once this challenge is mastered, the 
chain-management system can be used as a "unique relationship proposition" in 
order to attract the best firms to join the network. Attracting the best firms at all 
levels of the food chain is important because SCN fiercely compete against other 
chain organisations. As a result, competition in the agri-food business can be 
described as co-opetion, i.e., within the network, firms not only co-operate, but 
they also compete against other networks. 
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In this paper a hazard function approach is applied to study the dynamics of ag-
ricultural households’ labour market participation in the context of an economy 
under transition. Using a household survey dataset from the Chinese Zhejiang 
province, which covers the second half of the 1990s, we empirically examine fac-
tors that drive farm households both to start and to interrupt off-farm employ-
ment. The results suggest that education increases the persistence of households 
to remain in their currently occupied regime. The same applies for wealthier 
households. Higher agricultural income reduces the probability of starting off-
farm work, but increases the risk of returning to non-participation. Finally, house-
holds in more urbanized regions face higher mobility regarding the probability of 
shifting to off-farm occupation, as well as transition into non-participation. 
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DYNAMICS OF LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION:  
WHAT DRIVES CHINESE FARMERS INTO AND OUT  




Undoubtedly, the adjustment of rural labour markets to economic reforms is an im-
portant indicator of the progress of transition. Without well-functioning labour 
markets, it will be difficult to achieve the primary mode of an efficient allocation of 
resources and thus to effectively enforce economical transition (DE BRAUW et al., 
2002). As in other transition economies, the institutional change of agricultural 
policy in China at the end of the 1970s strongly increased agricultural productivity, 
but at the same time restricted sectoral out-migration, which resulted in high ru-
ral underemployment. With the beginning of the second half of the 1980s, la-
bour mobility was allowed for and hence an increasing integration of farm 
households into rural labour markets took place (BENJAMIN and BRAND, 1997; 
ROZELLE et al., 1999; DE BRAUW et al., 2002). Following criticisms of the impact 
of the rural market program, the government introduced a set of adjustment 
policies starting in 1990 that aimed to further phase out the old centrally-planned 
agricultural system in favour of more market-oriented solutions. In addition, the 
government has actively supported the development of non-agricultural produc-
tion, in particular by township and village enterprises, to provide employment 
opportunities for the perceived rural labour surplus (BOWLUS and SICULAR, 2003). 
Policy developments starting in 1994 aim to renew self-sufficiency policies, not 
only at the national level, but also at the regional level. Despite the structural re-
forms and a general slowing of economic growth between 1993 and 1999, non-
agricultural employment has continuously grown. The agricultural sectors’ im-
portance for rural employment thus declined, from 93 % in 1978 to 64 % in 
2003. In the case of the Zhejiang province, the share of the rural labour force 
declined even faster, from 89 % to 39 % during the same period (IFPRI, 2004; 
SSB).  
However, while Township and Village Enterprises (TVE) provided rich possi-
bilities for off-farm employment and enhanced economic growth of rural regions 
at the end of the 1980s (DE BRAUW et al., 2002), agricultural land markets re-
main underdeveloped and family farms operate on very small plots. Under the 
land market constraints, the extent to which rural households take part in labour 
markets is limited (BOWLUS and SICULAR, 2003). Most of the households still 
depend on agricultural land as the lone important income source. Even though 
family members partly or fully work off-farm, households tend to keep land usage 
rights by hiring labour or working on farm in the busy season. Under the so-called 
"household responsibility system", land is distributed by the size of household or 
labour force, ignoring the heterogeneous distribution of productivity and effi-
ciency of labour force. Without an efficient land market, some of the family 
members may temporarily or permanently quit off-farm jobs to keep land usage 
rights. The on-going process of China’s reform to a market economy offers the 
rare chance to empirically assess the dynamics and determinants of rural house-
holds’ participation in the labour market. Thomas Glauben, Thomas Herzfeld, Xiaobing Wang 
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There is a wide body of literature analysing agricultural households' labour mar-
ket participation. Off-farm labour markets are of special importance in the trans-
formation from an agriculturally-dominated into a modern economy. Previous 
research applied various approaches to labour market participation and labour 
market responses of agricultural households. The most commonly used methods 
in the literature involve the estimation of probit or logit models to assess the 
dichotomous decision from the aspect of seasonal fluctuations of the labour 
force (LOVELL and ESPERANZA, 2004), the entry, exit and re-entry of non-farm 
employment (GOULD and SAUPE, 1989; ZHANG et al., 2001), and the degree and 
determinants of migration from the agricultural sector (BARKLEY, 1990). CORSI 
and FINDEIS (2000) as well as WEISS (1997) use different specifications of a pro-
bit model to explain the persistence of off-farm participation. Others use multi-
nomial logit models to evaluate the household’s decision-making between alterna-
tive labour market participation regimes in Chinese agriculture (CHEN et al., 2004; 
GLAUBEN et al., 2004). BUCHENRIEDER et al., (2002) as well as CHAPLIN et al., 
(2004) apply a multinomial logit model to analyse non-farm employment in 
three Balkan and Central European countries, respectively.  
These analyses seek to identify factors influencing a household’s decision regar-
ding labour market participation. However, the applied methodologies implicitly 
presuppose that the process which generated the decision-making has achieved a 
point of equilibrium and that the probability of finding households in each of the 
regimes should be unaltered even with the passage of time. Empirical evidence 
suggests, however, that there are frequent movements over time from one state 
to another state. Therefore, a number of authors use the more flexible technique of 
duration models. A quantity of works assess individual behaviour during unem-
ployment spells (SUEYOSHI, 1995; ADDISON and PORTUGAL, 2003), the probabi-
lity of a return to employment for older workers (CHAN and STEVENS, 2001), the 
influence of unemployment insurance on the duration of unemployment (LIGHT 
and OMORI, 2004), the probability of labour force transition in decision-making 
processes involving a partner (BLAU and RIPHAHN, 1999), job turnover by gender 
(MEITZEN, 1986; LIGHT and URETA, 1992) and, finally, model the search of em-
ployers (BURDETT  and CUNNINGHAM, 1998). In the framework of transition 
economies, the papers by ORAZEM and VODOPIVEC (1997) as well as SORM and 
TERELL (2000) have to be mentioned. The first two authors use a proportional 
hazard model to analyse the transition from unemployment to a new job in Slo-
venia and compare their results with the pre- and post-transition periods. Their 
results suggest that better-educated persons show a higher probability of finding 
a new job after economic transition. The latter authors analyse the transition be-
tween three different labour market participation regimes in the Czech Republic 
using a discrete-time hazard model. They find that younger, less educated, single 
men working in the construction or trade sectors face a higher probability of be-
coming unemployed. On the other hand, younger, more educated, married men 
show a higher probability of exiting unemployment and finding a new job. Dynamics of labour market participation 
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This paper aims to assess the dynamics of rural households’ participation in labour 
markets within the background of transition to a market economy. The on-going 
process of China’s reform to a market economy offers the rare chance of empiri-
cally assessing the dynamics and determinants of rural households’ participation in 
the labour market. Special attention is paid to the variability of households’ 
choice over multiple spells. Previous literature on family members’ participation 
in the labour market was based on one or two observations, which certainly un-
derstates the mobility of a labour force on a continuous basis. In order to fill the 
gap, we begin with a relatively new specification to consider all households over 
the whole period, rather than measuring the persistence of a special household 
status from a certain entrance time to its exit. Additionally, the longitudinal data-
set facilitates incorporating family, farm and regional characteristics as explana-
tory variables. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we develop a 
continuous-time hazard framework to estimate the probability of a household’s 
shift into and out of off-farm work. Whether this shift is due to a trigger event or 
can be accounted for by the observed characteristics of family, farm and region, 
or unobserved heterogeneity, respectively, is analysed. Section 3 introduces the 
data and provides sample statistics and Section 4 presents the empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes.  
2 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Before proceeding to the data, some methodological information should be pre-
sented. For a more detailed description of the methodology we refer to 
KALBFLEISCH and PRENTICE (2002). This study analyses the transition into and 
out of off-farm work. The two potential transitions between supplying off-farm 
labour (s) and non-participation (n) on off-farm labour markets can be repre-
sented by the following transition matrix pij, where the subscript i denotes the 













  (, , ) ij sn =  
Assuming the probability of transition between the states of labour market par-
ticipation at time  1 + t  only depends on the current state occupied at time t, the 





p S =   ,{ , } ij sn = . 
Here, Fij is the number of households in state i at time t, who flow to state j at 
time  1 + t , and Si is the original stock of households in state i at time t.  
After considering the probability of the transition, we specify the duration model 
to estimate the determinants of a household’s shift. The data of the history of a Thomas Glauben, Thomas Herzfeld, Xiaobing Wang 
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household’s participation in a labour market is used to estimate a continuous-time 
hazard model
1. The hazard function is represented by a popular exponential  
regression function:  [ ] ( ) 01 ;( ) , e x p kk tX t x t λβ β β ⎡ ⎤ =+ ⎣ ⎦. Here, λ represents the hazard 
of the transmission from one state to another  ( ) ,, ij sn =  ij ≠ , where i represents 
the original status at time  11 ,..., n tt −  and j denotes the shifted state at time  n t . Fur-
ther, λ indicates the baseline hazard of an event, say the transmission from non-
participation (n) to off-farm employment (s), which can be chosen from a para-
metric family under the condition that there is no heterogeneity among the indi-
viduals. In this paper we chose a Weibull form:
2 
(2) 
1 () ( ) tt
ρ λλ ρ λ
− =   
where,  ρ  is the ancillary shape parameter estimated from the data. If ρ  > 1, the 
hazard rate function monotonously increases and decreases for ρ < 1. Thus, al-
lowing for time-varying covariates in the duration model and assuming a base-
line hazard with Weibull form, the log-likelihood function can be written as 
(KALBFLEISCH and PRENTICE, 2002, p. 198):  
(3)  01 01
11 0
[ () ] () e x p [ () ]
nn
kk k l l
kl
Lx t Y u x u d u δβ β β β
∞
==
=+− + ∑∑ ∫   
here, k and l denote the number of observed households, while Y represents the 
left-continuous at-risk process. X is a vector of covariates which may vary with 
time t and u denotes the covariate history (0 ≤ u < t). The censor indicator δ 
equals one for the observed transition, and zero for right-censored observations. 
According to KALBFLEISCH and PRENTICE (2002), the observation is right cen-
sored if its survival time is greater than the time span of the survey. In our transi-
tion models, a household shifting from state i to j and vice versa experiences risk 
and all observations which remain in the same regime over the whole span of the 
survey should be treated as right censored. It has been noted that the original state 
i of the certain household is not fixed for the full duration given that the household 
may shift its state from one to another many times during the analysed period.  
Household heterogeneity includes two aspects: One is the effect of observed co-
variates x
3, which shift the hazard function upwards or downwards by multiplying 
                                                 
1 As  JENKINS (1995) concludes from his own work, the corresponding continuous- and dis-
crete-time duration models provide similar results and implications. 
2  All models were estimated with a Weibull distribution as the baseline hazard and a Cox 
proportional hazard model. Following the Akaike Information Criterion, the Weibull dis-
tribution is favoured in all specifications. 
3  Heterogeneity of individuals reflected by differences in characteristics (x) might change 
the individual hazard. That is, if  ( ) exp , 1 ij xt ß ⎡ ⎤ > ⎣ ⎦ , then the risk of the event j, i for this 
individual would increase, and if  ( ) exp , 1 ij xt ß ⎡ ⎤ < ⎣ ⎦  the opposite holds. Thus, the hazard 
model provides insights on how risk changes with the covariates. Dynamics of labour market participation 
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it with a scale factor. Unobserved heterogeneity denotes remaining differences in 
the distributions after controlling for covariates’ effects and may lead to incorrect 
inferences about duration dependence and the effects of included explanatory 
variables (KIEFER, 1988). To control for unobserved heterogeneity, an inverse 
Gaussian distribution is included.  
3 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
The data sample used in the study is drawn from a fixed-point household and 
village survey data in Zhejiang province for the period of 1995-2000. The sur-
vey, which is the primary source of microeconomic information on the eco-
nomic and social condition in rural China, was directed by the Ministry of Agri-
culture. In order to ensure its representativeness, a stratified random survey by 
villages’ location and average income level was conducted in Zhejiang province, 
containing 10 villages. Fifty households in each village were interviewed an-
nually. Most of the households remain in the survey for the whole period if they 
could be classified as rural households
4. Once a household was dropped from the 
survey, a new sample household was recruited from the same village and stayed 
in the survey for the following year, if it was qualified. Thus, the data constitutes 
an unbalanced time-series and cross-section data with 2,475 observations over 
6 spells, where a spell is defined as one calendar year.  
In addition to recording the household’s status in the labour market from 1995 
onwards, the survey also reports on labour participation behaviour of the given 
household precisely before the survey. This facilitates the tracking of the house-
hold’s mobility into and out of off-farm work during the whole survey period. 
Table 1 summarises the snapshot status of households which participate in off-
farm labour markets, as well as those which do not, in each year. The table 
shows that 67 % of households participate in some off-farm occupation in 1995, 
and this share increases to 83 % in 2000. By pooling all observations, 23 % of 
households, on average, never participated in any off-farm work. 
One remarkable feature of Table 1 is the high variation of the share of the two 
regimes, especially in the first  years. Table  2 reports the absolute number of 
transitions and shows that they fall significantly during the last year. 
                                                 
4  Under the household registration system in China, households can be divided into rural or 
urban. Thomas Glauben, Thomas Herzfeld, Xiaobing Wang 
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Table 1:  Static distribution of households’ labour market participation 
Off-farm participation  Non-participation  Total  Year 
No. %  No.  %   
Before 1995  307  74.51  105  25.49  412 
1995 248  67.21  121  32.79  369 
1996 286  79.22  75  20.78  361 
1997 277  79.37  72  20.63  349 
1998 268  79.06  71  20.94  339 
1999 275  82.09  60  17.91  335 
2000 257  82.90  53  17.10  310 
Sum 1,918  77.49  557  22.51  2,475 
Source:  Own calculations based on Agricultural Fixed Point Survey in Zhejiang Province, 
1995-2000.  
Table 2:  Observed transition between labour market regimes, 1995-2000 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
s→n
a  78 44 48 44 37 17  268 
n→s  50 88 53 48 48 14  301 
Total  128  132  101 92 85 31  569 
Source:  Own calculations based on Agricultural Fixed Point Survey in Zhejiang Province, 
1995-2000.  
Note: Variables  s and n represent off-farm participation and non-participation, respec-
tively. 
From Table 1, we have a deep impression of the varying shares of off-farm par-
ticipation. What explains the households’ persistence or transition between the 
two states? We attempt to identify whether the observed transition of the house-
hold is sensitive to household, farm and village characteristics. The survey pro-
vides detailed information on household characteristics such as labour supply, 
households’ production activities and family composition; characteristics of the 
farm, as well as social and economic conditions of the village in which the 
households are located. Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics of the co-
variates, conditional on the household’s status in the labour market.  Dynamics of labour market participation 
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Table 3:  Descriptive statistics 




   (n=1918) (n=557) 
Variables  SYMBOL  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Household characteristics     
Age level of the house-
hold’s head (1= <30, 
2=30-40, 3=40-50, 4=50-
60, 5= >60) 
AGEHEAD 
2.84 0.96 3.00 1.11
Share of labour graduated 
from elementary school 
ELEMENTS 
0.44 0.32 0.45 0.35
Share of labour graduated 
from secondary school 
SECONDS 
0.34 0.30 0.28 0.30
Share of labour graduated 
from high school and 
above 
HIGHS 
0.07 0.17 0.05 0.15
Share of labour with spe-
cial skills 
SKILLS 
0.15 0.28 0.10 0.25
M-LABOUR  1.45 0.66 1.30 0.63 Number of male labour 
force (persons)     
F-LABOUR  1.28 0.68 1.16 0.65 Number of female labour 
force (persons)     
DEPEND-
ENT  1.19 0.93 1.17 0.88
Number of children and 
elders (persons) 
   
PMEMBER  0.13 0.34 0.17 0.38 Communist party member-
ship (1=yes, 0=no)     
TRANSFER  -83.63 617.10 -47.02 607.44 Net transfer per capita 
(yuan/person)     
     
Farm characteristics     
ASSETS  4.01 5.15 2.95 2.59 Household’s production 
durable assets at 1985 con-




SOWN  1.32 1.40 1.63 3.02 Sown area per capita 
(mu/person)     
AGR-INC  0.81 1.36 1.41 2.59 Income from agricultural 
production at 1985 con-




LIVESTOCK -3.22 7.08 -2.91 7.25 Logarithm of number of 
animals     
     
Table 3: continued   Thomas Glauben, Thomas Herzfeld, Xiaobing Wang 
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Village Effects          
Unemployment rate (%)  UNEMP  13.56 10.15 10.75 9.55
Average income per capita 
(thousand yuan/person) 
AVINCCAP 
1491.01 618.05 1381.37 511.03
Population density (inhabi-
tants per mu) 
POPDENS 
0.91 0.95 0.87 0.78
Terms of trade  TRADE  18.08 110.17 42.19 308.13
Source:  Own calculations based on Agricultural Fixed Point Survey in Zhejiang Province, 
1995-2000. 
Starting with the household characteristics, the age level (AGEHEAD) of the 
household’s head is included as a categorical variable. The age level of the head 
is highest in the non-participating households. To address the profiles of the 
educational attainment and ability of the household’s members, we construct the 
shares of family members that finished elementary school (ELEMENTS), secon-
dary school (SECONDS) and high school (HIGHS) and/or have special skills 
(SKILLS). The family composition is further characterized by the gender of la-
bour force (M-LABOUR and F-LABOUR) and the number of dependent persons 
(DEPENDENT) including children younger than 16  years and the elders
5. 
Households choosing off-farm occupation have more male and female labourers. 
Party members (PMEMBER) show a lower inclination to participate in the off-
farm sector. It is interesting to find out that the mean of net transfers (TRANSFER) 
per capita is negative in the whole sample, with even higher values for partici-
pating households. 
Concerning the features of the farm, the evidence is as expected. Participating 
households are wealthier, as indicated by the durable production assets (ASSETS) 
per capita, but labour on a smaller farm size (SOWN). Higher income per capita 
from agricultural production (AGR-INC) may motivate households to restrain 
from off-farm participation. The descriptive analysis shows that participating 
households raise fewer animals (LIVESTOCK). 
Other variables included in the analysis are used to check for village and macro-
economic effects. In villages with a lower unemployment rate (UNEMP), 
households tend to restrain from off-farm work. Regarding the average village 
income per capita (AVINCCAP), the figures indicate that participating house-
holds are generally located in comparatively rich villages. The indicator of 
population density (POPDENS) is used with the assumption that the probability 
of finding off-farm employment is higher in more densely populated villages. To 
capture the competitiveness of agricultural production, the Terms of Trade 
(TRADE) are included. Non-participating households face much higher Terms of 
Trade.  
                                                 
5  Whether older persons are counted as labour force or not in the survey depends on both age 
and health. Generally, if the person is above 65 years old, he would be recorded as a de-
pendent person.  Dynamics of labour market participation 
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the transition probabilities of households entering off-farm oc-
cupation and exiting it. The table suggests a considerably higher probability of 
entering off-farm work than leaving it.  
Table 4:  Transition probability matrix of household’s labour market 
participation 
Year 
            Destination 
Origin  
S n 
s  0.7459  0.2541 
1995 
n  0.4762  0.5238 
s  0.8226  0.1774 
1996 
n  0.7273  0.2727 
s  0.8322  0.1678 
1997 
n  0.7067  0.2933 
s  0.8412  0.1588 
1998 
n  0.6667  0.3333 
s  0.8619  0.1381 
1999 
n  0.6761  0.3239 
s  0.9382  0.0618 
2000 
n  0.2333  0.7667 
s  0.8603  0.1397 
Total 
n  0.5404  0.4596 
Source:  Own calculations based on Agricultural Fixed Point Survey in Zhejiang Province, 
1995-2000. 
Note: Variables  s and n represent off-farm participation and non-participation, respec-
tively. 
Households with off-farm employment show the highest probability of staying 
in this regime during the subsequent period. This persistence in labour market 
behaviour stands in the centre of the analyses by CORSI and FINDEIS (2000). 
They separate this persistence into one observed part, called true state depend-
ence, and one unobserved individual heterogeneity. Our analysis concentrates on 
the explanation of the opposite, the high proportion of transitions which occur 
between periods. Of those off-farm participating households, on average, 86 % 
tend to stay in the same group, whereas 14 % discontinued off-farm employment. 
Regarding non-participating households, they face a higher probability of working 
off-farm than remaining in their previous state. Data for China reveals similar 
asymmetric behaviour between entry and exit from off-farm work as observed in Thomas Glauben, Thomas Herzfeld, Xiaobing Wang 
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other countries (GOULD and SAUPE, 1989; WEISS, 1997). Persistence of off-farm 
participation is much higher than persisting in autarky. Interestingly, the persis-
tence of non-participation increases significantly in the last survey year. Reasons 
for this might be declining employment opportunities in industry, general employ-
ment growth below 1 %, and an increase of employment in agriculture as re-
flected by national statistics (KEIDEL, 2001). 
The preceding tabulations provide clear evidence that the households’ participa-
tion in the labour market is characterised by frequent transitions. To explore the 
effects of explanatory variables and unobserved characteristics on households’ 
transitions, we present the estimated hazard ratios of the continuous-time hazard 
model in Table 5. The hazard ratios, which are  ) exp(β , can be explained as the 
change in the hazard rate associated with a unit change in the value of the corre-
sponding covariate. That is, if the hazard rate  1 ) exp( 0 > + + θε β β
r r j i r x , then the in-
stantaneous risk of transition from the original state i to state j would increase, 
while  1 ) exp( 0 < + + θε β β
r r j i r x , describes a reduced risk of the corresponding tran-
sition (CLEVES et al., 2003, pp. 159).  
In the following, the obtained estimated regressions and hazard ratios are pre-
sented. Compared to other specifications, the baseline hazard of the Weibull 
form reaches, in all estimated specifications, the lowest value of the Akaike In-
formation Criterion (AIC) (AKAIKE, 1974; CLEVES et al., 2003). As can be seen 
from Table 5, the parameters controlling for unobserved heterogeneity are statis-
tically significant
6 in both transitions.  
                                                 
6 An  asymptotic  χ
2-test is used to determine whether unobserved heterogeneity influences 
the transition process. Results are reported as variable θ in Table 5. Dynamics of labour market participation 
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Table 5:  Estimated results of duration model 
SYMBOL  n→s  s→n  
 Hazard  rate  z-Value  Hazard rate  z-Value 
AGEHEAD 0.84  -1.58  0.93  -0.64 
ELEMENTS 0.54  -1.60  0.69  -0.92 
SECONDS 0.36**  -2.26  0.39*  -1.94 
HIGHS 0.25*  -1.85  0.22*  -1.94 
SKILLS 0.63  -1.08  0.79  -0.50 
M-LABOUR 0.88  -0.80  0.85  -0.91 
F-LABOUR 1.05  0.29  0.88  -0.72 
DEPENDENT 0.88  -1.02  0.83  -1.43 
PMEMBER 1.67*  1.77  1.63  1.64 
TRANSFER 1.00**  -2.42  1.00  1.33 
ASSET 0.95**  -2.26  0.86***  -3.83 
SOWN 1.05*  1.78  1.01  0.31 
AGR-INC 0.88*  -1.78  1.12***  2.67 
LIVESTOCK 1.01  0.40  1.02  1.21 
UNEMP 1.01  0.85  1.01  1.13 
ANIPP 1.00*** -2.63  1.00***  -4.21 
POPDENS 1.78*** 3.23  2.08***  3.61 
TRADE 1.00  1.12  1.00  0.54 
ln (P)  1.04*** 11.02  0.99***  10.38 
P 2.83    2.70   
1/P 0.35    0.37   




2  40.68   81.03   
Log likelihood  -483.15    -461.01   
AIC        
No. of transitions  301    268   
Source:  Own calculations based on Agricultural Fixed Point Survey in Zhejiang Province, 
1995-2000. 
Notes:   ***, ** and * are statistically different from zero at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % signifi-
cance level, respectively; 
+ probability that θ = 0. 
Estimating the mean survival time reveals that persistence in off-farm occupa-
tion, at 4.63 years, is slightly higher that non-participation, at 4.29 years. Sur-
prisingly, most covariates influence the hazard rate in the same direction. The 
only exceptions are the number of female labourers (F-LABOUR) and agricul-
tural income (AGR-INC). The magnitude of the parameter P indicates that the 
probability of both transitions increases over time. The age of the household’s 
head (AGEHEAD) is a categorical variable with 5 levels. The estimated hazard 
ratios of the age of household’s head, which underlie all transition functions, are 
not statistically significant at conventional levels. For the variables regarding 
educational attainment of family members, the estimated results imply that edu-
cation increases the stability and persistence, respectively, of a household’s la-
bour market participation choices. This contradicts findings from discrete choice 
models where education is one of the main determinants of the probability of Thomas Glauben, Thomas Herzfeld, Xiaobing Wang 
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working off-farm. But our results reveal that conclusions based on cross-
sectional snapshot data may differ from longitudinal data with a focus on the 
transition between states. Education may increase regime-specific returns to 
human capital in off-farm work as well as in agricultural production, which lowers 
the probability of leaving the state currently occupied. It is assumed that more 
educated persons will accumulate more and faster task-specific skills and there-
fore face a lower risk of dismissal. Households with a larger share of members 
with a secondary (SECONDS) or high school degree (HIGHS) appear to have a 
lower propensity of leaving their currently-occupied labour market state. The per-
sistence of participation decision seems to be higher for more educated house-
holds. Again, it is important to recall that the majority of household members ob-
tained only elementary education or are even illiterate. This share (ELEMENTS) 
has no significant impact on the probability of transition and is the omitted cate-
gory, respectively. In view of the household’s demographic structure, the magni-
tude and effect of labour force’s gender on the transition between the states has 
no statistically significant impact. Whereas a higher number of female labourers 
(F-LABOUR) increases the probability of starting off-farm work, it reduces the 
risk of exiting off-farm occupation for non-participation. This might be ex-
plained by the characteristics of agricultural work and Zhejiang province’s in-
dustrial structure
7. Considering the influence that communist party membership 
(PMEMBER) played on labour market transition, party members show a higher 
probability of entering off-farm occupation. Whereas the estimated hazard rate 
of transfers (TRANSFER) is highly statistically significant, the magnitude of the 
coefficient implies only a very small effect on the transition into off-farm work. 
Interestingly, the effect of durable production capital (ASSETS) works in the 
same direction for both transitions. Wealthier households have a lower probability 
of moving out of their current regime. This applies more for the transition s→n 
than vice versa, where an increase of about 1,000 Yuan per capita reduces the 
probability of exiting off-farm work by 14 %, and regarding the transition into 
off-farm participation, the hazard rate goes down by 5  %. Contradictory to 
findings from the literature, an increase of sown area per capita (SOWN) by one 
mu
8 increases the hazard rate of entering off-farm labour (n→s) by 5 %, keeping 
other variables constant over time. Moreover, a bigger size of sown area has no 
significant impact on the opposite transition. The covariate of agricultural in-
come (AGR-INC) has a very strong negative effect on the probability of house-
holds’ transition into off-farm work, but a highly positive effect on transition 
into non-participation. This is the only covariate which has a significant impact 
                                                 
7  Employment in manufacturing, as well as wholesale and retail trade in Zhejiang, is signifi-
cantly above the national average: 28 % compared to 11 %, as well as 11 % in comparison 
to 7 %, respectively (SSB). 
8 1mu=0.067  hectare. Dynamics of labour market participation 
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on both transitions and drives the hazard function in different directions depending 
on the state of origin.  
Considering village income per capita (ANIPP), it could be seen that households 
located in the wealthier villages tend to show a higher persistence of current la-
bour market participation, although the magnitude of the hazard rate implies 
only a negligible quantitative effect. We find a statistically significant and posi-
tive effect of the population density (POPDENS) on the transition probability. 
More urbanized villages offer more income possibilities for rural households, 
which increases their mobility. Estimating the model with the three groups of 
explanatory variables separately provides similar results, which underlines the 
stability of the presented results.  
Assessing future development is difficult. On the one hand, the increasing edu-
cational level of rural households will lead to the higher persistence of labour 
market regimes. The further urbanization of villages might, on the other hand, 
increase the mobility between off-farm work and exclusive agricultural produc-
tion. That the process of increasing off-farm participation is not reversible is 
shown by the effect of agricultural income. Increasing profitability of agricul-
tural production poses a high incentive for households to interrupt off-farm work 
and to concentrate on agriculture while at the same time reducing the probability 
of leaving for off-farm employment. 
5 SUMMARY  
The study contributes to the on-going debate over the participation of Chinese 
agricultural households on rural labour markets during the 1990s. In particular, 
the focus of attention has been on the frequency of each possible transition from 
non-participation to off-farm employment and vice versa. To empirically evaluate 
factors such as household, farm, and regional characteristics affecting the fre-
quency of transition between labour market states, we apply a continuous-time 
hazard approach to a 7-year panel survey of Chinese households. 
The results of the work firstly suggest that there is a significantly higher persis-
tence of off-farm employment than of non-participation in off-farm businesses. In 
other words, the probability of entering off-farm work is in any year higher than 
the probability of exiting labour markets. Thus, the analysis reveals similar 
asymmetric behaviour between entry and exit from part-time farming as observed 
in other countries (GOULD and SAUPE, 1989; WEISS, 1997). Interestingly, the per-
sistence of non-participation significantly increases during the last year. The un-
derlying causes of this could be numerous, ranging from declining employment 
opportunities in industry to relaxed planting requirements in 2000 and therefore 
more opportunities for diversifying agricultural production (KEIDEL, 2001). Thomas Glauben, Thomas Herzfeld, Xiaobing Wang 
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Unfortunately, data for the most recent years are lacking. It could not be ob-
served whether a stable trend towards less off-farm participation is emerging. 
Regarding the impact of farm and household characteristics on the risk of 
changing a given employment regime, we find that education increases the per-
sistence to remain in the currently occupied regime. Education may increase re-
gime-specific returns to human capital in off-farm work as well as in agricultural 
production, which lowers the probability of leaving the state currently occupied. 
This might indicate that more educated persons will accumulate more and faster 
task-specific skills and therefore face a lower risk of dismissal. Furthermore, the 
probability of participating in any off-farm occupation increases with party 
membership and farm size, and is higher in more densely populated villages. In 
addition, higher assets and higher agricultural incomes reduce the inclination of 
starting off-farm work. The probability of exiting off-farm work to concentrate 
on agricultural production increases with agricultural income and a location’s 
population density. 
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This paper explores the differences between agricultural market channels in 
Romania and how these differences are important in promoting a commercial 
orientation, which in turn can improve the functioning of output markets. The 
study uses an Agricultural Household Survey from 2003 and analyses the charac-
teristics of market channels in terms of transaction costs, transportation costs 
and product specificity. This study finds that selling to traders, wholesalers and 
processors is associated with low transaction costs and a high level of commer-
cial orientation, while both selling at markets and to farmers involve high transac-
tion costs and are mostly practiced by subsistence farmers. A correlation analy-
sis at the regional level, as well as the Heckman and Tobit regressions, highlight 
the positive relationship between the presence of traders, wholesalers and proces-
sors and a farm's degree of commercial orientation. Promoting low transaction 
cost buyers – traders, wholesalers and processors – increases commercial orien-
tation, which in turn furthers viable input and output markets, thus contributing 
to the overall commercialization of Romanian agriculture. 
Keywords: Commercial orientation, market channels, Romania. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
During Romania's transition to a market economy, structural agricultural changes 
such as land privatisation and the downsizing of production units have taken 
place. As a result of reform, numerous small individual farms have emerged. 
However, the reforms did not focus on restructuring down and upstream sectors 
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as per the needs of new agricultural producers, therefore the use of output mar-
kets involved high transaction and transportation costs. The transaction and 
transportation costs of the various market channels have contributed to the de-
crease of agricultural supply from agricultural producers and therefore a de-
crease in commercial orientation
1. Impact was registered in the other direction as 
well: The low and unstable agricultural supply from subsistence farmers further 
decreased the functioning and performance of output markets. This paper seeks 
to explore the differences in agricultural market channels in Romania in terms of 
transaction and transportation costs, and how these differences are important in 
promoting commercial orientation, which in turn can improve the functioning of 
output markets.  
The methodology employed in this study consists of descriptive and economet-
ric analysis. First, the output markets and commercial orientation during transi-
tion are presented and measures of commercial orientation are calculated. Various 
market channels are then distinguished, such as occasional sales to farmers, 
markets, traders, processors and wholesalers; next, market channel characteris-
tics in terms of transaction, transportation costs and product specificity are ana-
lysed. The impact of demand from different market channels on commercial ori-
entation is studied with the help of correlation analysis, a Heckman selection 
model and a Tobit model. Analysis is based on an agricultural household survey 
from 2003 (AHS,2003) collected as part of a PhD research. 
2 OUTPUT MARKETS AND COMMERCIAL ORIENTATION DURING 
TRANSITION 
The individual farms that have emerged in Romania during transition play 
mainly a social role, providing basic subsistence to rural, and in part, to the ur-
ban population (OECD, 2000). The subsistence characteristics of the new pro-
ducers are related to the difficulties they face with respect to production as well as 
sales. The farmers lack agronomical knowledge, capital and machinery and thus 
have returned to traditional crops which require a low quantity of inputs. Due to 
the specificity of land restitution, the land owned by peasants was small and 
fragmented, which contributed to the increase in transaction costs for production 
and sales, for example in transportation and quality control. Transaction costs, to-
gether with the risk-averse attitude of the farmers, determined the diversification 
                                                 
1  Subsistence farming and commercial orientation are two complementary concepts. Subsis-
tence farming is frequently defined as the share of production used in the self-consumption 
of the household. Often, a 50 % share of production for self-consumption is considered as 
a sign of subsistence (BRUENTRUP and HEIDHUES, 2002;WHARTON,1969). In line with this 
argument, commercial orientation is defined as when more than 50 % of the output is mar-
keted. Market channels and commercial orientation in Romania 
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of agricultural production, increased self-consumption and decreased reliance on 
the markets. The decrease in the use of markets, through a low level of agricul-
tural products supply, as well as input demand, has furthered the slow develop-
ment of commodity markets and input provision (TESLIUC, 2000). 
In addition to the characteristics of the individual farmers, the late reforms have 
also influenced the poor development of the farm input and output marketing 
system. Prior to economic transition, collective and state farms occupied 90 % 
of the agricultural territory, with the input and output side of production organ-
ised by state companies (KENNETH, 2003;OECD, 2000). However, reforms did 
not target the restructuring of down and upstream sectors in line with the needs 
of the individual farmers, therefore the input and output markets were not suitable 
for them (TESLIUC, 2000).  
For example, processing factories, which represent an important channel of sales 
and the only outlet for some technical crops, have only slowly been privatised. 
Indeed, while in the 1990s several small-scale private food processing enter-
prises emerged, the privatisation of medium and large-scale upstream and down-
stream companies was rather slow, and has been accelerating only since 1998. 
By the end of 1999, only 36 % of the processing factories had been privatised 
(OECD, 2000). 













1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 
Source: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS (NIS), 2004. 
Privatisation was desirable since the companies in both the upstream and down-
stream sector were characterised by low productivity, outdated technology, lack 
of adaptation to demand and a monopolistic position towards producers. In most 
cases, even privatisation did not bring about improvements in productivity and 
competitiveness. The amount of foreign direct investment in the food industry 
has been very low. The small- and medium-scale enterprises were privatised Borbala Balint 
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mainly through management-employee buyouts, transferring the companies to 
employees who lacked the necessary management skills and experience as well 
as capital. Furthermore, bankruptcy law has not been applied for social reasons, 
thus blocking potentially more effective producers from overtaking the compa-
nies (OECD, 2000). 
Along with the sluggishness of privatisation and structural changes in agricul-
ture, there was an important drop in the quantity of processed agricultural products 
from 1990 on. Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the production of processed ag-
ricultural goods, taking 1993 as a base year with an indicator of 100. 
3 COMMERCIAL ORIENTATION OF THE ROMANIAN HOUSEHOLDS 
Commercial orientation is approximated on the output side as the share of agri-
cultural sales in production (VON BRAUN, 1994). Measures of commercial orien-
tation encountered in the empirical studies are work time of the household for 
household agriculture in hours per year (SEETH et al., 1998), the allocation of la-
bour in peasant households towards non-farm work (KEISTER and NEE, 2001), 
total sales and total sales per hectare (MATHIJS and NOEV, 2004) or the ratio of 
land dedicated to individual farming (RIZOV et al., 2001).  
Based on the above studies, the research uses two measures of commercial orien-
tation: Share of sales value from production value – henceforth referred to as the 
commercial orientation index – and total agricultural sales. 
Total sales are calculated by aggregating the value of sales for different agricul-
tural products. For the commercial orientation index, the value of production must 
first be calculated. Given that the output is composed of 17 crops and 17 animals 
and animal products, and that prices are observed only when there are sales, it is 
not straightforward which price to use in the valuation of production if no sales 
occurred. Therefore, for the localities where there are households who produced 
but did not sell some products, farm-gate prices are calculated. Further, farm-
gate prices are used in the valuation of production whenever there are no sales 
prices for the household’s products
2. For some products, since there are not 
enough cases of sales and therefore price observations, farm-gate prices cannot 
be calculated. These products are thus left out of the commercial orientation in-
dex calculation. 
Based on the calculations, the average sales value per household is 1,482 Euro 
for 2002, and 172 households (more than half of the sample) are sellers. The 
commercial orientation index is calculated for 166 households only, since farm-
gate prices are not available for some products, and thus the share of sales from 
                                                 
2  Farm-gate prices are calculated by decreasing county-level main market prices with trans-
portation and transaction costs in order to get local level farm-gate prices. Market channels and commercial orientation in Romania 
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production can not always be valued. Sellers of the products with missing farm-
gate prices number 6 households, accounting for the difference in the number of 
observations for total sales and the commercial orientation index. The average 
value of the commercial orientation index is rather low – 30 % – suggesting that 
even the seller households have a strong subsistence characteristic (AHS, 2003). 
4 MARKET CHANNELS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS 
4.1  Transaction and transportation costs  
Transaction and transportation costs are assumed to be important determinants 
of commercial orientation in the Romanian context. Transaction costs of sales 
are composed of information, negotiation, screening, enforcement and supervi-
sion costs. Information costs represent the costs of searching for a partner with 
whom to exchange, screening the potential trading partners’ trustworthiness and 
searching for the best price. Bargaining costs are costs incurred when negotiating 
with potential trading partners in order to reach an agreement. After the transac-
tion has occurred the agreement needs to be monitored and enforced (HOBBS, 
1997; KEY et al., 2000; STAAL et al., 1997). Moreover, costs are incurred when 
transferring the product between the parties (KEY et al., 2000; STAAL et al., 1997). 
The five market channels distinguished in AHS 2003, selling to farmers, traders, 
selling on the market, selling to processors and wholesalers
3, have different 
characteristics with respect to transaction and transportation costs and thus have 
an important influence on market participation and the commercial orientation 
of the Romanian households. 
Selling to local farmers or at the market involves a high level of uncertainty with 
respect to price and demand, as well as high search costs. For example, farmers 
spend several days at the market waiting for buyers. Selling to traders involves 
lower uncertainty and less search costs, with the traders usually coming to the 
village every year at harvest time. Processors and wholesalers represent more cer-
tain demand and low search costs, since farmers are, in general, knowledgeable 
about the demand of these entities and about price (own interviews). A further 
factor decreasing fixed transaction costs is the difference in the scale of sales to 
different channels (Table 1). The average value sold per household increases as 
the market channel changes from farmers to market, then to traders, to wholesalers, 
and finally to processors.  
                                                 
3  From the market channels, an "other" channel which could not be classified in any of the 
above categories is left out of the analysis. The "other" channel was used by only 1 % of 
sellers.  Borbala Balint 
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Table 1:  Differences between market channels 
  Farmer Market  Trader  Wholesaler  Processors
Avg. value sales per seller 
(Euro)  627 689 800 1,055 1,535
Share of sellers using a given 
market channel (%)  25 % 22 % 18 % 7 %  26 %
Avg. distance of transport 
(km)  1.6 12.0 2.0 3.6 5.6
Max. distance of transport 
(km)  25.0 40.0 30.0 25.0 32.0
Source: AHS,  2003. 
Notes:  Avg. = average, max. = maximum. 
Even if there is a difference between the market channels in terms of transaction 
costs, the relation between market channels and commercial orientation is not 
straightforward. Differences in transaction costs are translated in differences in 
prices. The prices for all crops and animal products are, depending on the product, 
on average, 4-52 % lower when selling to a trader, wholesaler or processor than 
the price when selling to farmers or at the market (AHS, 2003). Moreover, traders, 
wholesalers and processors paid late in 7 % of the cases, while there was no de-
layed payment when selling to the farmer or market (AHS, 2003). In addition, 
some low transaction cost alternatives such as processing factories are in a phase 
of restructuring, which means high uncertainty with respect to their performance, 
such as demand and payment capacity. 
A larger quantity demanded from processors and wholesalers may imply a low 
number of sellers. Large amounts bought from each peasant means that there is 
more scope for large farmers, not as much for subsistence farmers, to sell. Proces-
sing factories have certain quality requirements which may render unlikely a 
high share of participation in the output markets.  
Differences in transportation costs for different market channels also complicate 
the interaction between market channels and market participation. Some of the 
market channels have specific transportation costs, for example sales to farmers 
usually occurred at the local level and sales to traders occurred either in the vil-
lage or at a distance close to the village, therefore these two market channels 
have very low transportation costs. Wholesalers and processors are located fur-
ther away, while the highest is the average distance of transportation to the mar-
ket (Table 1). 
Although, as pointed out above, it is possible that the difference in transaction 
costs of the market channels are offset by the differences in prices, risks and 
specific transportation costs of the channels, for simplicity the market channels 
are categorised in terms of transaction cost differences. Thus, below, low transac-
tion cost market channels – traders, wholesalers, processors – and high transac-
tion cost market channels – markets, farmers – are distinguished.  Market channels and commercial orientation in Romania 
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4.2 Product  specificity 
Different products have various market channels and different degrees to which 
they are marketed and are commercial. For example, processing is targeting cer-
tain products like wheat, rye, sugar beets, sunflower, milk, milk products and 
meat products. Some of these products – like sugar beets and sunflower – in an 
unprocessed form have very little use for peasants. Therefore, peasants usually 
decide to sell these products the moment they decide to produce them. 
Table 2 and Table 3 illustrate the relationship between the different products and 
product groups as well as commercial orientation. The products and product 
groups are described in terms of percentage of producers from all households, 
sellers from producers and share of sales from total production in the case of 
sellers. At some product groups where farm-gate prices were not calculated, the 
share of sales value from production value is not reported. This is the case for 
animal feed, fruits and vegetables in Table 2, and for subsistence food products 
in Table 3. 








Share of sales 
from prod. 
Share of sellers 
to low TC  
Buyers 
Grains  94 %  10 %  42 %  53 % 
Potatoes  28 %  11 %  40 %  40 % 
Technical crops  23 %  48 %  91 %  91 % 
Animal feed  42 %  5 %  –  0 % 
Vegetables  9 %  15 %  70 %  0 % 
Fruits  8 %  29 %  63 %  29 % 
Grapes  29 %  20 %  80 %  72 % 
Source: AHS,  2003. 
Notes:  Prod. = production; TC = transaction costs; grains = wheat, corn, oat, barley, rye; 
technical crops = sunflower, soya, sugarbeet; animal feed = fodder, hay, lucerne. 
According to the information presented in Table 2, different crops can be distin-
guished depending on lower or higher subsistence orientation. Grains such as 
wheat, corn, oat, barley and rye as well as potatoes are produced in most of the 
households. They are sold in about 10 % of the cases and the sellers commer-
cialise less than half of the production. These crops have more of a role providing 
the households and their livestock with food and less of a commercialisation 
role. Technical crops –sunflower, soya and sugar beets – are cash crops, pro-
duced only in one quarter of the households, sold by about half of the producers, 
and the share of sales from total production is very high. The role of grapes as 
cash crops depends on the region; in regions specialised in wine production they 
are cash crops, in the rest they contribute to the diet of the household. Vegetables 
and fruits are occasionally produced and sold, thus, they could be considered as 
cash crops in part, as they complement household income. Hay, lucerne and Borbala Balint 
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fodder are subsistence crops used for feeding animals, and are often produced 
but almost never sold.  
In addition to the subsistence nature of the products, the type of market channel 
used in commercialisation is presented. Table 2 illustrates that the more com-
mercial the product or product group is, the more often it is commercialised 
through low transaction cost market channels. Indeed, the highest share com-
mercialised through low transaction cost market channels occurred in the case of 
technical crops, followed by grapes, grains, potatoes and fruits. Vegetables and 
animal feed were not sold to traders, wholesalers or processors. 
Table 3:  Commercial orientation and market channel characteristics of 












low TC  
buyers 
Cattle  60 %  37 %  56 %  43 % 
Horses  35 %  13 %  12 %  7 % 
Donkeys  2 %  0 %  0 %  – 
Pig  88 %  26 %  56 %  40 % 
Sheep  30 %  18 %  64 %  41 % 
Subsistence food products  99 %  3 %  –  9 % 
Animal products  98 %  26 %  52 %  37 % 
Source: AHS,  2003. 
Notes:  Prod. = production; TC = transaction costs; cattle = cow, oxen, bulls; subsistence 
food products = rabbits, poultry, bees, pork meat, chicken meat, beef meat, meat 
products; animal products = milk, cheese, eggs. 
In the case of animals and animal products, several groups can be distinguished 
according to the commercial character of the product and its role in consumption 
(Table  3). Therefore, livestock such as cattle, pigs and sheep are frequently 
owned by the household, and are sold in a third of the cases. They could thus be 
classified as semi-subsistence products. Subsistence food products – rabbit, poul-
try, pork, beef and other meat products – are bred or produced in all the house-
holds and almost never sold. Indeed, livestock owned by the household is the 
source of meat products for self-consumption. Milk, cheese and eggs form an 
animal product group which is always produced, and in one-third of the cases 
marketed. In terms of commercial orientation, except for subsistence food products, 
horses and donkey, all the animals and animal products are, in more than half of 
the cases, commercialised. 
The commercial characteristic of the products and the type of market channels 
where they are most often marketed display patterns similar to the case of crops. 
Subsistence food products, horses and donkeys are least often marketed through 
low transaction cost market channels, while semi-subsistence animal products, Market channels and commercial orientation in Romania 
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cattle, pig and sheep are sold to wholesalers, traders and processors in slightly 
less than half of the cases. 
4.3 Correlation  analysis 
In order to understand the relationship between different sales channels and 
market participation, it is necessary to analyse some correlation coefficients at 
the regional level. Table 4 presents the correlation of two market channel charac-
teristics with the percentage of sellers and the share of sales from the total pro-
duction of the respective localities. The market channel characteristics are the 
regional share of sales to different market channels and the percentage of sellers 
which sell to a given market channel from total sellers in the locality. Only few 
correlations are significant, owing to the fact that the correlation was performed 
on just 15 observations from the 15 localities where the survey was conducted. 
Table 4:  Correlation between the regional characteristics of market 
channels and sales 
Corr. of share of sales in total 
loc. sales to different market 
channels, with: 
Corr. of share of sellers from 
loc. Sellers which sell to dif-
ferent market channels, with: Market channels 
% of sellers 
in loc. 
Loc. share of 
sales in prod. 
% of sellers 
in loc. 
Loc. share of 
sales in prod. 
Farmer -0.07 -0.05 -0.41   -0.08 
Market 0.04 -0.43 -0.36   -0.51  **
Trader 0.48 * 0.22 0.46 *  -0.10 
Wholesaler -0.17 0.07 0.47 *  0.24 
Private processor  -0.21 -0.10 -0.07   0.04 
State processor  0.02 0.25 0.65 ***  0.78  ***
Wholesaler and processors  -0.23 0.18 0.36   0.52  **
Trader, wholesaler and 
procs. 0.03 0.31 0.44 *  0.30 
Farmer and market  -0.04 -0.32 -0.31   -0.30 
Source:   AHS,2003. 
Notes:  Corr. = correlation, loc. = locality, prod. = production, procs. = processors,   
*** Significance at 1 % level, ** Significance at 5 % level, * Significance at 10 % level. 
Table 4 illustrates that the two types of market channel characteristics correlate 
in different patterns with the percentage of sellers in the locality and the share of 
sales in total production. The share of sales to high/low transaction cost market 
channels does not correlate with market participation. Even more strikingly, the 
share of sales to wholesalers and processors correlates negatively with market 
participation. This finding is contrary to the correlation between the share of 
sellers from total locality sellers which sell to wholesalers and processors and 
market participation. At the same time, the percentage of sellers in the locality 
positively correlates with the percentage of sellers from total locality sellers to 
low transaction cost alternatives – traders, wholesalers and processors – and Borbala Balint 
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negatively correlates with the share of sellers which sell to high transaction cost 
alternatives. The findings highlight that in the case of a large share of sales to 
wholesalers and processors, only few farmers participate in the market. This 
finding parallels the fact that a larger average quantity is sold to wholesalers and 
processors than to other market channels (Table 1). 
In the case of the locality-specific share of sales from total production correla-
tion, both the share of sales in the locality to a given market channel and the 
share of sellers from locality sellers which sell to a given market channel exhibit 
more or less similar patterns. The locality-specific commercial orientation index 
positively correlates with the share of sales to low transaction cost buyers and 
with the share of sellers in the locality to low transaction cost buyers. The com-
mercial orientation index negatively correlates with the share of sales value to 
high transaction cost buyers and with the share of sellers to high transaction cost 
buyers.  
In the case of processors we notice a peculiar impact, since state-owned proces-
sors have a positive impact, while privatised processors have a small negative or 
no impact on the percentage of sellers and share of sales from total production. 
This could be explained by the fact that privatised companies do not always per-
form well. Indeed, as mentioned, in most cases privatisation has occurred 
through employee-management buyout, therefore worsening the lack of capital 
and know-how and the performance of the privatised processors (OECD, 2000). 
Another explanation is that peasants associate positive experiences with the state 
enterprises and many of them nostalgically think back to communist times. It is 
possible that whenever peasants had positive experiences with the processors, 
they tended to report that they sold to state-owned enterprises. At the same time, 
it could be that the enterprises had already been privatised. 
5 RELATION OF MARKET CHANNELS TO COMMERCIAL  
ORIENTATION 
The problem of commercial orientation can be conceptually defined with the help 
of an agricultural household model incorporating transaction costs (KEY et al., 
2000; OMAMO, 1998). The model is estimated econometrically with the help of a 
sample selection model (GOETZ, 1995).  
The sample selection model can be estimated by Heckman’s two-step estimation 
or by Heckman’s Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), as well as by Tobit 
estimation. In the Heckman two-step estimation, first the decision to sell is re-
gressed on different factors, and the Mills ratio is calculated. In the second stage, 
an ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used and total sales respective to 
the share sold from total production are regressed on the independent variables Market channels and commercial orientation in Romania 
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and the inverse Mills ratio. The MLE jointly estimates selection and the second 
stage regression while accounting for the selection bias (GOETZ, 1995).  
Besides the Heckman selection model, another model employed in the analysis 
of commercial orientation is the Tobit model. While the Heckman model has the 
advantage of pointing out separate impacts of variables on the decisions of mar-
ket participation and the intensity of participation – sales and commercial orien-
tation – the Tobit model can show the impact of variables which jointly affect 
the probability of participation and intensity of participation. Therefore, for a 
thorough analysis of the impact of market channels on commercial orientation, 
both the Heckman and the Tobit models are used (GOETZ, 1995). 
5.1 Variables 
The dependent variables in the models are the square root of sales and the square 
root of the transformed commercial orientation index
4. Square root transforma-
tions are applied in order to bring the distribution of sales and commercial orien-
tation closer to the truncated normal distribution. 
The explanatory variables consist of household characteristics, prices, produc-
tion characteristics, production factors, transaction costs – approximated partly 
by market channels – and transportation costs. As household characteristics, 
size, the age of the head of household, gender and education are analysed. Wheat 
and milk prices are used in the regression from the 20 agricultural products prices 
used for calculating the commercial orientation index. Including more prices 
would lead to the loss of degrees of freedom and would likely introduce multi-
collinearity, since most product prices correlate with each other. 
The number of agricultural products produced by the household represents pro-
duction characteristics in the regression. Production factors are cultivated land 
size, family and hired labour, machinery, livestock and amount of yearly non-
agricultural income
5. For the purpose of normalisation, cultivated land size, 
family labour, hired labour and livestock are included in the square root form.  
The locality share of sellers which sell to low transaction cost buyers is used as 
an approximation for transaction costs. Other variables approximating transac-
tion and transportation costs are an indicator of informal cooperation, the locality 
output-weighted average distance to the sales point, the type of road leading to 
the village and a dummy for the counties from Transylvania where formal coopera-
tive forms existed.  
                                                 
4  The commercial orientation index is a bounded variable between 0 and 1, and for the pur-
poses of estimation needs to be transformed into a positive unbounded variable. The trans-
formation, following ROLLER  and  WAVERMAN, 2001,is: Commercial orientation index/ 
(1-commercial orientation index). 
5  Only non-agricultural income is included in the regression in order to avoid endogeneity 
problems, which would likely be the case if the whole income would be included. Borbala Balint 
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The approximation of most of the variables is self-explanatory and their measure-
ment unit is reported together with the regression results. Some of the variables 
not clarified in the regression results are explained in the following. 
Machinery is by calculated adding 1 for the ownership of a truck, 1 for the owner-
ship of a tractor, 0.2 for the ownership of a plough for the tractor, 2 for the pos-
session of a combine, 0.5 for the ownership of a carriage and 1 for the owner-
ship of a harvesting machine. Therefore, machinery takes a minimum value of 0 
and a maximum value of 5.7. Livestock is calculated by adding the number of 
cattle, the number of pigs multiplied by 0.5 and the number of sheep multiplied 
by 0.3. The calculations for livestock and machinery are based on the methodol-
ogy of another study on Romania (RIZOV et al., 2001).  
The approximation for informal cooperation is a variable with the value of one if 
the household cooperated with the owners of the neighbouring plot with respect 
to the planting of compatible crops, and zero if not. This variable is a rough ap-
proximation of informal cooperation; however, it is the only one available. The 
variable formal cooperation takes the value of one for localities with profes-
sional associations, and zero otherwise.  
5.2  Heckman and Tobit regressions 
Some variables in the Heckman regression influence the decision to sell, but not 
the amount sold or the commercial orientation index, and vice-versa. Therefore, 
the variables included in the selection equation and in the regression of the 
amount sold and commercial orientation – in what follows referred to as the in-
tensity regression – differ to some extent. The difference between the variables 
in the two parts of the Heckman regressions is important for avoiding a high cor-
relation between the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the selection equation 
and the explanatory variables of the intensity regressions. 
Age, age squared and age cubed are included in the selection equation, based on 
the examination of the graphical relationship of age and probability of sales. In-
deed, when testing the model with age (model 1), age and age-squared (model 2) 
and age, age squared and age cubed (model 3), the Akaike information criteria 
(AIC) suggests that the best model is  model 3  (AIC 294.4),  then  model 1 
(AIC 295.8) and finally model 2 (AIC 296.5). In the intensity regressions, only 
age is included. 
Other differences are the inclusion of the number of products in the intensity re-
gression but not in the selection equation. A low number of products and thus 
high specialisation is expected to promote commercial orientation and sales, 
while it is expected to have no impact on the decision to sell.  
The variable approximating transaction costs, the percentage of sellers to a low 
transaction cost alternative from total sales, is included in both the selection 
equation and the intensity regression. However, while in the selection equation Market channels and commercial orientation in Romania 
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the share of sellers in the locality which sell to a low transaction cost alternative 
from total village sellers is used, in the intensity regression, the individual share 
of sales value to a low transaction cost alternative from total sales value is in-
cluded. The case for the distance to the sales point is similar, where the explana-
tory variable in the selection equation is the output-weighted distance of trans-
portation to the sales point specific for the village, calculated by averaging the 
output-weighted distances across all villagers. The weighted average distance is 
calculated from the distance of transportation for different agricultural products 
weighted by the share of sales value of the products in total sales, taking into 
consideration only distances below 60 km
6. In the intensity regression, the 
weighted average distance of transportation specific to the individual households 
is included. 
The dummy of formal cooperation is included in the selection equation but not 
in the intensity of participation regression. It is expected that formal cooperation 
will lower fixed transaction costs and thus influence market participation, but 
not the degree of participation. Indeed, the agricultural household model sug-
gests that fixed transaction costs will only influence the market participation de-
cision (KEY et al., 2000).  
In the Tobit regression, most variables present in the Heckman regressions are 
included. Here, the locality-specific market channels and transportation distances 
are used since the dependent variables in the Tobit regression refer to both non-
sellers and sellers. 
Table 5 presents the results of the Heckman and Tobit regressions. The Heckman 
regression is approximated by MLE, since, if the underlying assumptions of the 
model are correct, MLE is a more efficient estimation method than the two stage 
regression (WOOLDRIDGE, 2002, pp. 385-386). The Tobit and the Heckman re-
gression results are similar, and there are no cases where the Heckman selection 
and intensity regression coefficients would both be insignificant, while being sig-
nificant in the Tobit regression. Therefore, significant Tobit coefficients reflect 
either the selection or the intensity of participation effects, or both. Given the 
redundant nature of the Tobit regression results to the Heckman regression re-
sults, the Tobit regression coefficients are not discussed. 
                                                 
6  Four cases with more than 60 km transportation are left out from the calculations. Indeed, 
distances longer than 60 km may be due to considerations other than sales (e.g. a scheduled 
trip). Borbala Balint 
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Table 5:  Heckman and Tobit regression results 
  Heckman MLE  Tobit 






















Household size  -0.81 -0.09*  -0.03  -0.11**  -2.25***  -0.07** 
Age head (years)  -0.14** -0.56***  -0.01**  -0.58***  -0.12  -0.00 
Age head squared   0.01**    0.01***    
Age head cube   -0.00**    -0.00**    
Education (1-12 years or 
more, 0-11 years or less)  5.72** -0.05  0.08  0.02  4.79  0.06 
Wheat price (thou ROL)  1.81* -0.17 0.09*  -0.13  -0.78 -0.02 
Milk price (thou ROL)  0.42 0.26***  -0.02  0.25***  2.88***  0.07** 
Agric. products in house-
hold  -0.76**   -0.03**    0.30  0.03 
Sqrt. cultivated land (ha)  4.53*** 0.44**  0.06  0.52***  6.88*** 0.15** 
Sqrt. family labor  
(man-days/month)  0.12 0.04  -0.03*  0.03  0.43 -0.00 
Sqrt. hired labor  
(man-days/month)  0.95** 0.28***  0.03  0.24***  1.10*  0.02 
Machinery  2.11* 0.20  -0.03  0.24  1.75  -0.03 
Sqrt. Livestock  3.47** 0.63***  -0.05 0.65***  7.86***  0.09* 
Owner of car  
(1-yes, 0-no)  4.94** -0.07  0.16**  -0.10  3.77  0.10 
Non-agric. income (Euro)  0.00 0.00*  0.00  0.00**  0.00**  0.00** 
Informal coop.  
(1-yes, 0-no)  3.05** 0.30*  0.07  0.36**  5.32** 0.13 
Individual share of sales 
in total to low TC  
buyers  
2.39   0.11* 
    
Share of sellers in  
ocality selling to low TC 
buyers 
 
1.35***   1.27***  20.55***  0.87*** 
Individual transp.  
dist.(km)  -0.16   -0.01*       
Locality transp. dist. (km)   -0.11***    -0.11***  -1.24***  -0.04*** 
Formal coop.  
(1-yes, 0-no) 
  0.57**   0.64*** 4.46  0.11 
Constant  15.14 6.96*  1.39***  7.25**  -41.61***  -0.91* 
Observations  286 286  287  287  288 289 
Source: AHS,2003. 
Notes:  Sqrt. = square root, agric. = agricultural, com.or. = commercial orientation, thou = 
thousand, coop.= cooperation, TC = transaction costs, transp. dist. = transportation 
distance, *** Significance at 1 % level, ** Significance at 5 % level, * Significance 
at 10 % level. 
  Gender and road type to locality are insignificant and are not reported in the table.  Market channels and commercial orientation in Romania 
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The Wald test for the Heckman selection model rejects the hypothesis that there 
would be selection bias. Therefore, the sales and commercial orientation regres-
sions could be estimated by OLS regression without encountering the omitted 
variable problem (WOOLDRIDGE, 2002, pp. 563). 
The individual share of sales to low transaction cost market channels positively 
influences commercial orientation. Moreover, the locality share of sellers to low 
transaction cost buyers positively influences market participation. These findings 
suggest that besides proportional transaction costs, households face important fixed 
transaction costs. Thus, the low transaction cost buyers – wholesalers, traders and 
processors – promote market participation through lower market entry costs.  
Other proxies for transaction costs and transportation costs, such as informal co-
operation, low distance and formal cooperation, all promote market participa-
tion. Interestingly, informal cooperation plays an important role in the quantity 
sold, not in the share sold from total production, while the individual share of 
sales to low transaction cost buyers, similar to the individual distance to the 
sales point, is more important for commercial orientation than for sales. Indeed, 
one would expect that cooperation with neighbours may reduce transaction costs 
and thus increase sales. However, commercial farmers do not sacrifice much 
time for building informal relationships.  
Besides transaction and transportation costs, several other factors turn out to be 
important for commercial orientation. The fewer members the household has, 
the higher is market participation. Youth is an important factor in market par-
ticipation and sales, as well as commercial orientation. Education plays an im-
portant role in the amount sold; however, not in market participation.  
Wheat prices are important for the intensity of market participation – sales and 
commercial orientation – while milk prices are important factors determining the 
decision to sell. If one considers that wheat prices stand for the commercial and 
semi-commercial crops and milk for animal products, the results suggest that 
there is a higher potential for crop producers to become commercial and sell 
more, while this is not so much the case for those with animal products. Animal 
products and their prices, given their perishable nature, are more likely to influence 
the household in its decision to sell. 
The number of products produced has a negative impact on the intensity of mar-
ket participation, specialisation in few products, promoting the amount sold and 
commercial orientation.  
Factors of production such as cultivated land size, hired labour and livestock 
positively influence market participation and the amount sold. Machinery posi-
tively influences the amount sold, car ownership promotes the amount sold and 
commercial orientation, while non-agricultural income – although with a low 
value – is influential on the decision to sell. The degree of commercial orientation 
is negatively influenced by household labour. The positive impact of hired labour Borbala Balint 
 
264
and negative impact of family labour illustrates that commercial farmers rely on 
hired labour and not on family resources. 
6 CONCLUSION 
The paper addresses the issue of how differences in Romanian market channels 
determine commercial orientation. For this purpose, the characteristics of different 
market channels are analysed and their relation to commercial orientation is 
studied with the help of correlation analysis, Heckman and Tobit regressions. 
The paper finds that low transaction cost market channels – traders, wholesalers 
and processors – as well as high transaction cost market channels – farmers and 
markets – can be distinguished. The correlation analysis and the econometric es-
timations show that the more sellers in the locality sell to traders, wholesalers 
and processors, the more likely is market participation and the higher is the 
amount sold and degree of commercial orientation. Moreover, the higher the in-
dividual share of sales value to traders, wholesalers and processors, the more 
commercially-oriented the household is and the more it sells. 
The regressions also highlight other factors which influence market participation 
and commercial orientation. Informal and formal cooperation, as well as low 
transportation costs, are important determinants of market participation and/or 
the degree of market participation. Head of household characteristics – youth, 
education – small household size, and production factors such as land, hired la-
bour, machinery, income and car ownership all promote market participation 
and/or the intensity of participation. Wheat prices are important for the intensity 
of market participation, while milk prices, similar to livestock ownership, are in-
fluential on the decision to sell. A high amount of family labour employed in the 
household decreases commercial orientation. 
In order to further farms' commercial orientation, policy makers should encourage: 
The replacement of malfunctioning processing companies with viable ones; the 
improvement of their functioning; and the establishment of new processing fac-
tories and collection points. The resulting increased commercial orientation 
could then promote viable input and output markets and thus contribute to the 
overall commercialisation of Romanian agriculture. 
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POLICY INTERVENTION 
   
LAND REFORM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL LAND 






Russia has experienced dramatic changes in land ownership and land tenure 
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991: Agricultural land has been 
largely privatized, individual landowners now have legal rights to most agricul-
tural land in the country, and previous prohibitions on buying and selling land 
have recently been removed. The necessary pre-conditions for the development 
of agricultural land markets have been met and we are beginning to witness 
transactions that involve individual landowners, not just the state. However, fur-
ther development of the embryonic land market is severely circumscribed by the 
inadequacy of the administrative and technical infrastructure. In this paper we 
discuss the evolving legal framework for land reform, consider the impacts of 
land reform on privatization and ownership structure of agricultural land, and 
analyze the development of land market transactions. The analysis is based on 
official statistical sources and the results of a questionnaire-based survey con-
ducted by the authors in 2003 in three regions. The paper concludes with a re-
view of the existing constraints on land transactions and some policy recom-
mendations. 
Keywords: Agricultural land markets, land transactions, land leasing, land re-
form, transition countries, Russia. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Russia ranks fifth in the world in agricultural land area (after China, Australia, 
USA, and Brazil)
3. At 220 million hectares, Russia’s agricultural land matches 
that of the whole of Europe and is about 40 % of the agricultural land in China 
or in all 15 countries of the former USSR combined. Russia usually has a reputa-
tion for being a land-rich (mnogozemel’naya) country. Russia’s endowment of 
agricultural land is 5.5 hectares per rural resident, which is actually less than in the 
United States (6.3  hectares per rural resident), but much more than in China 
(0.7 hectares per rural resident) or India (0.3 hectares per rural resident). Availa-
bility of agricultural land is thus not a constraint in Russia, and yet land ownership 
is an emotionally charged issue that cuts across all segments of the population. 
This paper examines the dramatic changes in land ownership and land tenure 
that have occurred in Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
We start with a discussion of the legal framework for land reform that crystal-
lized in the early 1990s and has continued to evolve ever since; consider the im-
pacts of land reform on privatization and the ownership structure of agricultural 
land; and analyze the development of land market transactions. The analysis is 
based on official national sources and the results of a questionnaire-based survey 
conducted by the authors in 2003.
4 We conclude with a review of the existing 
constraints on land transactions and some policy recommendations. 
2 LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND LAND REFORM OUTCOMES 
Russia’s agricultural land area has remained remarkably stable, at 220 million 
hectares, since 1990. On the other hand, agricultural land used by producers 
(both corporate and individual farms) dropped from 214  million  hectares in 
1991 to 195 million hectares in 2003 – a decrease of 16 % during transition. The 
share of agricultural land used by farms declined from 96 % in 1991 to 88 % in 
2003. The remainder was transferred, primarily, to the state land reserve, which 
is a pool of land available for allocation to producers but not currently in use. 
The reclassification of land from farm use to rural municipalities also contributed 
to this decrease. The main change in agricultural land use occurred in 1998-99, 
when reserve land and land controlled by municipalities (and other users) 
abruptly doubled from 13 million hectares to 26 million hectares.  
                                           
3  The data in Section 1 are based on FAOSTAT – FAO’s on-line database, <www.fao.org>. 
4  The survey, referred to as the 2003 BASIS survey, was implemented by the Analytical 
Centre on Agri-Food Economics in Moscow as part of the BASIS/CRS research project 
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Table 2.1 shows the structure of agricultural land resources, by users, in 1991 and 
2003. In addition to the features discussed above, the table demonstrates the 
substantial transfer of land from corporate farms (former kolkhozes and sovkhozes) 
to the individual sector: Corporate farms lost 59 million hectares, or nearly 30 % 
of their total land endowment in 1991, while the individual sector gained 
40 million hectares (the remainder was absorbed by the state reserve and by user 
reclassification). The distribution of land flow between 1991 and 2003 is illus-
trated in Figure 2.1.  
Table 2.1  Structure of agricultural land by users in 1991 and 2003  
(beginning of year) 
Million ha  Percent   
2003 1991 2003 1991 
Total agricultural land  220.9  222.1  100.0  100.0 
Used by farms  194.6  213.8  88.1  96.3 
Corporate farms  150.4  209.8  68.1  94.5 
Peasant  farms  17.0 0.1 7.7 0.0 
Household  plots  11.8 3.9 5.3 1.8 
Municipal meadows and 
pastures in household use 
15.4 0  7.0 0 
Reserve  land  13.8 1.8 6.2 0.8 
Other  users  12.5 6.5 5.7 2.9 
Fig. 2.1. Agricultural land flows 1991-2003









Source: GOSKOMSTAT, 2003a. 
2.1 Historical  background 
Land in Russia (and in other parts of the former czarist empire) was nationalized 
within days of the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917, as Lenin’s Decree on 
Land (Dekret o zemle) transferred all land to the state and prohibited private land 
ownership. "Land to the peasants" was the slogan that the Bolsheviks used to Zvi Lerman, Natalya Shagaida  272 
attract the largely conservative peasantry to the revolutionary cause. Indeed, after 
1917, the land from large estates was distributed to the landless and the land-poor, 
and communal land was generally transferred to individual use (in a sense comple-
ting Stolypin’s unfinished reform that began in 1905 and was interrupted by the 
outbreak of World War I in 1914). Although the Bolshevik platform from the start 
advocated collective farming as the road to socialism, individual farming domi-
nated the Russian rural scene throughout the 1920s. Thus, of the 20 million hec-
tares distributed to the rural population from 1917-19, fully 95 % went to peasant 
families and only 5 % to various collectives and state farms.  
It was only in 1929 (after the severe grain procurement shortfalls of 1927-28) 
that Stalin initiated a forceful and brutal collectivization program, which rapidly 
led to total elimination of individual farming and the establishment of collective 
and state farms (kolkhozy and sovkhozy) as the monopolistic organizational form 
in Soviet agriculture. Russian peasants who had received individual land plots 
only a decade earlier were now forced to put their land and assets in collective 
farms. By the end of the 1930s, a relatively small number of socialized, or "pub-
lic-sector" farms (about 30,000 in total) controlled 98 % of agricultural land and 
produced most of the commercially marketed output. 
However, despite pervasive collectivization and monopolistic state ownership of 
land, individual or private agriculture quickly reemerged in a different guise. 
Independent peasants had disappeared, but millions of rural households were 
now allowed to cultivate small plots of less than 0.5 hectare, producing mainly 
for subsistence (although part of the output always found its way to farmers’ 
markets in nearby towns). The policy of allowing small-scale private farming on 
household plots within large collectives was implemented as a measure for im-
proving rural family incomes and mitigating the resistance of the peasantry to 
socialized agriculture. Household plots operated by employees of collective 
farms and other village residents controlled, in aggregate, 2 % of agricultural 
land, but still managed to produce 20 % of gross agricultural output. During 
most of the Soviet period, Russia’s agriculture was thus characterized by a dual 
farm structure in which commercial production from collective and state farms 
was supplemented by subsistence-oriented individual agriculture based on small 
household plots within the large collectives.  
Since the 1930s, collective and state farms were given state-owned land for 
permanent, perpetual use, without any payment. Transfers of land between these 
large corporate farms were initiated by orders from the authorities, as part of of-
ten changing government programs that aggregated or disaggregated collective 
farms and transformed kolkhozes into sovkhozes (or back). Rural households 
typically received their plots through use rights from the local collective farm 
and generally enjoyed security of tenure (subject to the administrative whims of 
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2.2 Reform  legislation 
After more than seven decades of state monopoly in land ownership, the first 
signs of readiness to reform the Soviet system were incorporated in the 1989 
Principles of Land Legislation of the USSR. This Union-level law relaxed the 
traditional policy of giving state land in use rights only, and introduced a new 
category of land tenure for rural households – lifetime inheritable possession 
(pozhiznennoe nasleduemoe vladenie). Security of tenure was formally ensured, 
but land transactions (including subleasing) were absolutely prohibited. From 
this point on, Russia took over the land reform initiatives from the USSR legis-
lators. In October 1990, more than a year before the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, Russia (then still called RSFSR – the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic) passed the Land Reform Law and introduced an appropriate constitu-
tional amendment that actually recognized the right of private ownership in agri-
cultural land. As a compromise, however, the amendment imposed a 10-year 
moratorium on the buying and selling of private land and restricted the alienation 
of land to the state (and not to other landowners).  
This was truly the beginning of the latest revolution in land-tenure relations in 
Russia. The trail-blazing constitutional amendment was followed by the Russian 
Law on Peasant Farms (December 1990), which legalized private farming, al-
lowed distribution of collective land in the form of paper shares to members, and 
provided the option of withdrawing land plots for the establishment of an inde-
pendent peasant farm outside the collectivist framework. Russia’s new Land 
Code, passed in April 1991, formalized these various legal initiatives and paved 
the way for the mass privatization of agricultural land.  
Land ownership is an emotionally charged issue in Russia. The passage of re-
form-oriented land laws was accompanied by dramatic political debates, and the 
sharply opposed positions of the reform-minded executive branch and the highly 
conservative legislature prevented the development of a full-fledged legal priva-
tization mechanism for more than a decade. The main sticking point was the 
right to buy and sell privately-owned land – a basic inalienable right associated 
with private land ownership in market economies. The two branches of govern-
ment could not agree on this point and the legal deadlock was clearly reflected 
in the laws of that period. The 1993 Russian constitution simply reiterated the 
right of private ownership. The 1994 Civil Code suspended its land chapter until 
the passage of a new land code, while the 2001 Land Code skirted the issue 
completely by deferring all matters relating to transactions in agricultural land to 
a special law to be passed at some unspecified time in the future. Thus, all the 
legal advances since mid-1991 have been realized in the form of presidential 
decrees and government resolutions – temporary instruments that required ulti-
mate codification in permanent laws, but because of the persistent legislative 
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mainly focused on mechanisms that progressively broadened the range of permis-
sible transactions in land shares, not physical plots. Ownership rights in agricul-
tural land (including buying and selling) were finally normalized in January 2003, 
when the Law on Agricultural Land Transactions came into force. Mortgaging 
agricultural land has been allowed since February 2004. 
In 1991, agricultural land held by collective and state farms began to be distributed 
in the form of land shares to individuals, who could then withdraw their land 
allocation for the establishment of a peasant farm. Alienation of land in peasant 
farms was allowed only to the state (in practice, to local authorities), not to other 
individuals. Starting in early 1992, land shares still held in the form of paper cer-
tificates could be sold to other members of the collective or to the collective 
farm as a legal body; physical land plots could be sold only under special cir-
cumstances (e.g. when the landowner retired, when the plot was passed as in-
heritance, when the peasant farmer relocated to another region, or when the 
seller undertook to use the proceeds from the sale of land for the establishment 
of a non-farm business). Procedures adopted in March 1993 allowed the buying 
and selling of land for household plots and other individual uses (dachas, gar-
dening, individual housing). 
The new 1993 constitution declared that landowners had "freedom of disposition 
without violating the rights of other owners". However, the buying and selling of 
land (other than household plots) was neither allowed nor prohibited. Some re-
gions (e.g. Saratov Oblast) adopted local legislation allowing transactions in land, 
but no federal law existed. This naturally created serious administrative barriers to 
the development of land markets, and until the adoption of the January 2003 law, 
land transactions mainly involved the conversion of land shares into physical plots.  
In practice, the legal ban on the buying and selling of agricultural land was by-
passed even before January 2003 by presidential decrees and government resolu-
tions. These decrees and resolutions allowed the buying and selling of land 
shares (first to other members of the collective, and since October 1993 practi-
cally to any buyer). Having purchased a land share, the new shareowner could 
request its conversion into a land plot. The transferability of land shares has led 
to substantial redistribution of land ownership and land use in former collective 
farms. Presidential decrees and government resolutions also allowed (since Oc-
tober 1993) conversion of land shares into physical plots for household farming. 
Once the ownership of the new addition to the household plot was officially regis-
tered, it could be sold and bought in accordance with the various rules applicable 
(since May 1993) to land in household plots. A market has thus emerged for 
relatively small plots created through conversion of land shares by family mem-
bers. The national average land share was about 10 hectares, and some regions 
actually allowed the expansion of household plots to be included in the combined 
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household plot in the fields outside the village limits could thus reach several tens 
of hectares, which is comparable with the average size of a peasant farm.  
Beyond the psychological opposition to the buying and selling of land, other 
emotional issues included the concern about concentration of land ownership in 
the hands of few physical persons or corporations ("latifundiazation" of agricul-
tural land), the fear of excessive fragmentation of land during privatization, loss 
of land holdings by former collective farms due to their weak financial situation 
and danger of bankruptcy, and that perennial bogey, the sale of Russian land to 
foreigners. The provisions of the 2003 Law of Agricultural Land Transactions 
were designed to address these concerns. While the buying and selling of land 
plots (as well as land shares) was allowed, the state retained a preemptive right 
on land purchases; regional governments could impose limits on physical con-
centration of land by a single owner (typically 10 % of the agricultural land in 
the district), as well as limits on the minimum size of physical plots that could 
be surveyed and registered for farming purposes (household plots were exempt 
from this restriction); foreigners and companies with a majority of foreign capi-
tal could only lease agricultural land, not own it.  
Table 2.2  Assessment of the impact of legal restrictions on transactions in 
agricultural land 
Legal restriction  Impact assessment 
Preemptive right of oblast government and 
municipal authorities to purchase land plots 
and land shares from joint shared owner-
ship 
Intended to prevent socially undesirable trans-
actions, but significantly delays the comple-
tion of land transactions and complicates 
seller-buyer negotiations. Can be bypassed by 
resorting to alternative mechanisms: Public 
auction, investment in the equiy capital of a 
corporation, gifts 
Upper limit on concentration of land by 
physical persons or legal bodies created  
by physical persons 
Intended to prevent "latifundiazation", but 
may be overcome by creating a legal body 
owned by another legal body, not a physical 
person (e.g. in Belgorod, whole districts are 
held by a single corporation created by an-
other corporation) 
Minimum size of agricultural plots  Intended to prevent excessive fragmentation, 
but some conservative regions abuse this pro-
vision by setting unacceptably large minimum 
sizes, e.g. 100 ha in Voronezh, 200 ha in Kras-
nodar. 
Foreigners and foreign corporations not be-
ing able to own land 
Intended to address social concerns; the re-
strictive impact of this provision has been al-
leviated by allowing long-term leasing for 49 
years 
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The introduction of preemptive rights for the oblast and municipalities is per-
haps most restrictive in this context. Negotiations for a piece of agricultural land 
(or even a land share) between private parties cannot be concluded without of-
fering the authorities the option of buying the land for the same terms. The pri-
vate deal can go through only if the authorities refuse or let the option lapse 
(within one month). Moreover, if the terms of sale are changed in the process of 
negotiations, the authorities again should be given the option to exercise their 
preemptive right, leading to a further delay of at least one month. Despite these 
and other reservations, in Russia the legal restrictions on the whole are regarded 
as striking a reasonable balance between the need to alleviate the original con-
cerns and the goal of minimizing the restrictions on land markets (Table 2.2). 
2.3 Land  privatization 
Contrary to the Baltic states and most countries in East Central Europe, Russia 
chose to privatize agricultural land by distribution to users, not restitution to 
former owners. Initial legislation in 1989-91 focused on the principle of private 
ownership of land and the procedures for distributing state land for individual 
farming (household plots, small-scale gardeners and vegetable growers, peasant 
farmers). Mass privatization was launched in 1991-92, when large chunks of 
state land were privatized into joint ownership of the rural people who lived and 
worked in collective and state farms. This formal privatization affected most of 
the agricultural land in collective and state farms, while the rest of the agricul-
tural land and other rural land (including land under farm buildings, for in-
stance) remained state property (creating the so-called redistribution reserve for 
future municipal and farming needs). The privatized land was then divided into 
equal shares, and each adult – collective farm worker, pensioner, or employee of 
rural social services – received one land share. The size of the share was deter-
mined by land availability in the district and was rigidly controlled (much like 
the size of all land distributions to individuals; see Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3  Typical size of privatized land units in Russia 
Privatization category  Size  
Allocation for peasant farming  30-50 ha 
Allocation for household plots  0.5 ha in the village; 1.0 ha in the fields  
outside the village 
Allocation for gardening and vegetable 
growing  0.06-0.08 ha 
Allocation for individual housing  0.10 ha 
Land share  7-10 ha 
Source:  Authors’ estimates based on official statistics. 
A land share is a paper entitlement of fractional ownership in the agricultural 
land transferred by the state to the collective. This mechanism created a new 
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no longer state ownership (hence the use of the term "privatization"), but it was 
not individual ownership either. The reform laws typically allowed shareowners 
to withdraw physical land plots from joint shared ownership into individual 
ownership, but the requirement to survey and register the plot (with all the at-
tendant costs and administrative complications) was deferred to that time in the 
future when the shareowner would actually decide to withdraw his or her land 
from the common pool of owners. 
Russian land privatization quickly produced 11.9 million shareowners, with land 
shares covering 117.6 million hectares, or 9.9 hectares per share. By 1995 the 
state had privatized through land shares fully 56 % of the original 209.8 million 
hectares controlled by former collective and state farms at the beginning of re-
form. The remaining land was transferred to the state redistribution reserve, 
which provided the pool of land for the future creation of peasant farms, expan-
sion of household plots, and various municipal needs.  
The distribution of land shares created, for the shareowners, a difficult decision: 
They could choose to start an independent business by withdrawing their land 
from the collective; or they could simply leave their land shares in joint cultiva-
tion with the existing collective farm (which meanwhile had reorganized as a 
corporate farm in one of the standard organizational forms, such as a shareholding 
company, limited liability company, partnership, or agricultural cooperative). It 
was clear from the outset that most shareowners would not extablish an inde-
pendent farm and instead would prefer to keep their land shares in the collective. 
It bears mention that in 1992 half the shareowners were elderly pensioners. With 
time, the rural population developed mixed conversion strategies, with several 
members of the same family or groups of relatives and neighbors pooling their 
paper shares to receive one contiguous land plot in return. One of the villages in 
Leningrad Oblast provides a typical example of such "home-made consolida-
tion": Six families jointly holding 17 land shares were allotted 6 consolidated 
plots, with each family receiving a single plot of appropriate size, regardless of 
whether its individual members had 2, 3, or 5 land shares. This share consolida-
tion strategy is a natural response to concerns about the excessive fragmentation 
of individual land plots. In retrospect, distribution of land shares has proved 
more effective and less costly for land consolidation than the distribution of 
physical plots would have. This is evident from any comparison with the ex-
perience in East Central Europe, where land fragmentation and consolidation 
efforts are still a major issue after nearly fifteen years of transition. 
The privatization process itself provided the trigger for the first land market 
transactions in Russia. The former collective and state farms, now reorganized 
as corporate farms of various types, were formally left without any land for 
farming. They had to turn to the newly-created shareowners and lease their land 
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capital of the corporate farms. Initially, it was not too difficult to persuade the 
new shareowners not to withdraw their land and to let the corporate farm con-
tinue using it. However, as time went on and people began to get used to the 
new market mechanisms, some shareowners would withdraw their land from the 
former collective farm and lease it to another producer who was offering more 
competitive terms. A shareowner could actually avoid the bureaucratic hassle of 
withdrawing a land plot and simply lease out the land share. The lessor would 
then negotiate for a specific plot with the manager of the collective farm where 
the share was originally used. A two-tier leasing system thus developed: Leasing 
land shares from individual shareowners (either by the original corporate farm 
or by other producers) and leasing land plots from individuals who have inde-
pendently converted their land share into a plot. All in all, it seems that the Rus-
sian land privatization strategy, based on the distribution of land shares instead 
of the more conventional (to the Western observer) distribution of individual 
land plots, has had clear beneficial effects on the level of transaction costs, al-
though it possibly delayed the productivity improvements normally associated 
with individual ownership and control of land. 
The 2003 Law on Agricultural Land Transactions has interfered with this estab-
lished process by prohibiting the leasing of land shares and requiring that a land 
share be converted into a physical plot before it could be leased. All the existing 
lease transactions involving millions of land shares have thus been placed in a 
legally dubious position. According to the strict letter of the law, the existing 
lease agreements have to be rewritten for specific land plots or, failing that, the 
land shares have to be placed in a fiduciary trust. The trust manager would then 
supervise the distribution of revenues between the farmer-operator and the land-
owner. The option of converting land shares into plots is not simple to imple-
ment because of the substantial costs and bureaucratic complications (see Sec-
tion 4), whereas the option of putting the leased land in trust is totally alien to 
the peasant mentality (not only in Russia, but anywhere in the world) and more-
over suffers from various legal inconsistencies with the provisions of trust manage-
ment in the Civil Code. Nevertheless, the new provision of the 2003 Law on Ag-
ricultural Land Transactions has definitely spurred interest in surveying, regis-
tering, and titling individual land plots, and has unintentionally led to further cost 
increases as the demand for surveyor services outstripped the limited availability 
of these professionals. 
In addition to transactions in private land, there are, naturally, transactions in-
volving state-owned land. The original distribution of state land to peasant farmers 
and households (up to specific limits) was free. After that, state land had to be 
leased or purchased. Both types of transactions for state land legally require an 
auction, or at least a bidding process, but in many cases, in practice, this re-
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2.4  Land ownership structure 
The structure of agricultural land ownership produced by privatization is pre-
sented in Table 2.4. The share of state-owned agricultural land dropped from 
100 % before 1990 to around 40 % today. Nearly 60 % of agricultural land is 
now privately owned, but most of this land (51 %) is represented by land shares – 
abstract (though transferable) pieces of paper corresponding to virtual plots. 
Only 6 % of agricultural land is in the form of physically demarcated plots, most 
of it owned by individuals (household plots and peasant farms).  
Table 2.4  Agricultural land ownership, 2003 
  Million ha  Percent 
Total agricultural land  220.9  100 
Privately owned (as reported)  127.5  58 
  Individuals: Land shares  112.7  51 
 Individuals:  Plots
1 12.1 5 
 Corporations
1 2.7 1 
State owned (by difference)  93.4  42 
Source:  Total agricultural land from GOSKOMSTAT (2003a); Breakdown by ownership from 
ROSZEMKADASTR (2002a), рp.  49, 57, 100, 109; and  ROSZEMKADASTR (2004), 
рp. 13, 253, 604, 616. 
Note:  
1 About 2.5 million hectares held in peasant farms registered as legal bodies have  
   been moved from the category of corporations (where it is formally reported) to  
   the category of individual plots. 
Examining the structure of land ownership via three main categories of users 
(corporate farms, peasant farms, and household plots), we see an astonishing 
similarity between corporate farms and household plots (Figure 2.2). For both 
types, about 30 % of the land is state-owned, and close to 70 % is land owned by 
private individuals; land in corporate private ownership (leased from other cor-
porate farms or invested by shareowners in the equity capital) accounts for a 
negligible 1 %-2 %. However, there is a huge difference in the kind of individual 
land ownership between corporate farms and household plots: Virtually all indi-
vidually owned land in corporate farms is in the form of land shares owned by 
the local rural population, while in household plots this is physically demarcated 
private land. Peasant farms have a smaller component of individually owned 
private land (about 40 %, all of it in the form of physical plots) and they rely to a 
greater extent on land leased from the state and on land shares leased from out-
side owners who are not family members. This component of land leased in the 
form of shares from outsiders accounts for 18 % of total holdings in peasant 
farms (shown as "other" in Figure 2.2).  
Some of the state land in individual farms is still reported in the old tenure forms 
(usage rights or possession). This applies to two-thirds of the state land in 
household plots and one-third in peasant farms. Eventually this land will be 
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Fig. 2.2. Structure of land ownership by farm type 2001
(in percent of agricultural land)











individually owned land by as much as 25 % in household plots and 15 % in 
peasant farms.  
Since 88 % of privately owned land is represented by land shares (Table 2.4), it 
may be instructive to look at the disposition of land shares in corporate farms. 
According to Roszemkadastr data for 2004, 64 % of the land shares are leased 
by corporate farms from individuals and 12 % are given to corporate farms in 
use rights. The remaining 24 % is represented by unclaimed land shares of bene-
ficiaries who have died, left the village, or failed to exercise their right for other 
reasons (e.g. did not want to pay for the share certificate). The local corporate 
farm continues to use the unclaimed land shares by default.  
2.5  Land redistribution in the process of reorganizing former collective 
farms 
The basic land privatization mechanism – distribution of land shares accompa-
nied by the option of individual or group withdrawal with land – has created the 
basis for redistribution of agricultural land among users. Although in reality this 
option has seldom been exercised among the 12 million shareholders, it exists 
and in some specific instances has led to the significant redistribution of privatized 
land resources. 
One of the examples of significant land redistribution is provided by the 
Lodeinopl’skii Raion in Leningrad Oblast. In the pre-reform period, the farms in 
this district specialized in dairy production, largely relying on concentrated feed 
supplied by the state at subsidized prices. After 1991, when state support to live-
stock production was curtailed, farms did not have machinery to produce feed 
grain and had to reduce their dairy herd to one-third of the pre-reform level. The 
performance of all corporate farms in the district deteriorated and signs of im-
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for a spate of reorganizations, which included the creation of new corporate 
farms, as well as the expansion of peasant farms and household plots.  
 
Fig. 2.3. Farm reorganization by transfer of land shares










The process did not involve any buying and selling of land and was enabled by a 
flow of land shares from owners to new users. Among the six former collective 
farms in the district, more than 50 % of land resources were redistributed by 
land share transfers (Figure 2.3). Most of the land was absorbed by new corpo-
rate farms (primarily through leasing), but about 10 % of the land shares were 
taken up by peasant farms and household plots with the purpose of expanding 
their holdings. The remaining 48 % of the land shares did not find new users, in 
part because the shareowners had died or left without assigning their usage 
rights (about 20 % of the shares). By default, these shares continue to be used by 
the (greatly downsized) former collectives.  
This example, with half the land shares transferred to new users and the other 
half remaining, by default, with the original user – a former collective farm – is 
typical of agriculturally poor regions, where the demand for land is weak. In ag-
riculturally fertile regions land is in greater demand and the process of redistri-
bution proceeds differently. Thus, in Belgorod and Orel oblasts in the highly 
productive central region, the oblast authorities are actively trying to attract new 
investors to agriculture. The investors prefer not to acquire the failing, debt-
ridden former collectives and instead create entirely new corporate farms by 
leasing or buying land shares and sometimes even persuading the shareowners to 
put their land in the corporate farm’s equity capital. The former collective farms 
remain as empty shells and carry the responsibility for most of the outstanding 
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3 EMERGENCE OF LAND MARKETS 
Land market transactions are divided into two main categories: Buy-and-sell 
transactions that involve the transfer of legal ownership; and leasing transactions 
that involve the transfer of use rights from owner to tenant without change of 
ownership. The existing registration procedures ensure a fairly complete record 
of transactions in state land (both leasing and buying), but they do not capture 
any leasing transactions between individuals – whether plots or land shares. The 
buying and selling of land plots between private individuals and corporations is 
in principle covered by the statistics, but only to the extent that the buyers and 
sellers choose to go through the bureaucratic difficulties of registering the transac-
tion (see Section 4). The general trend of all registered transactions (including 
both agricultural and non-agricultural land) is shown in Table 3.1, and Table 3.2 
estimates the transactions in agricultural land (which constituted one-third of the 
total number of 5.6 million transactions in 2001). 
Table 3.1  Registered land transactions 1997-2002: National statistics 













Other types of 
transactions* 
1997  4.0 23.5  88  7  5 
1998  4.4 24.6  91  5  4 
1999  5.2 72.2  91  6  3 
2000  5.3 60.3  90  6  4 
2001  5.6 70.0  90  6  4 
2002  5.3 43.9  89  6  5 
Source:  1997-99 from GOSKOMZEM (private communication); 2000-2001 from ROSZEMKA-
DASTR (2002b), p. 19; 2002 from ROSZEMKADASTR (2003a), p. 104. 
Note:   * Sale of state and municipal land, sale of lease rights in state and municipal land,  
   inheritance, mortgage, gifts. 
Table 3.2  Transactions in agricultural land 2001: National statistics 
  Number of transactions, 
‘000 
Percent 
Leasing of state land to households  1,695.6 93.0 
Leasing of state land to agricultural  
producers  81.4 4.5 
Sale of state land to households  2.6 0.1 
Sale of private land to households   44.5 2.4 
Total transactions in agricultural land  1,824.1  100.0 
Source:  Estimated from ROSZEMKADASTR (2002b), pp. 46, 52, 78, 84, 111, 113, 115. Data 
for later years not available. 
The buying and selling of agricultural land by individuals is miniscule compared 
to land leasing from the state and shareowners. Statistics record 150,000 transac-
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household and garden plots), and the amount of land transacted is about 0.5 % of 
their total holdings. Table 3.3 presents the available data in the form of three-year 
averages (1997-99 and 2000-02). The number of transactions shows a definite in-
crease over time, while the transacted land area remains constant. As a result, 
there is a slight decrease in the average transaction size, which is more noticeable 
for household plots (0.24 ha in 1997-99 compared with 0.21 ha in 2000-02). Fur-
thermore, the number of land transactions for garden plots is an order of mag-
nitude greater than the number of transactions for household plots, but the aver-
age transaction size is an order of magnitude smaller.  
Table 3.3  Sale of privately owned rural land for household plots and 
garden plots  
Number of  
transactions  Area, ha  Average plot size, ha















92,385 45,101  22,005  3,580  0.24  0.08 
2000-02  107,854 50,295  22,222  3,778  0.21  0.08 
Total holdings  
2000-02     6,480,000  1,260,000     
Note:    Calculations based on yearly data from the following sources: 1997-99 from 
GOSKOMZEM (2000), p. 24; 2000-01 from ROSZEMKADASTR (2002b), p. 31; 2002 
from ROSZEMKADASTR (2003a), p. 115. Total holdings from GOSKOMSTAT (2003a), 
p. 399. 
Land transactions and land market constraints cannot be studied using only offi-
cial sources because no statistical data are available on transactions in agricul-
tural land and land shares and there is absolutely no information on the terms of 
land transactions, the composition of buyers and sellers, or supply and demand. 
At the present stage, the required data can be obtained only through specially de-
signed questionnaire-based surveys. We carried out such surveys in three re-
gions – Rostov, Ivanovo, and Nizhnii Novgorod – which differed in natural condi-
tions, economic development, and level of policy reforms. The surveys covered 
agricultural producers of three basic organizational forms – farm enterprises  
(a corporate form of organization), peasant farms, and household plots (of two 
individual forms of organization).
5 The discussion in the following subsections 
is based on the survey results. 
                                           
5  For a detailed discussion of these organizational forms, see UZUN (2005). One of the sig-
nificant behavioral differences between peasant farms and household plots was eliminated 
from the survey by restricting the sample to household plots with declared commercial orien-
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3.1  Land market activity 
The survey shows that only household plots rely mainly on owned land, while 
leasing is widespread among both corporate and peasant farms (Table 2.4). In 
corporate and peasant farms, the share of leased land is, on average, 60 % of the 
total area of agricultural land used. In corporate farms, three-quarters of the 
leased land is in the form of land shares, and only one-quarter is leased as land 
plots. Peasant farms, on the other hand, tend to lease land plots to a greater ex-
tent (more than 40 % of all leased land). The owned land in peasant farms con-
sists of land shares and land plots allotted, without payment, to the members of 
the farm during land privatization (land in joint shared ownership), as well as 
land shares and land plots purchased on the market. The owned land of corpo-
rate farms consists of land shares invested by members in corporate equity capi-
tal. The share of owned land in corporate farms (36 % in Table 3.4) is overesti-
mated in part due to the incorrect interpretation of survey questions by the mana-
gers, who improperly regard leased land shares as land shares invested in their 
corporate farm’s equity. According to official national statistics, the share of 
owned land in corporate farms is only 1.3  % (see ROSZEMKADASTR (2003b), 
p. 13). 
Table 3.4  Sources of land in the survey (percent of the total area) 






Average farm size  4,100 ha  270 ha  2.6 ha 
Leased land    61  57  3 
Leased land shares  (46)  (32)  -- 
Leased land plots  (15)  (25)  -- 
Owned land  36  42  93 
Purchased land shares  (2)  (30)  -- 
Purchased land plots  (1)  (11)  -- 
Land shares invested in equity  (33)  (1)  -- 
Other 3  1  4 
Total 100  100  100 
Source:  2003 BASIS survey.  
Note:   * The numbers in parentheses are rough estimates based on a portion of the respon 
   dents. 
Respondents from 553 farms of various organizational forms in three regions 
reported 97 land transactions during one year. The frequency of transactions was 
virtually the same in farms of different organizational forms. There was only one 
case of selling land. All other transactions involved land leasing. Strengthening the 
data in Table 3.4, this shows that land leasing is the dominant form of transaction 
in land markets across Russia, and yet most of these transactions remain outside 
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The survey did not detect any dependence of land transaction frequency on the 
distance from the regional center in any of the three oblasts studied. Yet we are 
witnessing a particularly active land market in areas close to Moscow and in 
Moscow Oblast, where land is bought for non-agricultural purposes. This sub-
ject requires further study.  
3.2  Reported land transactions 
The incidence of land transactions in the sample is not very pronounced and ba-
sically only leasing transactions are reported. A total of 96 respondents (17 % of 
the sample) report engaging in land lease transactions of some kind in 2001. Of 
these, 57 respondents (10 %) report that they lease in additional land, 34 respon-
dents (6 %) report that they lease out land, and 4 respondents (1 %) report both 
leasing in and leasing out of land. 
Leasing in 
A total of 61 respondents (11 % of the sample) reported acquiring additional 
land by leasing in 2001. The distribution of transaction frequency across the 
three organizational forms did not significantly vary from the uniform (see gray 
bars in Figure 3.1). The transactions included 56 instances involving the leasing 
of physical plots and 13 instances involving the leasing of land shares (land 
shares can be leased from private individuals only).  
Table 3.5  Lease-in transactions and prices by source of land (including 















Plots:            
Corporate farms  22  112  5  17  480  324 
Private individuals  18  298  29  13  576  362 
District administration  10  163  142  8  42*  48 
Other 6  1,102  425  2 100-143   
Total plots  56  287  28  40  405   212 
Plots from corporate 
farms and private indi-
viduals 
40 196  16  30 522 343 
Land shares from private 
individuals  13 1,198  524  13  607  420 
Source:  2003 BASIS survey. 
Table 3.5 shows the distribution of transactions by main sources of land and the 
estimated prices per hectare, per year (mean and median). The prices reported 
for land leased from the district administration (40-50 rubles per hectare) were 
significantly lower than the prices paid to corporate farms and private individuals 
(400-500 rubles per hectare). There were no statistically significant differences in Zvi Lerman, Natalya Shagaida  286 
prices paid to private individuals for land leased in the form of plots or paper 
shares. This issue requires further study in a larger sample, as one would nor-
mally expect surveyed plots to fetch a higher price than land shares, which in-
volve additional transaction costs before conversion into physical land ready for 
cultivation (see also Section 4). 
The average amount of land, per farm, acquired through land shares is signifi-
cantly greater than the amount of land acquired by leasing physical plots. On the 
other hand, there are no statistically significant differences in the size of physical 
plots leased from different sources. The median plot areas in Table 3.5 seem to 
suggest that the smallest areas are acquired from corporate farms and the largest 
from the district administration and other sources. However, these differences 
are not statistically significant. In general, the amount of new land acquired in 
2001 is strongly correlated with total land holdings of the acquiring farms 
(R=0.94 between logged variables). The correlation with land holdings remains 
statistically significant even when we control for organizational form (corporate 
farms, peasant farms, household plots), which in itself accounts for a lot of varia-
bility in land transactions (R
2=0.83).  
Table 3.6  Distribution of farms of different organizational forms,  
by sources of land 






Corporate farms  22  21  55 
Private individuals 
- Plots  
22 21  36 
- Land shares  26  29  0 
District administration  17  21  5 
Other 13  8  4 
Total 100  100  100 
Source:  2003 BASIS survey. 
There are no significant differences in access to different sources of land for 
corporate farms and peasant farms (Table 3.6). Unlike corporate and peasant 
farms, household plots do not lease land shares: They only lease land plots – 
mainly from corporate farms and, to a certain extent, also from private indi-
viduals. Their transactions with the district administration are minimal. This is 
also in contrast to corporate and peasant farms, for which more than 25 % of 
lease transactions are with the district administration. These differences in the 
pattern of leasing sources, and specifically the preference of household plots for 
leasing land from corporate farms, may explain the observation in Table 3.5, ac-
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Leasing out 
In addition to 61 respondents who lease in land, 38 respondents (7 % of the 
sample) report leasing out land and one respondent reports the sale of land. It is 
mostly corporate farms that lease out land (the one seller is also a corporate 
farm), presumably due to lack of profitability and inadequate business opportu-
nities. At the other extreme, very few peasant farms lease out land – for exactly 
the same reasons, but in reverse (see black bars in Figure 3.1). Household plots 
fall in between, with 9 % leasing out land. A working hypothesis suggests that 
these are probably plots owned by older families, although a lack of household 
demographic data in the survey instruments makes it impossible to check this 
hypothesis. The survey only reveals that farms lease out land predominantly be-
cause they are unable to cultivate it themselves. This is the reason provided by 
32 out of 38 lessor farms. Yet these responses are equally distributed among 
corporate farms and household plots and we cannot learn anything about the 
specific reasons for leasing out land by household plots. Note that, contrary to 
the distribution of lessors (black bars in Figure 3.1) the lessees are fairly uni-
formly distributed across farm types (gray bars in Figure 3.1). 
The average size and the average price received in leasing-out transactions are 
given in Table 3.7 (means and medians in the sample). The general pattern is 
essentially the same as for leasing-in transactions (see Table 3.5), except that 
district administration is not included. Household plot operators lease out land 
exclusively to the local corporate farm. Corporate and peasant farms lease out 
land to other corporate farms and private individuals in roughly equal propor-
tions (in such a small sample, percentage frequencies are meaningless). In this 
sense, the leasing-out and leasing-in patterns are identical. 
Fig. 3.1. Leasing transactions by farm type
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Table 3.7  Lease-out transactions and prices by source of land 














Corporate  farms  29 163  13  15 467 350 
Private indi-
viduals  10 262 139  8 361 238 
Other  2  100-191  2  24-158  




39 188  18  23 430 325 
Source:  2003 BASIS survey. 
Larger farms (i.e., corporate farms) clearly lease out more land than smaller 
farms (i.e., household plots). This association between farm size and the amount 
of land leased out is demonstrated in Table 3.8. Yet, the large corporate farms 
lease out but a small fraction of their holdings, while the small individual farms, 
once they decide to lease out land, release most of their initial holdings and are 
sometimes left with less than the amount leased out to other users. Of the 21 
small farms that act as lessors, 14 farms leased out about half their initial holdings 
while the remaining seven farms leased out 94 % of their initial holdings. These 
"superaggressive" lessors cultivate, on average, a small residual of 0.7 hectares 
after leasing out more than 10 hectares.  
Table 3.8  Amount of land leased out and farm size 






Corporate farms  16  7,400  463 
Plots and peasant farms  21  8.6  11.4 
"Aggressive" lessors  14  12.5  11.9 
"Superaggressive" lessors  7  0.7  10.3 
Source:  2003 BASIS survey. 
3.3  Payment for land 
Prices of leased-in and leased-out land were compared for transactions involving 
corporate farms and private individuals as lessees and lessors (see last line in 
Tables 3.5 and 3.7, respectively). The differences in prices are not statistically 
significant. The median price in the sample for all leasing transactions in these 
channels is 330-340 rubles per hectare. Supplementary data were obtained by 
analyzing the lease payments for land shares (median 420 rubles) and separate 
partial responses of lessees and lessors regarding structure of lease payments 
(which give 450 rubles/ha for leasing in and 440 rubles/ha for leasing out; the 
difference is not statistically significant). The various numbers suggest median Land reform and the development of agricultural land markets in Russia  289
lease payments of 350-450 rubles per hectare in the sample (excluding transac-
tions with the district administration, which command much lower prices). 
Table 3.9  Lease payments estimated from the survey 









ments for leased 
out land, % 
Land tax  45  2  13  1 
Fixed, in cash  25  20  22  17 
Fixed, in-kind  52  57  17  22 
Share of output  9  18  43  59 
In services  9  3  13  1 
Total *  100  *  100 
 56  res-
pondents  451 rubles/ha  23 respon-
dents  441 rubles/ha 
Source:  2003 BASIS survey. 
Note:  
* Adds up to more than 100 % because multiple answers were allowed. 
Most lessees made lease payments in-kind; payment in cash was less common. 
Many lessees assumed responsibility for the land tax. Lessors also indicated that 
lease payments were typically a share of the output. The mean lease payment 
was 440-450 rubles/ha (Table  3.9). Lease payments estimated separately for 
land shares exhibited a median of 420 rubles/ha, while the median of all leasing 
transactions in the survey was 340 rubles/ha. Thus, the lease payments range 
between 350-450 rubles/ha, excluding the transactions in state land. The lease 
payments to the district administration for state land are much lower (about 
50 rubles/ha, see Table 3.5). The differences in lease payments across farms of 
different organizational forms are not statistically significant. 
Leasing is often for medium- or long term. About 50 % of both lessees and les-
sors report leasing terms longer than 4 years (and in some cases longer than 10 
years).  
3.4  Potential for land transactions 
The potential for land transactions was examined by exploring farms' perceived 
need for additional land (Table 3.10). Nearly 30 % of respondents desired in-
creased landholdings. This potential for future land transactions should be com-
pared with the actual frequency of land leasing in 2001, which covered 11 % of 
respondents (uniformly distributed over the three organizational forms). The 
greatest need for additional land is expressed by peasant farmers: 50 % of re-
spondents in this category desire more land, compared with less than 20 % among 
household plots and corporate farms. Peasant farmers who would like to increase 
their holdings typically have less land than the rest, although the difference is not 
dramatic (225  hectares compared to 314  hectares for those who do not need 
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compared with 4,320 hectares). Among household plot operators, on the other 
hand, the difference in land holdings between those who say they need more 
land and the rest is not significant.  
Table 3.10  Potential and actual land transactions (percent of respondents) 
  Potential: Desire  
additional land 
Actual: Acquired additional 
land in 2001 
Whole  sample 29 11 
Corporate farms  18  13 
Farms 49  9 
Plots 13  11 
Source:  2003 BASIS survey. 
In principle, we can expect the demand for land to depend on a farm's financial 
situation. However, the only indicators of financial performance in the survey 
were sales revenue and surplus – a very crude profit-like measure of financial 
sources in excess of uses. Neither of these financial indicators showed a clear 
association with the perceived demand for land.  
The most common option for acquiring additional land is by leasing a plot from 
a private individual (40 % of respondents with a perceived need for additional 
land). Other accessible options (in multiple-choice answers) include obtaining a 
plot from the state in leasehold or use rights (35 %), buying land shares (18 %), 
and even buying a land plot from a private individual (17 %). There are clear 
differences in potential access patterns of different organizational forms to various 
sources of land (Table 3.11). While corporate farms and peasant farms envisage 
mainly leasing from private individuals and the state, household plots primarily 
intend leasing from corporate farms or buying from individuals. Buying land 
shares is considered a viable option only by peasant farms.  
Table 3.11  Perceived sources for acquiring additional land  
(percent of respondents)* 










Leasing plot from individual  44  32  52  16 
Leasing from the state  35  28  40  20 
Buying land shares  18  8  23  4 
Buying plot from individual  17  0  19  24 
Leasing from corporate farm  16  28  9  32 
Source:  2003 BASIS survey. 
Note:  
* Percentages in each column add up to more than 100 % because multiple answers  
   were allowed; "lease" also includes taking land in use rights. 
Buying land is thus not perceived as an impossibility in the current environment. 
Indeed, fully 30 % of respondents indicate that they would be able to get addi-
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clearly perceived as the most accessible option, with more than 60 % indicating 
that they would be able to lease additional land as needed.  
Table 3.12  How can you acquire additional land if needed?  
(percent of respondents) 
  Acquire in private  
ownership  Lease 
Yes 31  61 
Undecided 48  34 
No 20  5 
Source:  2003 BASIS survey. 
As there are no observations of buy-and-sell transactions in the survey, it is un-
fortunately impossible to analyze the role of access to credit and other farm-
related factors as potential constraints in land market development. Still, it is 
encouraging to note the emergence of land leasing transactions as a first stage 
and the positive perception of the buying and selling of land as the second stage 
of land market development in the future.  
3.5  Estimating the demand for agricultural land 
The holdings of existing agricultural producers, including the leased component, 
formed a long time ago, thus the observed situation does not necessarily reflect a 
true satisfied demand for land. The survey has shown that the demand for land 
and thus the potential for land transactions vary by region and by type of farm.  
In all three regions surveyed, peasant farms revealed a greater demand for land 
than corporate farms. Thus, 30 %-70 % of peasant farmers indicated a demand 
for land (Table 3.13). Among corporate farms, on the other hand, the maximum 
demand for land (30 % of respondents) was reported in Rostov (a region with 
highly developed agriculture), whereas in the less developed Ivanovo and Nizhnii 
Novgorod oblasts, corporate farms showed a much lower demand for land.  
Table 3.13  Land users’ intentions to reduce or enlarge their land  
(percent of responses) 
Region  Farm type  Reduce  Enlarge  Total ag. land, 
ha 
Ivanovo Corporate  farms  43  3 98,000 
 Peasant  farms  10  20  420 
 Household  plots  1  14  80 
Nizhnii  
Novgorod  Corporate farms  26  11  99,000 
 Peasant  farms  0  67  460 
 Household  plots  7  12  141 
Rostov Corporate  farms  3  1  271,000 
 Peasant  farms  30  50  57,000 
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In Ivanovo (an example of an agriculturally depressed region), 43 % of corpo-
rate farms plan on reducing the use of land and only 3 % plan on enlarging it 
(Table 3.13). A similar trend is observed in Nizhnii Novgorod (an example of a 
region with medium agricultural development). This suggests that corporate 
farms in agriculturally less developed regions will probably shed some of their 
land when they begin re-registering their use rights in state land and lease contracts 
for land shares, as mandated by the new law. Some of the released land will be 
absorbed by peasant farmers, who in general seek to enlarge their holdings, but 
the growth potential of this segment is not particularly large: While corporate 
farms control tens of thousands of hectares in each oblast, all peasant farms 
combined have less than 1,000 hectares in Ivanovo and Nizhnii Novgorod. Due 
to the absence of other interested parties, much of the land released by corporate 
farms may remain unused. The opposite situation will probably occur in Rostov, 
with its highly developed agriculture and different specialization (more crops, less 
livestock). There will be no unused agricultural land in this oblast (Table 3.13) 
and unsatisfied demand for land can actually arise. 
To conclude, we see that there is a demand for land for large-scale agricultural 
production in some regions (the Rostov example). In all regions, however, peasant 
farmers and household-plot owners show less intention of reducing their holdings 
and more willingness to enlarge their land than managers of large corporate 
farms. This tendency does not depend on natural and climatic conditions. In all 
three regions surveyed, peasant farmers demonstrate a greater demand for land, 
even more than household-plot operators. Nevertheless, the physical potential of 
peasant farms and household plots in Ivanovo, Nizhnii Novgorod, and similar 
less developed regions is not sufficient to absorb the surplus land that will be 
released by corporate farms. 
3.6  Factors determining land transactions 
We have attempted to use Rozsemkadastr regional data to model land transac-
tions in a cross-section of Russia’s 71 regions (omitting those where private land 
ownership is prohibited and where data are suspect). The registered transactions 
are a mixture of different types, but the main category includes transactions that 
involve leasing state land outside the village limits by corporate and peasant 
farms. Household plots are not included in this category since they generally 
lease land from municipalities inside the village limits.  
Our modeling exercise was subject to severe restrictions imposed by the availa-
bility of regional data. We have tried a model in which the total number of leasing 
transactions is explained by the following independent variables: 
•  The number of potential lessees, i.e., the number of corporate and peasant 
farms in the region. The expectation is that a higher number of potential 
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for the possibility of differential effects of farms from the two categories, 
the number of corporate farms and the number of peasant farms were in-
troduced separately. 
•  The quality of agricultural land: The expectation being that better land 
will increase the scope of leasing transactions. Land quality was repre-
sented by two alternative measures: The so-called "cadastral price", 
which is a value calculated based on local land fertility (Model 1), and 
partial productivity of land calculated as regional agricultural product 
per hectare of agricultural land (Model 2). 
•  Availability of agricultural land in the region: More agricultural land 
should lead to more leasing transactions. 
Other a priori relevant factors, such as the financial situation of farms (farms 
that are better off would tend to engage more in leasing transactions), could not 
be used for lack of data.  
The regression results are presented in Table 3.14, which also gives the mean 
values of the variables across 71 regions. On the supply side, both availability of 
agricultural land and land quality have a significant positive effect on the num-
ber of lease transactions. On the demand side, the number of peasant farms has a 
positive effect on the number of transactions, while the effect of the number of 
corporate farms is not statistically significant. This result is understandable be-
cause peasant farms exist in much larger numbers (nearly 3,500 peasant farms in 
the average region) and accordingly engage in more numerous transactions. The 
few hundred corporate farms in each region (350 on average) cannot produce a 
noticeable impact on the total number of transactions. 
Table 3.14  Regression modeling of land lease transactions in a cross-section 
of 71 regions (2001)  
Model 1  Model 2   
Coefficient  p-level Coefficient p-level 
Mean 
value 
Dependent variable: Number of transactions        1,131 
Number of corporate farms  -1.35  0.214  0.25  0.827  347 
Number of peasant farms  0.11  0.032  0.21  0.000  3,374 
Agricultural land in farms, 
‘000 ha 
0.48 0.001  0.33 0.031  2,081 
Cadastral price, ruble/ha   0.13  0.000  --  --  10,950 
Land productivity, ruble/ha  --  --  0.07 0.080  7,360 
R
2 0.545  0.42    
Source:  Transactions from ROSZEMKADASTR (2002b), pp. 46-47; Agricultural land in farms 
from ROSZEMKADASTR (2002a), pp. 113-129, 199; Number of farms and productivity 
from GOSKOMSTAT (2001). 
Land transactions are naturally driven by additional factors that could not be 
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groups of factors that seem to be conducive to the development of land transac-
tions in rural areas. These factors include the general poverty of the rural popu-
lation, which often drives families to sell their property for cash; the inability of 
current land users to pay competitive rates, which encourages rural landowners 
to look for new clients for their land; and the emergence of cash-rich non-
agricultural companies looking for new investment opportunities in agriculture. 
Rural poverty 
Agricultural land is mainly owned by the rural population, i.e., workers and pen-
sioners of farm enterprises created by the reorganization of kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes. This is a low-income segment of the Russian population. The agri-
cultural wages remain very low (40 % of the national average) and every third 
worker in agriculture suffers from salary arrears (compared with every eighth 
worker in the manufacturing industries). In April  2002, 51  % of agricultural 
workers earned less than 1,000 rubles per month and about 40 % earned less 
than 800 rubles per month. The per capita income of rural households was 
1,971 rubles, exceeding the minimum cost of living by only 4 % (GOSKOMSTAT, 
2003b). If anybody were to suggest that these workers sell their land shares, they 
would sell them. For comparison, the minimum price of land (in the form of 
land shares, before conversion into plots) in Moscow Oblast is 10,000 rubles per 
hectare, and the average land share is 3-4 hectares. These people would gladly 
sell their land if anyone were willing to buy it. 
The practice shows that when willing buyers turn up in a village, only 15 % of 
land-share owners refuse to sell. The buyers offer cash on the table, and the 
price is comparable with wages or pensions that rural people receive over 1-3 
years. Land shares have become a commodity in impoverished areas, which was 
not the case during the initial stages of land privatization. Thus, from the begin-
ning of land privatization to 2003, heirs never bothered to register the rights to 
their inherited land, because registration would only lead to a real estate tax 
without any increase of income. According to calculations for four farm enter-
prises in Moscow Oblast, the dead "owned" nearly 30 % of land shares as of the 
beginning of 2004. When the demand for land shares materialized, most of the 
heirs began to register their rights to the inherited land. 
Uncompetitiveness of traditional agricultural producers in the land market 
To compete against those who buy land for non-agricultural purposes, lease 
payments from farm enterprises and peasant farmers should at least be equal to 
the bank interest rate on the market value of a land share, i.e., on average, 
1,000  rubles/ha. Agricultural producers cannot afford such payments (as 
shown previously, the actual lease payments in the survey are 300-400 rubles/ha), 
and as a result they will not be able to retain, in the long term, the privately-
owned land they are currently using, mainly on trust. Rural people will therefore 
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Cash accumulation in other industries 
Surplus cash accumulated in other sectors of the economy may encourage non-
agricultural business to buy land from rural landowners. This hypothesis has 
been prompted by the analysis of the high demand for land in some regions 
close to Moscow Oblast. The available statistical data point to the following fac-
tors: Surplus profits that are not used for investment in assets are increasing, de-
posits in Russian banks are becoming less attractive, and the decrease of the 
dollar/ruble exchange rate drives depositors away from foreign-currency ac-
counts. Real-estate prices begun to grow in 1999, and they are now at their peak, 
with experts predicting an imminent fall in prices. All these factors have en-
couraged businesses to search for new investment opportunities. The demand for 
suburban homes, the poverty of rural land-share owners, and the end of the de-
bate about the buying and selling of agricultural land have made it possible for 
non-agricultural businesses to buy agricultural land. For a more detailed discus-
sion of these developments see RYLKO and JOLLY (2005).  
4 CONSTRAINTS ON LAND TRANSACTIONS 
Analyzing the 2003 BASIS survey and Roszemkadastr data on sources of land 
used by agricultural producers, we conclude that farms of all types heavily rely 
on leased land and some even purchase land from individual and corporate 
owners. Yet the state land registry contains records of relatively few transac-
tions that represent a very small portion of agricultural land. Two main groups 
of reasons may be responsible for this curious state of affairs. First, there is a 
general lack of market information pertinent to land transactions. The agents 
do not have sufficient knowledge of mechanisms and procedures necessary for 
the registration of land transactions. Many rural people still do not know that 
land transactions are allowed and prefer to deal informally; many do not know 
how to draw up a contract or where to get standard forms for this purpose. 
Second, the legal registration procedures are very cumbersome, costly, and 
time-consuming. People may be avoiding land registration because of such bu-
reaucratic barriers.  Zvi Lerman, Natalya Shagaida  296 
Table 4.1  Main constraints to registration of land transactions  
(percent of respondents) 










No need to register  42  44  17  69 
Lack of information  18  23  11  23 
High costs  19  10  34  7 
Complex procedures  16  15  25  6 
Clear procedures, no 
problems  23 23  36  9 
Source:  2003 BASIS survey; numbers do not add up to 100 % because multiple answers 
were allowed. 
These groups of obstacles have been suggested by the analysis of the survey re-
sponses as summarized in Table 4.1. It may be instructive to note some different-
ces across farms of different organizational types. Thus, the large corporate 
farms and small household plots both feel that they can disregard registration 
requirements. This is far less the case for peasant farms, who are apparently 
much more sensitive to the protection they get through land registration. At the 
same time, peasant farmers complain much more frequently of high registration 
costs and complex procedures. Somewhat paradoxically, however, more than 
one-third of the peasant farmers report that the registration procedures are clear 
and they have no problems in that respect (last line in Table 3.1). 
4.1  Lack of market information  
Respondents of the 2003 BASIS survey were asked if land transactions were 
permitted, if they knew the land prices, if they knew where to find a standard 
lease contract form and how to register a transaction. With the exception of 
Rostov's peasant farmers (12 %), 22 %-32 % of the respondents indicated that a 
lack of information on these matters was a problem for engaging in land transac-
tions. Land price information and transaction registration procedures were men-
tioned as the most important obstacles. 
Most respondents did not know the prevailing land prices. The survey showed 
that many (though not all) knew the land tax rate: 33 %-50 % of respondents in 
different groups knew what the land tax was because they paid it once or twice a 
year. However, most respondents could not answer the other questions. The re-
sponse rate was highest among the peasant farmers in Rostov, where land trans-
actions were more frequent and the interest in the enlargement of holdings 
greater (Table 4.2). The fact that most respondents did not know the prevailing 
land prices apparently means that there are no established prices for land. There 
is no benchmark that could help rural people with the decision to sell or lease 
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Table 4.2  Frequency of responses to land-price questions (percent) 
Lease payments  Buy-and-sell price 















Ivanovo             
Corporate  farms  49  20  17  3 0 0 35 
Peasant  farms  70  20  50  0 0 0 10 
Household  plots  34  3 2 1  0  0  94 
Nizhnii Nov-
gorod 
           
Corporate  farms  49  8 5 3  0  3  39 
Household  plots  45  11  12  1 2 2 93 
Rostov             
Corporate  farms  53  14  26  9 0 1 70 
Peasant  farms 47  46 49 27  2  1  209 
Source:  2003 BASIS survey. 
The issue of the market price of land is of special importance because the 2003 
Federal Law on Agricultural Land Transactions mandates the use of market 
prices in the process of the partitioning of land in joint, shared ownership (i.e., 
when converting land shares into plots). According to this law, disputes between 
withdrawing and remaining owners are resolved by applying the market price of 
specific land plots (on a per share basis). If the agricultural land market is not 
developed and there are no consistent land prices in the district, it is impossible 
to speak of the market price of specific fields and plots. This is a severe barrier 
to the partition of joint shared land and to the withdrawal of share owners with 
land plots for individual farming.  
4.2  High registration costs and complex procedures 
Expert judgments suggest that high registration costs and complex procedures 
are an obstacle to land transactions. This view is confirmed by the responses of 
the Rostov peasant farmers, who have the highest tendency toward land 
enlargement. Indeed, most of the peasant farmers in Rostov (84 %) regard those 
two issues as a major problem (Table 4.3; in other regions, where land markets 
are less developed, a much smaller percentage of respondents addressed these 
issues).  
The analysis of registration procedures shows that governmental bodies have 
created numerous administrative and organizational restrictions to land registra-
tion. In the land registration system in force until 1998, all the procedures were 
carried out by a single administrative level – the district committees for land re-
sources and land planning. These committees kept the land redistribution maps, 
the lists of shared landowners, copies of land ownership certificates, and other 
documents confirming land rights. The district committees also registered the 
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At present, three organizational levels are involved in the registration of land 
transactions: (1) district committees for land resources and land planning; (2) 
district divisions of regional registration chambers (subordinated to the Ministry 
of Justice); (3) district divisions of regional cadastral chambers. 
Table 4.3  Are high registration costs and complex procedures an obstacle 
to land transactions? (percent of yes responses)  
Regions  Peasant farms and  
household plots  Corporate farms 
Ivanovo   10  12 
Nizhnii Novgorod   15  5 
Rostov   84  58 
Source:  2003 BASIS survey. 
The new system suffers from at least two serious problems. The first problem is 
the refusal of the cadastral chambers to issue registry extracts for land plots in 
joint shared ownership. In theory, previously issued certificates of land owner-
ship rights have the same validity as new entries in land registers, but in practice 
each new transaction requires full registration of the previous rights. As a result, 
the whole area in joint, shared ownership (often several thousand hectares) has 
to be surveyed. This is not only a very expensive operation (500 rubles per hec-
tare), but it also takes a long time to complete (at least two months). The second 
problem is the multi-step and opaque operation of the registration and cadastral 
chambers, especially regarding the requirements for documents. These bodies 
develop internal instructions that are not always compatible with the relevant 
law and require additional documents that were not envisaged by the law. These 
administrative barriers involve additional expenses for the applicants and lead to 
a sharp increase in transaction costs. 
Table 4.4, based on a case study for Moscow Oblast in 2004, lists the various 
organizations that are involved in the process of selling a land share or requesting 
conversion of land shares into a physical plot. The numbers in the table show the 
sequence of actions for a landowner in his dealings with these organizations. 
The sequence of actions for registering previously existing rights is shown sepa-
rately in column 2. Registering rights associated with a new transaction is iden-
tical to the registration of previously existing rights. The case study in Table 4.4 
assumes that the share owner has a land ownership certificate in his possession, 
i.e., a document that certifies his ownership rights and theoretically has the same 
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Table 4.4  List of organizations involved in the registration of a transaction 
with land shares (column 1) and the sequence of relevant  
actions (columns 2-4): Moscow Oblast, 2004 
  Registration of 
previous rights 
Selling a land 
share 
Converting 10 land 
shares into a 42 ha 
plot 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Registration chamber  1, 8  3  7 
Land committee  5    5 
Cadastral chamber  3, 6*  4  6, 8 
District archive  7     
Corporate farm  2     
Surveyor 4*    5 
District newspaper    1  1, 4 
Notary     3 
General assembly of 
land-plot owners  
   2 
Ministry of Real Estate    2   
Total elapsed time   From two weeks 
to six months 
Not less than 
three months 
From three to six 
months 
Cost, ‘000 rubles  0.3-1.5*  Not less than 2.4  Not less than 88.1 
Note:   * In case of refusal to issue a cadastral extract. 
As Table 4.4 shows, the costs of registering previously existing ownership rights 
vary widely. Theoretically, the total shared area is already registered in the ca-
dastre and the applicant has only to pay 100 rubles to get the cadastral extract for 
his land share. In practice, however, officials often require a full survey for the 
identification of the individual plot, which is too expensive for the private land-
owner. This requirement is apparently based on the provisions of the 2001 Law 
on Agricultural Land Transactions, which stipulates that land in joint, shared 
ownership should be physically divided into plots, a very costly proposition for 
the small landowners.  
The calculations in Table 4.4 were carried out assuming that each action requires 
only one visit to the administrative office. Usually, each action requires at least 
three visits, and the time delays are substantially longer than shown. In the au-
thor’s own experience, the withdrawal of a single land plot from joint. shared 
ownership requires up to one year of constant occupation. The cost of the entire 
procedure of converting a land share into a plot of land (according to the actions 
in column 4 of Table 4.4) can be estimated by comparing the market price of a 
land share with the market price of a registered plot in the same area. In Voloko-
lamsk, near Moscow, the price of a plot is double the price of a land share before 
conversion.  
While the registration procedure is determined by law, the law does not specify 
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their own demands. In Moscow Oblast, nine out of the ten steps that an applicant 
has to complete are not prescribed by the law, require submission of additional 
documents, or are part of a list of verbal requirements that are not listed in any 
official document. In this situation, corporations that can afford to hire advisors 
and have specialized staff responsible for transaction registration are in an ad-
vantageous position. This is a typical example of market asymmetry, where 
some agents have more information than others by virtue of their official posi-
tion, greater financial possibilities, or the ability to hire experts. Land-share 
owners, peasant farmers, and traditional corporate farms are weak players in this 
process: They have to spend so much time and money on registration that they 
often simply give up their rights or use land that is not legally registered. 
In order to simplify the land purchase procedure, buyers resort to general power 
of attorney or give the land away as a gift. With general power of attorney, the 
seller gets the money and empowers a third person to sell the land share and 
complete all the necessary arrangements. With a gift of land, there is no need to 
offer the share to other pre-emptive buyers (the joint owners, the oblast govern-
ment, or the municipality). These "under-registration" mechanisms are risky for 
the buyer, as power of attorney can be revoked before the registration of rights 
transfer to the buyer is completed, and a gift can be annulled as a fictitious 
transaction. Still, buyers are willing to take the risk because the prices of land 
rise so quickly (the price of land in Mozhaisk near Moscow increased by a factor 
of 20 between January 2003 and June 2004).  
4.3  Expected effect of mortgage on transactions in agricultural land  
The inability to mortgage land or, more generally, to use it as collateral for ob-
taining credit, is often cited in the literature as a major obstacle to the buying and 
selling of land. The mortgage of agricultural land was allowed only in January 
2004 by a special amendment of the 1998 general mortgage law. However, the 
language of the original mortgage law extended to agricultural land imposes cer-
tain conditionalities that are highly restrictive in the new context. Thus, only a 
land plot can be mortgaged, while most agricultural land is in joint shared owner-
ship. Moreover, only owned land can be mortgaged, and owned land accounts 
for a mere 1.3 % of agricultural land used by corporate farms.  
These legal provisions suggest that although the 2004 amendment formally al-
lows agricultural land to be mortgaged, the technical barriers to meeting the ba-
sic requirements are practically insurmountable. It therefore seems that at the 
present stage, land mortgage will have a very limited potential in Russia and will 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
Russia has met the necessary pre-conditions for the development of agricultural 
land markets: Agricultural land has been largely privatized, individual landowners 
have legal rights to most agricultural land in the country, and previous prohibi-
tions on the buying and selling of land have been removed by recent laws. Land 
markets have responded positively to these changes and we are beginning to 
witness transactions that involve individual landowners, and not only the state. 
While the Russian media, politicians, and scholars generally argue that market 
development is restricted by the low demand for agricultural land, our survey 
results seem to indicate that this is not really so: A substantial proportion of 
farms in some regions are actually interested in expanding their holdings.  
However, further development of the embryonic land market is severely circum-
scribed by the inadequacy of the administrative and technical infrastructure. 
There is no public registry of plans and maps that can be used to complete the 
transactions, the bureaucracy has created numerous procedural obstacles that 
complicate land transactions, and the agents, effectively, do not have access to 
market information about land prices or demand and supply of land. All these 
factors contribute to very high transaction costs in land markets. In the absence 
of competitive demand for agricultural land in many regions, landowners have 
no motivation to complete the required procedures for registration of their prop-
erty rights, be it registration of land shares or physical plots. The actual costs are 
simply not justified by the expected benefits from making their property "ready 
for the market".  
Market constraints – both legal and administrative – exist in all countries in the 
world. The Treaty of Rome, which governs the accession to the European Union, 
recognizes the right of member countries to keep their national property rules, 
and the new members have received special permission to maintain constraints 
on land markets during the next decade. Yet restrictions on the transferability of 
land and general non-transparency from which land markets so often suffer 
throughout the world (and not only in Russia) are serious obstacles to achieving 
economic efficiency. In Russia, particular attention is required to create ade-
quate market information systems and significantly reduce transaction costs. 
Measures in these areas will hopefully alleviate the main barriers to land trans-
actions in this huge, land-rich country. 
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PUBLIC QUALITY SCHEMES – HELPING ENSURE  
WELL-FUNCTIONING AGRI-FOOD MARKETS IN CENTRAL  





Western governments regard public quality schemes as an agricultural policy 
instrument for improving a market's functioning, as do governments of Central 
and Eastern European countries. But from a consumer perspective, governments 
have to take an essential information role for the functioning of markets for cre-
dence qualities. This paper analyses public quality schemes in this regard by app-
lying the Persuasion Knowledge Model, which concludes that by establishing 
public quality schemes, governments will jeopardise rather than improve market 
functioning. 
Keywords: Credence qualities, quality schemes, public intervention, consumer 
information, Persuasion Knowledge Model. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The domestic agricultural and food sectors are relatively important for the eco-
nomic performance of Central and Eastern European countries. Yet in these 
countries the markets for agricultural and food products do not function without 
friction. Farmers do not obtain the income level they would if markets were well 
functioning. Furthermore, the development of rural areas, as well as that of the 
respective national economies, falls short of their potential. 
From a market-economy perspective, one reason for poorly-functioning agri-
food markets may be the inexperience of farmers and farmer groups with   
                                           
*  Author’s note: Dr. Eckhard Benner is an agricultural economist and Lecturer at the De-
partment of Agricultural Policy and Markets (Inst. 420b), University of Hohenheim,  
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market-oriented business management, i.e., with marketing instruments. Farmers' 
lack of experience and farmer groups with marketing instruments may suggest 
that governments in CEE countries should support farmers’ marketing efforts by 
establishing public quality schemes. 
Public intervention through establishing public quality schemes is justified by 
arguments of transaction cost economics (LIPPERT and THIEDIG, 2001) or welfare 
economics (e.g. HERRMANN et al., 2000; and, generally, FORKER and WARD, 
1993), though there are counter-arguments based on welfare economics (see e.g. 
COULIBALY and BRORSEN, 1999; V. ALVENSLEBEN, 1991). However, from the 
consumer perspective, governments have a vital informational role to play in 
well-functioning markets. This role differs by design from public quality 
schemes.  
The paper will analyse public quality schemes by taking into account govern-
ments‘ informational role. It will be shown that governments jeopardise rather 
than improve the functioning of markets when establishing public quality 
schemes. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two will describe 
public quality schemes as policy instruments. Section three will present the ra-
tionale of public consumer information by referring to information economics. 
Section four will present a consumer model, which describes how consumers 
cope with persuasive attempts in the market place. Section five will discuss the 
impact of public quality schemes on market functioning. Finally, Section six will 
present policy implications.  
2 PUBLIC QUALITY SCHEMES 
Public quality programs are intensively used measures by (local, regional, na-
tional and supranational) governments to promote agricultural products and 
food. For example, nearly every German federal state has established a quality 
scheme for conventional agricultural products or a scheme for organic products.  
From an agricultural policy perspective, public quality schemes supplement 
agricultural policy instruments such as price guarantees, income support, pro-
duction restraints and environmental and social measures. They aim to increase 
demand for promoted products. With respect to the number of beneficiary 
farmers, two forms of public quality schemes exist: Those that restrict support 
to farmers residing within a specific geographical area and those that do not 
restrict support in such a way. Schemes which restrict support are usually ac-
companied by a designation of origin (see Figure 1). Yet within the EU, estab-
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Article  28 of the European Treaty (GERICHTSHOF DER EUROPÄISCHEN 
GEMEINSCHAFTEN, 2002; BECKER and BENNER, 2000). 
Figure 1:  Public quality schemes 
 
Source: Own  representation. 
However, from a marketing perspective, public quality schemes are meant to 
support farmers’ marketing efforts in two respects: They encourage farmers’ 
product policy by establishing a quality term, and they encourage farmers com-
munication policy by establishing a quality label (signalling that certain quality 
standards are met) and conducting information campaigns.  
Quality terms define product and process requirements (e.g. organic standards, 
animal husbandry, pest management), as well as some kind of monitoring. Thus, 
only farmers whose products meet the defined standards are supported by public 
quality schemes. A quality label graphically displays a quality term, and aims to 
simplify consumers’ perception. As such, a quality label represents an "official 
brand" (compare BENNER, 2003, p. 44). Whether or not the government acts 
visibly as the principal of information campaigns, two forms of public quality 
schemes can be distinguished: Direct and indirect advertising. Direct advertising 
is conducted by the government itself (e.g. government’s departments, eventually 
supported by an advertising agency). With indirect advertising, a government 
establishes a semi-state institution either by a check-off program or by public 
spending. A semi-state institution set into operation by a check-off program is 
funded by a legal levy on agricultural commodity sales (e.g. per cow head or per 
kiloliter milk) raised by the first handler of the commodity (bottle neck, i.e., 
slaughterhouse or dairy) (FORKER  and  WARD, 1993, p.  2, and compare 
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the German Zentrale Marketinggesellschaft der deutschen Agrarwirtschaft 
(CMA). An example of a semi-state institution set into operation by public 
spending, (partly) funded from the government’s budget, is the Marketing- und 
Absatzförderungsgesellschaft Baden-Württemberg (MBW). 
The success of "official brands" relies on uniqueness regarding their market po-
sition. Such a position is based on high communication pressure, emotional po-
sitioning, and consistently high product and process quality. But by aiming to 
support a majority of farmers, it is difficult to achieve a unique market position: 
Often, public quality schemes come along with relatively low product and process 
standards, and a high level of uniformity of the labeled products (compare 
SPILLER, 2001).  
3 PUBLIC CONSUMER INFORMATION 
Generally, a public contribution to information provision is necessary if markets 
are characterised by asymmetric information and this asymmetry can not be re-
moved by private efforts alone (FRITSCH et al., 1999). From a consumer perspec-
tive, a market situation characterised by asymmetric information exists, with 
transactions relying on credence qualities. Credence qualities are product at-
tributes, which consumers cannot verify, neither before nor after purchase 
(DARBY and KARNI, 1973). Credence qualities are e.g. organic production, methods 
of animal husbandry, and the use of pesticides. 
With credence qualities, consumers rely on the truthfulness of provided informa-
tion. Trust in provided information and its source, respectively, has to replace 
self-evaluation (HAUSER, 1979, p. 751). Thus, every communication effort at-
tempting to transmit a credence quality faces the problem of credibility. More-
over, transmitting credence qualities calls for a minimum level of credibility. 
With credibility too low, market transactions based on a credence quality do not 
take place (BENNER, 2004). Supposing a syllogistic relation between information 
credibility and source credibility (LUTZ, 1985, pp. 49), the same is true for source 
credibility. As pointed out by the following, this problem of credibility necessarily 
calls for a specific form of public intervention. 
Advertising is, for firms’, a vital means for information provision. However, at 
the same time, advertising is a form of persuasive communication. Advertising 
anticipates the result of consumer’s reflection about its content. For that purpose 
it transmits information within a framework of rhetorical stylistic devices. The 
framework consists of purposefully selected words as well as a purposefully ar-
ranged structure of argumentation (BEHRENS, 1996; SCOTT, 1994; MCQUARRIE 
and  MICK, 1996; TOM  and  EVES, 1999; MCQUARRIE  and  MICK, 2003; 
MALKEWITZ et al., 2003). Thus, when based on advertising, consumers always de-
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In the anonymous market place, therefore, firms' advertising efforts are unsuitable 
for transmitting credence qualities. In order to be understood as being credible, 
advertising always refers to consumers’ everyday knowledge about credibility 
(WILLEMS, 1999). For this, advertising reverts to dramatising strategies (e.g. 
mentioning a guaranty or an award, etc.). Yet, since consumers are not able to 
evaluate credence qualities, they never can feel confident, whether e.g. mentioning 
a guaranty doesn't merely serve to stage credibility.  
For that reason, taking the consumer perspective into account, marketing cre-
dence qualities must always be assured through product and process monitoring 
by a third party (MCCLUSKY, 2000). However, even with third parties, consumers 
can never feel confident whether certification doesn't merely serve to stage 
credibility (TEISL and ROE, 1998, p. 144). Furthermore, private monitoring sys-
tems could be easily circumvented, since participation is voluntary and third par-
ties are not authorised to exercise coercion. But without mandatory participation, 
the existence of credence goods is not guarantied. Thus, public intervention is 
imperatively needed (MARETTE et al., 2000), because within democratic socie-
ties the state is the sole institution, which is allowed to exercise coercion (e.g. 
via mandatory regulations) to which firms have to stick to without exception. In 
democratic societies, citizens voluntarily assign the possibility of exercising coer-
cion to the state (STIGLITZ, 1989). 
The required public intervention consists of three features, which have to be 
regulated by law: Firstly, product and process requirements have to be deter-
mined, by which a normative term of the credence quality is defined. Secondly, 
a monitoring system has to be established to ensure compliance with the deter-
mined product and process requirements. Public monitoring must be able to gain 
relevant information, to detect a breach of law, and be enforced, i.e., public au-
thorities must stick to the regulation as well, even if there are limits to enforcing 
them (STIGLITZ, 1998), otherwise the monitoring system is still open to fraud 
(BAIRD et al., 1995, pp. 95; GIANNAKAS, 2002). Finally, an informational cam-
paign has to be conducted that informs consumers about the content of the pub-
lic intervention. However, such an information campaign should follow specific 
requirements for public consumer information, transmitting information in a 
way that enables and facilitates consumers to reflect on their genuine needs 
(SCHERHORN, 1979, pp. 37). In doing so, it does not advise the direction and re-
sult of the consumers’ reflection, and accepts the primarily achieved results. The 
campaign follows neither business interests (EINSIEDEL, 1998, p. 411) nor govern-
mental interests (FRITSCH et al., 1999, p. 279), and does not put these interests 
against consumer interests. Particularly, the campaign forbears emotional pleas 
(SCHERHORN, 1979, pp. 35). For the sake of clarity, this type of consumer in-
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Public intervention of this kind is intimately connected with governments, since 
governments are at least its executors, if not its initiators. Governments are nor-
mally involved in public monitoring and communication through some of its 
departments or responsible authorities, see for example the monitoring systems 
for organic production of the EU Member States (LAMPKIN et al., 1999). 
In the anonymous market place, this type of public intervention constitutes the 
necessary trust in products and credibility of market information and market ac-
tors, and lets markets for credence qualities evolve and function well. 
4 THE PERSUASION KNOWLEDGE MODEL 
The Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) is a consumer model, which describes 
how a consumer copes with persuasion attempts with which he is exposed in the 
market place (see FRIESTAD and WHRIGHT, 1994).  
The initial point of PKM is the assumption that the consumer acts in order to 
pursue his own market goals. Its foundation is a consumer’s ability to deliberate 
comprehensively about persuasion in general and advertising in particular, and 
independently from current persuasion attempts.  
A consumer’s deliberation is independent from current persuasion attempts since 
the consumer is able to deliberate about persuasion not only when he is directly 
exposed to an attempt, but also at any other time. His deliberation is comprehen-
sive, since all perceived features of the considered persuasion attempt are incor-
porated into it. The topic of a consumer’s deliberation is both the credibility of 
the advertisement, and the tactics and objectives of the advertising agent, as well 
as of the agents principles. With the assistance of his deliberation, the consumer 
is able to control his behaviour during a persuasion attempt and to shape the at-
tempt according to his own market goals. This is not to say that consumers' de-
liberation is based upon complete information. Rather, it is said that consumers' 
deliberation is based upon more information than is made available by an infor-
mation source and its means (e.g. advertisement). During the deliberation, the 
consumer draws upon his "knowledge of persuasion". 
In contrast to other consumer models (e.g. Elaboration-Likelihood-Model), 
PKM does not assume that the consumer copes with persuasion attempts by only 
using his product knowledge and reacts on stimuli delivered by e.g. an adver-
tisement, but also by using his knowledge of persuasion. Consumer’s knowledge 
of persuasion consists "of interrelated beliefs about the psychological events that 
are instrumental to persuasion, the causes and effects of those events, the impor-
tance of the events, the extent to which people can control their psychological 
responses the temporal course of the persuasion process, and the effectiveness Public quality schemes  309
and appropriateness of particular persuasion tactics" (FRIESTAD and WHRIGHT, 
1994, p. 6). 
The fundamental component of a consumer’s knowledge of persuasion is a so-
ciety's own common knowledge about persuasion ("folk wisdom on persua-
sion"). The extent of the foundation varies on both social and individual levels. 
At the social level, the extent varies over time, since at different times a society 
holds different levels of knowledge of persuasion. This knowledge is enlarged as 
e.g. scientific insights find their way to laymen. At the individual level, the con-
sumer expands his knowledge of persuasion actively and passively. He actively 
expands his knowledge of persuasion through interpersonal interaction and his 
own experience with persuasive attempts. Besides, he passively expands his 
knowledge of persuasion by conversations which influence feelings, cognition, 
and behaviour, as well as by reading, seeing and hearing media comments on 
marketing tactics. 
Through these changes of a consumer's knowledge of persuasion, and caused by 
his deliberation, a consumer's behaviour and attitudes towards information cam-
paigns and information sources can be changed ("change-of-meaning-
principle"). The basic change is provoked when a feature of an information 
campaign or an activity of an information source is first perceived as a persua-
sive tactic. Since the consumer is interested in the principal ("the puppet mas-
ters") and his goals, the change in behaviour and attitudes does not only include 
the immediate information source, but also its principal. 
5 DISCUSSION 
A main feature of public quality schemes is promoting agricultural products 
characterised by credence qualities, e.g. organic production, pest management or 
animal husbandry standards.  
From a consumer's point of view, purchasing such products requires credible 
information. To obtain credibility, business information efforts necessarily rest 
on a legally enforced system that consists of three features: A legal term, a pub-
lic monitoring system, and literal consumer information (see Section 3).  
However, when establishing public quality schemes, governments indeed would 
establish some kind of public monitoring and quality term (even though not neces-
sarily legally enforced) and would be engaged in conducting advertising (i.e., 
persuasive information) instead of conducting literal consumer information (see 
Sections 2 and 3). Thus, with public quality schemes, governments seek to urge 
consumers to bring their consumption decisions into line with agricultural policy 
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Furthermore, from a consumer's perspective, by establishing public quality 
schemes, governments play a double role: That of "self-monitoring advertisers" 
(see Figure 2). By holding such a role, a government acts like any enterprise that 
has installed a privately-driven monitoring system and advertises its product at 
the same time (see Section 3). 
Figure 2:  Governments double role 
 
Source: Own  representation. 
Consumers recognise the government’s double role since they deliberate com-
prehensively about persuasive attempts (see Section 4). This recognition be-
comes particularly important when one enterprise or a group of enterprises en-
gaged in marketing agricultural products characterised by a credence quality 
fails to comply with the legal system, i.e., market a product with specific claims, 
but do not produce said product according to the (assumed) legal definition.  
In such a case, consumers exceedingly rely on the government (or on one of its 
executive authorities) as a credible information source. Because in the case of 
non-compliance, consumers have to be capable of discriminating between products 
from enterprises which comply with the legal standard and products from enter-
prises that do not. Thus, consumers must be able to discriminate between the 
failure of a single enterprise (or a group of enterprises) and the breakdown of the 
whole monitoring system. In order to be capable of discriminating, it is impera-
tive that consumers receive information that possesses an extraordinary degree 
of credibility. Since this particular discrimination applies to a credence quality, 
the only source which can provide such required information is the government 
(see Section 3). 
By taking on the role of the self-monitoring advertiser, the government promises 
the everlasting reliability of the legal monitoring system, at least implicitly (just 
as an enterprise implicitly assures the reliability of its control system by promising, 
via advertising, the existence of a particular product attribute (see Section 3)). 
However, a recognised instance of non-compliance conflicts with such a promise. 
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the government will be displayed as an untrustworthy information source. As a 
result of such a situation, the government would lose credibility, and that loss 
would become manifest in a decrease in demand, or even a demand refusal. Fi-
nally, the market for the promoted products would break down ("policy of recur-
ring market breakdown", see BENNER, 2003, p. 139).  
6 POLICY IMPLICATION 
Governments must work intensively to ensure the credibility of both market in-
formation and themselves. Facing the problem of asymmetric information and 
the danger of market breakdowns, CEE governments (as well as EU Member 
states) must not engage in public quality schemes, because this engagement will 
jeopardised the well functioning of markets, and, hence, the development of ru-
ral areas (see Section 5).  
However, governments’ contribution to overcoming the problem of asymmetric 
information with respect to consumers' decision-making based on credence 
qualities is required. So instead of establishing quality schemes, governments 
should financially support the efforts of consumer organisations to provide literal 
consumer information. Moreover, within the European Union, a European ordi-
nance is required for literal consumer information (see BENNER, 2003). 
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"The advantages of competition do 
not depend on it being ‘perfect’" 
(HAYEK, 1990, p. 65). 
 
ABSTRACT 
The paper highlights the perspective of Hayek and the Austrian School of Eco-
nomics on competition, market power and antimonopoly policy in contrast to the 
widely used model of perfect competition of mainstream economists. The paper 
shows that in economics there is no unanimous agreement on how to assess 
competition. Neoclassical economists view competition as "perfectly" functioning 
when prices equal marginal cost, and focus on competition as a means to achieve 
maximum wealth in the sense of Pareto optimality. For the Austrian school, 
competition means a dynamic, rivalrous process, whose desirability stems from 
its ability of being a means of discovery. These differing views on competition 
result in various implications for antimonopoly policy. Whereas adherents of the 
perfect market model demand antitrust regulations in order to bring markets in 
the direction of their benchmark model of "perfect" competition, Austrian 
economists oppose such regulations on the grounds that this would be inherently 
incompatible with rivalry.  
Keywords: Competition, Austrian economics, antimonopoly policy. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The development of competitive markets is a crucial task for establishing func-
tioning market economies in Central and Eastern European countries. In order to 
assess the development and performance of competition, policy makers need 
some sort of benchmark. Textbooks on competition theory and policy show that 
there exists not one, but a whole range of different concepts or models showing 
what competition should be like (see e.g. MANTZVINOS, 1994; HERDZINA, 1993, 
p. 113ff., SCHMIDT, 2001, p. 2ff.). However, when looking at empirical studies 
on this topic, it is striking that scholars often use (without saying) the neoclas-
sical model of perfect competition as a benchmark, just as if other concepts 
and theories were non-existent (see e.g. SCHROETER, 1988; AZZAM, 1992; 
MCCORRISTON, 1997).  
The model of perfect competition is based on strict assumptions such as the exis-
tence of numerous buyers and sellers, homogenous products, complete market 
transparency, perfect entry and exit from the market, perfect information of eco-
nomic actors regarding all aspects of production, exchange and distribution ac-
tivities and an infinite velocity of reactions. As a result of these conditions, the 
actions of any single buyer or seller have a negligible impact on the market 
price. The assumption that competitive firms are profit maximizing the price in 
perfectly competitive markets equals marginal costs. It can be shown that in 
such a world of perfectly competitive markets the wealth of a society, defined as 
allocative and distributive efficiency in the sense of Pareto, can be maximized. 
The advantages of this model are that price formation and the welfare optimum 
can consistently be derived from the assumptions and that it can serve as a use-
ful tool for didactic purposes, i.e., explaining the principles of price formation in 
other market forms such as monopoly or oligopoly (STREIT, 2000, p. 19).  
However, the model of perfect competition has severe deficiencies for normative 
analysis, i.e., for trying to assess real world market structures and behaviors and 
deriving adequate options for competition policy. One of the well-known criti-
cisms is that it compares the real world with an ideal world and is thus not able 
to explain real world market phenomena. This is why DEMSETZ (1969, p. 1) 
called this model a "nirvana approach". 
A second point is that the model erases the dynamics of competition, since ac-
cording to its strict assumptions, most parameters for entrepreneurial actions 
such as price setting, product innovation, quality improvement or advertisement 
are either not at the disposal of the entrepreneur or he has no incentives to use 
them (MÖSCHEL, 1984, p.  158). While in such a static world allocation effi-
ciency can be achieved, there is no room for economic progress in the sense of 
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A third critical point is that the use of an unrealistic and overly high standard of 
what competition should be may lead to erroneous options for competition policy. 
Trying to establish the ideal world would necessitate, as a logical consequence 
of the model’s assumptions, constant government intervention into market struc-
tures and behavior in order to remove imperfections. In the extreme case, this 
would include the prohibition of product innovations or any other innovative 
actions. Using the model of perfect competition as a standard for judging the 
performance of competition thus creates the paradoxical situation that a theory 
whose ultimate goal was to demonstrate the superiority of market forces may 
turn into a theory which actually favors market interventions because real world 
markets are anything but perfect (PIES, 1996, p. 7). It is obvious that such a 
situation would be fatal for any country’s welfare, so the model of perfect com-
petition is not of much practical use for competition policy. The main reason for 
this deficiency is that neoclassical theory, with its benchmark model of perfect 
competition, has a narrow view of the nature of competition. It regards competi-
tion only as a method of achieving a certain kind of social welfare optimum. 
However, the purpose of competition in a market economy lies far beyond that. 
It was the Austrian economist and Nobel Prize winner of 1974, Friedrich August 
von Hayek, who emphasized that the purposes and advantages of competition do 
not lie in it being "perfect," but in being a discovery procedure.  
The aim of this paper is to highlight Hayek's view, as well as that of the Austrian 
School of Economics, of competition and the issues of market power and anti-
monopoly policy in order to make mainstream economists question the too-often 
uncritical use of their standard model and to provide policy makers with an al-
ternative approach to competition policy.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains Hayek's principle critique 
of the neoclassical model of perfect competition. Then Hayek’s and the Austrian 
School’s understanding of the purpose of competition is shown in Section 3. 
Next, the issue of market power and how it can be dealt with by economic policy 
will be discussed (Sections 4 and 5). The paper ends with concluding remarks 
for scholars and politicians dealing with competition issues in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Section 6). 
2 HAYEK’S CRITIQUE OF "PERFECT COMPETITION" 
Stemming from the conclusions of classical economists like Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo or John Stuart Mill, which state that an economy based on market trans-
actions is best suitable for ensuring a high decree of wealth of a nation, in the 
last quarter of the 19
th century economic research started to focus its interest on 
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wealth of a nation in the sense of Pareto optimality
1. This so-called neoclassical 
research, which is linked to names like William Stanley Jevons, Léon Walras or 
Alfred Marshall, came to the conclusion that Pareto optimality is achieved if 
there are perfectly competitive markets. The requirements for perfect competi-
tion were completely formulated by F. H KNIGHT in 1921 (p. 75ff). In such a 
market structure, none of the producers or consumers can influence the price on 
their own. They are price takers and the price would move instantaneously to 
equilibrium.
2 According to proponents of the perfect competition model, any 
real situation in a market that deviates from this ideal state of affairs is regarded 
as sub-optimal to societies' well being. It is then recommended that the govern-
ment intervene in order to improve consumers well-being whenever such devia-
tion occurs. 
As mentioned in the introduction, Austrian economists, as typified by LUDWIG 
VON MISES and FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, are not the only ones who criticize 
this model's explanation of the nature and purpose of competition in market 
economies (see also RICKETTS, 2002, p. 13ff.); however, their criticisms have 
been both pioneering and trenchant (KIRZNER, 1997, p. 63). This criticism is 
based on two arguments that are, to a certain degree, interlinked. The first argu-
ment, already addressed in the introduction, is that the strict assumptions of the 
model eliminate the very nature of competition as a dynamic process, seeing it 
as a state of affairs called "competitive equilibrium". Prices, product/resource 
qualities, and the production and utility function are taken as given "data" to 
each decision-maker. The only way to act for them is to adapt production quanti-
ties to these given conditions. How much they have to produce is thereby already 
predetermined by the data, i.e., the quantities can be deduced from them. HAYEK 
(1945, p. 85) calls this the "Pure Logic of Choice". In reality, however, market 
participants compete by bidding higher prices, by offering to undersell competi-
tors or by offering consumers better quality merchandise, better service and the 
like (KIRZNER, 1997, p. 63f., FEHL, 2002, p. 6f.). In fact, as LUDWIG VON MISES 
(1949, p.  274) emphasizes, competition "manifests itself in the facts that the 
sellers must outdo one another by offering better or cheaper goods and services 
and that the buyers must outdo one another by offering higher prices". Competi-
tion is thus "by nature a dynamic process whose essential characteristics are as-
sumed away by the assumptions underlying static analysis. In this sense, "perfect" 
                                           
1  Pareto optimality is realized when it is no longer possible to enhance the welfare of one or 
more economic subjects by a change in the transaction or production conditions without 
diminishing the welfare of some other subject.
2  This is achieved through the so-called "tâtonnement process" associated with Léon Walras. 
It is supposed that an "auctioneer" sets prices and that economic agents form provisional 
arrangements at these given prices. If it turns out that excess demand or supply exist, the 
provisional arrangements lapse and the auctioneer modifies prices in an attempt to elimi-
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competition "means indeed the absence of all competitive activities," (HAYEK, 
1948, p. 96). This in turn means that so-called "data" such as qualities, prices, 
production technologies or preferences are anything but given. Rather, competi-
tion as a process involves a continuous change in exactly these data, brought 
about by the economic agents themselves (KIRZNER, 1997, p. 70). The signifi-
cance of competition "must therefore be completely missed by any theory which 
treats these data as constant," (HAYEK, 1948, p. 106).  
This leads to the second and core argument against the perfect market model, 
which plays the central role in Hayek’s scientific work. This is the problem of 
knowledge, which HAYEK (1937) considers to be the central problem of eco-
nomics as a social science. Hayek was one of the few economists who con-
tinuously emphasized that the knowledge of human beings in and about complex 
phenomena like a modern economy based on the division of labor is limited. 
This holds not only for the economic agents acting on the markets but also for 
the economist observing an economy. Due to his limited cognitive abilities, the 
single economic agent is not able to acquire full knowledge and information re-
garding all relevant circumstances of place and time on which he bases his eco-
nomic decisions. Rather, this knowledge is dispersed among the many people of 
the society. One economic agent possesses knowledge of one certain circum-
stance; another agent has knowledge of other facts. But this knowledge is never 
given to anyone in its entirety; neither to any one of the economic subjects nor 
to the observing scientists or any omniscient dictator (HAYEK, 1945, p. 77f.). 
This, however, is assumed in the perfect competition model, which analyses ad-
aptations to so-called objective market data. In reality, the actions of market par-
ticipants are determined by facts and circumstances that the individual agent has 
revealed for himself personally and regarded as relevant for his decisions. These 
facts cannot be stated a priori by means of logic, for they are, to a high degree, 
the result of subjective evaluations (STREIT, 2000, p. 96).  
As a result, HAYEK (1990, p. 67) considers any comparison with a state that 
might have been achieved if somebody had complete knowledge of all facts as 
"wholly irrelevant". In fact, for an economic decision-maker, this total knowledge 
is, in a market economy, not even necessary. What is necessary are sufficient 
signals about scarcity and their changes, as well as alert economic agents who 
are ready to take upon themselves transaction costs in order to make use of in-
formation for their personal advantage. These signals are, in market economies, 
the prices, or more precisely the changes in relative prices.  
HAYEK (1945, p. 85f.) explains this with the following example: "Assume that 
somewhere in the world a new opportunity for the use of some raw material, 
say, tin, has arisen, or that one of the sources of supply of tin has been elimi-
nated. It does not matter for our purpose – and it is significant that it does not 
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of tin need to know is that some of the tin they used to consume is now more 
profitably employed elsewhere and that, in consequence, they must economize 
tin. There is no need for the great majority of them even to know where the more 
urgent need has arisen, or in favour of what other needs they ought to husband 
the supply. If only some of them know directly of the new demand, and switch 
resources over to it, and if the people who are aware of the new gap thus created 
in turn fill it from still other sources, the effect will rapidly spread throughout 
the whole economic system and influence the uses of tin but also those of its 
substitutes and the substitutes of these substitutes, the supply of all the things 
made of tin, and their substitutes, and so on".  
It is this capacity of the price system, to transmit information from one part of 
the market to another, in which Hayek and Austrian economists saw (and see) 
the key contribution of competition to social well-being. Competition is thus not 
needed to ensure a maximum of wealth in the sense of Pareto optimality, be-
cause this is, due to the lack of knowledge, not achievable (HAYEK, 1937). What 
competition can accomplish is the discovery of possibilities and preferences that 
no one had hitherto realized. Thus, competition is socially desirable, because it 
ensures optimal possibilities to activate and use dispersed knowledge and informa-
tion (MANTZAVINOS, 1994, p. 133). This is why later, HAYEK (1968/94, p. 253) 
called competition a "discovery procedure" that generates "such facts as, with-
out resort to it, would not be known to anyone". 
3 COMPETITION AS A DISCOVERY PROCEDURE 
To explain in more detail what "competition as a discovery procedure" means, 
HAYEK (1968/94, p. 249f.; 1990, p. 67f.) refers to other situations in life where 
competition is used, e.g. in sports or even in science. The aim of competition in 
these fields is to find out who will do best. It would "apparently be absurd to ar-
range a competition if we knew in advance who the winner would be" (HAYEK, 
1968/94, p. 249). The same holds for the economy. Competition would be un-
necessary if the facts to be discovered like "which goods are scarce, or what 
things are goods, or how scarce and valuable they are," are already known or 
could be predicted: In each case it is the preliminary outcomes of the market 
process that inform individuals where it is worthwhile to search…Their attention 
will be directed by the prices the market offers for various goods and services. 
This means, "that each individual’s particular combination of skills and abilities – 
which in many regards is always unique – will not only (and not even prelimi-
nary) be skills that the person in question can note down in detail or report to a 
government agency. Rather, the knowledge of which I am speaking consists to a 
great extent of the ability to detect certain circumstances, an ability that indi-
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and services are demanded, and how urgently," (HAYEK, 1968/94, p.  253f.). 
How any individual will act in detail and what particular circumstances he will 
encounter is not known beforehand and must be still more unknown to anyone 
else (HAYEK, 1990, p. 69). When it is thus impossible to know in advance "the 
facts we wish to discover with the help of competition, we are also unable to de-
termine how effectively competition leads to the discovery of all the relevant 
circumstances that could have been discovered. All that can be empirically veri-
fied is that societies making use of the competition for this purpose realize this 
outcome to a greater extent than do others…" (HAYEK, 1968/94, p. 250). HAYEK 
(1990, p. 68) emphasizes that this does not mean that the outcome of competi-
tion is necessarily the best imaginable result, though it provides one of the most 
effective incentives to such an achievement. It will only tell us who did best on 
that particular occasion. HAYEK (1990, p. 66f.) points out that "as a rule there 
will exist at any one time not only an optimum size of the productive unit, below 
and above which costs will rise, but also special advantages of skill, location, 
traditions, etc., which only some but not all enterprises will possess. Frequently, 
a few enterprises or perhaps only a single one will be able to supply as much of 
a particular commodity as can be sold at prices covering its costs which may be 
cheaper than those of any other firm. In this case a few firms (or the single firm) 
will not be under the necessity of bringing their prices down to the marginal 
costs, or of producing such a quantity of their product that they can be sold at 
prices covering its marginal costs. All that their interest will induce the firm to 
do will be to keep prices below the figure at which new producers would be 
tempted to enter the market. Within this range such firms (or such a firm) would 
indeed be free to act as monopolists or oligopolists and to fix their prices (or the 
quantities of goods produced) at the level which would bring them the highest 
profits, limited only by the consideration that they must be low enough to keep 
out others. In all such instances, an omniscient dictator could indeed improve the 
use of the available resources by requiring the firms to expand production until 
prices only just covered marginal costs. Using this standard, most markets in the 
existing world are undoubtedly very imperfect. For all practical problems, how-
ever, this standard is wholly irrelevant, because it rests on a comparison with a 
state that might have been achieved if certain facts which we cannot alter were 
other than they in fact are". 
All that competition can do is to "produce an inducement to do better than the 
next best, but if the next best is far behind, the range within which the better one 
will be free to decide how much to exert himself may be very wide. Only if the 
next best is pressing on his heels and he himself does not know how much better 
he really is, will he find it necessary to exert himself to the full. All we can hope 
to secure is a procedure that is on the whole likely to bring about a situation where 
more of the potentially useful objective facts will be taken into account than 
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which makes so irrelevant for the choice of a desirable policy all evaluation of 
the results of competition that starts from the assumption that all the relevant 
facts are known to single mind. The real issue is how we can best assist the op-
timum utilization of the knowledge, skills and opportunities to acquire knowledge, 
that are dispersed among hundreds of people, but given nobody in their entirety," 
(HAYEK, 1990, p. 68). It is therefore meaningless to require any individual "to act 
‘as if’ competition existed, or as if it were more complete than it is," (HAYEK, 
1990, p. 69). The standard for judging the performance of competition thus can-
not be "the arrangements which would be made by somebody who had complete 
knowledge of all facts, but the probability which only competition can secure 
that the different things will be done by those who thereby produce more of 
what the others want than they would do otherwise," (HAYEK, 1990, p. 67). 
4 THE ISSUE OF MARKET POWER IN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 
These fundamentally different views of the nature and purpose of competition 
between neoclassical and Austrian economists also have implications on what is 
considered market power. Proponents of the perfect competition model speak of 
market power or market imperfections not only when there is a single producer, 
but whenever a supplier on a certain market is able to sell his product above 
marginal cost. Since such a deviation is regarded as sub-optimal for allocation 
and to consumers’ well being, they contend that it is desirable for producers to 
be made to act ‘as if’ perfect competition existed, i.e., that they should increase 
production until the marginal costs are equal to price (HAYEK, 1990, p.  70). 
From the point of view of Austrian economics, this view is problematic for three 
reasons. Firstly, it underestimates the problem of knowledge faced by an outside 
supervising authority or economist in determining the deviation. Secondly, it 
neglects the importance of the self-interest of the producers as a major incentive 
for their actions. Thirdly, it neglects the dynamics of the market process.  
The problem of knowledge in determining the deviation of price from marginal 
costs consists of the impossibility of objectively determining the individual’s 
cost curves and of knowing what the competitive price is supposed to be (see 
also HERDZINA, 1993, p. 58; SHOSTAK, 2000). Although mainstream economics 
often pretends that costs were a "datum," i.e., given knowledge, HAYEK (1990, 
p. 70) argues that "the lowest costs at which a thing can be produced are exactly 
what we want competition to discover. They are not necessarily known to any-
one but to him who has succeeded in discovering them – and even he will often 
not be aware what it enables him to produce more cheaply than others can". 
Consequently, it is also not possible for the observing economist to objectively 
establish whether a large excess of price over costs, manifesting itself in high 
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adequate return on investment. ‘Adequate’ in this case must mean a return to the 
expectation which was sufficient to justify the risk incurred". According to 
Hayek, the costs contain, to a large extent, the expectations of the producer 
about probable future developments. The success of the individual producer and 
his long-run efficiency will therefore depend on how correct his expectations 
were. Whether the producer that has made an investment should at once extend 
production to the point where prices will fall to their new marginal costs will 
thus depend on the judgment regarding the probability of future developments.  
Another point closely linked with that is that it is precisely a certain deviation of 
prices and marginal costs that is sufficient enough to provide not only amortiza-
tion of the capital sunk in it, but also to compensate for the risk of creating it, 
which creates the incentive of acquiring information and knowledge on which 
producers base their investment decision in new production technologies or 
products. It would be impossible for an outside observer to judge how great the 
risk was or ought to have appeared (HAYEK, 1990, p. 70). "We cannot at the 
same time rely on their self-interest to find the most economical method of pro-
duction and not allow them to produce the kinds and quantities of goods by 
method which best serve their interest. The inducement to improve the manner 
of production will thereby often consist in the fact that whoever does so first will 
thereby gain a temporary profit," (HAYEK, 1990, p. 70). It would wipe out the 
incentive for any innovation, if, "after the venture had proved successful, the 
firm were required to reduce prices to what would then appear as its long-run 
marginal costs. Competitive improvements…rest largely on the endeavor of 
each to gain temporary monopolistic profits so long as he leads; and it is in a 
great measure out of such profits that the successful obtain the capital for further 
improvements," (HAYEK, 1990, p. 71). Also, non-Austrian economists, e.g. FEHL 
(2002, p. 6) highlight this view and point out that it is exactly this ability of 
competition to generate innovations that makes the performance of a market 
economy superior any other thus-far known economic system. 
This leads to the third argument against the neoclassical determination of market 
power – the neglect of competition as a dynamic, rivalrous process. It has been 
shown that for such a process it is characteristic that the economic agents are 
constantly trying to outdo their rivals by price cutting, advertising, differentiating 
their products and introducing new products in order to stay in business 
(KIRZNER, 1997, p. 70). Once an entrepreneur introduces a new product he inevi-
tably acquires 100 % of the newly-established market. However, in open mar-
kets, this market "dominance" is never permanent. As SCHUMPETER (1934/2003) 
explained, it is these temporary monopolistic profits which attract new entrants 
(who imitate products) into the market and thus contribute to the diffusion of the 
innovation. It should be noted that the new entrants do not always simply imi-
tate, but that their imitation often contains, in itself, innovative elements meant 
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in motion that will never come to an end in the sense of a competitive equilib-
rium (FEHL, 2002, p. 12f.). If, against this background, adherents of neoclassical 
economics who claim the perfect market is a desirable state of affairs, evaluate 
real world markets and observe a deviation of prices from marginal costs, they 
can never say at which state of the competitive process they do their analysis, 
whether it’s the beginning or the end of the process or somewhere in between. 
Therefore, it is also impossible to determine whether detected "monopolistic" 
profits are the result of a successful realization of an innovation or of an "abuse" 
of market power because a firm is the single producer (see also HERDZINA, 1993, 
p. 59).  
For Austrian economists, the existence of one single supplier in a market, i.e., of 
a monopolist, is in general of no economic problem, as long as the reason for the 
monopolistic position is superior skills or the possession of a rare or unique re-
source or factor of production (MANTZAVINOS, 1994, p. 129; KIRZNER, 1978, 
p. 81ff.). It would then "be absurd to punish the possessor for doing better than 
anyone else by insisting that he should do as well as he can," (HAYEK, 1990, 
p. 72). Apart from the practical difficulties of ascertaining whether such a de 
facto monopolist does extend his production to the point at which prices will 
only just cover marginal costs, the requirement for him to do so is rejected, be-
cause it would harm two other principles of a free market economy, namely the 
institution of private property and the freedom of action. "The power to deter-
mine the price or the quality of a product at the figure most profitable … is a 
necessary consequence of the recognition of private property in particular 
things, and cannot be eliminated without abandoning the institution of private 
property. There is in this respect no difference between a manufacturer or mer-
chant who built up a unique organization, or acquired a uniquely suitable site, 
and a painter who limits his output to what will bring him the largest income," 
(HAYEK, 1990, p. 72). Concerning freedom of action, HAYEK (1990, p. 72f.) 
explains: "So long as any producer is in a monopoly position because he can 
produce at costs lower than anybody else can, and sells at prices which are lower 
than those which anybody else can sell, that is all we can hope to achieve – even 
though we can in theory conceive of a better use of resources which, however, 
we have no way of realizing…Not to do as well as one could, cannot be treated 
as an offence in a free society in which each is allowed to choose the manner of 
employing his person and property…We know how to induce such individuals 
or organizations to serve their fellows better than anyone else can do. But we 
have no means of always making them serve the public as well as they could". 
The most efficient way of inducing a single or few producers to provide good 
products and services is seen in keeping markets open (HAYEK, 1990, p. 79). 
Then monopolies or oligopolies will prevail only so long as other producers are 
unable to meet the demand at prices and qualities that the single or few producers 
do. Otherwise, new producers would be tempted to enter the market. This has Jürgen Wandel  324 
also been demonstrated by the Contestable Market Theory of BAUMOL, PANZAR 
and WILLIG (1982).  
As barriers to entry, Austrian economists interpret only government protection, 
e.g. tariffs, subsidies, certain legal restrictions in enterprise law, tax and other 
privileges or regulations in patent law. Economic barriers to entry that are usually 
set down as imperfectly competitive or even as "monopolistic" in textbooks of 
mainstream economists (e.g. CLARKE, 1985, p. 71ff.; CARLTON and PERLOFF, 
2000, p. 107ff.) because they imply less than perfectly elastic demand curves 
facing firms, e.g. advertising, product differentiation, predatory pricing, price 
discrimination or tie-in sales and exclusive-dealing contracts are considered to 
be legitimate business practices in the competitive process since they are pre-
cisely the kinds of entrepreneurial initiative which make up the dynamic com-
petitive process (KIRZNER, 1978, p. 170; 1997, p. 75). The same holds true for 
competitive advantages that are due to size, such as absolute cost advantages or 
economies of scale that would require from a newcomer a large amount of capi-
tal to enter the market. Freedom of entry would then only be violated if someone 
could raise the necessary capital and meet other requirements of being able to 
compete, such as having assembled the necessary management and workers with 
the necessary skills, and then were forcibly prevented from entering the market 
by the government. The freedom to enter is thus not equal to the ability to enter 
an industry (REISMAN, 2002).  
Rather, size and concentration, and thus high capital requirements, are seen as 
the natural consequence of the competitive struggle. Consequently, size and 
concentration in themselves are not considered to be of concern. This is also be-
cause "neither size in itself, nor ability to determine the prices at which all can 
buy their product is a measure of their harmful power. More important still, 
there is no possible measure or standard by which we can decide whether a par-
ticular enterprise is too large. Certainly the bare fact that one big firm in a par-
ticular industry ‘dominates’ the market because other firms of the industry will 
follow its price leadership, is no proof that this position can in fact be improved 
upon in any way other than by the appearance of an effective competitor – an 
event which we may hope for, but which we cannot bring about so long as no-
body is available who enjoy the same (or other compensating) special advan-
tages as the firm that is now dominant. The most effective size of the individual 
firm is as much one of the unknowns to be discovered by the market process as 
the prices, quantities or qualities of goods to be produced and sold. There can be 
no general rule about what is the desirable size since this will depend on the 
ever-changing technological and economic conditions; and there will always be 
many changes which will give advantage to enterprises of what on past stan-
dards will appear to be an excessive size," (HAYEK, 1990, p. 77f.). Competition, market power and antimonopoly policy  325
5 IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST POLICY 
The different views of market power lead to different implications for antitrust 
policy. As mentioned in the introduction, if one would strictly follow the perfect 
competition model, then anytime a real situation in a market deviated from this 
model, it would be recommended that the government intervene in order to im-
prove allocation efficiency and consumers well-being. Even as early as the 
1920s and 1930s such an approach was considered unrealistic. This caused the 
so-called price theoretical revolution, linked to names like PIERO SRAFFA (1926), 
JOAN ROBINSON (1933) and EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN (1933) who tried to find a 
more realistic alternative to the perfect competition model by introducing "im-
perfection" such as product heterogeneity or advertising into their models. This 
led to the development of models of "monopolistic competition" and the concept 
of "workable competition" for practical competition policy. The latter is based 
on the works of Edwards S. Mason, John Maurice Clark and Joe S. Bain and of-
ten summarized under the term "Harvard School". Nevertheless, the model of 
perfect competition remained the benchmark economic theory and policy strove 
for ("first-best-solution"), though they were aware that it is in practice not 
achievable. So they were looking for imperfections that were tolerable to keep 
competition at least "working" and were about to bring second-best results com-
pared to the ideal of perfect competition (ABERLE, 1992, p. 29ff.; MANTZAVINOS, 
1994, p.  21ff.). Economists then elaborated criteria with which to assess the 
workability of competition. However, these criteria often differed considerably 
from author to author, which led MASON (1959, p. 381) to state: "There are as 
many definitions of ‘effective‘ or ‘workable‘ competition as there are effective 
or working economists." 
In contrast, Austrian economists do not see much necessity for special antitrust 
policy. Rather, competition issues are mainly to be solved within the framework 
of general economic policy. The main task of the economic policy is seen as set-
ting up and protecting a functioning framework of rules, i.e., of institutions for 
the market economy that guarantee the freedom of everybody to act according to 
his own personal goals. Hayek developed three requirements that these rules or 
institution must meet: (1) The rules shall consist only of prohibitions and not of 
orders to act in a certain way, because only then is the discovery and use of new 
knowledge and ways of acting assured (HAYEK, 1991, p. 183). (2) These rules 
must be general, i.e., there must be no exemptions, but the rules must apply to an 
unknown and indefinite number of persons and cases (HAYEK, 1986, p. 73). 
(3) The rules must be valid for a long time, so that the economic agents can 
build stable expectations (HAYEK, 1986, p. 270f.). For competition issues, these 
requirements imply that certain behaviors or actions not considered to be in line 
with economic freedom shall per se be forbidden, or more precisely: Shall be 
declared as invalid from the very beginning and not be capable of being sued for 
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and collusions set up to prevent competition. In addition, there should be no 
privileges for any enterprise in the form of tax breaks or exemptions from the 
general prohibition of cartels and collusion. In reality, however, this is often the 
case, especially in German antitrust law, which is full of exceptions to the rule.
3 
Abolishing such privileges and other regulations contributes to the fulfillment of 
the basic requirements of Austrian economists in inducing and ensuring dynamic 
competition: Guaranteeing free entrepreneurial entry into any market where 
profit opportunities may be perceived to exist, since only government regula-
tions are seen as harmful barriers to entry (KIRZNER, 1997, p. 74). Limiting the 
size of firms, for example by obstructing mergers, is also regarded as blocking 
entrepreneurial entry and thus as anti-competitive (KIRZNER, 1997, p. 75). 
Concerning size and concentration, HAYEK (1990, p.78ff.) does not deny that 
great size can be harmful in that it might confer power on its management which 
it can use to exercise influence on the government, and that the advantages of 
size do not always depend on facts which cannot be altered, "such as the scarcity 
of certain kinds of talents or resources (including such accidental and yet un-
avoidable facts as that somebody has been earlier in the field and therefore has 
had more time to acquire experience and special knowledge); they will often be 
determined by institutional arrangements which happen to give an advantage to 
size which is artificial in the sense that it does not secure smaller social costs of 
the unit of output. In so far as tax legislation, the law of corporations, or the 
greater influence on the administrative machinery of government, give to the 
larger unit differential advantages which are not based on genuine superiority of 
performance, there is indeed every reason for altering the framework as to re-
move such artificial advantages of bigness. But there is as little justification for 
discrimination by policy against large size as such as there is for assisting it," 
(HAYEK, 1990, p. 78). 
As a result, Austrian economists are opposed to the antitrust policy that has been, 
and still is, widely practiced in many western market economies. In the USA, and 
also in Germany, competition policy has long been dominated
4 by the ideas of the 
"Harvard School," which thus still sees the ideal degree of competition as repre-
sented by the perfectly competitive model (FEHL and SCHREITER, 1997, p. 231). 
This was reflected in a rather strict attitude towards business practices like 
                                           
3  In Germany, nearly 50 % of all economic activities are estimated to be exempt from the 
antitrust law - among them agriculture (FEHL and SCHREITER, 1997, p. 234). 
4  In the USA, this dominance was interrupted with the presidency of Ronald Reagan. Not 
only competition policy, but the entire economic policy was influenced by the Chicago 
School. Some of its main representatives are George Stigler, Robert Bork, Harald Demsetz 
and Richard A. Posner. Although they used neoclassical research methodologies, their 
view on competition and competition policy was almost identical to the Austrian school 
(PAQUE, 1985; MANTZAVINOS, 1994, p.  42f.). Under George Bush senior, mainstream 
economists regained some influence (ABERLE, 1992, p. 145ff.; SCHMIDT, 2001, p. 250f.). Competition, market power and antimonopoly policy  327
"predatory pricing" or price discrimination and especially to mergers of any 
kind. Since the benchmark of the perfect competition model demands "many" 
small firms in "unconcentrated industries," each producing a homogenous product 
and charging the same price, the mentioned business practices and the reduction 
of the number of market participant are seen as harmful.  
In contrast, Austrian economists see in such an antitrust policy a tool to shield 
smaller and less efficient businesses from their larger competitors (DILORENZO, 
1991, p. 2; DILORENZO, 2001; REISMAN, 2002). DILORENZO (1991) shows, in an 
analysis of the historical development of antitrust legislation in the USA (with 
an emphasis on the time of the introduction of the Sherman Act in 1890) that 
there is in fact no evidence, in the industries that were sued for being monopo-
lized by trusts, that output fell and prices rose, but exactly the opposite hap-
pened. Many lawsuits were initiated by relatively small but politically active 
firms, not seldom farmers, who sought protection from larger competitors 
(DILORENZO, 1991, p. 3). But although falling prices should be seen beneficial 
for consumers’ well-being, this in turn often raises the complaint of predatory 
pricing, that is, pricing below costs meant to drive out competitors. In Germany, 
such business practices have been, under certain circumstances
5, forbidden since 
1999 (AGRA-EUROPE, 31/00, 31.  Juli 2000; LÄNDERBERICHTE, 1+2). But as 
DILORENZO (1991, p. 5) shows, there has yet to be found an example of a real 
world monopoly created by predatory pricing. Indeed, what rational business-
man would continue to price below cost for a long period? Also, OBERENDER 
(1989, p. 320) supports this view and criticizes the prohibition of pricing below 
costs as the setting of an artificially low boundary, which serves only to protect 
inefficient competitors.  
Austrian economists have a similar view of the well-known antitrust case against 
Microsoft. The US Justice Department's demand that Microsoft separate its 
browser from Windows 98 is seen as an attempt by Microsoft’s competitors to 
cripple a rival who is providing superior products and service. It is especially 
seen as a step toward destroying product differentiation and enforcing homoge-
neity in accordance with the perfect competition model. It is argued that by 
combining its browser with Windows 98, Microsoft offered a new product to 
consumers. If a consumer were to become dissatisfied with Microsoft's browser, 
he always has the option of using browsers offered by other suppliers. Conse-
quently, it is consumers who must be allowed to express their judgment, and not 
government officials (DILORENZO, 2001; REISMAN, 2002). In addition to the 
                                           
5  The prohibition to sell under costs refers "only" to enterprises with "market power" and to 
enterprises that not only occasionally, but constantly use predatory pricing, and where this 
has no "objective" justification (AGRA-EUROPE, 31.  Juli 2000; LÄNDERBERICHTE; 1+2). 
These are very vague conditions, which open much space for discretionary interference of 
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well-know arguments, mainstream economists argue in favor of the breakup of 
Microsoft with a new theory of so-called "market failures" – the theory of net-
works effects (see also ERLEI and SIEMER, 2002). Network effects arise when-
ever the value of a good to a consumer heavily depends on the number of other 
consumers that use the good. Therefore, the more consumers who use computers 
with email or fax capabilities, the more valuable it becomes to have a computer 
with such capabilities. It is argued that these increasing returns (advantages) to 
consumers tend to "lock in" some initial technological innovation as a kind of 
industry standard (and "lock out" would-be competitors) and create a fatal "path 
dependence" that ultimately can lead to (inefficient) monopoly for first-mover 
firms. Austrian economists admit that network effects can exist and can be im-
portant to consumers, and that they may even lead to high market shares in cer-
tain circumstances. However, the process of achieving the high market share 
outcome is regarded as both competitive and efficient and usually does not rep-
resent any market failure (LIEBOWITZ and MARGOLIS, 1999, p. 14f.). The com-
petitive process means that any monopoly is, ultimately, unstable and that 
newer, more efficient innovations will break through, leading to some new mo-
nopoly. LIEBOWITZ and MARGOLIS (1999, p. 15) call industries with such net-
work effects serial monopolies. "The new entrant seeks not to coexist with the 
incumbent, but rather to replace it. …the rivalry that they create, is apparently 
sufficient discipline to hold monopoly price in check and to keep the rate of in-
novation very rapid". 
Besides the argument that market power is never persistent if competition is 
viewed as a open market process, practiced antitrust policy is also rejected be-
cause of the discretionary power it gives government agencies, so that situations 
arise where government "tells some businessmen that they must not cut prices, 
others that they must not raise prices, and still others that there is something evil 
in similar prices," (HAYEK, 1990, p. 86). 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The paper tried to highlight the view of Hayek and the Austrian School of Eco-
nomics on competition, market power and antimonopoly policy in contrast to the 
widely-used mainstream economics model of perfect competition. The aim was 
not to deny the usefulness of neoclassical research and methodology in the field 
of positive analysis of price formation. Instead, the aim was to plead for a cau-
tious application of its research methodology and results for normative conclu-
sions, especially in assessing the performance of competition. In addition, the 
aim of paper was to show that in economics, there is in fact no unanimous agree-
ment on how to assess competition. Whereas neoclassical economists view com-
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competition as a means of achieving maximum wealth in the sense of Pareto op-
timality (achieved in the so called "competitive equilibrium") for the Austrian 
school, competition means a dynamic, rivalrous process, whose desirability 
stems from its ability to be a discovery procedure. In addition, the concept of 
perfect competition is rejected on the grounds of what HAYEK (1974/96) called 
the "pretence of knowledge," i.e., the assumption that facts are given, which in 
reality are just what competition has to discover, and the pretence of knowing 
what the optimal size or market structure should be. As a result, different impli-
cations for antimonopoly policy are drawn. Adherents of the perfect market 
model are convinced that antitrust regulations are needed to force the markets in 
the direction of their idealized model of "perfect" competition. But Hayek and 
other Austrian economists oppose such regulations on the ground that this would 
be inherently incompatible with rivalry. The best way to secure competition is 
seen as keeping markets open through the removal of government-created barriers 
to competitive entry.  
In the agro-food sector of Central and Eastern European countries, market power 
is often of major concern. It is claimed that the up- and downstream sectors have 
and abuse market power vis-à-vis farmers. In Russia, it is thereby often referred 
to the development of prices, i.e., that farm-gate prices rise slower than prices 
for means of productions and that the number of firms in these sectors is less 
than in agriculture. It follows that clear cut advice on what to do depends on 
what school of economic thought decision-makers adhere to. If one sees compe-
tition as a means to achieve a certain goal, e.g. Pareto-optimality, one would call 
for corresponding government interventions. If, like Austrian economists, one 
sees no specific task for competition to achieve save that of being a discovery 
process, one would have to check whether there are government regulations that 
create and protect market power and hamper market entry. In Russia, the emer-
gence of large conglomerates in the agro-food sector in the form of agroholdings 
can be attributed to missing or ill-functioning institutions, but also to political 
support, especially in the Belgorod and Orel Oblast (HOCKMANN, WANDEL and 
SHAIKIN, 2003, p. 1246ff.). It is feared that large agroholdings may become a 
threat to competition. Although it cannot be excluded that some of these big 
conglomerates dominate markets, in the Austrian view this would be of no con-
cern, since open markets constantly menace these positions. In fact, recent de-
velopments where some big agroholdings suffered losses and started to sell off 
plants illustrates that competition in the Hayekian sense of a dynamic process 
and as a discovery procedure seems to be at work in Russia, too (see e.g. 
KOSTINA, 2003; SAGDIEV, 2003). 
Which theoretical concept of competition decision-makers in Central and Eastern 
Europe adhere to must be decided by the societies themselves through the politi-
cal process. Often, the decision will also depend on the (moral) values that are Jürgen Wandel  330
regarded as being important. The only thing economists can do is to show the 
advantages and disadvantages of different concepts.  
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Ukrainian agricultural markets have been characterised by occasional instability 
throughout the last decade, which has further reinforced the widespread convic-
tion that market mechanisms do not lead to satisfactory results in the agro-food 
sector. Such mistrust of the ‘invisible hand’ has led to repeated attempts to stabi-
lise prices and support farm incomes through various market interventions, most 
of which, however, remain ineffective. In the aftermath of the severe winterkill 
of 2003, which reduced the wheat harvest to one third of its average volume, a 
concerted effort was made to get domestic agricultural prices under public con-
trol. The major policy tool for achieving this goal was the introduction of mini-
mum prices coupled with extensive intervention purchases for the most impor-
tant agricultural commodities. In this paper we investigate possible conse-
quences of the introduction of floor prices in Ukrainian agriculture and the food 
sector on production, producer incomes, domestic market prices, trade, and 
overall welfare. The quantitative portion of the analysis is carried out with the 
Regional Agricultural Sector Model of Ukraine (RASMU). This model aims to 
analyse the consequences of different policy actions in the field of agriculture 
and the processing industry. Our simulation results clearly show that the use of 
minimum prices is incompatible with Ukraine’s position as a net exporter of ag-
ricultural commodities and its aspirations to join the WTO, and that such an in-
tervention system would inflict a considerable burden on consumers and the 
state budget. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The ‘invisible hand’ is working in Ukraine, but weak market integration is cur-
tailing much of its beneficial potential. More specifically, huge trade costs, 
combined with volatile harvests, resulted in wide producer price fluctuations 
throughout the previous decade. But instead of addressing the problem directly 
by improving agricultural productivity and reducing the transaction costs of 
trade, the government of Ukraine (GOU) has repeatedly tried to achieve stability 
through either direct interventions or the establishment of target prices. Direct 
intervention usually came in the form of excessive monitoring and control of 
commodity movements, both inter-regionally and through the processing chain. 
A recent attempt to guarantee a certain producer price level for grain was made 
in the form of a pledge price system intended to ease the downward pressure on 
farm gate prices during the harvest period. But while price guarantees have been 
largely ineffective for lack of funding through the GOU, the command-style di-
rect interventions – particularly enforced sales to publicly-owned elevators and 
price controls – have led to mistrust of authorities and policymakers. In the af-
termath of the severe winterkill of 2003, which reduced the wheat harvest to 
one-third of its average volume, another concerted effort was launched to get 
domestic agricultural prices under public control. The major policy tool for 
achieving this goal was the introduction of minimum prices, coupled with exten-
sive intervention purchases, for the most important agricultural commodities.
3 
The GOU seems to be determined to introduce this minimum price system, 
which is supported by the fact that UAH 335m (USD 63m) has been earmarked 
for this purpose in the draft state budget for 2005. The question, however, is 
whether the introduction of such measures would be sustainable in fiscal, eco-
nomic and legal terms.  
A minimum price system has proved to be unsustainable in European agriculture, 
especially as it became incompatible with WTO standards, i.e., lost its legal foun-
dation (CRAMON, 2004). But the budgetary impact of ever-increasing spending on 
intervention and export subsidies also contributed to the factual replacement of 
the minimum price by direct income support. On the other hand, the economic 
losses in the form of increased consumer prices have played only a minor role. 
In the case of Ukraine, both the fiscal and economic affordability of such an in-
tervention system is important, as Ukraine’s GDP per capita (roughly 
USD 5,240 at PPP in 2003) is that of a developing country comparable to China, 
which leaves much less room for implicitly taxing consumers. In this paper we 
investigate possible consequences of minimum prices on agricultural produc-
tion, producer incomes, domestic market prices, trade, and overall welfare. In 
section two we briefly recall the most important economic aspects of minimum 
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price regimes. Section three is devoted to a quantitative analysis carried out with 
a regional agricultural sector model for Ukraine, and section four concludes the 
article with a discussion of alternative solutions for the volatility of Ukraine’s 
agricultural markets. 
2 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A MINIMUM PRICE REGIME 
This chapter highlights the basic economic, institutional, and legal consequences 
of a minimum price regime. First, we qualify the impact of a minimum price re-
gime on several groups of economic agents by means of a partial market model:  
i) consumers, ii) taxpayers, iii) landowners, iv) farm households/producers, and  
v) input suppliers and resource owners. Then we discuss the additional costs of 
the program and finish the chapter with WTO-relevant aspects of the issue.  
2.1  Market effects of minimum price regime 
In the following we carry out a conventional welfare analysis of floor prices for 
grain in Ukraine. On the supply side, the market consists of more than 10,000 
agricultural enterprises, which in 2004 produced about 42 Million tons of grain, 
including 16.5 Million tons of wheat. This harvest amount is far beyond the do-
mestic needs of the country, which makes grain exports necessary during the 
course of the marketing year. Moreover, most grain producers suffer from limited 
on-farm storage capacity and are therefore forced to sell immediately after har-
vest at low prices, or store their grain in elevators run by large companies that 
often have some degree of regional monopolistic power. Consequently, these 
elevator companies are able to charge fees above their marginal costs from pro-
ducers and traders, thereby increasing the marketing costs of grain. These stylised 
facts hold true in most years
4 and serve as a justification for policy makers to 
implement support price programs, as, for example, the minimum price regime 
envisaged.  
To illustrate how a price support program affects the situation on a market, con-
sider the model of a grain market as shown in Figure 1. The minimum price re 
gime affects market demand and supply by raising the domestic price level as 
shown in Figure 1. Introducing the floor (minimum) price causes total demand 
DDC to become perfectly elastic at the support level PM, since the government is 
(theoretically) ready to buy unlimited amounts of grain to defend this price 
level. Total demand then becomes DDG. In the short run, total supply Ss (inelas 
tic in the short run), is represented by a vertical line. 
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In a period following a below-average harvest, characterized by a low market 
supply SS*, the market price PD* exceeds the support price level, rendering 
government intervention purchases obsolete. On the other hand, after a bumper 
crop (see SS), as in 2004, the government needs to procure the necessary amount 
(QD-QM) to prevent competitive forces from driving prices below the floor price. 
The associated reduction in consumption is (QC-QM), since in a net export situa-
tion under free market conditions, domestic consumers will consume the amount 
QC. Consequently, consumers incur welfare losses represented by the areas 
marked b and a (reduction in consumer surplus). The induced costs for taxpayers, 
needed to pay for government purchases, equal the rectangle with base (QD-QM) 
and height (PM-PW). Thus, if the government intends to raise the domestic price 
above the world price parity level, it needs to buy from the market even more of 
the amount that would have been exported at PW, i.e. (QD-QC). Moreover, if the 
support price were raised above the c.i.f. price level (i.e., world market price 
plus trade costs: Tariffs, transport, marketing costs), imports would occur at this 
price in almost unlimited quantities and prevent the government from achieving 
its price goals (see Section 2.3 for further discussion). On the other hand, due to 
the increased price level, producers gain the area represented by (b+a+c+d). 
Nevertheless, for all groups together, there is a net loss equal to the triangle a.  
The above analysis, however, applies only to a short-run perspective. In the long 
run the supply response to a change in the domestic price is larger, as supply 
will become price-responsive. The important thing here is that the number of 
farms and some of the factors of production are fixed in the short run (e.g. capital), 
but variable in the long run. The increase in price means that firms, on average, 
will make super-normal or excessive profits, represented by the shaded rectangle 
in Figure 2. The presence of super-normal profits attracts new firms with higher 
long-run average and marginal costs (LAC and LMC curves respectively, e.g., 
farm 2) to enter the industry, while existing firms invest in expanding their out-
put. As a result, the short-run supply curve turns outward, causing the long-run 
supply curve to be inclined to the right (SL curve on Figure 1). Production ex-
pands towards the level QL. In this case, the corresponding long-run net loss is 
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there will be increased demand for the scarce resources needed for producing 
grain: Equipment, land, fertilizers, etc. Increased demand for these inputs will 
raise the long-run marginal and average costs of producing grain to LMC1 and 
LAC’1 (see Figure 2), which drives economic profits for the average producer in 
the industry down to zero again. Since the firms do not earn any super-normal 
profits in the long run, the entire long-run increase in producer surplus is shifted 
back to inputs or production factors such as land or capital. The increased de-
mand for inputs tends to raise input prices and permits suppliers of theses inputs 
to earn greater profits than they would in the absence of a price support program. 
Thus, the producer surplus is partly distributed further on in the form of higher 
rents on fixed factors (e.g. land, entitlements, etc.). The distribution of these 
rents depends on the elasticity of factor supply and substitution, as well as on the 
relative importance of the factor in crop production (GARDNER, 1987). 
As a consequence of this, minimum price regimes or market price support (ac-
cording to OECD analysis) were shown to be the least efficient policy instru-
ments for increasing producer incomes. For example, only roughly 40 % of price 
support payments end up in farmers’ or land owners’ pockets. The remaining 
60 % of payments end up either in the hands of input suppliers or as administra-
tive and other costs. (CRAMON, 2004).  
It is possible to extend this conventional static equilibrium analysis by employing 
a dynamic perspective. For instance, MIRANDA and HELMBERGER (1988) have 
examined a rational expectation model of the U.S. soybean market in which the 
government attempts to stabilise price through open market purchases and sales. 
The authors show that although price support programs raise market prices in 
the short run, they can also reduce prices in the long run under certain condi-
tions, thereby questioning the suitability of such a program. Moreover, although 
price programs can substantially stabilize prices, they can also serve to destabi-
lise producer revenues, particularly when harvests are volatile.  
On the demand side, minimum producer prices will most likely result in in-
creased consumer prices, making the poorest layers of the population suffer 
most. Since such a situation might be politically unacceptable, the GOU may 
seek to control retail prices, requiring the restoration of administrative controls 
(limits on mark-ups) or additional budgetary spending (subsidies to the grain-
processing sector). Given that Ukraine has a competitive processing sector all 
the way down to the retail bakery shops, any artificial restrictions on processing 
margins will not work, as, under competition, these margins will not be signifi-
cantly above zero.  
That ultimately means that the GOU would have to start using consumer subsi-
dies in order not to reduce the activity of the processors. Let us consider the 
downstream sector and welfare consequences of a minimum price regime and 
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price regime inflicts additional costs on the operation of the downstream sector in 
terms of higher inputs costs, shifting the supply curve S0 inward to S1 (Figure 3). 
As a consequence, consumers face a higher price P*. In order to compensate con-
sumers, the government introduces an ad valorem subsidy sufficient to restore 




























      Figure 4: Representative firm  Figure 3: Consumer subsidy impact 
 
Thus, producers receive price Pp and consumers the pre-program price Pc. In order 
to pay enough subsidies to restore the initial level of consumption Q, the GOU 
needs to use budgetary funds represented by the area (a+b+c+d+f) in Figure 3. 
Figure 4 shows that increased input prices drive up the marginal and average 
cost curves of the downstream sector enterprise to the new equilibrium (P*, q*). 
The consumer subsidy would allow the representative enterprise of the down-
stream sector to earn additional profits (shaded area in Figure 4). Although pro-
ducers and consumers gain areas (b+c) and (a+d), respectively, the whole 
economy ends up with a net welfare loss (area f) in addition to the net welfare 
losses from the minimum price regime as shown in Figure 1. The magnitude of 
these losses, of course, depends on the elasticities of supply and demand func-
tions. Nonetheless, a very important implication can be drawn from this analy-
sis. Since every point on the demand curve shows how much people value that 
particular level of consumption, the subsidy simply induces them to consume 
goods that are priced below their resource cost. It would be more efficient to 
hand out a direct grant to consumers (i.e., the area a+d in Figure 3), allowing 
budgetary funds to be used for other purposes and fully compensating consumers.  
2.2 Institutional  effects 
There are additional effects deriving from minimum prices which have to be 
taken into consideration when assessing the costs of such a policy programme. 
Minimum prices also weaken the incentives of producers to improve their pro-
duction efficiency and reduce costs, thus spoiling the industry’s international 
competitiveness. As Figure  2 demonstrates, the minimum price creates rents 
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which creates incentives to lobby policy makers to maintain the support measures. 
So once Ukraine has implemented such a minimum price regime, it will probably 
take a long time to abandon it again, inflicting a significant burden on consumers 
and taxpayers. This is exactly what has happened in the European Union: It is 
politically very difficult to drive down a level of economic support for agricul-
ture or other beneficiaries once such a measure has been in place for some time. 
Moreover, measures for administrating the program and its associated costs 
constitute an additional burden for taxpayers. First of all, this concerns the 
administrative body that carries out the procurement and storage of purchased 
commodities. The government (or basically taxpayers) incurs significant expen-
ditures for the staff salaries of that body, and for commodity handling and main-
taining storage facilities, etc. Also, one should not underestimate the costs de-
rived from the perish of stored grain, which adds to the overall costs.  
2.3 Legal  aspects 
Due to its substantial trade distortion effects, market price support is becoming 
increasingly controversial under multilateral trade agreements, and, above all, 
within the WTO (accession to which Ukraine is currently pursuing). Driving 
prices above the world level is not a feasible option for agricultural policy, as 
this requires the use of export subsidies in the case of a surplus producer such as 
Ukraine. Since export subsidies are explicitly not allowed under WTO rules, 
Ukraine will face considerable constraints selling its minimum price program to 
its trade competitors, which are counterparts in the WTO accession negotiations 
(OECD, 2004). The inevitable countervailing measures would negatively influence 
the competitiveness of Ukraine’s exports and would thwart Ukraine's long-term 
goal of becoming a powerful agro-food exporter. 
Furthermore, a minimum price regime might be ineffective without corresponding 
import barriers. If the minimum price is set above the c.i.f. - import parity price, 
an import tariff (either prohibitively high or flexible) has to prevent imports 
from entering the domestic market. As the level of import protection is moni-
tored by the WTO, Ukraine could run into trouble with WTO partners were it to 
introduce a floor price regime. 
3 ENUMERATION OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MINIMUM PRICES 
This chapter undertakes a quantitative analysis of a minimum price regime on 
Ukraine’s agricultural markets. First, we describe the basic features of the simu-
lation model RASMU (Regionalized Agriculture Structural Model of Ukraine) 
which was used for the analysis. Second, we explain how the minimum price 
regime was incorporated into the model. Then we define our simulation setup, 
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3.1  Data and modelling framework 
The RASMU model allows for the analysis of the consequences of various 
existing and planned policy actions in the field of agriculture and the processing 
industry within a simplified and consistent framework of quantities and prices.
5
To begin with, the model distinguishes between Ukrainian oblasts, so it allows 
for the capture of the diverse agro-ecological conditions in Ukraine, and thereby 
determines where certain policy measures have the greatest effect. For the sake 
of simplicity, four aggregate regions (West, North, Central, and South), com-
posed of neighbouring oblasts with similar agro-ecological conditions, have 
been identified, and these four representative regions trade among each other 
and the rest of the world. When looking at similar modelling approaches (e.g. 
PUSTOVIT, 2003), the major difference of RASMU is the treatment of trade. On 
the one hand, RASMU has no differentiated treatment of the world outside 
Ukraine, while Pustovit’s model distinguishes trade relations with the EU and 
other major trade partners. On the other hand, Pustovit’s model treats Ukraine as 
one singular market, while RASMU allows for regionally differentiated analyses 
within Ukraine. 
RASMU is a partial equilibrium model, operating only with agricultural product 
and input markets. It comprises 27 commodities: Raw commodities (wheat, barley, 
rye, maize, oats, buckwheat, potatoes, sunflower seed, sugar beets, pulses, cow’s 
milk, beef cattle, pigs, poultry, hens) and processed commodities (bread products, 
maize flour, processed buckwheat, sunflower oil, sugar, butter, cheese, other 
milk products, beef, pork, poultry meat, eggs), whose production, consumption, 
and trade are modelled. Although such a framework may not completely account 
for some macroeconomic repercussions, it simplifies the data management process 
and equation system.  
The model is comparative-static in nature, meaning that it is not a multi-period 
dynamic model producing future forecasts. Nevertheless, development in 
Ukrainian agriculture has been too volatile during the past decade to derive ap-
propriate trend parameters, making the model results satisfactory for the time 
being. 
To assess the effectiveness of policy measures, RASMU employs an aggregate 
welfare calculation, which includes four elements: Producer surplus, feed user 
surplus, consumer surplus and the balance of the government budget. The interre-
gional and foreign trade relations in RASMU are represented as net trade 
flows. The idea of this mechanism is simple: If the target region has excess 
supply, it exports the commodity to those regions where the price difference 
(minus trade costs) is highest. The trade flows provide for the relative equalisation 
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of commodity prices between the regions and the world market. Trade costs, in 
turn, comprise handling and packaging, transport, transaction costs, and ad-
ministrative trade barriers. But due to the lack of information, RASMU thus far 
considers only railway transport costs. As a proxy for real transport costs, these 
are probably overestimated. However, existing estimations of trade costs for 
Ukrainian grain trade indicate that the magnitude of the current transport costs in 
RASMU comes relatively close to the level of overall trade costs. 
The decision variable for crop supply is the regional cropping area, which is 
driven by the change in revenue per hectare. This formulation has been chosen 
to allow for the simulation of abrupt yield shocks for a crop, which often hap-
pens in Ukraine due to adverse weather conditions. Production of livestock and 
processed commodities is driven, in turn, by the change in the prices of crops, 
livestock, and processed products. Consumption demand is determined by a linear 
expenditure system (LES) in which the marginal budget share is fixed and each 
commodity is characterised by a minimum consumption (subsistence) level. 
Processing demand is represented by fixed (Leontieff-type) input-output coeffi-
cients.  
The database of RASMU consists of annual regional-level data for 2001 and 
2002: i) production and consumption, ii) regional prices (producers, consumers), 
iii) border prices, iv) trade costs (railway fees). The data was accumulated from 
different sources: National and regional statistics, international statistics (FAO), 
surveys of farms, rural households, and consumers, as well as own parameter 
estimations based on surveys (elasticities).  
3.2  Minimum prices in RASMU 
This subsection shows how the RASMU model, formulated as a Mixed Comple-
mentarity Problem (MCP), deals with a minimum price regime and compensating 
consumer subsidies. Following the discussion in Chapter 2, the state commits 
itself to buying grain surpluses from producers at a minimum price  M P . Thus we 
introduced the minimum price regime to the optimization problem as an addi-
tional constraint in the form of an inequality: 
,, 0, Mi r i r PP DV I N T V i ≤⊥ ≥ ∀ r   (1)
where the symbol " " means at least one of the adjacent inequalities must be 
satisfied as a strict equality. In other words, the inequality (1) says that if the 




M P , then the volume of intervention purchases of grain   must be 
positive.  
, ir VINTV
We also accounted for the net budgetary outlays necessary to carry out interven-
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world prices), so as the difference between these magnitudes would constitute 
the net costs of the program to the budget. Also, we added intervention stocks 
 as an additional component to the total demand calculations.  , ir VINTV
A consumer subsidy has been introduced as a negative ad valorem tax on bread 
products: 
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where  stands for consumer price for good i in the target region r;  is the 
warehouse price;   is a processing margin (including VAT); and  is a 
consumer subsidy. Also, we accounted for additional budgetary outlays for sub-
sidizing bread consumption. 
,
C
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3.3  The policy experiments 
This section discusses policy simulation scenarios using RASMU to estimate the 
economic costs and benefits of introducing a minimum price regime for cereals. 
We distinguish between the following scenarios, which are compared to the base 
situation without minimum prices: 
1. Scenario I: Floor price at UAH 800/t
6 (USD 151.2/t) for wheat and a 
EURO 40/t import duty;
7 
2. Scenario II: Scenario I, plus a compensatory 20 % consumer subsidy for 
bread products; 
3.  Scenario III: Floor prices at UAH  800/t (USD  151.2/t) for wheat, 
UAH 600/t (USD 122.5/t) for rye, and UAH 450/t (USD 92.3/t) for barley; 
import duty is set at EURO 40/t for all three crops
8.  
Scenario I: We present the results for Simulation I in Table 1. The table also il-
lustrates the impact of the minimum price regime on the ‘bread products’ sector. 
Generally, Table 1 quantitatively supports the analysis we conducted in Chapter 2. 
If a floor price for wheat were implemented, we would observe an expansion of 
both area and production by almost 16 % (18 m tons) due to increased prices. Pro-
ducers most likely would use either idle land or substitute land under competing 
crops for wheat. In total, the surplus of wheat producers would increase by nearly 
1,377  m  USD as a consequence of introducing the floor price. Due to the in-
 
6  At this price, the GOU purchased wheat to intervene on stocks in 2004 (AGROBUSINESS, 
No. 14, 2004) 
7  The import duty is necessary to prevent imports from entering the domestic market in 
unlimited amounts, thus thwarting the desired effects of the minimum price regime. 
8  At this price, the GOU purchased wheat, rye, and barley to intervene on stocks in 2004 
(AGROBUSINESS, No. 14, 2004). Moreover, in 2005, GOU is also determined to continue 
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creased domestic price (UAH 800/t = USD 151.2/t) wheat becomes a more expen-
sive input for the processing sector (both feed and bread products), which leads to 
decreased processed volumes (-3.6 %) and feed use (-68.6 %). As a consequence, 
producers of breadstuffs would be worse off by USD 157.8 million. We observe a 
slight decline in the domestic consumption of breadstuffs, by -3.6 %, primarily 
due to increased domestic prices on bread products by 15 %, but also combined 
with the assumption that bread products are non-tradable. Further, increased do-
mestic prices on breadstuffs requires rigorous consideration. Since bread products 
constitute a considerable share of expenditures of the representative household in 
Ukraine (GALUSHKO et al., 2004), rising prices for bread may bear considerable 
political risk. The GOU may counteract with additional measures, meaning addi-
tional budget expenditures, to be discussed below. 
Table 1:  Scenario I: National results for wheat and bread products 
Base values: Scenario I:  Changes in percent
Wheat          
Area (1,000 ha)  5,978 6,926  15.9 
Production (1,000 t)  15,657 18,185  16.1 
Processing (1,000 t)  6,122 5,903  -3.6 
Feed use (1,000 t)  4,789 1,503  -68.6 
Net trade (non-subsidised exports) (1,000 t)  3,049 0  -100.0 
Intervention stocks/subsidised exports (1,000 t)  8,734   
Domestic price (US$/t)  91 151  66.0 
Producer surplus (m US$)   1,377   
Bread Products       
Production (1,000 t)  6,101 5,884  -3.6 
Domestic consumption (1,000 t)  6,101 5,884  -3.6 
Producer margin (US$/t)  176 155  -11.5 
Domestic price (US$/t)  275 317  15.1 
Producer surplus (m US$)    -157   
Source: RASMU  simulations. 
Most importantly, Table 2 shows that the government would need to take about 
8.7 m tons of wheat away from the market in order not to let the market price 
slip below the floor price level; and this for an average year! This is caused by 
the expectation that unsubsidized exports of wheat (Table 1) will no longer be 
competitive on the international market at a floor price of UAH 800/t.
9 Table 2 
also illustrates the welfare implications of the minimum price regime for the 
model regions and Ukraine as a whole. It can be clearly seen that the South and 
Central regions would gain the most, whereas Northern and Western regions 
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would lose. This is due to the fact that the South and Central regions produce the 
most significant wheat surpluses in Ukraine, so they are better off, first of all, 
due to significantly increased crop producer surpluses. But on the national level, 
Ukraine would suffer a USD 179 m welfare loss, which means that the losses of 
the West and North regions would outweigh the gains of the Central and South 
regions. Moreover, floor prices for wheat alone would cost at least USD 614 m, 
or approximately 5 % of the 2004 central state budget, which is equivalent to all 
central budget expenditures for agriculture in 2004. 
Table 2:  Scenario I: Intervention stocks and overall welfare changes 
Scenario I vs. base values    
Ukraine  North  West  Central  South 
Regional wheat intervention 
stocks (1,000 t)  8,734 373  0.0  3,303  5,057 
Welfare effects (m USD)         
Feed users  -441  -94  -73  -159  -115 
All producers and processors  1,003  128  70  356  449 
Consumers -568  -117  -92  -161  -199 
Taxpayers (budget)  -614  -136  -101  -158  -219 
Total welfare  -179  -125  -123  37  31 
Source: RASMU  simulations. 
As these calculations do not include the administrative costs of the program, 
these 5 % rather represent a lower boundary of budgetary costs. Producers, how-
ever, would gain about USD 1.0 bn, with the Central and South regions benefiting 
the most, as this is where the bulk of the wheat supply is located. On the other 
hand, animal producers, processors, consumers and taxpayers would suffer huge 
losses regardless of their home region. Obviously, taxpayers in the South and 
Central regions would incur the highest losses. The reason for this is that the 
Central and South regions are significantly more populated than the North and 
West, meaning higher overall costs of increased consumer prices for the region. 
Feed users are confronted with a similar situation, as the demand for feed wheat 
is higher in the South and Central regions, meaning higher overall losses there. 
Scenario II: For the second scenario, we chose a consumer subsidy (20 % ad 
valorem) such that the consumption level of bread products is kept constant, in 
contrast to Simulation I. Table 3 describes the welfare implications if the GOU 
were to introduce a minimum price regime coupled with this compensating con-
sumer subsidy.  An ex-ante analysis of a minimum price system for Ukraine  345
Table 3.  Scenario II overall welfare changes 
   Scenario II vs base values (m USD) 
  Ukraine  North  West  Central  South 
Feed users  -458  -98  -79  -163  -117 
All producers and processors  1,190  170  97  410  512 
Consumers -353  -71  -69  -100  -111 
Taxpayers (budget)  -926  -205  -152  -238  -330 
Total welfare  -89  -106  -124  71  70 
Source: RASMU  simulations. 
Compared to Table 2, however, we observe a 50 % increase in central budget 
expenditures, i.e., almost USD 1 billion. Producers also benefit to the magnitude 
of almost USD 190 m, while the welfare of bread consumers alone increases by 
about USD 213 m, which complies with our qualitative analysis in Section 2.1. 
Nevertheless, consumers as a whole still suffer losses, because the notion "con-
sumer" in the model comprises the whole spectrum of consumers, not just bread 
consumers. While bread product consumers are compensated, consumers of milk 
or meat products are not, despite increased milk and meat prices due to feed 
wheat price changes. Additionally, we observe a smaller national welfare loss as 
compared to Simulation I. This can be explained by the partial character of the 
model: The misallocation on the consumer side is partly removed, while the 
negative effect of the additional tax burden on resource allocation is not ac-
counted for in a partial equilibrium model.  
Scenario III: In August 2004 the Ukrainian Law "On the state support of 
Ukrainian agriculture" listed products that are subject to state regulation via an 
intervention price system. These included wheat, rye, barley, oat, corn, wheat 
and rye flour, sugar, soybean, flax, rape, sunflower seed and hops. Nevertheless, 
a decision on the levels of floor prices has not yet been made for 2005. So we 
decided to design Scenario III such that the official 2004 pledge prices serve as 
reference for the simulation of minimum prices for wheat, rye, and barley. In 
fact, those prices were set significantly higher than world prices. Table 4 shows 
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Table 4.  Scenario III: National results for grains and other crops 
  Base values: Scenario III:  Changes in 
percent 
Wheat, rye, barley          
Area (1,000 ha)  10,536 11,159  5.9 
Feed use (1,000 t)  10,794 6,902  -36.1 
Net trade (non-subsidized exports) (1,000 t)  4,957   -100.0 
Intervention stocks/subsidized exports (1,000 t)  13,820   
Producer surplus (m US$)   1,285   
Other crops       
Area (1,000 ha)  7,505 6,796  -9.4 
Feed use (1,000 t)  10,174 10,028  -1.4 
Net trade (non-subsidized exports) (1,000 t)  1,916 425 -77.8 
Producer surplus (m US$)   426   
Source: RASMU  simulations. 
Compared to Scenario I, the area increase of favoured crops by percent is 
smaller. Unsubsidised exports of the favoured crops cease to happen and are re-
placed by an astonishing amount of almost 14 m tons, which go into intervention 
stocks. These mainly ‘consist’ of former exports and the reduced feed use quan-
tities. The cross-price effects lead to shrinking areas of competing crops, which 
reduces net trade and increases domestic prices. As a consequence, feed users 
cannot reasonably substitute wheat and barley in their rations, as can be seen 
from the feed use results for competing crops.  
Table 5.  Scenario III overall welfare changes 
Scenario III vs. Base values (m USD)    
Ukraine  North  West  Central  South 
Feed users  -735  -186  -130  -242  -175 
All producers and processors  1523  285  155  509  573 
Consumers -1042  -231  -184  -280  -346 
Taxpayers (budget)  -628  -139  -103  -161  -224 
Total welfare  -147  -85  -132  67  2 
Source: RASMU  simulations. 
From Table 5 it becomes clear that feed users (e.g. livestock producers) and con-
sumers would suffer most from an expansion of the minimum price regime. The 
main reason for this is the increased price for grain crops, which translates to 
higher input prices to feed users and processors, and eventually to consumers. If 
we compare Table 5 and Table 2, we see that feed users and consumers would 
loose twofold more. On the other hand, producers will benefit by almost 
USD 1.5 billion, which is 50 % more than in Scenario I. On the national level, 
Ukraine would suffer a USD 147 m welfare loss, coupled with significant budget An ex-ante analysis of a minimum price system for Ukraine  347
outlays of USD 628 m. Concerning the regional distribution of welfare effects, 
the situation is similar to Scenario I and II. Namely, while producers in the South 
and Central regions benefit most, consumers, taxpayers, and feed users lose.  
The simulation results illustrate that once the government supports producers, it 
starts a whole cycle of consequences: Huge budget outlays, implicit taxation of 
feed and downstream sectors, and higher consumer prices. If the government 
tries to counteract by compensating consumers through subsidies, it additionally 
increases budgetary outlays, which leaves consumers only partially compensated. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis illustrates sectoral adaptation processes and welfare implications 
for Ukraine’s economy if a minimum price regime were seriously implemented 
there. First of all, the GOU would incur huge budget outlays accrued by sustaining 
such an intervention system. As the analysis has shown, the GOU would need at 
least USD 614 m to maintain prices at a floor level. This constitutes approxi-
mately 5 % of the 2004 central state budget, or all central budget expenditures 
on agriculture in 2004, which is quite a lot for Ukraine under the current budget 
constraints. From an economic point of view, if a minimum price regime hap-
pened to be implemented, Ukraine would suffer a USD 179 m welfare loss. But 
behind this net effect are much larger redistributive processes at work which 
would shift wealth from feed users, processors, consumers and taxpayers on to 
grain producers. The more the government tries to compensate losers, the higher 
are the budgetary costs of the measures. A partial model underestimates the dis-
tortions which are inflicted on the national economy by increasing taxes to help 
a relatively small group of producers. 
Alluding to the motto of the IAMO forum 2005, too much mistrust of the ability 
of the ‘invisible hand’ to stabilise producer incomes can quickly turn into a very 
costly affair. Even if the intervention system would be based on minimum prices 
in line with long-term average domestic prices, neither price nor income stabili-
sation is a simple and cost-neutral matter of buying wheat in times of excess 
supply, storing it, and selling it later when prices are dear. Ukrainian grain 
(wheat) prices do not follow a regular seasonal pattern because neither do world 
prices. This is explained by the fact that at any point in time, grain is being har-
vested somewhere in the world (CRAMON, 2003). Each of these harvests is sub-
ject to fluctuations due to factors such as weather and policy changes. As a con-
sequence, traders on the world grain market face a continuous flow of new in-
formation, which has an impact on world price levels, and which are transferred 
to domestic markets. Since each year is characterized by a unique flow of infor-
mation, each year is also characterised by a unique seasonal price pattern. Oleg Nivyevs’kiy, Arnim Kuhn  348
The amount of grain likely to be subject to intervention purchases is very high 
and exceeds the current average grain net exports, as feed use would be reduced. 
Sooner or later this grain would have to be disposed of on the world market using 
export subsidies, given the assumption that long-term grain prices on the inter-
national market remain largely stable. But this would thwart the attempts of 
Ukraine to become a member of the WTO. Another important aspect is the bur-
den laid on livestock producers through the introduction of such high floor 
prices. Livestock production has suffered most during transition, and it would be 
disastrous to disrupt the recovery of this promising sector through implicit taxa-
tion. 
There are more effective options Ukrainian policy makers can choose from. The 
notorious failure to refund VAT on grain exports indirectly taxes Ukrainian pro-
ducers of grain. Exporters simply offer a lower bid price to grain producers to 
compensate for VAT refund arrears. Straightening out the VAT refund administra-
tion to grain exporters would most likely lead to a bid up of producer prices. 
Moreover, investing budget funds into improving marketing services and infra-
structure would be another feasible option for GOU. Investments in transport 
infrastructure are the most important component of price stabilisation policies, 
since improved transportation networks decrease marketing costs, increase farm-
gate prices (thus increasing farmers’ incomes), lower input costs and thus sig-
nificantly contribute to the reduction of price fluctuations.  
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